




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HISTORY OF THE POPES.

VOL. IX.

THE
HISTORY OF THE POPES,
FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

DRAWN FROM THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE VATICAN AND OTHER
ORIGINAL SOURCES.

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CHAPTER I.

SITUATION IN ROME AT THE DEATH OF LEO X.—ELECTION OF ADRIAN VI.

THE death of Leo X. in the prime of life, coming unexpectedly, altered the whole basis of the political situation in Italy. So strong was the reaction, that everything which had hitherto been accomplished became once again an open question. The victorious career of the Imperial and Papal forces in Lombardy came to a standstill, while simultaneously, in the States of the Church, the enemies of the Medici lifted up their heads. Cardinals Schinner and Medici had to quit the army of the League and hasten to Rome for the Conclave, while at the same time the funds, which had been supplied almost exclusively by the Papal treasury, were cut off at their source. In consequence Prospero Colonna was obliged to dismiss all his German mercenaries, and his Swiss to the number of five hundred men. A portion of the Papal forces withdrew, under Guido Rangoni, to Modena; the remainder stayed in Milanese territory with the Marquis of Mantua. All further movements depended on the result of the election. The Florentine auxiliary troops marched back home to the Republic. Had it not been for the caution of Guicciardini, Parma would have fallen into the hands of the French. To the latter, provided that they were resolutely supported by Francis I., the

opportunity lay open of recovering all their losses in Lombardy.¹

No one rejoiced more over the death of Leo than the Duke Alfonso of Ferrara, who ordered a medal to be struck with the circumscription: "Out of the Lion's paw" (*de manu Leonis*). Making use of the favourable moment, Alfonso at once occupied Bondeno, Finale, the Garfagnana, Lugo and Bagnacavallo; his successful progress was not checked until he reached Cento. The deposed Duke of Urbino and the sons of Giampaolo Baglioni, Orazio and Malatesta, also rose in arms. Francesco Maria della Rovere recovered without difficulty his entire dukedom, with the exception of the portion in the possession of Florence; he also made himself master of Pesaro. Orazio and Malatesta Baglioni entered Perugia on the 6th of January 1522. At the same time Sigismondo da Varano drove out his uncle Giammaria, who had been made Duke of Camerino by Leo X., while Sigismondo Malatesta seized Rimini. Under these circumstances the fear that the Venetians might snatch Ravenna and Cervia from the Papal States was not groundless.²

The situation in Rome also was critical; but Vincenzo Caraffa, Archbishop of Naples, who had been appointed Governor of the city, knew how to maintain tranquillity.³

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XIV., 4; *cf.* Op. ined., III., 505 *seqq.*, and CHIESI, 99 *seq.* * *Cuncta quidem ex morte Leonis misceri coepere atque turbari*, writes S. TIZIO, * *Hist. Senen.*, Cod. G, II., 39, Chigi Library, Rome.

² With GUICCIARDINI, XIV., *cf.* ALFANI, 296; VETTORI, 340 *seq.*; CARPESANUS, 1338 *seq.*; Bollett. p. l'Umbria, V., 687; VI., 69 *seqq.*; UGOLINI, II., 224; BALAN, Storia, VI., 57-58, and BOSCHETTI, I., 180 *seqq.* See also Arch. d. Soc. Rom., XXVI., 427 *seq.*

³ *Cf.* * Letter of B. Castiglione, of December 3, 1521 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua); BERGENROTH, II., n. 368, 369, and * Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

In the meantime the government of the Church was carried on by the Sacred College,¹ whose members were unremitting in their endeavours to maintain peace and order in all directions.² Their difficulties, however, were increased, during this period of political tension, by the exceptional drain on the exchequer which had been brought about by the prodigal and random expenditure of Leo X. In order to meet the most pressing necessities, almost all the treasures of the Holy See, which had not already been pawned, were gradually put into the hands of the money-lenders; the mitres and tiaras, the ecclesiastical ornaments of the Papal chapel, and even the precious tapestries designed by Raphael were pledged.³ At the time of Leo's death a detailed inventory was taken of all the

¹ Cf. the *decree of the Sacred College, dated Romae, in Palatio Apost., December 2, 1521 *Sede vacante*, appended to *Acta Consist., 1492-1513, f. 56. Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.

² See *Letter of the Cardinals to the castellan of Assisi, dated Rome, December 2, 1521, in Cod. 1888, f. 20-21, Bibl. Angelica, Rome; and to the Swiss, dated December 19, 1521, and January 12, 1522. Cf. Archiv für schweiz. Ref., III., 451, by DAMARUS, in Histor. Jahrb., XVI., 85, and WIRZ, Filonardi, 56 *seq.* Also the *letter of the Cardinals to the castellan of Spoleto of December 7, 1521, in *Acta Consist., f. 59.

³ Together with SANUTO, XXXII., 252, 290, 417, and Appendix, No. 2, see the *letter of B. Castiglione to the Marquis of Mantua, dat. Rom., December 16, 1521: *Io ho il cervello tanto pieno di confusione e fastidio che non mi pare di poter soddisfare a cosa alcuna di quelle ch'io debbo con V. Ex.; pare facendo quanto io posso parmi essere excusato e più serei, se quello potesse vedere il stento ch'io patisco; non è povertà al mondo ne meschinità sopra quella che si vede in questo collegio, che s'io la dicessi come è non si crederia. Oltra li debiti grandi lassati da Papa Leone s^{ae} mem. sono dopo la morte sua impegnate tutte le gioie, tutti li panni di arazzo, dico quelli bellissimi, e mitre e regni e paci e argenti della credenza e si è dovuto far queste exequie tanto povere che non so qual cosa al mondo sia povera e pagare li fanti della guardia e far le stanze del conclave. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

precious contents of the Vatican, including the pontifical mitres, tiaras, pectoral crosses, and precious stones. This catalogue shows that the current report, that Leo's sister Lucrezia Salviati had rifled¹ the Vatican of all its most costly belongings, was, to say the least, a gross exaggeration.²

Worse than the political confusion and the want of money was the moral condition of the Sacred College, which consisted for the most part of men of thoroughly worldly character, who offered only too true a picture of that spirit of faction and enmity which was then the disintegrating factor in Italy and Christendom at large.³ The divisions of party among the electors were so great that it was the belief of many that the Church was on the verge of schism.⁴

Manuel, the Ambassador of Charles V., mentions as true Imperialists the Cardinals Vich, Valle, Piccolomini, Jacobazzi, Campeggio, Pucci, Farnese, Schinner, and Medici; Cesarini as not having a mind of his own; the three Venetians, Grimani, Cornaro, and Pisani, as well as Fieschi, Monte, Grassis, and Cajetan, as doubtful, and Accolti and Soderini as decidedly hostile.⁵ The leader of the Imperialists was the Cardinal Vice-Chancellor Giulio de' Medici,

¹ Gradenigo in ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 71.

² In the inventory of jewels belonging to Leo X., the missing pieces are named. (*Inventario havuto da M. Barth. a Bibiena guardaroba di P. Leone X., a dì 6 di Dicembre 1521. State Archives, Rome.) The additions to the *Inventario delle robbe rulla foraria di P. Leone X. mention several missing pieces and give information as to their whereabouts (*e.g.* some went to Serapica, Maddalena de' Medici), but Lucrezia is not here named. That pieces from the *guardaroba* of Leo X. were stolen, Castiglione also says expressly in a *letter of February 22, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ HÖFLER, Adrian VI., 72.

⁴ Cf. Clerk in BREWER, III., 2, n. 1895.

⁵ BERGENROTH, II., n. 370.

who had already reached Rome on the 11th of December 1521. On his side were by no means all, but only a portion, of the Imperialists and those younger Cardinals who had been nominated by Leo X.¹ Among the circumstances which weighed strongly in favour of the candidature of the Vice-Chancellor was the extraordinary reputation which he enjoyed, grounded on the assumption that he had had untrammelled direction of Leo's policy, along with his connection with Florence and his wealth, which would prove of great assistance in relieving the financial necessities of the Papal government.²

The Imperial Ambassador, who was supported by the representatives of Portugal and of the Florentine Republic, did all he could to secure the election of Medici, although the candidature of the latter was opposed not only by the Franco-Venetian party, but also by the senior Cardinals. The latter, many of whom desired the tiara, laid great importance on the fact that no one under fifty years of age was eligible for the Papacy. From another quarter came the objection that it would be a discredit and danger if Leo were succeeded by a member of his own family, the hereditary principle being thus introduced into a Papal election. Many who had imperialist leanings were disinclined to accept Medici, while Cardinal Colonna showed more and more his decided hostility.³ To all these enemies were added

¹ JOVIUS (Vita Adriani VI.) says that among the younger Cardinals not only Colonna, but also Trivulzio, Jacobazzi, Pallavicini, and Vich were against Medici. The latter placed his suit before the Emperor in a *letter of December 18, 1521, Cod. Barb. lat., 2103, f. 191 seq., Vatican Library.

² See BERGENROTH, II., n. 374, and SANUTO, XXXII., 262.

³ GUICCIARDINI, XIV., 4; SANUTO, XXXII., 260, 288; KRAFFT, Briefe, 33. *Colonna si è scoperto nemico capitalissimo di Medici, reports Giov. Maria della Porta in a *letter, dated Rome, December 25, 1521. State Archives, Florence, Urbino, 132.

the Cardinals who, for one reason or another, had become dissatisfied with Leo X. Next to Colonna the most important leader of the opposition was Soderini;¹ since the discovery of the conspiracy of Petrucci, he had lived in exile and discontent, and had often said openly that he would do all in his power to prevent a return of the Medicean tyranny.² Medici could count on a sum total of fifteen or sixteen votes;³ all the others were against him. Disunited as these opponents were on other points, they were unanimous in their determination that in no case should a Florentine Pope again ascend the chair of Peter.⁴

Not less eagerly than Medici did the ambitious Wolsey, who remained in England, strive after the tiara. He was

¹ Cf. the *Report of the Nuncio Raince, January 10, 1522, Beth., 8500, f. 91 *seq.*, and FONTANIEU, 191, f. 9 (National Library, Paris). G. M. della Porta writes, Jan. 9, 1523: *Io vi dico che havemo infinito obligo al card. Colonna, che se non fosse stato esso havressemoglia papa Medici. State Archives, Florence, Urbino, 132.

² Cf. SANUTO, XXXII., 252, 260, 288.

³ At first it was stated, on an exaggerated calculation, that Medici could count on 20 votes (SANUTO, XXXII., 262, 263). Manuel on December 24 reckoned on 18 (so also SANUTO, XXXII., 275), on January 6 only on 15 or thereabouts (BERGENROTH, II., n. 370, 372). Clerk also (BREWER, III., 2, n. 1895), N. Raince (*Report of January 9, 1522, Beth., 8500, f. 95; FONTANIEU, 191, f. 6 (National Library, Paris), and GUICCIARDINI (XIV., 4) give 15 supporters; JOVIUS (Vita Adriani VI.), 16. Giov. Maria della Porta speaks in his *report of December 25, 1521, as well as in that of January 2, 1522, of only 13 certain votes. State Archives, Florence.

⁴ Giov. Maria della Porta reports on December 25 that Medici is almost sure of 13 votes: *ma all'opposito tutti gli altri se gli sono congiuncti contro et deliberato primo morire che di vederlo papa, pur tra essi non sono poi concordi in la electione; chiaro è che non vogliono Fiorentino in alcuno modo. State Archives, Florence. Cf. also despatches in Arch. Stor. Ital., Nuova Serie, IX., 4-5. *El card. Medici sta forte per far se, writes Naselli on December 25, 1521. State Archives, Modena.

ready, he declared, to pay 100,000 ducats in order to reach this goal. From England, at the instance of the King himself, the Emperor was besieged with formal entreaties to intervene in favour of his election. The shrewd Hapsburger gave fair promises, but took no serious steps to fulfil them.¹ It was impossible, in the existing conditions of things, that an English Pope, and above all such a man as Wolsey, could be acceptable to the Emperor.² Wolsey on his side, strange to say, placed a delusive trust in the Emperor's assurances; he even suggested unblushingly to the latter that he should march his troops on Rome and compel the Cardinals by main force to carry his election.³ Charles V. paid so little attention to this that it was not until December the 30th that he specifically named Wolsey as a candidate in a letter to his Ambassador Manuel.⁴ The time for this recommendation, as for the coming of the English envoy, Richard Pace, had passed.⁵ The latter, by his stay in Rome, could only have been strengthened in his conviction that the candidature of the English Cardinal had never been seriously considered.⁶

Among the other numerous candidates for the Pontificate, Grimani, Carvajal, Soderini, Grassis, Gonzaga, and above all Farnese, were prominent. The last named did

¹ LANZ, Briefe und Aktenstücke, I., 501 (No. 155); *cf.* BREWER, III., 2, n. 1906; REUMONT, Wolsey, 17 *seq.*

² BROSCHE, Engl. Geschichte, VI., 154; *cf.* MARTIN, 348 *seqq.*

³ LANZ, I. 523 (No. 162).

⁴ See MIGNET, Revue d. deux Mondes, XIV. (1858), 168. SÄGMÜLLER, Papstwahlen, 148.

⁵ *Cf.* BUSCH, Vermittlungspolitik, 181. Manuel certainly did nothing towards Wolsey's election; *cf.* BROSCHE, *op. cit.* 155.

⁶ *Cf.* MARTIN, 351. LEPITRE, 148, like many other historians, takes Wolsey's candidature too seriously. It is interesting to see how Schinner, in a *letter dated Rome, March 6, 1522, comforts the ambitious Wolsey. Cotton MS., Vitellius B. V., f. 45, British Museum.

all in his power to win Medici and Manuel.¹ The Cardinal Vice-Chancellor and the Ambassador did not shut their eyes to the fact that a united combination of their opponents would render the election of a second Medici Pope impossible. It was therefore agreed upon between the two that the votes of the Imperialist party should be transferred to another candidate acceptable to Charles V.²

Under these circumstances Manuel reminded the electors, upon whose pledges he could rely, that, in the case of their being unable to vote unanimously for one of the Cardinals in Conclave, they should bethink themselves of Cardinal Adrian of Tortosa, then resident as Viceroy in Spain.³ At this juncture nothing more was done, since Medici continued to hope that he might yet carry the day, if not for himself, at least for one of the Cardinals present, on whose devotion he could thoroughly rely.

Public opinion in Rome had been from the first almost entirely on the side of Medici; before his arrival he had been marked as the future Pope. This Cardinal, it was stated in a report of the 14th of December 1521, or some other of his choosing, would receive the tiara.⁴ Next to those of Medici the chances of Grimani and Farnese⁵ were in advance of all others; there were also some who con-

¹ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 370, 371, and *letter of Naselli of December 25, 1521 (State Archives, Modena); also JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI. *Bona openion si ha di Farnese et di Grassis Alcuni propongono Aracoeli et Egidio, reports Giov. Maria della Porta on December 25, 1521 (State Archives, Florence). For Gonzaga see his letter in Giorn. d. lett. Ital., XIX., 83.

² BERGENROTH, II., n. 370.

³ Manuel's despatch of December 28, 1521, in BERGENROTH, n. 371, and DE LEVA, II., 128, n. 2, where the passages in question are given in the original phraseology.

⁴ SANUTO, XXXII., 282; cf. 275.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 260, 284.

sidered that Cardinals Gonzaga and Piccolomini had a favourable prospect.¹ The elevation of Wolsey or any other foreign candidate was wholly impossible, owing to the highly developed consciousness of their nationality and civilization to which the Italian people had attained.

The strong tendency to satire which characterizes the Italian is especially marked among the Romans, whose vocabulary is uncommonly rich in humorous and mordant expressions. A vacancy in the Holy See invariably gave them an opportunity for turning this vein of satire on the electors and candidates. On the present occasion this mischievous habit was carried beyond all previous limits. Like mushrooms after rain, lampoons and pasquinades sprang up in which first the dead Pope and his adherents, and then the electors of the future Pontiff were, without exception, attacked in unheard-of ways. It was now that the statue of Pasquino assumed its peculiar character as the rallying-point for libellous utterances and raillery.² The foreign envoys were amazed at the number of these pasquinades in prose and verse and in different languages, as well as at the freedom of speech prevailing in Rome.³ Among the Cardinals there were not a few whose conduct deserved to be lashed unsparingly; but there were also many to whom failings and vices were attributed only for the sake of giving vent to scorn and ridicule.

The master-hand in raising this rank crop of abusive literature was that of Pietro Aretino, who turned the favourable opportunity to account without scruple. His epigrams

¹ Cf. letter of B. Castiglione of December 28, 1521 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua); also SERASSI, I., 5, and KRAFFT, Briefe, 31.

² See, Pasquinate di P. Aretino ed anonime per il conclave e l'elez. di Adriano VI., publ. e ill. da V. Rossi, Palermo, 1891. Also Giorn. d. lett. Ital., XIX., 80 *seqq.*, XXXIII., 78 *seqq.*, 470.

³ Cf. Clerk's letter to Wolsey in BREWER, III., 2 n., 1895.

sparkled with wit and intelligence ; in originality and biting sarcasm he had no equal, but his language was foul and full of a devilish malice.¹ Only a portion of the malignant allusions contained in these lampoons is now intelligible to the reader ; contemporaries were well aware at whom each of the poisoned shafts was aimed. In this way, in the eyes of the people, each of the Cardinals whose candidature came up for discussion, was morally sentenced in advance. As many of these pasquinades made their way into foreign countries, a deadly blow was then given, as Giovio remarks, to the reputation of the Sacred College.²

The longer the hindrances to the Conclave were protracted, the larger was the scope afforded for the satirists and newsmongers. As soon as the obsequies of Leo X. were brought to an end on the 17th of December 1521, attention was at once directed to the Conclave, when the news arrived that Cardinal Ferreri, who was on the side of France, had been detained in Pavia by the Imperialists ; hereupon it was decided to wait eight days longer for the Cardinal, whose liberation had been urgently demanded.³ In diplomatic circles, moreover, it was confidently asserted that as early as the beginning of December the French envoy had formally protested against the beginning of the Conclave prior to the arrival of the French Cardinals.⁴

Already in the autumn of 1520, when Leo's health gave no grounds for anticipating his early death, Francis I.

¹ The opinion of FLAMINI, 224.

² JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.

³ Besides SANUTO, XXXII., 273, see BREWER, III., 2, n. 1879 ; BERGENROTH, II., n. 369 ; Paris de Grassis in GATTICUS, 440.

⁴ Castiglione reports on December 3, 1521 : *Lo ambasciator di Franza è stato hoggi udito in questa congregazione stimati che abbia protestato che non si proceda a la elettione del pontefice se non si dà tempo a li cardinali che sono in Franza de potervi si trovare. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

had been eagerly occupied with the question of the Papal succession; it was then stated that the King was ready to spend a million of gold thalers in order to secure at the next conclave a Pope after his own mind.¹ Since then the question had become one of still greater importance for Francis I. If the choice were now to fall on a nominee of the Emperor, Charles V. would command not only in Italy but in all Europe a crushing preponderance over France; it can therefore be well understood that Francis should have made his influence felt in Rome. He took steps, however, which went beyond what was just and permissible, and threatened a direct schism if Cardinal Medici were chosen.² The repeated expression of such menaces by the partisans of Francis in Rome did as little to further the French prospects as the churlish proceedings of Lautrec.³ An emissary of the latter demanded of the Cardinals, who were administering the affairs of the Church, the withdrawal of the Papal troops; to the carefully prepared answer that they must first await the issue of the election, he replied with threats, so that the Cardinals in anger remarked that they must take measures for the security of Parma and Piacenza, whereupon the Frenchman, in corresponding terms, rejoined that these cities were the property of his sovereign.⁴

¹ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 281, 293.

² Cf. BREWER, III., 2, n. 1947; MIGNET in *Rev. d. deux Mondes*, XIV. (1858), 619; SÄGMÜLLER, *Papstwahlen*, 149.

³ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 369, 370.

⁴ Castiglione to the Marquis of Mantua, dated Rome 1521, December 26: *Un gentilhuomo, qual si dimanda Grangies, l'altro giorno parlò alli deputati che sono l' Armellino, Monte, S. Quattro e Cesis e Siena da parte de m. de Lautrech pregandoli a voler revocare le sue genti d'arme: li fu risposto modestamente che bisognava aspettare il novo pontifice; lui replicò con arrogantia e quasi minacciando di modo che quelli signori entrarono in collera e dissero che volevano essere sicuri

Under such gloomy auspices the election began on the 27th of December 1521. After the Mass of the Holy Ghost, Vincenzo Pimpinella delivered the customary address to the Sacred College, and immediately afterwards, amid a press of people in which life was endangered, thirty-seven Cardinals proceeded to the Vatican for the Conclave; two others who were ill, Grimani and Cibo, were carried there in litters, so that at evening, when the doors were shut upon the Conclave,¹ the total number of electors amounted to thirty-nine.² Forty cells had been prepared which were distributed by lot. The persons—upwards of two hundred—who are thus confined, wrote the English envoy Clerk to Wolsey, have within the electoral enclosure as much room at their disposal as is contained within the great apartments of the King and Queen, as well as the banquet-hall and chapel, at Greenwich. According to the same informant each cell was only sixteen feet long and twelve broad: they were all situated in the Sixtine Chapel.³

de Parma e Piacenza e Grangies rispose che erano del re. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

¹ SANUTO, XXXII., 325, 330 *seqq.*; GATTICUS, 318.

² Not 38, as given by Gradenigo in ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 73; and also not 35, as VETTORI, 340, says.

³ Cf., with Blasius de Martinellis (GATTICUS, 318), and the despatches in PETRUCELLI DELLA GATTINA, I., 520, the report of Clerk in BREWER, III., 2, n. 1932. Differing somewhat from SANUTO, XXXII., 329, TIZIO, *Hist. Senen. (Chigi Library) gives the following detailed description of the Conclave Hall:—

CAMERE SORTE DIVISE.

	Altare.	
Trivulzi, . . . 20		Medici, . . . 21
Grassis, . . . 19		Armellino, . . . 22
Ridolphi, . . . 18		Ranghoni, . . . 23
Ivrea, . . . 17		Grimani, . . . 24
Monte, . . . 16		Ponzetta, . . . 25
Trani, . . . 15		Gaetano, . . . 26
Cesis, . . . 14		Cavaglioni, . . . 27
Siena, . . . 13		S. Quattro, . . . 28
Colonna, . . . 12		S. Croce, . . . 29

Since the Swiss, on account of their close relationships with Cardinal Medici, were distrusted by many, a levy of 1500 men was raised to keep watch over the Conclave.¹ So strict was their vigilance that next to nothing of the proceedings in Conclave reached the outer world;² consequently, there was ample room for rumours of all sorts. In the prevalent mania for betting, wagers would often be

Egidio, . . .	11		Colonna, . . .	30
Vichi, . . .	10		Ursino, . . .	31
Ancona, . . .	9		Mantua, . . .	32
Como, . . .	8		La Valle, . . .	33
Farnese, . . .	7		Cibo, . . .	34
Pisani, . . .	6	Porta del choro della	Campeggio, . . .	35
Salviati, . . .	5	Cappella.	Araceli, . . .	36
Flisco, . . .	4		Swiczero, . . .	37
Jacobacci, . . .	3		Cornaro, . . .	38
Hec secunda camera			Soderini, . . .	39
vacabat.			Cesarini, . . .	40
Petrucci, . . .	1	Porta della Cappella.		

Two reports of the conclavist of Cardinal S. Gonzaga, of December 13 and 14, 1521, to Isabella d'Este, have recently been published by A. LUZIO in Arch. d. Soc. Rom.

¹ See SANUTO, XXXII., 285, 291, 302. Cf. also CANCELLIERI, Notizie, 17 seq.; BREWER, III, 2, n. 1895, 932, and the *letter of Castiglione of December 26, 1521, in which he says: *Dimani che è venerdi alli 27 s'entra in conclavi. N^{ro} Sig. Dio mandi el Spirito Santo che ve n'è grandissimo bisogno. Oltre la guardia de Suizeri che sono 500 al palazzo, il quale è benissimo fortificato de gran sbarre, porte murate, artiglierie de sono ancor fatti mille cinquecento fanti altri e datasene la cura al sig. Renzo et al sig. Prospero da Cavi per guardar pur il palazzo. Roma è pienissima de genti, non se fanno però desordini de importanza. Il card. de Ivrea intendo che questa sera è gionto. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² SANUTO, XXXIII., 332. For the close watch kept on the doors see also BREWER, III., 2 n. 1932; also for the system of signs made use of for purposes of communication. Cf. also JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI. B. Castiglione reports on January 1, 1522: *Perche questi signori sono anchor in conclave e fannosi le guardie strettissime non se li po dare lettera alcuna se non fosse directiva a tutto il collegio. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

laid in the gaming-houses on as many as twenty names in a day.¹ Outside Rome opinion was still more divided.² At the different Courts the most varied surmises were current, all of which were more or less inconsistent with the actual facts. Of the thirty-nine electors who were present on this occasion, all were Italians save three, the two Spaniards, Carvajal and Vich, and the Swiss, Schinner; of the remaining nine foreigners, not one appeared in Rome.³

The disunion among the Cardinals present was extraordinarily great.⁴ Besides the division, so frequently observed, into junior and senior Cardinals (of the thirty-nine electors, six had been nominated by Alexander VI., five by Julius II., and twenty-eight by Leo X.), another cause of dissension was added by the sharp opposition of the Imperialist to the Franco-Venetian party. But an even more potent factor of disunion was the immense ~~X~~ number of aspirants to the Papacy. So calm an observer as Baldassare Castiglione was of opinion, on the 24th of December 1521, that many, if not all, had a chance of election; "Medici has many friends, but also many enemies; I believe he will have difficulty in fulfilling his wishes, at least so far as he is personally concerned."⁵ The same diplomatist wrote two days later that there

¹ PETRUCCELLI, I., 521-522. Cf. SANUTO, XXXII., 262, 332 *seq.*; ROSSI, Pasquinate, XV. *seq.*; Giorn. d. lett. Ital., XIX., 83.

² Cf. TIZIO, *Hist. Senen., Cod. G, II., 39 (Chigi Library, Rome).

³ The names are in CIACONIUS, III., 425.

⁴ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 369, 370; and TIZIO, *Hist. Senen., *ut supra*.

⁵ **Letter of December 24, 1521, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. V. Alberghati reports on December 20, 1521, to Bologna: *Oggi et ogni giorno mancho se sa et se intende queste pratiche pontificale che non si facea el primo di et questo procede perchè vechi, gioveni, richi, poveri, docti, practici tutti concoreno a questo disio sancto. State Archives, Bologna.

had not been for two hundred years such diversity of opinion in a Conclave ; certain of Medici's opponents were so ill-disposed towards him that, in the view of most men, his election was held to be impossible ; in such an event, he had given promises to Cardinal Gonzaga.¹ After the Cardinals had entered the Conclave, Castiglione repeatedly remarks that on no previous occasion had there been so great a want of unanimity on the part of the electors ; "perhaps," he adds prophetically, "God will yet bring it to pass that the final result shall be better than anyone has dared to anticipate."²) XX

As a matter of fact, the Conclave began in utter confusion. As soon as Soderini brought forward his motion in favour of secret voting, parties came into collision.³ On the other hand, unanimity prevailed in the settlement of the election capitulations and the subsequent distribution among the Cardinals of the cities and offices of the States of the Church.⁴ In the opinion of contemporaries, the binding force of these arrangements on the future Pope was already discounted ; it was lost labour, thought

¹ *Questi sig^{ri} cardinali sono varii d' opinione quanto forse fossero in al caso cardinali mai da ducento anni in quà e monsig. de Medici ha alcuni inimicissimi quanto dir si possa, di modo che la maggior parte estima, che lui non possa essere papa. Sua S^{ria} rev^{ma} ha promesso non potendo essere, aiutare Mantua ; presto vedremo. To this is added in cipher : *Io ho operato, che Medici ha dato la fede a Mantua, che non potendo esser lui, aiuterà Mantua. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² Letter of Castiglione's of December 27, 1521, in Lett. dipl. di B. C. (Padova, 1875), 23-24. Cf. also the *report of N. Rance of January 9, 1522 (National Library, Paris).

³ Blasius de Martinellis in GATTICUS, 318. Cf. SANUTO, XXXII., 260.

⁴ HÖFLER in the Denkschrift der Wiener Akademie, XXVIII., 223 seqq., gives the text of the *capitula* and the *distributiones oppidorum*, etc. Cf. Adrian VI., 82-86, where, however, the names of places are in part incorrect.

a Venetian, since the Pontiff on election could observe or ignore the capitulations at pleasure.¹ Moreover, it is clear, from the absence of all provision for such a contingency, that the Cardinals had then no anticipation that their choice would fall on an absentee.

The far-reaching divisions among the electors opened up the prospect of a prolonged Conclave, although the condition of Christendom, as well as that of the imperilled States of the Church, called urgently for a speedy decision. In the event, no less than eleven scrutinies were necessary before a decision was reached. The reports of various conclavists on the votes of individuals are extant, but they disagree on important points; without the disclosure of new and more reliable sources of information, we are not likely to succeed in establishing the full truth as regards the process of voting in individual cases. The difficulties are less in considering the principal phases of the Conclave, since here there is substantial agreement on the essential points.²

¹ SANUTO, XXXII., 332.

² Among the reports of the conclavists are two of special importance contained in versions which certainly in parts do not agree. The first of these is that published by Struvius and Papenbroch, and reproduced by BURMANN, 144 *seqq.* (The text is that of Struvius, with Papenbroch's variants in the notes; *cf.* also LAEMMER, Beiträge, II.) In essential agreement with this is the report taken from the papers of J. Berzosa, from which BERGENROTH, II., n. 375, gives an extract. A second and fuller account, with copious and interesting data, is that of a conclavist in Cod. lat. 5288 of the National Library, Paris, of which HÖFLER was the first to make use (Denkschrift der Wiener Akademie, XXV., 357 *seqq.*). Of this I found a better version under the title *Ordo et gesta conclavis post mortem Leonis X., in TIZIO, Hist. Senen., Cod. G, II., 39, f. 92-98 (Chigi Library, Rome). *Cf.* also Cod. Vat., 3920, f. 33 *seq.*, Barb. lat., 2103, f. 124 *seq.*, and Vallicella Library, Cod. J, 39, f. 33 *seq.* Then to the above must be added, in the third place, the letter in SANUTO, XXXII., 377 *seqq.* (*cf.* especially 384-385, the remarks on the results of the eleven scrutinies), and 412

The Medicean party had at their disposal more than a third of the votes. They could thus exclude any undesirable candidate, but were not strong enough to carry the election of their leader Giulio de' Medici. Since not only the French party but also a portion of the Imperialists, led by Pompeo Colonna, declined to support the cousin of Leo X., the latter soon recognized the hopelessness of his candidature; he now strove to transfer the majority of votes to one of his friends. His candidate was Cardinal Farnese, who, in the belief of many, would also be acceptable to the group of senior Cardinals. After the first scrutiny on the 30th of December¹ the junior

seqq.; and fourthly, the **Commentaria rerum diurnalium conclavis*, in quo creatus fuit Adrianus Papa VI. Africano Severolo auctore (existing in numerous copies. Besides Vatican copies specified by Domarus in his well-informed essays on the sources for a history of Adrian VI. [Hist. Jahrb., XVI., 89 *seqq.*], I also note: Court and State Archives, Vienna, Cod. 971, f. 29 *seqq.* A second copy is in the Bibl. Capilupi, Mantua; a third in Cod. 6324, f. 345 *seq.*, in the Court Library, Vienna; and a fourth [by O. Panvinio] in Cod. lat., 151, f. 288 *seq.*, in the State Library, Munich), which are, in many places, in verbal agreement with the version of Berzosa mentioned above. HÖFLER (*ut supra*, 358 *seqq.*) has made use of these commentaries without noticing that many passages had already been printed by GATTICUS, 318 *seqq.* The author is here wrongly called Sevarolus. He must have been a conclavist of Cardinal Cesi (*cf.* for him, Regest. Leonis X., n. 16121, 18009). In GATTICUS, *ut supra*, is also the narrative of the Master of Ceremonies, Blasius de Martinellis. The ambassadorial reports take less notice of the more than usually strict isolation of the conclave. Among moderns, *cf.* HÖFLER, *ut supra*, as well as the Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie, LXXII., 147 *seq.*, and Adrian VI., 80 *seq.*

¹ The reports in BURMANN, 147 *seqq.*, and BERGENROTH, *loc. cit.*, combine the first and second scrutinies; they are therefore useless. Differing from SANUTO, XXXII., 384, according to the **Ordo et Gesta* of the Chigi Library, in the first scrutiny Farnese received 12, Schinner 1, Accolti 5, Ponzetti 1, Adrian of Utrecht 2 votes.

Cardinals agitated so strongly for Farnese that the conclavists looked upon his election as secured. But the senior Cardinals stood firm, and watched throughout the whole night.¹ At the scrutiny of the following day, Farnese had only a few votes;² his own followers had not kept their word.³ On this very 31st of December a circumstance occurred which has not yet been sufficiently cleared up. Cardinal Grimani asked leave, on grounds of health, to quit the close quarters of the conclave, which were filled with smoke and foul air; it was only after his physician had sworn on oath that longer confinement would endanger the Cardinal's life that Grimani's petition was granted.⁴ Whether his condition was as critical as was represented, is open to question. Probably other motives, mortified ambition and disappointed hopes, led the Cardinal to take this remarkable step.⁵

The third scrutiny, held on the 1st of January 1522, was again without result; whereupon Medici once more tried

¹ Ordo et Gesta of the Chigi Library, *Opinion generale è chel papa sia Farnese. G. M. della Porta, December 31, 1521 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. also the *Letter of the Abbate da Gonzaga, January 2, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Four according to Sanuto and *Ordo et Gesta. The latter source differs from Sanuto in attributing in this scrutiny 5 votes to Medici and 2 to Adrian of Utrecht.

³ According to JOVIUS (Vita Adriani VI.), it was Farnese's friends among the French party who obtained information of his dealings with the Imperial Ambassador.

⁴ GATTICUS, 319 *seq.*

⁵ Thus SANUTO, XXXII., 348, 414. Giov. Maria della Porta reports the same in *his letters of the 2nd and 6th January. State Archives, Florence, Urbino, 132. See also BURMANN, 148, and Gradenigo in ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 73. The Abbate da Gonzaga, on the other hand, in his *letter of January 2, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), considers Grimani's illness dangerous.

his fortune on the candidature of Farnese.¹ The younger Cardinals also worked during the following days in this direction,² but without avail; the seniors maintained a stubborn opposition, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth scrutinies (from the 2nd to the 4th of January) were fruitless. The reports which continued to come in from without, of the growing danger to the States of the Church, and of the approach of the French Cardinals, did as little to unite the electors as the orders, already issued on the fourth day, to reduce the appointed rations. Many conclavists believed that Farnese's prospects still held good, while others thought that the tiara would fall to Fieschi, and a few had hopes of Schinner.³

By the beginning of the new year it was the opinion of the majority in Rome that the candidature of Medici or one of his adherents was hopeless; the chances seemed all in favour of Farnese. It was rumoured that together with the latter Egidio Canisio and Numai had also been proposed by Medici. Among the Cardinals of the opposite party Fieschi, Grassis, and Monte were named.⁴

¹ * Finito prandio card. de Medicis cum suis complicitibus cepit renovare electionem Farnesii, sed magnis viribus seniores obstiterunt.

* Ordo et Gesta. Chigi Library.

² On January 2, after the fourth ballot: * Paulo post alii juniores cardinales sequuti partes cardinalis de Medicis convenerunt in cappella Nicolai ibique per horam disceptantes tandem fuit decretum, quando seniores conatui r. card^{lis} de Medicis contradicebant eligeretur ex senioribus qui maxima probitate niteret nec partes foveret, sed imprimis priorem conatum de adjuvando Farnesio tertio non obmitterent.

* Ordo et Gesta, *loc. cit.*

³ * Ordo et Gesta. Although Jovius and Guicciardini say nothing about Schinner's prospects, it is yet certain that the latter received no inconsiderable number of votes in various scrutinies. The opposition of the French party, however, was too strong for him. Cf. Anz. für schweiz. Gesch., 1882, No. 5, P, 89; see also BLÖSCH, 18.

⁴ See * Letters of Giov. Maria della Porta of 2nd and 6th January

Ever since the 29th of December the couriers had been in readiness to carry the news of the election to the ends of the earth.¹ The longer the result was delayed, the higher rose the expectation and excitement, and Rome was buzzing with contradictory rumours. On the report that Farnese had been elected, his houses were at once set upon for plunder; it was not only in Rome that this bad custom prevailed—in Bologna, Cardinal Grassis fared no better.²

Masses and processions were celebrated in Rome, but still no decision was arrived at. "Every morning," writes Baldassare Castiglione, "one awaits the descent of the Holy Spirit, but it seems to me that He has withdrawn from Rome. So far as one knows, Farnese's chances are the best, but they may again easily come to nothing."³

On the 5th of January it was reported that Medici had made an attempt to secure the tiara for Cibo. Perhaps the cleverly constructed plot might have succeeded had it not been betrayed by Armellini, so that, at the last moment, Colonna was able to make an effectual counter-move.⁴ Thereupon Medici, on the following day, renewed his efforts on behalf of Farnese. No stone was left unturned, and at the eighth scrutiny Farnese received twelve votes, whereupon eight or nine Cardinals proclaimed their accession. At this point, although the two-thirds had not been

1522, in State Archives, Florence. Cf. the **report of the Abbate da Gonzaga of January 3, 1522, and that *of Castiglione of January 5, 1522, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. See also GATTICUS, 320.

¹ SANUTO, XXXII., 333.

² With Clerk's report in BREWER, III., 2, n. 1932, cf. PETRUCELLI, I., 527 *seqq.*

³ See the **letters of Castiglione of January 7, 1522, in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua; cf. RENIER, Notizia, 15.

⁴ See SANUTO, XXXII., 413-414 (cf. 378-379); *Ordo et Gesta in Chigi Library; Severolo in HÖFLER, Adrian VI., 87, and Blasius de Martinellis in CREIGHTON, V., 188; cf. STAFFETTI, Cybo, 35 *seq.*

obtained, Cardinal Pucci called out "Papam habemus." He wished in this way to create an impression so as to gain over the four or five hesitating Cardinals. The result was the reverse of his expectations: Cardinals Colonna and Soderini, the two most irreconcilable enemies of Farnese, insisted on the proceedings being carried out in strict conformity with rule.¹ Not only had Farnese not received the requisite number of votes, but the older Cardinals now formed a more compact body of resistance.²

For some time it seemed as if the Medicean party really intended to push Farnese's election at any cost, but now at last they practically abandoned his candidature, and at the tenth scrutiny on the 8th of January he had only four votes.³ Thereupon Medici consented to the putting forward of Cardinal Valle, and negotiations were carried on into the night, but without result;⁴ some still clung to Farnese, while the elder members of the College refused to hear of him, Valle, or Medici.⁵ The Medicean party on their

¹ Cf. SANUTO, XXXII., 413; Blasius de Martinellis in GATTICUS, 320; *Ordo et Gesta; BURMANN, 148; BERGENROTH, II., n. 376; Clerk in BREWER, III., 2, n. 1960; Gradenigo in ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 74; *report of the nuncio Raince of January 9, 1522, in the National Library, Paris; cf. MIGNET, *loc. cit.*, 621, and HÖFLER, 88.

² *Deinde viso periculo, in quo seniores fuerant, causa fuit, ut ipsi seniores facto consilio deliberarent, ut unanimiter se cohererent. *Ordo et Gesta.

³ SANUTO, XXXII., 348, and *Ordo et Gesta.

⁴ Blasius de Martinellis in GATTICUS, 320, and report of the nuncio Raince of January 9, 1522 (National Library, Paris).

⁵ *Demum hora prima noctis pars seniorum congregavit se in ultima aula, in qua congregatione unanimiter deliberaverunt non velle consentire nec Farnesio nec card^{li} de Valle nec card. Medicis præter card^{lem} Cavallicensem qui persistebat in prestando suffragio pro card^{li} de Valle, et rev^{mi} Senensis, Tranensis, Cornelius et Pisanus erant in favorem Farnesii et etiam card^{lis} de Mantua et Medicis, et deinde iverunt ad cenam. *Ordo et Gesta, Chigi Library.

side emphatically rejected either Carvajal or Soderini.¹ Yet they were not wholly to blame for the delay in the election; Colonna and Soderini, close confederates, did all in their power to worst every candidate put forward by Medici.²

While the factions were thus opposed more sharply than ever, the final crisis arose. Informants whose reports could be relied on announced that Francesco Maria della Rovere had made a compact with the Baglioni to make an attack on Siena. The special representations of Cardinal Petrucci were hardly needed to convince Medici of the danger to which Florence was thus exposed. This consideration wrought in him a change of mind. As the electors on the 9th of January were gathered together for the eleventh scrutiny, Medici rose in his place: "I see," he said, "that from among us, who are here assembled, no Pope can be chosen. I have proposed three or four, but they have been rejected; candidates recommended by the other side I cannot accept for many reasons. Therefore we must look around us for one against whom nothing can be said, but he must be a Cardinal and a man of good character." This met with general agreement. On being asked to name one of the absent Cardinals, Medici, who knew that the person whom he was indicating was one acceptable to the Emperor,³ replied, in his characteristic way of dealing playfully with grave concerns, "Choose the Cardinal of

¹ SANUTO, XXXII., 413.

² *Ibid.*, 356.

³ **Ludens ut consueverat et ut videretur rem gratam facere Ces. M^{ti} que illum commendaverat. Ordo et Gesta in Chigi Library. Cf. HÖFLER, 90-91, who remarks: "The proposal might have been nothing more than a mere manœuvre. When it is taken into consideration that Adrian as an absentee had not given his consent to the capitulations, and the disposal of the Papal towns and the benefices, and was under no binding oath, it is inconceivable that, by the choice of an absent member of the Conclave, the Cardinals should have reduced to*

Tortosa, a venerable man of sixty-three who is generally esteemed for his piety."

The proposal may or may not have been an electioneering manœuvre; the result of the voting gave fifteen votes apiece to Adrian of Tortosa and Carvajal; the Medicean party voted for the nominee of their leader. At this moment Cardinal Cajetan, the commentator of St. Thomas Aquinas, and a man conspicuous for learning, gave the turning-point to the decision. In eloquent language he described the high qualities of the Cardinal of Tortosa, whom he had come to know personally during his legation in Germany, and announced his accession. This proceeding on the part of Cajetan made all the more impression, as he had always shown himself an opponent of Medici. As Colonna also now gave his adhesion to the proposed candidate, the final decision could be no longer deferred, and Jacobazzi, Trivulzio, and Ferreri declared their approval.

In vain Orsini shouted to his party, "Blockheads, do you not see that this is the ruin of France?"—he was answered in like terms. As if driven by some irresistible force, first one and then another elector gave in his accession, and before the majority had realized the importance of the proceedings five-and-twenty votes had been given in. The six-and-twentieth whereby the two-thirds majority was secured was given by Cupis, a Roman, who said, "I also am for the Cardinal of Tortosa, and I make him Pope." For the rest, nothing remained for them but to declare their concurrence.¹

~~XXX~~ All this was the work of a few minutes. Hardly had the

open questions all the decisions arrived at in the interests of the Sacred College. Such an act of infatuation can hardly be attributed to that body."

¹ See the Venetian report of January 19, 1522, in SANUTO, XXXII., 414-415; cf. 377 and 379. Cf. further *Ordo et Gesta in Chigi Library;

Cardinals become fully aware that they had helped to crown with the tiara a sojourner in a distant land, a German, and therefore, from the Italian standpoint, a barbarian, the tutor of the Emperor, a personality utterly unknown to Rome and Italy, than the windows of the Conclave were thrown open, and Cardinal Cornaro, as senior Deacon, announced to the expectant crowd outside the election of

BURMANN, 149; BERGENROTH, II., n. 375; BREWER, III., 2, n. 1952, 1960, and GATTICUS, 320, as well as the report of the nuncio Raince, January 9 (National Library, Paris), already made use of by MIGNET (*Rivalité*, I., 316). The accessions are variously given: 1 follow the excellent account in SANUTO, XXXII., 414 *seq.* With regard to the final scrutiny, there are also discrepancies in the **Diarium of Blasius de Martinellis* (Secret Archives of the Vatican, XIII., 24, and Cod. Barb., lat. 2799, Vatican Library). The remarks of JOVIUS (*Vita Adriani* VI.) on the previous negotiations between the senior Cardinals and Medici are as much without corroboration as the assertion of Abbatis that Colonna had proposed Adrian (MOLINI, I., 156). The decisive action of Medici is treated as a matter of general knowledge in the instructions for Cardinal Farnese, printed by WEISS, Pap. de Granvelle, I., 280, and discussed hereafter under Clement VII. Cf. HÖFLER, 136. That Farnese, as GREGOROVIVS (VIII.³ 381) asserts, received 15 votes along with Adrian, is in contradiction to all our sources. Medici's declaration in favour of Adrian is purposely passed over in silence in the *report of Cardinal Gonzaga (given only in part in the *Giorn. d. lett. Ital.*, XXXIII., 83) to the Marchioness Isabella d'Este of January 9, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). *This says: "Alhora che io sperava giongere al desiato fine la maggior parte degli cardinali se abatterono ad dare il voto ad questo tale per gettarlo via come si vuol fare che l' uno non sapeva del altro. Dappoi lecti tutti gli voti di ciascuno si ritsovò questo tale havere 15 voti in suo favore, il che vedendo il card. de la Minerva e facendo iudicio, che questo era santo huomo e buono al papato ricorse col voto suo per accesso," etc. Medici's great share in the choice of Adrian is also to be gathered from Giberti's letter of January 9, 1522 (see Appendix, No. 1). *But it is also expressly stated in the *report of a conclavist to the Marquis of Mantua on January 10, 1522: *Ed è proposto dal rev^{mo} de Medici. (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.)

Cardinal Adrian of Tortosa, titular of the Church of St. John and St. Paul. As Cornaro had a very feeble voice, Campeggio again announced the result of the election.

Very few expected to hear the result that day. An eyewitness, the Venetian Francesco Maredini, relates how he suddenly heard confused cries of "Medici, Palle, Colonna, Cortona, Valle," and then saw people singly and then in numbers running towards the piazza of St. Peter's. As the outcries and tumult increased, there could no longer be any doubt that the Pope had been chosen, although his name was not yet clearly grasped. But in a very short time he must appear in person in St. Peter's. On the steps of the basilica Maredini heard the incredible announcement that the new Pope was living in Spain. Full of astonishment, he made haste with his companions to the cells of the Conclave, which were by this time thrown open; here Cardinals Campeggio and Cibo confirmed the news which he had just heard. "When," writes Maredini, "we were told all, we were well-nigh struck dead with amazement." On his way home the Venetian had an opportunity of observing the despair of Leo X.'s courtiers; one wept, another uttered lamentations, a third took to flight; all were agreed upon one thing: it would be at least six months before the new Pope arrived, and in the meantime they would be unprovided for; as a Fleming, Adrian would certainly give appointments only to his own countrymen; perhaps he would live altogether in Spain, or come to Rome in the company of the Emperor. "In short," Maredini concludes, "no one rejoices; all lament."¹

Most of the electors were filled with the same emotions.

¹ Letter of January 9, 1522, to G. Contarini, in SANUTO, XXXII., 380. Adrian is called "Lo card^{le} Fiamengo" in the letters of the Bolognese Envoys (A. Pepulus and Laur. Blanchettus) of January 9, 1522 (State Archives, Bologna).

A friend of the poet Tebaldeo, who entered the conclave immediately after the election had been declared, writes: "I thought that I saw ghosts from limbo, so white and distraught were the faces I looked on. Almost all are dissatisfied, and repent already of having chosen a stranger, a barbarian, and a tutor of the Emperor."¹ After the election, says the Venetian envoy, Gradenigo, the Cardinals seemed like dead men.² They had now begun to see clearly the full bearings of their action. [The States of the Church threatened to break in pieces unless energetic measures were taken at once—but months must go by before the new Pope could enter Rome. Leo's extravagance and his participation in the great struggle between the French King and the Emperor had exhausted the exchequer of the Holy See; no one but an entirely neutral Pope could arrest the total ruin of the finances. Such impartiality, however, could hardly be hoped for in the former instructor of Charles and his present commissioner in Spain. So intimate was the union between the two supposed to be that Cardinal Gonzaga wrote, "One might almost say that the Emperor is now Pope and the Pope Emperor."³ Most of the electors had everything to fear for themselves in the event of a thorough reform of the Curia. What was to be expected if the newly elected Pope were really the ascetic personality extolled by Cardinal Cajetan?⁴

¹ SANUTO, XXXII., 415.

² ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 74.

³ So bene egli non potrebbe essere più imperiale di quello che è, et quasi si può dire che l'imperatore sarà papa et il papa lo imperatore. Lo amore che è tra l'uno et l'altro di coso fa una trinità et saranno più persone in uno solo. *Cardinal Gonzaga to the Marchioness Isabella, Rome, January 9, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ Cf. Cajetan's dedication of the third part of his Commentary on St. Thomas, which BOTTEMANE has discussed in the periodical *De Katholiek* (Leiden, 1882), LXXXII., 73-93.

As soon as the Cardinals, after long consultation, had decided to send a letter to Adrian announcing his election, the bearer of which was to be Balthasar del Rio, Bishop of Scala, a Spaniard, and to despatch three Cardinal-Legates to the new Pope, they quitted the conclave. The crowds gathered before the doors received them with loud expressions of contempt and mockery, with cries and whistling. The Cardinals might be glad that the hot-blooded Romans confined themselves to such demonstrations and did not do them personal injury.¹ During the next few days there was an orgy of scorn and wit. Pasquino's statue was covered with lampoons in Italian and Latin in which the electors and the elected were handled in the basest terms of ridicule.² "Robbers, betrayers of Christ's Blood," ran one of these sonnets, "do you feel no sorrow in that you have surrendered the fair Vatican to German fury?"³ In many of these lampoons the Pope was assailed as a foreign "barbarian," in some also as a Spaniard. Under one ran the complaint of St. Peter that he had been delivered up out of the hands of the usurers into those of the Jews, *i.e.* the Spaniards. Another represented Adrian as a schoolmaster chastising

¹ See Blasius de Martinellis in GATTICUS, 320; SANUTO, XXXII., 380, 415-416; BREWER, III., 2, n. 1960; JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI. The election was made known at the 18th hour (11 a.m.). The Cardinals did not leave the Conclave until 3 p.m. So writes Bartol. Argillense to Bologna in a *letter of January 9, 1522 (State Archives, Bologna).

² See ROSSI, Pasquinate, XXXVIII. *seqq.* Cf. the satires in Cod. Ottob., 2480, f. 101-104. Quite unique is the Pasquillus taxans Leonem X. in laudem novi pontificis, which runs:

"Nunc bene Roma suo mutat cum principe mores

Nunc Roma est, prius Thuscia Roma fuit."

*Cod. Ottob., 2381, Vatican Library.

³ SANUTO, XXXII., 383.

the Cardinals with the birch; beneath was written, "Through their disunion they find themselves in this unlucky plight."¹

These gibes were eagerly read by the Romans, and so threatening was the position of the Cardinals, that for many days they dared not leave their palaces.² Hardly anyone was acquainted with the new Pope. All that was known of him was that he was a foreigner and therefore a "barbarian," a dependent of the Emperor, who lived in distant Spain, whither he would probably transfer the Curia. In this sense a placard was posted up on the Vatican: "This Palace to Let."³ So strongly were the Romans convinced that the Papal Court would be removed, that soon hundreds of officials were making ready to decamp to Spain, there to seek for places near the person of Adrian. The three senior Cardinals, who were carrying on the Government, endeavoured by stringent prohibition to check the exodus of officials.⁴ Those who commiserated themselves most—and not without reason—were the numerous curialists, who had bought their appointments, or had lived solely on the extravagant expenditure of Leo's household. Not merely all the persons of this sort, but the largest part of the population of Rome would be brought face to face with ruin if the Pope's absence from the city were of long duration. Nor were the Cardinals unmoved by like apprehensions, and the Legates who were appointed to approach Adrian were therefore laid under the strictest injunctions to urge him most earnestly to begin his journey Romeward without delay.

¹ SANUTO, XXXII., 415-416; *cf.* BREWER, III., 2, n. 1995. See also LUZIO, P. Aretino e Pasquino, Roma, 1890, 9 *seq.*

² BREWER, III., 2, n. 1995.

³ SANUTO, XXXII., 416.

⁴ SANUTO, XXXII., 382 383, 411, 417.

The Legates, moreover, were to submit to Adrian a confession of faith; in this the Pope was to promise to maintain the Catholic Faith and to extirpate heresy, especially as spread abroad in Germany; he was also to pledge himself not to change the seat of the Papacy without the consent of the Sacred College. Finally, the Legates were further commissioned to pray the Pope to confirm the existing enactments of the Cardinals and to abstain, for the present, from any decisive measures of Government.¹ Although these stipulations were duly drawn up by the 19th of January 1522, the departure of the Legates was put off from week to week. The want of money for the journey and the difficulty of obtaining ships could not have been the only reasons. Probably the Cardinals hesitated to leave Italy, in view of the possibility of a new Conclave; for the news that Adrian had accepted his election was long waited for in vain. It was re-

¹ The Instruction for the three Cardinal-Legates (Colonna, Orsini, and Cesarini), of which there are copious MSS. (Secret Archives of the Vatican, V., Polit., VII., f. 285 *seqq.*; in the Vatican Library, Ottob. 2515, f. 334 *seq.*, 3141 *seq.*, 5 *seqq.*; Urb., 865, f. 34 *seq.*; Cod. Barb., lat. 2103, f. 116^b *seqq.*; in the Ambrosian Library, Milan, P, 196, Sup.; and in the Communal Library, Ancona. The Instruction in Cod. Ottob., the incorrect date, January 29, is given), is printed by WEISS, Pap. d'Etat, I., 241 *seqq.*, and GACHARD, Correspond., 10 *seqq.*, but often very incorrectly. This is specially the case with the Professio of Adrian appended to the Instruction. Here, in agreement with the above-named MSS., we ought certainly to read "reformatione morum" instead of "ref. horum." Also the passage: "Juro etiam atque profiteor saluberrimam sacri collegii continuare" is corrupt. "Saluberrimam" gives no sense: probably we ought to read "saluberrima," with the addition of "decreta." It is important that, throughout the above-named MSS., instead of "s. collegii" is found "sancti concilii," which has an essentially different meaning. For the importance of the Professio required of Adrian VI. see BUSCHBELL in the Röm. Quartalschr., X., 446 *seq.*

peatedly reported in Rome that the Pope was already dead.¹ The French said openly that steps ought to be taken for holding a new election.²

Perplexity, anxiety, alarm, and fear filled the great majority of the inhabitants of Rome; only the Imperialists and the Germans rejoiced. "God be praised," wrote Manuel, the Ambassador of Charles, "since there exists no living person who is more likely to conduce to the peace and prosperity of the Church and the might of the King than this Pope, who is a man of holiness and the creature of your Imperial Majesty."³ To a friend Manuel repeated his opinion that the new head of the Church was undoubtedly the most pious of all the Cardinals within or without Rome, and in addition to that a man of great learning.⁴ The Netherlander, Cornelius de Fine, long a resident in Rome, who evidently had private sources of information regarding his fellow-countryman, wrote in his diary: "According to the counsels of God, the hitherto disunited Cardinals have chosen as Pope, contrary to their own intention, Adrian of Tortosa, who was absent from the Conclave. He is a man of very simple life, who has always been of a God-fearing disposition; at Louvain he lived only for science and learning; he is a man of solid education, a distinguished theologian and canonist, springs from a very humble family, and for three years he has governed Spain well. Truly, this distinguished man is the choice of the Holy Ghost."⁵

¹ Cf. SANUTO, XXXII., 403, 417, 425; Clerk in BREWER, III., 2, n. 2017; HÖFLER, 119 *seqq.* *Many believe that the Pope is dead, reports Bartol. Argillense on February 21, 1522, from Rome (State Archives, Bologna).

² BERGENROTH, II., n. 376.

³ GREGOROVIVS, VIII.³ 383.

⁴ BERGENROTH, II., n. 381.

⁵ CORNELIVS DE FINE, *Diary in the National Library, Paris.

In Italy the first impression was one of general astonishment that the thirty-nine Cardinals, although almost all Italians, should have chosen a foreigner.¹ The national feeling was so strong that this was a matter of the greatest reproach. "The Cardinals have incurred the deepest shame," wrote a Roman notary, "in bestowing the tiara on an utter stranger, a dweller in outlandish Spain."² Most characteristic also is the verdict of the Sienese Canon, Sigismondo Tizio, who is obliged, like other Italians,³ to acknowledge that Adrian by his uprightness and learning was worthy of the tiara, but cannot refrain from blaming the "blindness of the Cardinals," which has handed over the Church and Italy to "slavery to barbarians"—so that the unhappy lot of Italy is to be deplored!⁴

On the 18th of January 1522 the despatch announcing the Papal election reached the Imperial Court at Brussels. Charles V., to whom the missive was handed during Mass, gave it to his suite with the remark, "Master Adrian has become Pope." Many looked upon the surprising news as false, until a letter which arrived on the 21st set all doubt at rest. "He felt sure," so wrote the Emperor on the same day to his Ambassador in London, "that he could rely on the new Pope as thoroughly as on anyone who had risen to

¹ See *Giornale ligustico*, 1891, 229.

² GORI, *Archivio*, IV., 245. JOVIUS (*Hist.*, XX.) also uses similar expressions.

³ "S. Sta per quanto si intende è molto bene," writes Bartol. Argillense on January 9, 1522 (State Archives, Bologna). Cf. also the letter of V. Albergati of February 5, 1522, in FANTUZZI, *Scritt. Bol.*, I, 137.

⁴ *Meretur quidem vir iste pontificatum, vero caeci patres minus prospicientes ecclesiam atque Italiam in barbarorum servitatem coiecerunt. . . . Viri isti iniquitatis in facinus tam deplorandum ob suas discordias inciderunt ut lugenda sit misellae Italiae conditio.* (Cod. G, II., 39, f. 91, Chigi Library, Rome.)

greatness in his service." "His own election as Emperor," Charles assured the Pope later by the mouth of the envoy who conveyed his homage, "had not afforded him greater joy than this choice of Adrian."¹ The Imperial letter of thanks to the Cardinals was couched in terms of exuberant recognition. Charles entrusted to Adrian's friend Lope Hurtado da Mendoza his message of congratulation. "It is a remarkable circumstance," observed the Venetian Gasparo Contarini, then resident at Brussels as envoy, "that so large a number of Cardinals should have chosen an absentee and one who was unknown to most of them. The Pope is said to be very pious, and to be endowed with the highest qualities. He says Mass daily, and performs all his duties as a virtuous prelate." The same diplomatist thought that Adrian's devotion to the Emperor exceeded all that the latter could wish. The Grand Chancellor Mercurino Gattinara also was convinced that everything would now go as Charles desired, since God's grace had called to the Papacy one who had no rival in loyalty, zeal, and integrity towards the Emperor.²

It is easily understood that, at the Court of France, feelings of a quite contrary character should have prevailed. Francis I. began by making jests on the election of the Emperor's "schoolmaster," and seems even, for a while, to have refused to him the title of Pope; he saw in Adrian

¹ Thus the discourse, not yet printed, in *Miscell. polit.*, n. 75, f. 502, in the Royal Library, Turin.

² Cf. SANUTO, XXXII., 445, 479-480; DITTRICH, Contarini, 54; HÖFLER, 122 *seq.*; Archief voor de geschiedenis v. h. Aartsbisdom, Utrecht, XXVIII., 140. The instruction for Mendoza in GACHARD, *Correspond.*, 24 *seqq.* For the rejoicings in Utrecht on Adrian's election, see ANT. MATTHÆI, *Vet. aevi analecta*, III., Hagae Comitum, 1738, 687 *seqq.*; *Utrechtsche Volks-Almanak*, 1848, 71 *seq.*; BOSCH, 46 *seq.*; WENSING, 142 *seq.*, 145; *Dodt van Flensburg*, *Archief v. kerkel. geschied.*, III., 209 *seq.*

only the Emperor's "creature."¹ But from Rome, on the contrary, came other accounts; Cardinal Trivulzio wrote to the King direct that of all who had a prospect of the tiara Adrian was the best for him. The French envoy in Rome, moreover, thought that if the choice must fall on an Imperialist, the Cardinal of Tortosa was to be preferred as good and the least likely to do harm, not only with regard to the excellent accounts given of him personally, but also because six or eight months would have to elapse before he could reach the place where he or his pupil (the Emperor Charles) would be in a position to put hindrances in the King's way.²

While princes and diplomatists attached the most varied expectations to the new Pope, all those who had the good of Christendom at heart broke out into rejoicing. The new Head of the Church, said Pietro Delfini, enjoys everywhere so great a reputation as a pious, God-fearing, and pure-hearted priest that in his election the hand of God is visible. "It is only thy blameless life," wrote Joannes Ludovicus Vives to the newly elected Pontiff, "that has raised thee to the loftiest rank on earth." Another summed up his judgment in the words: "We have a Pope who was neither a competitor for the office nor present in conclave; no better nor holier head could have been wished for the Church."³

¹ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 383; BREWER, III., 2, n. 1994; HÖFLER, 137.

² MIGNET, *Rivalité*, I., 316.

³ See RAYNALDUS, 1522, n. 2; BURMANN, 457; HÖFLER, 102-103; HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 273. Cf. the opinion of St. Brodaric in FRAKNÓI, Ungarn, 21.

CHAPTER II.

EARLY CAREER OF ADRIAN VI.—HIS CHARACTER AND HABITS.

—JOURNEY TO ROME.—NEUTRAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE POWERS.—PROJECTS OF PEACE AND REFORM.

THE new Pope was indeed a remarkable man, who through untiring diligence and the faithful performance of duty had raised himself from a very humble condition. Adrian was born on the 2nd of March 1459, in the chief city of the Archbishopric of Utrecht. At this date Netherlanders, who did not belong to the nobility, had no family names; they simply added their baptismal name to that of their fathers. Thus Adrian was called Florisse or Florenz (*i.e.* Florenssohn) of Utrecht;¹ his father Florenz Boeyens (*i.e.* Boeyenssohn),² whose occupation has been

¹ Adrianus Florencii a Trajecto. *Cf.* for the following, along with MORING-BURMANN, 1 *seqq.*, especially REUSENS, *Syntagma doct. Adriani VI.*, Appar., I., *seqq.*, and *Biogr. nat.*, II., Bruxelles, 1868, 546 *seqq.*, as well as CLAESSENS, *Adrien VI.*, in the *Rev. Cath.*, 1862, 596 *seqq.* In Utrecht the Huis Brandaa in the Oude Gracht is supposed to be Adrian's birthplace. It contains some pictures of a later date, mostly of no historic value (Leo X. bestowing the Cardinal's hat on Adrian). The house is itself built into the monastery of St. Andrew. The Pauszaal indicates the site of the former house. *Cf.* *Tijdschrift v. geschied. v. Utrecht*, I., 7 *seqq.*, 108 *seq.*, and WENSING, 85 *seq.*

² Boeyen is not a family name, but an abbreviation of the baptismal name Bauduinus (Baldwin); see BURMANN, 512 *seq.*; REUSENS, *loc. cit.*

variously stated, died early.¹ His excellent mother Gertrude laid deep the foundations of piety in her gifted son. She also took care that he received solid instruction and training, and for this purpose she entrusted him to

¹ Probably he was employed as a ship's carpenter; BURMANN, 4; *cf.* Contarini in SANUTO, XXXII., 472. The Netherlander CORNELIUS DE FINE also says in his *Diary (National Library, Paris): "*Pater ejus arte mechanica victum quaerebat*"; and later: "*natus patre fabro lignario.*" The statement that his father was a brewer is certainly an invention. Notes on the family are given by HOGEMAN in *Verslag v. d. Vergadering der Vereeniging tot beoefening v. Overijsselsch Regt en Geschiedenis*, October 1892 (Zwolle, 1893). At a later date two noble families, Rodenburch and Dedel, claimed a place for the famous Pope among their lineage. The claims of the first-named family, however, do not call for consideration; those of the second appear to be better grounded; v. STRAMBERG (*Rheinisch. Antiquarius*, III., Koblenz, 1852, I, 52 *seq.*). REUMONT (III., 2, 843), GREGOROVIVS (VIII., ed. 3, 383), HÖFLER, and still more recently RIETSTAP (*Wapenboek v. d. Nederlandsch. Adel I.*, Groningen, 1883, 86), consider the Dedel descent as undoubted. But the suspicions already raised in BURMANN, 3, have not been weakened up to the present day, so that LEPITRE, 8-9, leaves the matter undecided. M. Count von Nahuys, of the house of Horstmar-Ahaus, in the *Jahrbuch des heraldisch-genealogischen Vereins Adler in Wien*, IX. (1882), 25 *seq.*, and *Dietsche Warande*, III. (1890), 589 *seqq.*, reject the descent from the Dedel, whose arms display three lilies and a lion. On the other hand, Adrian's original coat displays only three caltrops, as Pope Adrian quartered his shield and added the lion. The latter appears on his coins, his tomb, on the gable of the college founded by him in Louvain, and on his portrait painted in oil-colours in the museum at Amstersdam. The original coat-of-arms is to be found in the Paushuis in Utrecht. Since the old family of the Schrevel, originally belonging to Dordrecht, bears this coat, and Adrian, seventy years after his death, was called for the first time *filius Florentii Schrevelii Bouens*, the author of the treatise cited above is inclined to believe in a relationship with that family. But up to the present time no contemporary evidence is forthcoming in which Adrian is spoken of as bearing the name Schrevel or Dedel; he is most often called *Adriaen de Trajecto*, *Adrianus Florentii de Trajecto*, or, after

the Brothers of the Common Life,¹ whose community had been founded in the Netherlands by Gerhard Groot. According to some accounts, Adrian first went to school with them at Zwolle; according to others, at Deventer. The impressions thus received lasted throughout his whole life. He learned to look upon religion as the foundation of all true culture, and at the same time acquired a love for intellectual pursuits. His earnest view of life, his high ideal of the priesthood, his horror of all profanation of holy things, his preference for the study of the Bible and the Fathers which he was to display later on—all this was due to the powerful influence of his first teachers.

In his seventeenth year he entered, during the summer of 1476, the University of Louvain,² which, hardly touched by humanism, enjoyed a high reputation as a school of theology. During his first two years he studied philosophy with distinguished success and then, for other ten, theology and canon law. After thus acquiring a thorough knowledge of the scholastic system, he held a professorship of philosophy at the College at Eber, to which he had been attached at the beginning of his student period. In the year 1490 he became a licentiate in theology, and in 1491 took the degree of Doctor of Theology.³ Although from the

his appointment as Professor in the College of Eber, Meester Adriane in't Vercken (*cf.* E. v. Even in *Messag. d. scien. hist.*, 1856, 257, and the essay of *Dietsche Warande*, 1894, 388 *seq.*, cited below). He signed himself *Adriaen van Utrecht* (as in the letter of June 26, 1514, which G. Papenbroch gave to BURMANN [444]; I found the original in the Leyden Library, Cod. 945), or *Adrianus de Trajecto*; see the autograph letter to the Abbot of St. Hubert in the Ardennes, dated Brussels, June 21, 1510 (Royal Archives, Utrecht, Dom. S. 645).

¹ *Cf.* for this JANSSEN-PASTOR, ed. 18, I., 71 *seqq.*

² REUSENS, *Syntagma*, IX.

³ I have here followed E. v. EVEN, *Adriaan Florisz van Utrecht*

first he had never been in total poverty, and now held two small benefices, his means were yet so limited that his promotion was rendered possible only through the protection of the Princess Margaret, the widow of Charles the Bold.¹ Adrian's financial position gradually improved as the number of his benefices increased. He saw nothing reprehensible in this abuse, which at that time was general, and at a later date accepted still further preferment. He made, however, the noblest use of the income which he thus accumulated, for his alms were munificent. It is also worthy of remark that as parish priest of Goedereede in South Holland he took pains to secure a substitute of sound character, and yearly, during the University vacations, undertook the pastoral charge of his parishioners.²

Adrian's theological lectures, which even Erasmus attended, as well as his able disputations, steadily increased his reputation; he helped to form such solid scholars as Heeze, Pighius, Tapper, Latomus, and Hasselius. One of

aan de Hooge school van Leuven (1476-1515), in *Dietsche Warande*, N.S., VII. (1894), 386 *seqq.*, who made use of unprinted sources in the city archives, Louvain. The theological degrees are mostly assigned to the years 1491 and 1492.

¹ MORING-BURMANN, 17; *cf.* E. v. EVEN, *loc. cit.*, 257, and HENNE, II., 78. Also see WENSING, 92 *seqq.*, who wishes to uphold Adrian's poverty against Reusens. *Cf.* on this point also BOSCH, 9, and CRISSTOFFELS, 14.

² See MORING-BURMANN, 17-19, 31. *Cf.* *Regesta Leonis X.*, n. 2676, 7307; DE THEUX, *Le Chapitre de St. Lambert*, Bruxelles, 1871, III., 45; *Archief voor de geschiedenis v. h. Aartsbisdom Utrecht*, XI., 67; WENSING, 175; CRISSTOFFELS, 16 *seqq.*; BOERS, *Beschrijving v. h. eiland Goedereede, Sommelsdyk*, 1843, 100 *seq.*, where there is a letter of Adrian's of 1496. Adrian afterwards took a different view of the exemptions, on account of the abuses they gave rise to, just as he had done with regard to the plurality of livings. See *Rev. d. hist. eccl.*, I., 481.

his pupils published in 1515 a selection of his disputations, another in 1516 his lectures on the sacraments; both works soon went through many editions.¹ Chosen in 1497 to be Dean of St. Peter's Church in Louvain, Adrian had also to fulfil the additional duties of Chancellor of the University; twice (in 1493 and 1501) he was appointed Rector. In spite of all these official duties his application to study was as keen as before; he even found time for preaching, and three of his sermons have been preserved,² which show extensive learning, but are the dry compositions of a bookworm. In his enthusiasm for study as well as in his strong moral character he showed himself a worthy pupil of the Brothers of the Common Life. It is related that he inveighed especially against the relaxation of the

¹ *Quaestiones quotlibeticae* (10 editions, the first, Lovanii, 1515), and *Quaest. de Sacramentis sup. quarto Senteniar.* (8 editions, the first, 1516). REUSENS (*Syntagma doctrinae Adriani VI., XXXI. seqq., 1 seqq.*) has made use not only of these writings, but also of those yet unprinted, especially the *Comment. in Prov.*, and in several places has corrected the *Quaest. de Sacramentis* from Adrian's own manuscript. In an appendix (155-246) REUSENS gives *Anecdota Adriani VI.* (also published separately, Lovanii, 1862), for the most part from Adrian's autograph MS. in the Library of the Seminary, Mechlin: six discourses delivered on occasions of receiving theological promotion, four discourses to the clergy, one *Quaestio quodlib.*, the *Prologus* to the *Comment. in Prov.*, and four *Consultationes*. For his participation in the reform of the calendar see MARZI, 174 *seq.* For Gallican and Jansenist misrepresentations of Adrian's attitude towards the doctrine of Papal Infallibility see, along with FEA, *Difesa del P. Adriano VI. nel punto che riguarda la infallibilità*, Roma, 1822, and REUSENS, 122-152; also *Anal. juris pontif.*, VI., 1560 *seqq.*, XI., 267 *seqq.*; FÈVRE, *Papauté*, VII., 267 *seq.*, and WENSING, 90, f. 132. Adrian, as Pope, certainly did not deny infallibility. It has not much bearing on the subject whether, as Professor, he had held erroneous views on this as on other points (*cf.* *Archiv für Kirchenrecht*, LXXXV., 734 *seqq.*).

² Published in REUSENS, *ut supra*, 209 *seqq.*

rule of celibacy, in consequence of which the mistress of a Canon tried to take his life by poison.¹ The repute of the unspotted life, the learning, humility, and unselfishness of the Louvain Professor continued to extend, and he became the counsellor of persons in all ranks of life. Monks, clerics, and laymen from all parts of the Netherlands came to him for help. It was no wonder that the Court also coveted his services; probably as early as 1507 the Emperor Maximilian chose him as tutor for his grandson, the Archduke Charles, the future Emperor, to whom he imparted that deep sense of religion which he never lost amid all the storms of life. The Duchess Margaret also employed him in other capacities, and in 1515 she named him a member of her Council.²

Alarmed at the growing influence of the learned Professor, the ambitious Chièvres determined to withdraw him from the Netherlands upon some honourable pretext. In October 1515 Adrian was entrusted with a difficult diplomatic mission to Spain. He was there to secure for his pupil Charles the full rights of inheritance to the Spanish Crown, and on Ferdinand's death was to assume the provisional Government. Ferdinand received the diplomatist, whom Peter Martyr accompanied as secretary,³ with openly expressed mistrust, but Adrian found a protector in Cardinal Ximenes.

When the King died on the 23rd of January 1516 the Cardinal and Adrian entered on a joint administration of

¹ MORING-BURMANN, 20-21.

² Cf. HENNE, I., 267; REUSENS in Biog. Nat., II., 597; LEPITRE, 38 *seqq.* In 1515 Adrian was also appointed Commissary to Charles V. by permission of Leo X.; cf. Kist-Roijaards in Archief v. kerkelijke geschiedenis, I., 183 *seqq.*, 228 *seqq.*; VIII., 447 *seqq.* See also Utrechtsche Volks-Almanak, 1842, 236 *seqq.*

³ Cf. BERNAYS, P. Martyr, 26, 161.

affairs until the arrival of the new King, Charles.¹ Although within the sphere of politics differences of opinion were not lacking between the two, yet so highly did the Cardinal value the pious Netherlander that he used his influence to raise the latter to places of eminence in the Spanish Church. In June 1516 Adrian was made Bishop of Tortosa; the revenues of the see were not great; nevertheless, Adrian at once resigned all his benefices in the Low Countries, with the exception of those at Utrecht.² Neither then nor afterwards did he contemplate a permanent residence in Spain. It was long before he was able to adapt himself to the conditions of life in that country, so entirely different from those he had known before. As early as April 1517 he expressed his hope to a friend that the coming of Charles might be his deliverance "from captivity," since he did not suit the Spaniards and Spain pleased him still less.³ In July 1517 he wrote in jest, "Even if I were Pope, it would be my desire to live in Utrecht." At this time he had had a house built there,⁴ and made no concealment

¹ Cf. GOMEZ, *De reb. gest. a F. Ximeno*, 148 *seqq.*; P. Martyr, *Op. epist.*, 565; *Doc. ined.*, XIV., 347 *seqq.*; PRESCOTT, *Geschichte Ferdinands des Kath.*, Leipzig, 1842, II., 540, 588 *seqq.*; GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 231 *seq.*; LEPITRE, 45 *seqq.*, 57 *seqq.*; BAUMGARTEN, I., 26 *seqq.*, 36; HÖFLER, *Mon. hisp.*, Prag., 1882, II., 5 *seqq.*

² Cf. WENSING, 136 *seq.*

³ Letter from Madrid, April 16, 1517, published in *Archief voor de geschied. v. h. Aartsbisdom, Utrecht*, XXVIII., 130. For the mission of Adrian to Spain see also BAUER, *Die Anfänge Ferdinands I.*, Wien, 1907, 30 *seqq.*

⁴ Letter from Madrid of July 16, 1517, in BURMANN, 445. The passage refers to the Paushuis still standing in the Nieuwe Gracht in Utrecht. Cf. *Utrechtsche Volks-Almanak*, 1858, 84 *seq.*; *Archief voor de geschied. v. h. Aartsbisdom, Utrecht*, XIX., 254 *seq.*; cf. also v. d. MONDE in the *Tijdschrift v. geschied. en oudheidkunde v. Utrecht*, I., 152, and GARAMPI, *Viaggio in Germania*, Roma, 1889, 183.

of his intention, as soon as his Sovereign's service permitted, of returning to his native land in order to devote himself wholly to study.

Very different from Adrian's expectations was the actual outcome of events; he was never to see his beloved fatherland again. In the first instance, Spanish affairs detained him; Ximenes and Charles contrived that Adrian should be appointed Inquisitor by the Pope in Aragon and Navarre on the 14th of November 1516.¹ Adrian's conduct of affairs in Spain must have given Charles great satisfaction, for, on the occasion of the great nomination of Cardinals in the summer of 1517, he was recommended by the Emperor for the purple; Leo X. consented, and on the 1st of July Adrian received a place and voice in the Senate of the Church; his title was that of St. John and St. Paul.² He was able to write, in truth, that he had never sought this honour, and that he had only accepted it under pressure from his friends.³ From the former tenor of his life, ordered strictly by rule and divided between prayer and study, this man of ascetic piety and scholastic learning never for one moment swerved.

During his sojourn in Spain, the pupil of the Brothers of the Common Life became closely associated with the men who were throwing all their strength into projects for ecclesiastical reform. In this connection the first place must be given to the famous Ximenes, Cardinal-Archbishop of Toledo. Although often of divergent views in politics, the Spanish and the Netherlander Cardinal were of one heart

¹ Cf. GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 235-236. See also the *Carta de Roma del 1516 al Card. Ximenes in *Cod. Barb.*, lat. 2103, f. 11, Vatican Library.

² Cf. Vol. VII. of this work, p. 204.

³ Letter to Joh. Dedel, dat. Madrid, July 16, 1517, in BURMANN, 445.

and soul where the interests of the Church were concerned ;¹ like Ximenes, so also was Adrian (who during the controversy between Reuchlin and the Dominicans of Cologne, took the side of the latter²) of opinion that the religious and moral renewal must follow the lines of the old authorized Church principles within the strict limits of the existing order.

Around Ximenes, the leader of Church reform in Spain, grouped themselves three men of kindred spirit, with whom the Cardinal of Tortosa was also on terms of closest intimacy: the Dominican Juan Alvarez di Toledo, son of the Duke of Alba; the jurist Tommaso Gozzella of Gaeta; and the latter's close friend, the Nuncio Gian Pietro Caraffa.³

On the death of Ximenes, on the 8th of November 1517, the Cardinal of Tortosa carried on the Government alone until the coming of the King, which took place soon afterwards. Charles placed the greatest confidence in his former master, and often employed him on difficult negotiations, and repeatedly lent a willing ear to his counsels. Thus Adrian, who since the 3rd of March 1518 had also become Inquisitor-General of Castille and Leon, was successful in restraining the young King from giving his assent to the demands of the Cortes of Aragon that the existing judicial procedure of the Inquisition should be essentially altered.⁴

¹ The Bishop of Badajoz had written to Ximenes in high praise of Adrian (Bull. d. l. commiss. d'hist., X., 8), and had thus led to their intimacy.

² GEIGER, Reuchlin, 421 *seq.*, 441, 451.

³ Cf. *CARACCILOLO, Vita di Paolo IV., 18-9. Casanatense Library, Rome.

⁴ Cf. GACHARD, Corresp., 236; LEPITRE, 162 *seqq.* Here also Llorente's representation of Adrian as Inquisitor is corrected. Adrian appointed the first Inquisitor in America. See I. TERILIO MEDINA, Hist. de trib. d. S. Oficio en Chile (Santiago, 1890).

Against Luther's errors Adrian had pronounced from the first, and when the University of Louvain asked their former Rector for his opinion of the teaching newly set forth by the Wittenberg professor, he, in a letter intended for publication, remarked that his heresies were so crude that they would hardly be attributed to a theological student. While Adrian encouraged Luther's condemnation, he at the same time warned the authorities of Louvain to take care that Luther's own words were accurately quoted.¹ During the Diet of Worms he strongly exhorted the Emperor to protect the Church.² Where the faith was in question Adrian was inflexible—in other respects he showed exceptional kindness of heart, and he gave proof of this in repeated instances. When one of his servants fell ill of fever on a journey, the Cardinal gave up his litter to him, and in spite of bodily infirmity made the rest of the toilsome way on horseback.³

Before Charles embarked for the Netherlands and Germany, on the 20th of May 1520, he appointed the Cardinal of Tortosa to be his Viceroy in Spain.⁴ Charles was justified in thinking that he had chosen the right man. Adrian's position as a Cardinal and Inquisitor-General was a highly important one; yet he by no means failed to secure affection. His independent spirit, as compared with the intrigues of other Netherlanders in Spain, and his unspotted integrity won for him the

¹ BURMANN, 447; *cf.* KALKOFF, *Forschungen*, 189 *seq.* See also BOTTEMANNE, *De Brief v. d. Kard. v. Tortosa aan de Theol. faculteit v. Leuven*, in the periodical *De Katholiek* (Leiden, 1882), LXXXII., 1 *seqq.*

² GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 244 *seqq.*; LÉPITRE, 167.

³ MORING-BURMANN, 47-49.

⁴ Decree of nomination, May 17, in GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 237 *seqq.* *Cf.* HÖFLER, *Mon. Hisp.*, II., 42.

respect of many.¹ But he was a foreigner; that no Spaniard could overlook, least of all the grandees of the kingdom. Charles had hardly left before the insurrection of the Castilian Comuneros broke out, and Adrian, on foreign soil and without money, found himself in the greatest embarrassment. His sensitive nature was not able to cope with a most difficult situation; moreover, as a foreigner, he misunderstood the actual circumstances confronting him.² The experience was for him a real martyrdom, for, now in his sixty-first year, his health was shattered by the dangers and excitement of this time. The full weight of these responsibilities was still pressing upon Adrian when, on the 24th of January 1522, at Vittoria, in the Basque country, he heard through Blasio Ortiz, provisor of the Bishop of Calahorra, the wholly unexpected announcement that a yet heavier burden had been imposed upon him.³ The news seemed incredible, although confirmed by letters from other quarters. Not until the 9th of February, when Antonio de Studillo, one of Cardinal Carvajal's chamberlains, who had been delayed by violent snowstorms, entered Vittoria bearing the official despatch of the Sacred College declaring the result of the election,

¹ BAUMGARTEN, I., 237.

² Cf. HÖFLER, *Der Aufstand der kastilianischen Städte*, Prag, 1876; *Mon. hispanica*, I.; *Korrespondenz des Gobernadors Adrian von Utrecht mit Karl V. im Jahre 1520*, Prag, 1881; and *Adrian VI.*, 111 *seq.* Here, as in LEPITRE, 99 *seqq.*, 110 *seqq.*, 134 *seqq.*, and BAUMGARTEN, I., 249 *seq.*, 358 *seq.*, 468 *seq.*, a much too favourable view is held of Adrian's endeavours to cope with the revolution. On the other hand see HÖFLER, *Histor. Zeitschr.*, XCV., 427, 434, who perhaps goes too far on the other side. Cf. also VILLA, *Juana la Loca*, Madrid, 1892, 312 *seq.*, where numerous reports from Adrian to Charles V. are printed.

³ Ortiz, *Itinerarium*, in BURMANN, 258. For the *itinerarium* cf. FOULCHÉ-DELBOSC, *Bibliogr. d. voyag. en Espagne*, in the *Revue Hispanique*, III. (1896), 21.

could all doubt be allayed as to the truth of an event of such world-wide importance.¹

The wish, so often anxiously expressed by the best representatives of Christendom, for a Pope in whom piety, learning, and sanctity should be combined, was now granted. The custom, which since 1378 had become an unbroken precedent, of raising only an Italian to the Papal throne, was now interrupted. A conclave, composed almost exclusively of Italians, had, against their own inclinations, for the first time after a lapse of 461 years, elected to this position of great eminence a man of German origin, and one who was worthy, on account of his virtues, as hardly any other, of so great an honour.

Immersed in the whirlpool of secular life and of political affairs, the Popes of the Renaissance and, above all, Leo X., had too often lost sight of the weightiest of all duties, those inherent in their ecclesiastical station. Now the call had come to one who stood entirely aloof from Italian politics, and whose heart was set on the defence of Christendom and the restoration of the relaxed discipline of the Church. A simple, sincerely pious, and humble man, who had fled from rather than sought out titles and honours, had risen from the rank of a poor student to that of University Professor, to become the tutor of an Emperor, a Spanish Bishop, Cardinal, Grand Inquisitor, and Viceroy, and finally Chief Pastor of the universal Church.

On the first reception of the news of his election, Adrian had displayed that immovable calm which was one of his most prominent characteristics, and was in

¹ As late as January 27, 1522, Charles was informed from Vittoria that Adrian awaited more accurate information from Charles or from Rome before making any alterations. VILLA, Juana la Loca, 354, who wrongly gives the year as 1521.

keeping with his racial origin, as well as with his deep piety. All accounts agree that his elevation, so far from being a source of pleasure to him, distressed him, and although all the letters announcing the outcome of that crisis in his life have not been preserved, yet those known to us are sufficient to show the emotions of his soul. On the 2nd of February 1522 he wrote to Henry VIII. that he had neither sought nor wished for election; his strength was unequal to his task; did he not fear to injure the cause of God and His Church, he would decline the tiara.¹ In like manner, in a letter to the Emperor, he dwelt on the sorrow which his accession caused him when he considered how weak and powerless he was; rest, and not an unbearable burden, was what he needed.²

Adrian also showed imperturbable gravity when, on the 9th of February, Antonio de Studillo, as envoy of the Sacred College, handed him the official announcement of his election. He read the letter without remark, and then, in his dry manner, told Studillo, who was fatigued by the journey, to go and take some repose. On the same day he composed his answer to the College of Cardinals; in this he also reiterated his sense of unfitness for his new dignity and his willingness to have declined it; but, trusting in God, whose honour alone was his aim in

¹ BREWER, III., 2, n. 2018. Also in like manner to Wolsey (*ibid.*, 2019). These letters in full in GACHARD, Corresp., 254 *seqq.*

² The letter in Gachard bears date February 11, Corresp., 26 *seqq.*, but probably we ought to read II February; see BONNER, theol. Literaturblatt, 1874, 55. In Cod. Barb., lat. 2103 (Vatican Library), which contains a seventeenth-century copy, made in Madrid, from the original, of this very letter, which Gachard published from a MS. in the town library of Hamburg, also based on the Madrid original, the dates, unfortunately, are written sometimes in Arabic and sometimes in Roman numerals, so that no certain evidence can be adduced in settlement of this question.

all things, and also out of respect for the Cardinals, he acquiesced in his election; as soon as the Legates arrived and the fleet was ready to sail, he would make all haste to reach Rome.¹ But the letters written by him to an intimate friend in the Netherlands reflect still more plainly than these official documents the nobleness and purity of his soul. "Dear friend," he wrote on the 15th of February 1522 from Vittoria to the Syndic of Utrecht, Florentius Oem van Wyngarden, "there can be no one who would not have been surprised and who was not astonished at the Cardinals' unanimous choice of one so poor, so well-nigh unknown, and, moreover, so far removed from them as I, to fill the position of Vicar of Christ. To God only is it easy thus suddenly to uplift the lowly. This honour brings me no gladness, and I dread taking upon me such a burden. I would much rather serve God in my provostship at Utrecht than as Bishop, Cardinal, or Pope. But who am I, to withstand the call of the Lord? And I hope that He will supply in me what is lacking, and continue to grant me strength for my burden. Pray for me, I beseech you, and through your devout prayers may He vouchsafe to teach me how to fulfil His commandments, and make me worthy to serve the best interests of His Church."²

¹ SANUTO, XXXIII., 76-77; here 77 *seq.* are also the later letters of the Pope to the Cardinals and Romans. Of these the two briefs of the last day of February 1522 were printed soon after their arrival in Rome, by Bladus. I saw a copy of this extremely rare example of single-sheet printing in the Borghese Library. On the last day of February Adrian VI. also addressed a letter to the cities of the Papal States; see CHIESI, 106.

² BURMANN, 398; *cf.* HÖFLER, 129 *seq.* Adrian spoke out in precisely similar terms to another confidential friend; see PETER MARTYR, *Op. Epist.*, 753. *Cf.* also Adrian's letters of February 14, 1522, to Jean de Vignacourt in WEISS; *Pap. de Granvelle*, I., 251, and the

Not until he had received the official notification of his election did Adrian resign his Viceroyalty and assume the title of Pope-elect. Contrary to the custom observed for five hundred years, he adhered to his baptismal name.¹ X He was determined, even as Pope, to be the same man as before.²

Although Adrian was now in full possession of his Papal prerogatives, he yet resolved, in deference to the urgent wish of the Cardinals, to abstain from using them until the arrival of the Legates.³ But in order to be secure in every respect, he ordered, on the 16th of February, a notarial deed to be executed registering his consent to his election.⁴ This was done in strict secrecy; the public declaration was reserved until after the arrival of the Cardinal-Legates, which was delayed in unexpected ways. From day to day Adrian increasingly felt the embarrassment of his position, whereby he seemed to be reconsidering his acceptance of the Papacy. Nor, until he had publicly given consent to his election, could he act effectively as Pope, use his influence with the Princes

briefs addressed to Utrecht in ANT. MATTHAEI, *Analecta*, III., 690 *seqq.* See further BOSCH, 50 *seq.* On February 15, 1522, Adrian VI. also addressed a *cry for help to the Duke of Mantua. More *letters were sent to the latter on February 28, March 29, and April 27. The *originals are all in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

¹ As before his election (BURMANN, 444) so afterwards the Pope always signed himself Adrianus; *cf.* the Pope's own signature to the *Briefs of March 29, 1522 (National Archives, Paris), and of April 11, 1523 (State Archives, Vienna). On his tomb there is the curious interchange of Adrianus and Hadrianus.

² TIZIO lays stress on this, *Hist. Senen *ut sup.* (Chigi Library, Rome). *Cf.* also GRAADT JONCKERS in the *Utrechtsche Volks-Almanak*, 1857, 175.

³ *Cf.* Adrian's letter to Charles V., February 15, 1522, in GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 34.

⁴ See Ortiz in BURMANN, 161.

of Europe for the restoration of peace, or for arbitration. When, in the beginning of March, there were still no tidings of the departure of the Cardinal-Legates, Adrian made up his mind to wait no longer, and on the 8th of that month, in the presence of several bishops and prelates, and before a notary and witnesses, he made the solemn declaration of his acceptance of the Papacy. With emphasis he expressed, on this occasion, his trust that the Divine Founder of the Primacy would endow him, though unworthy, with the strength necessary to protect the Church against the attacks of the Evil One, and to bring back the erring and deceived to the unity of the Church after the example of the Good Shepherd.¹

Adrian's biographer pertinently remarks: "It must have been a more than ordinary trust in God which led him to bend his back to a burden the weight of which was immeasurable, and to take over the colossal inheritance of all the strifes and enmities which Leo had been powerless to allay. In the background, apart from the German revolt, lurked also a schism with France, whose King, through the Concordat with Leo, had made himself master of the French Church and was in no haste to acknowledge the German Pope, the creature, as it was asserted, of the Emperor."²

Not less great were the difficulties presented by the States of the Church, and in particular by the condition of Rome itself. The ferment among the youth of the

¹ The Instrumentum acceptionis electionis in SANUTO, XXXVIII., 204 *seqq.*, was published in Rome, April 9; see *ibid.*, 208; *cf.* Corp. dipl. Port., II., 69. The *Mandatum for the procurators of Adrian VI. sent to Rome (Enkevoirt, Ingenwinkel and Borell; *cf.* SANUTO, XXXIII., 209 *seq.*, and SCHULTE, I., 228), dat. in Civit. Calciaten, 1522, Martii 14, in Cod. Barb., lat. 2428, f. 14 (Vatican Library).

² HÖFLER in Freiburger Kirchenlexicon, V., ed. 2, 1429-1430.
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city and the divisions among the Cardinals, many of whom acted quite despotically, gave rise towards the end of January to the worst apprehensions. As time went on the situation became more precarious from week to week.¹ The circumstance that the three Cardinals at the head of affairs changed every month added to the insecurity and brought men into office who were altogether disqualified. An unparalleled confusion prevailed;² above all, the want of money was pressingly felt, and the Cardinals were reduced to the pawning of the remainder of the Papal mitres and tiaras; this led to the discovery that the costly jewels in the tiara of Paul II. had been exchanged for imitation stones. So great was their financial necessity that on one occasion they could not raise fifty ducats for the expenses of an envoy who was deputed to ascertain the state of affairs in Perugia: in order to make up the amount they were obliged to pledge some altar lights.³

On the 18th of February the Sacred College concluded a temporary treaty with the Duke of Urbino; they also hoped to come to an understanding with the Baglioni in Perugia. But in the Romagna, especially in Bologna, great unrest was felt; Ravenna and Foligno showed a readiness to throw off the authority of the Regents

¹ See SANUTO, XXXII., 433 *seqq.*, 447 *seqq.*, 465 *seq.*; *cf.* besides *Giorn. d. lett. Ital.*, XXXI., 411 *seq.* See also the entirely one-sided and exaggerated reports of Manuel in BERGENROTH, II., n. 384, 385, 386, 392, 394.

² *Cf.* the *reports of B. Castiglione of February, 5, 12, 22, 1522. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ SANUTO, XXXII., 442, 474. *Cf.* BREWER, III., 2, n. 2046, and SCHULTE, I., 228. *La difficultà de li denari è tanto grande che non po essere maggiore, wrote Castiglione on January 12, 1522. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

appointed by Leo X.¹ The Marquis of Mantua asked in vain for his pay as Captain-General of the Church.² The plague broke out in Rome, in addition to which great excesses were committed by the Corsican soldiery;³ assassinations took place daily with impunity. Nothing else could be expected, since the discord between the Cardinals of French and Imperialist sympathies showed no abatement. When Cardinals Ridolfi and Salviati wished to excuse the Medicean Governor of Loreto, Cardinal Grimani remarked: "Leo X. having ruined the Church, his relations now wish to bring all that is left to the ground."⁴

At the beginning of March little was known in Rome of Adrian's movements, the report of his death having often been current.⁵ At last, on the 18th of that month, Studillo arrived with the first authentic information concerning the new Pope. He was described as a man of middle height, with grey hair, an aquiline nose, and small, lively eyes;

¹ See SANUTO, XXXIII., 34, 57 *seq.*, 70, 74. Cf. ALIPPI in Bollett. Senese, X. (1903), 480 *seqq.*

² SANUTO, XXXII., 484, 492.

³ Cf. LANCIANI, Scavi, I., 214 *seq.*; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd edit., 388 *seq.*

⁴ SANUTO, XXXIII., 74, 76; cf. 8, 115, 131 *seq.*; BREWER, III., 2, n. 2044, and *letter of G. de' Medici of April 13, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. A member of Cardinal Gonzaga's family (Nepos Jac. Prot.) reported on April 1, 1522, from Rome on the dissensions among the Cardinals: *et tanta discordia non fu mai, de sorte che per fermo non andando bene le cose de Milano siamo certi di una cisma grandissima. Roma sta in arme (murders are committed every day). Dio ci adiuta et simo con grandissima guardia et gorni et nocte pervigilamo. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁵ SANUTO, XXXIII., 34. Cf. BREWER, III., 2, n. 2064, and BERGENROTH, II., n. 386. See also Castiglione's *account, March 5, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

his complexion was rather pale than sanguine; he was already a little bent, but still vigorous in body, being especially a good walker; he still continued to wear his Cardinal's dress, kept only a few servants, and loved solitude. In bearing he was extremely reserved, neither giving way to impetuosity nor inclined to jocosity; on receiving the news of his election he had shown no signs of joy, but had sighed deeply; he was in the habit of going early to bed and of rising at daybreak. He said Mass daily, and was an indefatigable worker; his speech was slow and generally in Latin, which he spoke not exactly with polish, but yet not incorrectly; he understood Spanish, and sometimes tried to express himself in that language. His most earnest wish was to see the Princes of Christendom united in arms against the Turk. In religious affairs he was very firm, and was determined that no one henceforward should receive more than one ecclesiastical office, since he adhered to the principle that benefices should be supplied with priests, and not priests with benefices.¹

¹ Cf. with Negri's letter in *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 98, *Corp. dipl. Port.*, II., 70, and Ortiz in BURMANN, 227 *seqq.*, the letter of Fra Vincenzo di S. Gimignano to Cardinal Fieschi, dated Vittoria, March 10, 1522, in SANUTO, XXXIII., 203-204. He also wrote to Cardinal Cajetan in entirely the same sense. This letter is in TIZIO, **Hist. Senen.*, G II., 39 (Chigi Library, Rome). Castiglione reported on March 26, 1522, *Circa la venuta del papa il collegio ha determinato che li legati non vadino più fora de Italia perchè questa andata potrebbe tardare molto S. S^{ta} et oltre di questo non avendo il papa cardinale alcuno dal canto di là estimasi chel debba accelerare la venuta sua molto più. Qui se hanno lettere da diverse che sono con S. S^{ta} Italiani li quali confermano la bontà et il valor suo et il desiderio de la pace universale e de la reformazione della chiesa; confermano ancor che S. S^{ta} ha deliberato e stabilito de non volere dare ne officii ne beneficii se non a persone che meritino; dicono che ogni matina celebra la messa devotissimamente e molte altre cose bone fa; tra l'altre tutta Spagna gli è intorno e ognuno

Such reports made no pleasant impression on the worldly members of the Curia. At first they had flattered themselves with the hope that, out of conscientious scruples, the pious Netherlander would have declined election; then the opinion gained ground that he would certainly not come to Rome.¹ Now they realized with what a firm hand he intended to direct affairs. A total breach with the traditions of government as embodied not only in the system of Leo X., but in that of all the Renaissance Popes, was to be expected. With fear and trembling the coming of the stranger was awaited; everything about him was matter of dislike, even the circumstance that he had not changed his name.²

[Studillo handed to the Cardinals Adrian's letter of thanks dated the 28th of February, to the effect that he only awaited the arrival of the Legates to begin his journey to Rome; the College of Cardinals replied forthwith that it was unnecessary to wait for their coming, but that he ought to hasten with all possible speed to Rome, his true place of residence.³ Individual Cardinals, such as Campeggio, also adjured the Pope in special letters to expedite his journey in order to bring to an end the confusion and incompetence there prevailing.⁴ How much the Cardinals still feared that he might not permanently

li domanda e non è cosa de valuta de dieci scudi che non li sia stata dimandata da cento persone e S. S^{ta} rimette ognuno a Roma ne vol fare la famiglia perfin che non è in Roma. Li legati andaranno a ricevere S. S^{ta} in Italia dove la avisava voler disimbarcare, estimasi pero de la più parte che serà a Napoli. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

¹ Cf. BERNI, Rime ed. Virgili, 32.

² * Cod. Barb., 2103, f. 128^b. Vatican Library.

³ SANUTO, XXXIII., 74, 79-80, 103-107.

⁴ Cf. Campeggio's letter in the Zeitschr. f. deutsche Geschichtswissensch., N.F., I. Vierteljahrshefte, 1896-97, 72 seq.

establish his court in Rome is shown by their original hesitation in sending to the Pope the fisherman's ring.¹ The longer the Pope's arrival was delayed, the greater was the general dissatisfaction and the fear that Spain might prove a second Avignon;² this last alarm was heightened by a forged brief summoning the Cardinals to Spain.³

In reality Adrian had never thought of remaining in Spain. His repeated assurances that it was his most urgent wish to come to Rome have been confirmed by unimpeachable testimony;⁴ however, obstacles of various kinds stood in the way of his departure. Adrian had to transfer his functions as Viceroy, and, owing to the voyage being insecure on account of the Turkish pirates, it was necessary to levy troops for the protection of the flotilla; to secure them he was forced, owing to his poverty, to rely on foreign, that is Spanish, support. An overland route through France was out of the question, since the Emperor would have seen in such a step an open bid for the favour of his enemy.

The difficulty of the Pope's position, confronted as he was by two great rival powers, each of whom wished to secure the Papal influence for the attainment of his own objects, showed itself also in other ways. The Imperialists gave the new Pope no rest with their irksome importunity. The Ambassador Manuel took a delight in offering unasked-for advice, sometimes tendered in letters which were frankly discourteous, while Mendoza made attempts to

¹ SANUTO, XXXIII., 162, 265; BERGENROTH, II., n. 408. Cf. *letter of Castiglione, April 14, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Cf. the *reports of Castiglione, April 19 and May 30, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ TIZIO, *Hist. Senen, *loc. cit.* (Chigi Library, Rome).

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 52, n. 1, the letter of Fra Vincenzo di S. Gimignano.

bribe those in Adrian's confidence.¹ Charles V. was assiduous in approaching the Pope with a host of wishes and business concerns, but mainly with the request that he should, like his predecessors, join in the alliance against the French. Adrian's dealings with his former lord and master were marked by great shrewdness, caution, and reserve; where he could he acted as the father and friend, but never at the cost of his high office as head of universal Christendom.

After waiting long, and in vain, in Vittoria for the arrival of La Chaulx, the Emperor's envoy, Adrian, on the 12th of March, betook himself by S. Domingo and Logroño, in the valley of the Ebro, to Saragossa, which he reached on the 29th of March. Many Spanish bishops and prelates, with a great number of grandees, had assembled in the capital of Aragon to pay homage to the new Pope,² the first whom Spain had ever seen. As well as La Chaulx, envoys also soon arrived from England, Portugal, and Savoy³ whose chief task it was to induce Adrian to enter the anti-French League. In one of the letters in Charles's own hand which he delivered, the Emperor had permitted himself to remark that Adrian had been elected out of consideration for himself. In his answer, animated by great goodwill, the Pope declared with delicate tact that he was convinced that the Cardinals, in making their choice, had been mindful of the Emperor's interests; at the same time, he felt very happy that he had not received the tiara, the acquisition of which must be pure and spotless, through Charles's entreaties; thus he

¹ See GACHARD, 7 *seqq.*, 47 *seqq.*, 55 *seqq.*, 69 *seq.* Cf. DE LEVA, II., 133.

² See Ortiz, *Itinerarium* in BURMANN, 162 *seqq.* Cf. GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 47 *seqq.*

³ Cf. with SANUTO, XXXIII., 302, also GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 78, and *Corp. dipl. Port.*, II., 71 *seqq.*

would feel himself to be even more the Emperor's ally than if he had owed the Papacy to his mediation.¹

Adrian also showed plainly in other ways that, with all his personal liking for the Emperor, he would not, on that account, as Pope, follow the lead of the Imperial policy. He declined positively to take part in the anti-French League. With all the more insistence he called upon Charles to forward the cause of peace by the acceptance of moderate, reasonable, and equitable terms, and provisionally to conclude a longer armistice. Every day made it clearer that he looked upon his Pontificate as an apostolate of peace.² The interests he was bent on serving were not those of individual monarchs, but of Christendom in general. On this account he had from the beginning urged the necessity of restoring peace among the Christian states and of uniting them in opposition to the oncoming assaults of the Ottoman power.³ On behalf of peace it was decided to send at once special envoys to the Emperor and to the Kings of France, England, and Portugal.⁴ Stefano Gabriele Merino, Archbishop of Bari, was appointed to proceed as Nuncio to France. Adrian had asked the French King to grant the Nuncio a safe-conduct, and at the same time exhorted Francis and the most important personages of his Court to make for peace.⁵ This letter was

¹ LANZ, I., 61 *seq.* La Chaulx's Instructions in the Denkschriften der Wiener Akademie, XXVIII., 250 *seq.*

² HÖFLER, 159.

³ See the brief to Venice, March 13, 1522, in SANUTO, XXXIII., 129 *seq.* Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 402.

⁴ Cf. SANUTO, XXXIII., 302.

⁵ Cf. PIEPER, Nuntiaturen, 63. The briefs addressed to France are wanting up to one dated March 29, 1522, which I found, in the original, in the National Archives, Paris (L. 357); this is addressed to the Archbishop of Sens. See also the brief to Portugal in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 76 *seq.*

not despatched until after the 8th of March, when Adrian had publicly and solemnly accepted the Papal office. Francis I. complained of this in very harsh terms, saying that the accession of the Pope had been communicated to him later than was customary; it would even seem that he went so far as to still address the duly elected Pontiff as Cardinal of Tortosa.¹ Adrian replied to this calmly in a brief of the 21st of April 1522.² The apostolic gentleness of tone disarmed the French King in such a way that in his second letter of the 24th of June he evinced a very different temper. Francis avowed his inclination to conclude an armistice, and even invited the Pope to make his journey to Rome by way of France.³

Adrian declined this invitation, as he did also that of Henry VIII. to pass through England and Germany on his way to Italy. He wished to avoid every appearance of sanctioning by a visit to the English King the latter's warlike bearing towards France. But he was all the more distrustful of the intentions of Francis, inasmuch as the improved attitude of the French King was undoubtedly connected with his military failures in upper Italy. French domination in that quarter was well-nigh at an end; the defeat at Bicocca on the 27th of April was followed on the 30th of May by the loss of Genoa. To the strange advice of Manuel, that he should travel through

¹ See HÖFLER, 163 *seq.* According to Manuel (BERGENROTH, II., n. 417), Francis I. was collecting canonists' opinions against Adrian VI.

² GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 262 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 262 *seq.*, note. The National Archives, Paris, contain unfortunately only a few letters of Francis I. to Adrian VI. In one, *dated Paris, December 17, 1522, the King begs the Pope to confirm the "statuts et réformations de l'abbaye et monast. de S. Victor de l'ordre de St. Augustin" made by the Archbishop of Sens. Francis here signs himself "votre devot filz le Roy de France, duc de Milan, seigneur de Gennes Francoys."

the Netherlands and Germany to Italy, Adrian also sent a refusal.¹

Towards the College of Cardinals Adrian maintained the same position of independence with which he had encountered the sovereign powers. Through his intimate friend, Johannes Winkler, he let the former understand that they were in nowise to alienate, divide, or mortgage vacant offices, but that all such must be reserved intact for the Pope's disposal.²

Nor was Adrian long in coming forward as a reformer. He set to work in earnest, since, to the amazement of the Curia, he did not simply confine himself to bringing the rules of the Chancery into line with established usage, but in many instances made changes whereby the privileges of the Cardinals³ were specifically curtailed. Jointly with

¹ Cf. HÖFLER, 156, 164; LEPITRE, 186.

² HÖFLER, 162.

³ The decision, "*quod cardinales non comprehendantur sub regulis cancell.*," fell through entirely. Gomez (Comment in regul. Cancell., Paris, 1547) has called attention, under their appropriate titles, to important alterations in the rules of Chancery, "*De non tollendo jure quaesito, de infirmis resignantibus, de subrogandis collitigentibus, de triennali possessore, de publicandis resignationibus.*" The assertion, to which Höfler still adheres, that Adrian repealed wholesale previous reservations, is incorrect. He renewed all "*reservationes generales et speciales*" named in the first Chancery regulations of his predecessor, as well as those in the constitutions "*ad regimen*" of Benedict XII. and "*Exsecrabilis*" of John XXII. Even the "*revocatis expectatarum*" is to be found already in the rules of the preceding period. But it is correct to say that Adrian VI. on this very point did make additions of intrinsic importance by which the privileges favourable to the Sacred College were restricted, and the "*facultates nominandi, reservandi, conferendi, commendandi*" granted by his predecessors were removed along with the nominations and reservations which were the result of this plenary authority. The removal of the faculties for the sale of curial offices, and of all the concessions relating to the latter which had been

the publication of these regulations, on the 24th of April 1522 the Pope appointed a special authority to deal with the petitions which were always coming in in large numbers.¹

In the first week of May, Adrian was anxious to leave Saragossa and to pass through Ilerda to Barcelona, but an outbreak of the plague in both cities caused a fresh hindrance, and another port of departure had to be found. In the meantime the Pope wrote to the Cardinals and the Romans on the 19th of May, and at the same time enumerated the difficulties with which he had to contend before he could get together a flotilla to protect him on his voyage to Italy across the Gulf of Lyons, then infested by Turkish pirates.² By the 3rd of June he was at last able to inform the Cardinals that these hindrances had been overcome.³

On the 11th of June the Pope left Saragossa, and reached Tortosa on the eve of Corpus Christi (June 18th). On the 26th of June he wrote from there that he intended to embark in a few days.⁴ As all his vessels were not yet assembled, a

guaranteed by Leo X. and, *sede vacante*, by the Cardinals, was an entirely new and decisive step. For these details I am gratefully indebted to the co-operation of Dr. Göller.

¹ Ortiz in BURMANN, 167-168. The correct date of the first publication has been established by DOMARUS in the Hist. Jahrbuch, XVI., 76. The second publication followed on September 25, 1522, at Rome, as given in the concluding notice of the Roman impression of the "Regulae," 1522. Melchior de Baldasini took part in the redaction of the "Regulae"; see GÖLLER in Archiv f. Kirchenrecht, LXXXVI. (1906), 21.

² See SANUTO, XXXIII., 303 *seq.*, 306 *seq.*; *cf.* 301. GACHARD, Corresp., 82 *seqq.*, 92 *seqq.*; Corp. dipl. Port., II., 77, 79, 80.

³ See the *letter in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, Appendix, No. 5.

⁴ Habemus parata omnia, quae ad navigationem nostram necessaria

new delay arose,¹ and not until the 8th of July was the Pope able to take ship, in spite of the excessive heat, in the neighbouring port of Ampolla. His departure was so unexpected that the greater part of the suite did not reach the harbour until nightfall. Owing to unfavourable weather it was impossible to sail for Tarragona before the 10th of July.² Here again a stoppage took place, a sufficient number of ships not being available. At last, on the evening of the 5th of August, the fleet put out to sea. The hour of departure was kept a secret. On board were Cardinal Cesarini, representing the Sacred College, Mendoza on behalf of the Emperor, and nearly two thousand armed men. The galley which conveyed Adrian was recognizable by its awning of crimson damask, bearing the Papal escutcheon.³

In addition to Marino Caracciolo, who was already resident at the court of Charles, Adrian VI. had, on the 15th of July,⁴ sent to the Emperor another intimate friend in the person of Bernardo Pimentel. Charles, who had landed at Santander on the 16th of July, despatched to the Pope as his representative Herr von Zevenbergen, who, among numerous other matters, was to express the Emperor's wish to see Adrian in person before he left Spain.

sunt et intra paucos dies adjuvante Domino velificaturi sumus. Letter to N. N. (perhaps the College of Cardinals), dated Dertusae, 1522, June 26. Copy in the Library, Mantua, Lett. di div.

¹ Cf. *the letter of Girolamo Adorno to the Archbishop of Capua of July 10, 1522 (Library, Mantua, *loc. cit.*). Adrian's exhortation to peace addressed to Charles, July 4, in Compt. rend. de la commiss. d'hist., 3 Series, III., 299.

² From Tarragona Adrian VI. addressed a laudatory letter to Alb. Pio of Carpi; see SEMPER, Carpi, 14 *seq.*

³ Cf. ORTIZ, Itinerarium, 173 *seqq.*; HÖFLER, 178 *seqq.*, 188.

⁴ See Adrian's letter of July 15, 1522, in Compt. rend. de la commiss. d'hist., 3 Series, III., 300.

Adrian, however, on various pleas, evaded the fulfilment of this wish. In a letter of the 27th of July he assured the Emperor of his great desire to effect a meeting, but that he was reluctant to suggest a rapid journey in the great heat, and that he himself could not wait longer, as his departure for Rome had, in other ways, been so long delayed.¹

Since Adrian, previously, had expressed a repeated wish to see the Emperor before he left Spain, this excuse was hardly sufficient to explain the fact,² which was everywhere attracting attention, that the Pope, after a month's delay, had embarked at the very moment of Charles's arrival on Spanish soil. Reasons were not wanting why Adrian should avoid a personal interview. He knew well that Charles disapproved of his dealings with France; he also may have feared that Charles would remind him of other wishes now impossible to gratify. Among the latter was the nomination of new Cardinals, a point urgently pressed by Charles, and refused in the letter of excuse above mentioned. But of greater weight than all these considerations was Adrian's regard for that position of impartiality which, as ruler of the Church, he had determined to adopt; he would not give the French King cause to suppose that by such an interview he was transferring to the side of his adversary the support of the Holy See.³ But in order that the Emperor might not be offended, Adrian wrote again, on the 5th of August, from on board ship, an affectionate letter, containing, together with valuable advice, a further apology for his departure; letters from Rome and Genoa had informed him how necessary

¹ LANZ, I., 63.

² Cf. letter of Negri of August 15, 1522, in *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 106.

³ Cf. BAUMGARTEN, II., 218.

his presence in Italy was. Their different ways of looking at the relations with France were also touched upon: he knew well that the Emperor was averse to a treaty with France until the French King's plumage, real or borrowed, was closely clipped, so that he could not direct his flight wherever his fancy pleased him; "but we also take into consideration the dangers now threatening Christendom from the Turk, and are of opinion that the greater dangers should be first attacked. If we protect and defend the interests of our faith, even at the loss of our worldly advantage, instead of meeting the evils of Christendom with indifference, the Lord will be our helper."¹

Although the fleet on which Adrian was bound for Italy consisted of fifty vessels, the coast-line was followed the whole way for safety. At Barcelona the reception was cordial, but at Marseilles it was impossible to stop owing to distrust of the French. The Pope kept the feast of the Assumption at S. Stefano al Mare, near San Remo; at Savona the Archbishop Tommaso Riario showed all the splendid hospitality of a prelate of the Renaissance. From the 17th to the 19th of August Adrian stayed in Genoa comforting the inhabitants, on whom the visitations of war had fallen heavily. Here came to greet him the Duke of Milan and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Imperialists, Prospero Colonna, the Marquis of Pescara, and Antonio da Leyva.²

¹ GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 103 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 180 *seqq.*

² See ORTIZ, *Itinerarium*, 178 *seqq.*, 182 *seqq.*, 185 *seqq.*; further, GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 107 *seq.* Adrian's letter here published shows the incorrectness of the account that the Pope had refused absolution to the Imperial Commanders-in-Chief. HÖFLER, 185, had already called attention to this; notwithstanding, LEPITRE, 209, repeats this false statement. A brief *of Adrian to the Marquis of Mantua, "ex triremi," August 11, 1522, relating to his journey, is to be found in the original in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

The passage to Leghorn was hindered by stormy weather, and the Pope was detained for four days in the harbour of Portofino. Amid incessant fear of attacks from Turkish pirates, Leghorn was reached at last on the 23rd of August.¹ Here Adrian was received in state by the representatives of the States of the Church² and five Tuscan Cardinals: Medici, Petrucci, Passerini, Ridolfi, and Piccolomini. The latter were in full lay attire, wearing Spanish hats and carrying arms; for this the Pope seriously rebuked them.³ When he was offered the costly service of silver with which the banquet table in the citadel had been spread, he replied: "Here, of a truth, the Cardinals fare like kings; may they inherit better treasures in heaven."⁴ He disregarded the entreaties of Cardinal Medici and the Florentines that he should visit Pisa and Florence and at first make Bologna his residence, on account of the plague. "To Rome, to Rome,"⁵ he replied, "I must needs go." The presence of the plague there caused him no anxiety;⁶ with the first favourable wind he made haste to embark, without informing the Cardinals, who were sitting over their dinner.⁷

Late in the evening, on the 25th of August, Adrian lay

¹ See ORTIZ, *Itinerarium*, 188 *seq.*, and report of M. da Silva in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 91.

² Cf. CHIESI, 107.

³ CAPPELLETTI, Il p. Adriano VI. a Livorno, in *Miscell.*, Livorn, I. (1894), 3.

⁴ TIZIO, *Hist. Senen, *loc. cit.* Chigi Library, Rome.

⁵ See SANUTO, XXXIII., 426, 431. Cf. *letter of T. Campeggio to Bologna, Rome, September 11, 1522 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁶ The Florentine envoys were enjoined to make special reference to the danger from plague in Rome: see *Instruzione ai m. ambasc. deputati a far reverentia alla S^{ta} di N. S. quando sarà arrivata ad Livorno, deliberata adi 16 di Augusto, 1522. State Archives, Florence.

⁷ JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.

off Civita Vecchia, and on the following morning set foot for the first time on the soil of the Papal States. A great concourse of persons, among whom were many members of the Curia, awaited him on the shore; Cardinals Colonna and Orsini were present to represent the Sacred College.¹ To the greetings of the former the Pope made a short but suitable reply. Here, as in all other places visited on his journey, he first made his way to the cathedral; thence he proceeded to the Rocca, where he took a midday collation and held audiences. By the 27th of August the Pope was again on board. To the beggars who pressed around him he said: "I love poverty, and you shall see what I will do for you." Head-winds made the landing at Ostia on the 28th of August a matter of difficulty. Adrian, in a small boat, with only six companions, was the first to gain the land; he sprang ashore without assistance, and with almost youthful alacrity. Here also he visited the church without delay and prayed. The Cardinals had prepared a repast in the Castle, but the Pope declined their invitation. He ate alone, and, at once mounting a mule, made his way to the cloister of St. Paul without the Walls. The Cardinals and the others who accompanied him followed in the greatest disorder, through mud and heat, the rapid progress of the Pontiff, who was met on his way

¹ G. de' Medici reports from Rome, August 9, 1522: *Hanno li prefati ^{rmi} [Cardinali] ordinato una intimatione a tutti li cardinali absentati da Roma, che si debbino trovar quà e alli ^{rmi} Orsino e Colonna che come legati debbino inviarsi alla volta di Civitavechia per incontrar S. Sta, dove per breve al s. collegio fa intender voler venire a di lungo senza far posata in loco alcuno, e di li si delibererà, se vorrà andare alla volta di Viterbo o quello vorrà fare. On August 21: *Yesterday Cardinal Colonna departed; to-day Orsini is to follow. August 25: Several Cardinals and a great number of the Court have gone to Civita Vecchia. State Archives, Florence.

by sightseers moved by curiosity, and by the Swiss guard carrying a litter. Into this he got reluctantly, but suddenly quitted it and again mounted his mule. His vigorous bearing astonished all who saw him, for during the voyage and even after his arrival Adrian had felt so ill that many were afraid he would not recover; having reached his journey's end, he seemed to regain youth and strength. He rode in front in animated conversation with the Ambassador Manuel. "His face is long and pale," writes the Venetian Envoy; "his body is lean, his hands are snow-white. His whole demeanour impresses one with reverence; even his smile has a tinge of seriousness."¹ All who saw the Pope for the first time were struck by his ascetic appearance. In a letter sent to Venice the writer says, "I could have sworn that he had become a monk."²

The plague being unabated in Rome, many advised the Pope to be crowned in St. Paul's. Adrian refused, and decided that the ceremony should take place in St. Peter's with all possible simplicity; the coronation over, he intended to remain in Rome notwithstanding the plague,³ since he desired by his presence to tranquillize his sorely afflicted subjects and to restore order in the city. Owing to the Pope's absence and the outbreak of the pestilence, a majority of the court had left Rome, so that

¹ SANUTO, XXXIII., 434-435; *cf.* 426 *seq.*, 430. *Letter of A. Taurelli of August 27 in State Archives, Modena. *Letter of G. de' Medici of August 28, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. Ortiz, in BURMANN, 192. BREWER, III., 2, n. 2771. HÖFLER, 188 *seq.*

² SANUTO, XXXIII., 432.

³ On August 23, 1522, G. de' Medici was able to report: *It is not yet decided whether the coronation is to take place in St. Paul's or St. Peter's; "nel uno luogo e altro si fa preparatione, la qual sarà con poco cerimonia e manco spesa; ancora che la peste vadia continuando al far danno, questi ministri di S. S^{ta} dicono farà la incoronatione a S. Pietro et che sua B^{ta} si fermerà in Roma." State Archives, Florence.

Castiglione compared the city to a plundered abbey.¹ The state of affairs was utterly chaotic; while the faithful had recourse to litanies and processions, a Greek named Demetrius was allowed to go through the farce of exorcising the plague by means of an oath sworn over an ox, whereupon the Papal Vicar at last interfered,² for it was understood that Adrian was rapidly approaching, and his arrival on the following day was even looked upon as settled.

On the 29th of August, at a very early hour, the Pope said a low Mass—as he had never omitted to do even amid the difficulties of the voyage—and afterwards presented himself to the Cardinals in the noble transept of St. Paul's. He received them all with a friendly smile, but singled out no one for special recognition. Then followed the first adoration of the Sacred College in the small sacristy adjoining.³ On this occasion Carvajal, as Dean and Cardinal-Bishop of Ostia, delivered an address, in which he frankly bewailed the calamities called down upon the

¹ Letter of August 16, 1522: "Roma pare una abatia spogliata per esserse partito un numero infinito de persone" (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). For the bad conditions prevalent in Rome owing to the Pope's absence, see *the letter of A. Taurelli, dated Rome, June 7, 1522, in State Archives, Modena.

² Cf., with Negri's letter (Lett. d. Princ., I., 106^b), the account in SANUTO, XXXIII., 401, 402-403. GREGOROVIVS (VIII., 3rd edit., 389) has overlooked the latter, and therefore believes BIZARUS (Hist. Gen., XIX., 456), who states that an ox was sacrificed to the demons in the Colosseum by Demetrius. That Adrian VI. could not, as one of his enemies asserts, have sanctioned such superstitions, is shown by his, "Sanctio in magos" and his other measures against magic and devil-worship. Cf. RAYNALDUS, 1522, n. 15, 1523, n. 87; Bull., V., 24 seq.; CANTÙ, Storia di Como, 106; LEPITRE, 318 seq. Cf. SOLDAN-HEPPE, I., 515, and HANSEN, Quellen zur Geschichte den Hexenwahns, 34 seq.

³ SANUTO, XXXIII., 428, 431.

Church by the election of unworthy and simoniacal Popes, and welcomed Adrian the more joyfully inasmuch as he had been chosen by other means. Although in the presence of such a Chief Pastor no special exhortations were necessary, he would yet ask him to lay seven points to heart: first, to remove simony, ignorance, and tyranny, and all other vices which deform the Church, while turning to good counsellors and keeping a firm hand on those in office; secondly, to reform the Church in accordance with her Councils and Canons, so far as the times permitted; thirdly, to honour and exalt the good Cardinals and prelates, and have a care for the poor; fourthly, to see to the impartial administration of justice and to confer offices on the best men; fifthly, to support the faithful, especially the nobility and the religious orders, in their necessities; sixthly, the speaker touched on the duty of opposing the Turks in their threatened attacks on Hungary and Rhodes; to do this an armistice among the Christian princes and the levy of money for a crusade were indispensable. In conclusion, Carvajal urged the reconstruction of St. Peter's, which to his great grief had been pulled down. If the Pope fulfilled these conditions, his glory would shine forth before God and men.¹

In his short reply the Pope thanked the Cardinals for his election and explained the reasons of his late arrival, at the same time stating his agreement with the programme of reform so comprehensively unfolded by Carvajal; he then asked the Cardinals to waive their right to give asylum to criminals; to this all consented. The second adoration in the basilica of St. Paul then followed, and in a further speech Adrian impressively adjured the Cardinals, prelates,

¹ See HÖFLER, 193 *seq.* He published the original text in the *Abhandl. der Münchener Akad.*, IV., 3, 57-62. The codex of the Vallicelliana Library, which Höfler more closely follows, is signed J 49.

envoys, and Roman dignitaries present to help him with their prayers.

The extraordinary strength of character at once exhibited by the new Pope aroused attention. Out of the numerous petitions presented to him he only countersigned those submitted to him by the conclavists. When Ascanio Colonna ventured to intercede for Lelio della Valle, who had committed a murder, Adrian replied: "Pardons for cases of murder will not be given except for very weighty reasons, and after hearing the case of the injured parties. We are determined to listen to both sides, since it is our intention to see that justice is done, though we perish in the attempt." Then a palafreniere whom Adrian had brought with him from Spain asked for a canonry. "Canonries," he was told, "will be given only to those who can be residentiary, not to palafrenieri." Even the Bishop of Pesaro, on applying for a canonry in St. Peter's, was met with a flat refusal; to Cardinal Campeggio, who expressed a similar wish, Adrian replied, "We will see." All sales of dispensations the Pope absolutely refused; the favours which were in his power to bestow he preferred to bestow freely. When, finally, the palafrenieri of Leo X. thronged round him in a body, and on their knees begged to be reinstated in their office, he merely gave a sign with his hand that they might arise. To the Romans, who intended to set up a triumphal arch in his honour at the Porta Portese, he intimated his desire that they would discontinue the works, since such an erection was heathenish and out of keeping with Christian piety. The deputation of the city magistrates was met with words of encouragement in view of the prevailing pestilence. "The inhabitants," he remarked, "must be of good cheer; he personally would be satisfied with very little."¹

¹ See SANUTO, XXXIII., 428, 431, 435-436; ORTIZ, *Itinerarium*,

Although, at Adrian's express wish, all extravagant display was avoided on his entry into Rome, the inhabitants would not allow themselves to be prevented from decorating their houses with tapestries. Delighted, at the end of nine long months, to look once again upon their Pope, they went out to meet him with acclamations of joy. Adrian was carried as far as the Porta S. Paolo; there he mounted a white charger. At the Church of S. Celso he was met by a procession of children with the picture of the Madonna del Portico, which, during thirteen days, had been carried through Rome on account of the plague. Adrian not only removed his hat, but also his skull-cap, and bent low before the sacred picture, while the Cardinals only slightly uncovered. While the cannon thundered from St. Angelo, the procession wended its way under the burning August sun to the basilica of the Prince of the Apostles. On the following Sunday, the 31st of August, the coronation took place in St. Peter's with the customary ceremonial. On account of the plague the concourse of people was not so great as usual. The festivities, which were carried out with economy, passed off quietly, but the coronation banquet, without being lavish, was not stinted. On rising from table the Pope passed into an adjoining room and conversed with the Cardinals; he then withdrew to his own apartments. LM

The Pope's first edict proscribed under heavy penalties the wearing of arms in the city and banished all disorderly persons from Rome. A second ordinance forbade ecclesiastics to grow beards, a fashion which made them look

✓ = (1) 195 *seqq.*; BREWER, III., 2, n. 2521; NEGRI in Lett. d. princ., I., 107; **Letters of G. de' Medici of August 29 and 31, 1522 (State Archives, Florence); Blasius de Martinellis, *Diarium* in CANCELLIERI, Possessi, 86 *seq.* Cf. HÖFLER, 194 *seq.*; LEPITRE. 210 *seq.*; CREIGHTON, V., 198 *seq.*

more like soldiers than priests. Such simplicity, piety, and determination as were displayed by the new Pope had never before been seen by the members of the Curia.¹ They were in sharp contrast to the excessive display, the brilliant secularity, and the refined culture which had pervaded the court of Leo X.

While the Cardinals, prelates, and courtiers of the last pontificate murmured in secret, unbiassed observers did not refrain from expressing their approval of the new Pope. His exemplary and holy life, his great simplicity, piety, and love of justice made a deep impression even on those who were disposed to watch him with critical eyes.² "Adrian," one of this class reports, "is a friend of learning, especially theology. He cannot suffer ignorant priests. His time is divided with strict regularity between prayer and official work. He has only two personal attendants, Netherlanders and homely fellows; in other respects his retinue is composed of as few persons as is possible." To the Cardinals who begged that he would maintain a household more befitting his rank, he replied that that was impossible until he had first discharged his predecessor's debts. When he was informed that Leo had employed a hundred pala-frenieri, he made the sign of the cross and said that four would suffice for all his needs, but as it was unseemly that he should have fewer than a Cardinal, he would appoint twelve. It was the general opinion that the new Pope's

¹ SANUTO, XXXIII., 429, 431, 437-438; Blasius de Martinellis in GATTICUS, 285 *seqq.*; Ortiz in BURMANN, 195-199: Lett. d. princ., I., 107^b; German accounts in REDLICH, Nürnberg Reichstag, 6; **Letters of G. de' Medici of August 31, 1522, in State Archives, Florence; *Letter of A. Taurelli, August 31, 1522, in State Archives, Modena; *Report of T. Campeggio to Bologna, September 11, 1522, State Archives, Bologna.

² See especially, for what follows, Negri's letter in SANUTO, XXXIII., 429-430; *cf.* Lett. d. princ., I., 108.

outward appearance was at once dignified and agreeable; although he was in his sixty-fourth year he did not look more than sixty. He always spoke Latin and, as the Italians did not fail to remark, correctly, seeing that he was a "barbarian"; his guttural pronunciation gave less satisfaction. In contrast to Leo X.'s love of recreation, it was observed by all that Adrian did not abate, as Pope, his strict mode of living and, as the Venetian Ambassador remarked, set thereby a thoroughly edifying example. V=11

The Spaniard Blasio Ortiz said that he had seen nothing bad in the Pope, who was a mirror of all the virtues.¹ A strict observer of the canonical hours, Adrian rose in the night to say Matins, returned again to his bed, and was up again by daybreak ready to say Mass and attend that of his chaplain. That a Pope should offer the holy sacrifice daily was such an innovation that even chroniclers of a later day call special attention to this evidence of Adrian's piety.² An hour in the forenoon was devoted to audiences, which Adrian usually gave in the study, lined with books, adjoining his bedchamber. His dinner and supper, which he always ate alone, were of the utmost simplicity; a dish of veal or beef, sometimes a soup, sufficed: on fast days he had fish only. On his personal wants he spent as little as possible; ¹¹ it was even said that he ate off small platters like a poor village priest.⁴ An old woman servant, from the Netherlands, looked after the cooking and washing. After his meal he took a siesta, then

¹ BURMANN, 228.

² Cf. LANCELLOTTI, I., 423; cf. *supra*, p. 52.

³ Gradenigo's saying, that Adrian spent only a ducat a day on his meals, is an exaggerated piece of gossip; see in Appendix, No. 19, L. Cati's report of March 21, 1523 (State Archives, Modena).

⁴ This comparison is found in the rare narrative "Wie der hl. Vater B. Adrianus eingeritten ist zu Rom" (1522).

finished what remained to be said of his office, and again gave audiences. Conscientious in the extreme, circumspect and cautious in his dealings, Adrian, suddenly plunged into an entirely new set of circumstances, appeared to be wanting in resolution. It was further deplored that he was disinclined to relax his studious habits, not only of reading but of writing and composing, for these, combined with his love of solitude, made him difficult of access. Moreover, his curt manner of speech was very displeasing to the loquacious Italians.¹ Adrian's capital offence, however, in the eyes of the Curia, lay in his being a foreigner. All Italians of that period prided themselves on their high culture; they looked down with contempt on the natives of all other countries, and specially on the coarse "barbarians" of Germany. And now in Rome, hitherto the centre of the Renaissance of art and letters, one of these barbarians was ruling and would settle the direction Italian politics should follow.

The antagonism of nationality between Adrian and the Italians was further intensified by the circumstance that the Pope was now too far advanced in years to adapt himself to those things around him which were indifferent in themselves and of minor importance. With the speech and social habits of those amongst whom he had come to sojourn he never became familiar;² there was even a touch of pedantry in his obstinate clinging to his former way of living. His long years of professorial duty had cut him off completely from the charm of manner and social address on which the Italians set so much value. Even in Rome he remained the same quiet, dry scholar, devoted

¹ See the Venetian accounts in ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 74 *seq.*, and 112; JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.

² Adrian always spoke in Latin (see *Report by Bart. Prosperi, September 21, 1522), as he was not sufficiently acquainted with Italian (see *letter of Enea Pio, October 5, 1522, State Archives, Modena).

to the seclusion of his study and easily put out of humour by the bustle of general society. The homeliness of Adrian's person and his austere asceticism compared with Leo X., presented a contrast a greater than which it is impossible to conceive. This contrast, conspicuous from every point of view, was especially noticeable in Adrian's attitude towards the culture of the Italian Renaissance.

All persons of culture were then filled with enthusiasm for the art of antiquity. But Adrian, whose turn of mind was pre-eminently serious and unimpassioned, was so absolutely insensible to such forms of beauty that he looked upon them merely as the debris of paganism. To his exclusively religious temperament the array of gleaming marbles set up by his predecessors in the Belvedere afforded not the slightest interest. When the group of the Laocöon,¹ then considered the most remarkable of these works of art, was pointed out to him, he observed in his dry manner: "After all, they are only the effigies of heathen idols." This might be regarded as merely a bit of gossip if the anecdote were not well authenticated.² "He will soon," said Girolamo Negri, Cardinal Cornaro's secretary, "be doing as Gregory the Great did, and order the antique statuary to be burned into lime for the building of St. Peter's."³ As a matter of fact, he sold some antiques,⁴ and had all the entrances to the Belvedere

¹ *Opus omnibus et picturae et statuariae artis praeponendum, says Tizio, *Hist. Senen., *loc. cit.* (Chigi Library, Rome).

² Not only by JOVIUS (Vita Adriani VI.), whose authority would not be sufficient, but by G. Negri in his letter, March 17, 1523, Lett. d. Princ., I., 113.

³ Lett. d. princ., 113.

⁴ I take this from Gabbioneta's *report. On July 27, 1523, he reports that he had thanked the Pope "per el dono delle imagine marmoree," and that Adrian had replied "Fecimus libenter et libentissime." On

walled up save one, the key of which he kept in his own custody.¹

The magnificent art of the Renaissance also seemed to be a closed book to Adrian. The continuation of the paintings in the Hall of Constantine was stopped,² and Raphael's pupils had to seek employment elsewhere.³ And yet Adrian was not totally wanting in artistic culture;⁴ but to his northern taste the Italian art of the Renaissance was unpalatable. He ordered a Dutch painter, Jan Scorel,⁵

October 29 Gabbioneta writes : *Mando per doi garzioni del Furia la tavola marmorea, la qual donò papa Adriano (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. also GAYE, II., 155.

¹ Cf. the Venetian narrative in ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 114.

² A *Letter of Castiglione's, December 21, 1521 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), shows how certainly the completion of this work was counted on.

³ Vasari has many hard things to say of Adrian on this account. His statement that the latter had compared the Sixtine Chapel to a bathing-place full of naked figures, and had expressed his intention of tearing the pictures down, is sufficiently suspect in view of the silence of Giovio, who was unfriendly to Adrian VI. Since CROWE-CAVALCASELLE (VI., 399 *seq.*) and STEINMANN (Sixtinische Kapelle, II., 231-515) give credence to Vasari, I call attention to the fact that none of the envoys to the Papal Court mention any such circumstance. The Mantuan agents, who showed so much interest in matters of art, would certainly have informed their court if the Pope had a design of this sort in mind. The whole story is either a fable of Vasari's or an invention of Adrian's numerous enemies.

⁴ MÜNTZ, *Hist. de l'Art*, III., 37, seems to believe this. He is also wrong in calling Adrian "ennemi des lettres et des livres" in his *Bibl. du Vatican*, 64; cf. also *Giorn. di lett. Ital.*, IX., 453.

⁵ Cf. HANN, *Meister Jan Scorel und das Obervellacher Altarbild*, Klagenfurt, 1888; TOMAN, *Studien über J. Scorel*, Leipzig, 1889; *Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst*, XXI., 83 *seq.*; GRÄVENITZ, *Deutsche in Rom.*, 109; see JACKSCH, *Die Scorelsche Altartafel zu Obervellach*, Klagenfurt, 1890; JANSSEN-PASTOR, VI., 12th edit., 109 *seq.*; JANITSCHKE, *Geschichte der Malerei*, 521; WURZBACH, *Gesch. der holländ.*

to paint his portrait.¹ Moreover, his interest in the progress of the reconstruction of St. Peter's² was sincere, although here again his point of view was religious rather than artistic. Another circumstance which contradicts the notion that Adrian held uncivilized views about art is the fact that, in spite of his monetary distress, he redeemed the tapestries of Raphael which had been pledged on the death of Leo X.,³ and restored them once more to the Sixtine Chapel on the anniversary celebration of his coronation.⁴

Malerei (1885), 62, who, however, is hardly able to adduce proof for his statement that Adrian had appointed Scorel "director of his art treasures."

¹ ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 205. There is at the present time a portrait of Adrian by Scorel in the Senate Hall of the University of Louvain. Another, attributed to Scorel, in the Museum, Utrecht. Cf. *Zeitschr. für bildende Kunst*, XVIII., 51 *seqq.*; see also MOES, *Iconogr. Batava*, I., 4; *Jahrb. der preuss. Kunstsamml.*, I., 197, and the "Adler" periodical, 1882, 26, quoted above, p. 35, note 1. In the Rijks Museum in Amsterdam there is a life-size portrait (No. 539) of Adrian VI. in full pontificals. This is a copy of an original portrait in the National Museum at the Hague; see BREDIUS, *Catalog. d. Schilderijen in het Rijks-Museum te Amsterdam*, Amsterdam, 1887, 68. The portrait of the Pope presented to the Cathedral Chapter of Utrecht is copied in Burmann edited by Moring. That in the gallery of Naples, the so-called Adrian, is a picture of Clement VII.; see WICKHOFF in the *Kunstgeschichtl. Anz.*, 1904, 98. Adrian's noble and venerable traits are strikingly reproduced in one of his medals. There is a fine specimen in the Cabinet of Coins in Vienna. For coins and medals of Adrian see CINAGLI, 89 *seq.*; KÖHLER, *Eine Münze Papst Hadrians VI.*, Nürnberg, 1730; and ARMAND, II., 114 *seq.*, III., 144, 198 *seq.*

² Cf. SANUTO, XXXIII., 438, and *letter of G. M. della Porta, October 1, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Cf. our remarks, Vol. VIII. of this work, p. 298.

⁴ This hitherto unknown fact has come to light through a *Report of L. Cati, dated Rome, September 2, 1523, part of which, unfortunately,

Adrian was not at home amidst the splendour of the Vatican, and from the first had felt disinclined to occupy it. He wished to have, as a dwelling, a simple house with a garden. The Imperial Ambassador reports with amazement this strange project of the newly elected Pope to whom God had given the noblest palaces in Rome.¹ No small astonishment was likewise caused by Adrian's abstention from any signs of favour towards the swarm of accomplished poets and humanists with whom Leo X. had been so much associated. Although not indifferent to the elegance of a fine Latin style, the practical Netherlander thought little of the gifts of the versifiers; he even sought opportunities for evincing his contempt for them. On appointing Paolo Giovio to a benefice at Como, the Pope remarked that he conferred this distinction upon him because Giovio was an historian and not a poet. What Adrian took especial exception to in the humanist poets of his day was the lax habit of life of the majority, and their frivolous coquetry with the spirit of heathen mythology. Leo X., in his enthusiastic admiration of beauty, had overlooked such excrescences; the serious-minded Teuton rightly judged them by a standard of much greater severity.² Yet his reaction was carried too far. He discriminated too little between the good and the bad elements in humanism; even Sadoletto, with his excellence and piety, found no favour in his eyes. He caused simple amazement by his depreciatory criticism of

has been destroyed by fire. The following, however, is legible: *N. S^{re} cossi come ha facto de l' altre cose recuperato da quelli mercatanti, cossi anche ha voluto mostrar quelle cortine, che fece far papa Leone secondo un disegno di Raphael d' Urbino et a quella proxima capella le ha fatto metter fuori. State Archives, Modena.

¹ BERGENROTH, II., n. 392.

² JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.; Schulte, I., 230.

the letters, the theme of general admiration, remarking that they were letters of a poet.¹

Adrian was completely a stranger in the midst of the intellectual culture of which Leo's reign had been the culminating point. His entrance into Rome was followed by an abrupt transition, all the more strongly felt since the Medici Pope had flung himself without reserve into every tendency of the Renaissance. Loud were the laments over the new era and its transformation of the Vatican, once echoing with the voices of literature and art, into a silent cloister. All Adrian's admirable qualities were forgotten; he was looked upon only as a foreigner, alien to the arts, manners, and politics of Italy, and his detachment from the literati and artists of Italy was not merely the outcome of a want of intelligent sympathy with the Renaissance; the shortness of his reign and his financial difficulties hindered him from the exercise of any liberal patronage.² His contemporaries shut their eyes to this

¹ Negri in *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 113, who sees in this expression a "beffeggiare della eloquenza." How little Adrian's earnestness was appreciated by the orators of the day is shown by the **Oratio de passione Domini* in *Cod. Vat.*, 8106, f. 53 *seq.* (Vatican Library), in which the apostrophe "Te dive Adriane" occurs, an expression which must certainly have been abhorrent to the Pope. Still more so were the unmeasured praises of Balbi (*Zeitschr. für schles. Gesch.*, XIX., 169). An oration and a sermon delivered before Adrian VI. exist in very rare copies: 1. Barth. Arnolphini *Oratio habita in publ. consist. ad Adrianum VI. P. M. pro obedientia reipubl. Lucen.*; s.l. et a. 2. De Christi passione oratio Io. Mariae archiepiso Sipontini habita in sacello pontif. ad Hadrianum VI. P. M. ac ampliss. card. senatum 1523, III. Non. April. Romae, 1597. The **Oratio Raynaldi Petruccii ad Adrianum VI.* on the occasion of the homage of the Sienese in *Cod. Vat.*, 3578 (Vatican Library).

² Müntz informed me in 1900 that in the accounts of Adrian VI. he had only found one entry of expenditure on art; but that was one highly characteristic of this pious Pope. *In October 1522 he paid a gold-

impossibility; they laid all the blame on the "barbarism" of the foreigner.

Nor was less offence taken at his foreign surroundings.

smith "per fare due angeli et una corona a la nostra donna." I also found in *Div. cam., 71, f. 226^b, of the Sec. Arch. of the Vatican, a *permit of the chamberlain's to Evangelista de Torquatis civ. Rom. D. Romae in cam. apost., 18 Julii 1523, pontif. Adriano VI. pro abstergenda, decoranda et siligenda via S. Spiritus de urbe. Cf. the permit of July 24, 1523, in Div. cam., 74, f. 34. MOLL, Kerkhist. Archief, II., 45, mentions an organ sent by Adrian VI. to the Netherlands. The arms of Adrian VI. on the façade of the Palazzo Pubblico at Foligno appear to indicate that he had been a supporter of the building in some way. Literary dedications to Adrian VI. are not numerous; together with the work of Cardinal Cajetan mentioned above, p. 26, n. 4, and the writing of Guilielmus Valla Rhegiensis on the Exarchate of Italy, which H. SAUER (Göttingen Diss., 1905) has recently discussed (to the MSS. mentioned here, on p. 16, must be added: Ottob. 2521, Urb., 813, f. 1 *seq.*, and 864, f. 273 *seqq.*, Barb., XXXIII., 97), must be added a composition of Hochstraten's against Luther (see LÄMMER, Vortrid. Theol., 17), as well as one of Eck's (HÖFLER, 323), Thomas Illyricus (Franciscan), Libellus de potest. s. pontificis, Taurini, 1523 (with dedication of November 12, 1552), Petri Martyris De insul. in mari Oceano a F. Cortesio rept. (*Cod. Vatic., 5795), and Ioh. Ant. Flaminii Epistola ad Adrianum VI., dat. Bononiae, 1523, xv. Cal. Martii (original dedication copy in *Cod. Vat., 7754, Vatican Library). In a letter *dated December 21, 1522, V. Albergati mentions the dedication of another book by Flaminio, a defence of Christianity against Judaism, and the payment of the author by the Pope (State Archives, Bologna). The monk Romulus de S. Cruce (Fabrianen.) dedicated to Adrian VI. the Liber Alberti Magni de ordine universi (original dedication copy in *Cod. Vat., 3739, Vatican Library). Also in Cod. Ottob., 888: *Gregorii Mutinen monachi opusculum adversus negantes Petrum Romae fuisse, dedicated to Adrian VI. See also G. Cortesius, de Itinere Rom. S. Petri ad Adr. VI. (Opera Cort., I., 213 *seq.*). For the oration of George Sauermann, dedicated to the German Pope, see Zeitschrift für schles. Gesch., XIX., 167 *seq.*; for Ferreri's writing see *infra*, p. 91, note 2. For the Pope's request to Pagnini to undertake a translation of the Bible, cf. WETZER and

Adrian at first recruited his bodyguard¹ from the Spaniards as well as the Swiss.² The castellan of St. Angelo was a Spaniard.³ The Pope's domestic servants, whose numbers were reduced within the limits of strict necessity, were also chiefly composed of non-Italians. Thus the hopes of Leo's numerous retainers of all ranks of continuing in busy idleness were disappointed. The chief objects of complaint and ridicule were the Pope's servants from the Low Countries,⁴ who contributed not a little to estrange the feelings of those around them. Even before Adrian's arrival in Rome, his court was contemptuously spoken of as a collection of insignificant persons.⁵ In reality, the Pope's three principal advisers were men of excellent character and no mean endowments.⁶

This was especially the case with Wilhelm van Enkevort, a native of Mierlo in North Brabant, who, attached to Adrian by a friendship of many years' standing, had entered the Papal Chancery under Julius II. and subsequently became Scriptor apostolic, Protonotary, and Procurator in Rome for Charles V. In character Enkevort presented many points of resemblance with the Pope; like the latter he had a warm affection for his native land, his piety was

WELTE, *Kirchenlex.*, II., 2 edit., 738. Bat. Fiera dedicated his poem *de homine to Adrian and received a letter of thanks; see DONESMONDI, *Ist. eccl. di Mantova*, II., 140 *seq.*; TIRABOSCHI, VII., 2, 16, and 3, 167, 208; *Giorn. d. lett. Ital.*, XXXIV., 54-55.

¹ TIZIO, *Hist. Senen., *loc. cit.* (Chigi Library, Rome).

² Cf. Anz. f. schweiz. Gesch., 1886, 36.

³ *Letter of T. Campeggio, September 27, 1522, State Archives, Bologna. Cf. the **brief of September 24, 1522, to Ruffo Teodoli, Div. cam., LXXIV., 6, in the Secret Archives of the Vatican.

⁴ Cf. for this BERGENROTH, II., n. 490, 540.

⁵ *Con S. S^{ta} non intendo sia huomini di molta auctorità ne intelligentia. G. de' Medici on August 27, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁶ See SCHULTE, I., 230. Cf. also SCHMIDLIN, 276.

genuine, and he was of studious habits and gentle disposition.¹ One of Adrian's first acts was to bestow the important post of Datary on this old friend,² who was of proved responsibility and thoroughly versed in Roman affairs. Enkevoirt had before this been described as one with Adrian in heart and soul,³ and with a zeal which often overstepped due limits, took pains to assert his position as first and foremost of the Pope's confidential advisers.⁴ Besides Enkevoirt, Dietrich von Heeze, Johann Winkler, and Johann Ingenwinkel had free access to the Pope. The last named, from the lower Rhineland, was a man of great ability, who knew how to retain office and confidence under Clement VII.; he died as Datary of the second Medici Pope.⁵ Johann Winkler was born in Augsburg.

¹ The earlier literature on Enkevoirt in BURMANN, 44, notes. Cf. also the important essay of ROIJAARDS, Kard. Willem. v. Enkevoirt, in *Archief v. kerkelijke geschied.*, IX. (1838), 119-231, overlooked by HÖFLER and SCHMIDLIN, 265 *seq.*, and F. HAUPTMANN in *Bonner Archiv*, IV. (1892), 37, 64 *seq.*, 96 *seq.* See also *Regesta Leonis X.*, n. 8285, 8303, 17716; *Lib. confrat. de Anima*, 20; PICKS *Zeitschr.*, 7-9, Heft, 417; GRÄVENITZ, *Deutsche in Rom.*, 130 *seq.*; SCHULTE, *Fugger, passim*; DUMONT, *Gesch. der Pfarreien der Erzd. Köln*, XXIV., Köln, 1885, 335; *Zeitschr. des Aachener Geschichts-vereins*, XVIII., 320 *seq.*, XIX., 2, 116; KALKOFF, *Aleander*, 65, n. 1; PAQUIER, *Aléandre*, 285; DE WAAL, *Campo Santo*, 101; PETENEGG, *Urk. des Deutschen Ordens*, 620; *Archief v. Haarlem*, XI., XIII.; PERICOLI, *S. Maria d. Consolaz*, 119.

² "Amicus meus antiquus et precipuus" he is called by Adrian in a brief of February 18, 1522; SANUTO, XXXIII., 79. The above-mentioned appointment of Enkevoirt as Datary, which Manuel had already recommended on January 11, 1522 (GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 8), is announced by G. de' Medici in a letter *of August 27, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

³ "Corculi et animae dimidium." Aleander to Enkevoirt, *MAI, Spicil.*, II., 235.

⁴ Cf. *infra*, pp. 87, 122.

⁵ SCHULTE, I., 231.

burg; he had already, under Leo X., been notary of the Rota, and died, at the beginning of Paul III.'s pontificate, a rich and distinguished prelate.¹

If Winkler, like Ingenwinkel, showed an undue anxiety to take care of his own interests in the matter of benefices, Dirk (Dietrich) van Heeze, on the contrary, was a thoroughly unselfish and high-minded personality. Originally a friend of Erasmus, Heeze, at a later period, did not follow the great scholar on the path which, in some respects, was so open to question, but took up a decided position on behalf of reform on strong Catholic lines. Heeze, who was extolled by his contemporaries for profound learning, modesty, piety, and earnestness of moral character, was placed by Adrian at the head of the Chancery as private secretary; it cost him some trouble to make himself at home in the processes of preparing and sending forth the Papal briefs.² After his patron's early death he left the Curia and returned to his own country, and died at Liège as Canon of St. Lambert's.³ Apart from these fellow-country-

¹ For Winkler *cf.* BERGENROTH, II., n. 490, 502; KALKOFF, Aleander, 202, n. 1. G. M. della Porta announces in a *letter of September 23, 1522 (State Archives, Florence) that Adrian had appointed "Giovan Vincle" a "referendario," and that the latter had influence. Peregrino mentions the death of "Giovanni Vincleer," in a *report to the Marquis of Mantua, dated Rome, July 22, 1535, as having taken place on the previous day; Winkler held many benefices and left 20,000 ducats. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² This is evident from the two samples given by G. M. della Porta in a *letter of September 23, 1522; otherwise Heeze is also here spoken of as "bona et santissima persona." State Archives, Florence.

³ For Van Heeze see BURMANN, 70, note; Archief v. kerkelijke geschied., IX. (1838), 119 *seq.*; BERGENROTH, II., n. 540, 543; DE RAM in *Annuaire de l'Université de Louvain*, 1862, 273 *seq.*; REUSENS in the *Biogr. Nat.*, IX., 336 *seq.*; DE RAM in *Bullet. de la Commiss. d'hist.*, 2 Series, XI., 61 *seq.*, XII., 271; v. DOMARUS in *Hist. Jahrb.*

men, however, Adrian also honoured with his confidence some Spaniards, such as Blasio Ortiz, and several Italians; the Bishops of Feltre and Castellamare, Tommaso Campeggio,¹ and Pietro Fiori, and especially Giovanni Ruffo Teodoli, Archbishop of Cosenza.² Girolamo Ghinucci³ became an Auditor of the Camera. The Italian, Cardinal Campeggio, was also frequently selected by the Pope for important transactions.⁴ All this the courtiers of Leo X. entirely overlooked in order to vent their dislike of the Netherlanders:⁵ "Men as stupid as stones."⁶ Almost all the Italians were as unfriendly to these trusted councillors of the Pope, whose names they could never pronounce aright, as they were to the "foreign" Pontiff

XVI., 72 *seq.*; BACHA in *Compte rendu de la commiss. d'hist.*, XVII., Bruxelles, 1890, 125 *seq.*, and especially the valuable treatise, almost unknown to Germans, of ALLARD, Dirk Adriaansz van Heeze, Utrecht, 1884. *Cf.* also ALLARD, Hezius en Erasmus, Utrecht, 1884; PIEPER in *Hist. Jahrb.*, XVI., 779 *seq.*

¹ V. Alberghati, in a *letter of January 3, 1523, calls him a "prelato di bontà, virtù et dottrina" (State Archives, Bologna).

² *Cf.* UGHELLI, V., 377; VI., 622; IX., 259. G. Ruffo Teodoli was summoned to the Pope by a *brief, dated Caesareaugustae, April 2, 1522 (Cod. 1888, f. 21, Angelica Library, Rome). G. de' Medici had already announced, in a *letter of August 27, 1522, that this prelate would have great influence (State Archives, Florence). See also BERGENROTH, II., n. 502. To Ruffo Teodoli the rare work of Ant. Pontus, *Rhomitypion Romae* (A. Bladus), 1524, is dedicated.

³ For Ghinucci see Vol. VII. of this work, p. 363, and UGHELLI, I., 471; many considered that for a long time he had the greatest influence, next to Enkevoirt and Heeze. See ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 76.

⁴ *Cf.* BREWER, III., 2, n. 2506.

⁵ As early as September 26, 1522, G. M. della Porta was complaining of Enkevoirt's great influence. He gives the Pope "molte mali consigli." *Hora tutti due (Enkevoirt and Winkler) sono odiati già da ognuno (State Archives, Florence).

⁶ *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 108.

himself, whose earnestness and moderation they would not understand. They distrusted their influence and pursued them with their hatred.¹ The poet Berni expressed the general opinion in his satirical lines :

“Ecco che personaggi, ecco che corte
 Che brigate galante cortegiane :
 Copis, Vincl, Corizio et Trincheforte !
 Nome di for isbigottir un cane.”²

The repugnance to the stranger Pope grew into bitter hatred the further Adrian advanced his plans for a thorough reform of the secularized Curia. Had it not been for this project, his native origin and character would have been as readily forgiven him as had once been the Spanish traits and Spanish surroundings of Alexander VI. Ortiz hit the mark exactly when he fixed on the efforts at reform as the seed-plot of all the odium aroused against Adrian VI.³

¹ Cf. the *letter of G. M. della Porta, dated Rome, September 23, 1522 (State Archives, Florence). Already, on December 29, 1522, Enkevoirt and Heeze had been officially honoured by receiving the Roman citizenship. Other Netherlands also were made Roman citizens at that time ; see *Nuova Antologia*, 3 Series, LI., 238.

² BERNI, *Rime*, ed. Virgili, 32. Cf. VILLARI, *Machiavelli*, III., 118.

³ See HÖFLER, 208.

CHAPTER III.

ADRIAN VI. AS A REFORMER AND ECCLESIASTICAL RULER.

BEFORE he reached Italy Adrian had already announced by his words and actions his intention of encountering with all his energy the many and grave disorders in religion. The numerous memorials and offers of advice addressed to him immediately after his election show what high hopes had been set on him as a reformer, and to what an extent his intentions in this respect had been anticipated. A number of these documents have been preserved. They differ much in their value and their contents; but all recognize the existence of grievous abuses.

The "Apocalypsis" of Cornelius Aurelius, Canon of Gouda, is unusually comprehensive and highly rhetorical. This strange document outspokenly describes, in the form of a dialogue, the scandalous lives of the clergy, especially of the Cardinals, the abuses at Rome, with particular reference to those of the Rota, and expresses the confident expectation that reform would proceed from Adrian, of all men the most just, the chastiser of wrongdoers, the light of the world, the hammer of tyrants, the priest of the Most High. As the essential means of restoring discipline the writer calls in burning words for the summoning of a general council such as Adrian himself had already advocated when a professor at Louvain.¹

¹ *Apocalypsis et visio mirabilis super miserabili statu matris ecclesiae*, etc., in BURMANN, 259-316.

A similar standpoint was taken in the memorial of Joannes Ludovicus Vives, the distinguished humanist who, by birth a Spaniard, had, through long years of residence in Louvain and Bruges, become almost a Netherlander, and was among the number of Adrian's friends. With sound Catholic views, Vives, who had distinguished himself by his writings on educational and politico-social subjects, was not blind to the transgressions of the clergy.¹ In a document issued at Louvain in October 1522, he takes as his text the sentence of Sallust, that no Government can be maintained save only by those means by which it was established. Vives requires that the Pope shall, in the sphere of politics, restore the peace of Christendom, and in that of religion institute a radical reform of the clergy. The latter can only be reached by a general council wherein all, even the most hidden and therefore most dangerous evils, must come to light. If other Popes had avoided a general council as though it had been poison, Adrian must not shrink from one. Even if the existing tempest had not broken loose, the assembling of a council, at which the principal matters to be dealt with, would not be theoretical questions but the practical reform of morals, would have been necessary; the religious controversy could be relegated to profes-

¹ For Vivès compare NAMÈCHE in *Mém. couron.* p. l'Acad. Roy., XV., Bruxelles, 1841; FRANCKEN, L. Vives, Rotterdam, 1853; Vives' works, translated, with treatise on his life, by WYCHGRAM, Vienna, 1883; ARNAUD, *Quid de pueris institut. senserit L. Vives*, Paris, 1888; HAUSE, *Die Pädagogik des L. Vives*, Erlangen, 1891; VADIER, J. L. Vives, Genève, 1892; F. KAYSER in the *Bibl. für kathol. Pädagogik*, VIII., Freiburg, 1896; KUYPERS, *Vives in seiner Pädagogik*, Leipzig, 1897; BRÖRING, *Die Dialoge des J. L. Vives*, Oldenburg, 1897; LECIGNE, *Quid de reb. polit. senserit J. L. Vives*, Paris, 1898. WÜRKERL, *Die Schrift des L. Vives über die Armenpflege* (Progr.), Pirna, 1902; WEISSMANN, *Die soziale Bedeutung des Humanisten L. Vives*, Erlangen, 1905.

sional scholars and experts.¹ In giving this advice, Vives certainly overlooked the fact that the Lutheran controversy had long since passed from the academic to the popular stage,² that the denial of the most important articles of belief would compel any council to declare its mind, and, finally, that the new teachers themselves were demanding a conciliar decision. The best and the most practical advice as regards reform reached Adrian from Rome itself. Two Cardinals, Schinner and Campeggio, there spoke openly and, with an exhaustive knowledge of the circumstances, explained the conditions under which the much-needed reforms could be effected. Schinner's report, dated the 1st of March 1522, is, unfortunately, only preserved in an abstract prepared for Adrian;³ this is much to be regretted, for in the fuller document his carefully considered counsels on the political as well as the ecclesiastical situation were imparted in the most comprehensive way. Schinner first of all urges a speedy departure for Rome, otherwise a Legate must be appointed; but in no case should the Sacred College be allowed to represent the Pope. Other suggestions concerned the maintenance of the States of the Church and the restoration of peace to Christendom. As the enemy of France, Schinner advised the conclusion of a close alliance with the Emperor and the Kings of England and Portugal, since the French must be kept at a distance from Italy, otherwise it would be impossible to take any steps against the Turks. To relieve the financial distress, Adrian should borrow from the King of England 200,000 ducats.

"If your Holiness," he says further, "wishes to govern in

¹ VIVES, Opera II., 834 *seq.*; BURMANN, 456 *seqq.*

² HÖFLER, 29 *seqq.*, and 360.

³ See the text in *Cod. Vatic., 3924, and Appendix, No. 3 (Vatican Library).

reality, you must not attach yourself to any Cardinal in particular, but treat all alike, and then give the preference to the best. On this point more can be said hereafter by word of mouth, as there would be danger in committing such confidential matter to paper." Trustworthy officials are to be recommended to the Pope in Rome by Schinner and Enkevort; for the present his attention is called to Jacob Bomisius as Secretary, and to Johann Betchen of Cologne as Subdatary. Hereupon follows the programme for the reform of the Curia. As regards the reductions in the *famiglie* of the Cardinals, the Pope is to set a good example by keeping up as small a Court as possible. The sale of offices, especially those of court chaplains and Abbreviators, must be done away with; the number of Penitentiaries and Referendaries reduced; and both these classes, as well as persons employed in the Rota, have fixed salaries assigned to them. The officials of the Rota may receive fees not exceeding, under penalty of dismissal, the sum of two ducats; the same scale to apply to the Penitentiaries; should the latter receive more from the faithful, the surplus shall go to the building fund of St. Peter's. The Papal scribes are to keep themselves strictly within the limits of the taxes as assessed. The river tax is to be reduced by one-half, whereby an impetus will be given to trade; under no circumstances is this tax any longer to be farmed. The numerous purchasable posts established by Leo X. are simply abolished.

The "Promemoria" sent by Cardinal Campeggio to the Pope in Spain¹ called for not less decisive measures;

¹ Discovered and published by HÖFLER in the Abhandl. der Münch. Akad., IV., 3, 62-89 (*cf.* Adrian VI., 210 *seq.*), but erroneously attributed to Egidius Canisius. Friedensburg established the real authorship in the Zeitschrift für deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft, N.F., I. (Vierteljahrshefte, 1896-7), 71 *seqq.* Höfler also found that the copy contained

apart from recommendations concerning the States of the Church, this document deals exclusively with the removal of ecclesiastical abuses; here, however, the advice is so uncompromising that it must be distinguished as the most radical programme of reform put forward at this critical time. With a noble candour and a deep knowledge of his subject, he exposes, without palliation, the abuses of the Roman Curia. His position is that of a staunch Churchman; the authority of the Holy See is based on divine institution; if, in virtue of this authority, all things are possible to the Pope, all things are not permissible. Since the source of the evil is to be traced back to the Roman Curia, in the Roman Curia the foundations of reform must be laid.

In the first place, Campeggio desires a reform of Church patronage. A stop must be put to the abuse of conferring benefices without the consent of the patrons; to the plurality of livings, a custom having its origin in covetousness and ambition; to the scandalous system of "commendams," and finally, to the taxation known as "compositio," an impost which had brought upon the Holy See the odium of princes and had furnished heretical teachers with a pointed weapon of attack. Campeggio points to the absolute necessity of a limitation of the powers of the Dataria, the officials of which were often as insatiable as leeches. The reservation of benefices must be entirely abolished, unless some case of the most exceptional kind should occur; those which were already sanctioned, however, were to be strictly maintained; every opportunity for illicit profit on the part of officials must be cut off. He lays down sound principles with regard to the bestowal of patronage. The personal qualifications of a candidate in the *Cod. Vatic., 6222, f. 79 *seq.*, in the Vatican Library, was better than that in the State Library, Munich.

should be considered as well as the peculiar circumstances of a diocese; foreigners ought not to be preferred to native candidates; appointments should in all cases be given to men of wholly virtuous and worthy character. Special sorrow is expressed over the many conventions, agreements, and concordats with secular princes whereby the greater part of the spiritual rights and concerns of the Holy See have been withdrawn from its authority. Although Campeggio in the very interests of ecclesiastical dignity and freedom recommends the utmost possible restriction of the concessions which earlier Popes had made through greed or ignorance, he is yet careful to exhort great circumspection and moderation in approaching this delicate ground.

In the second place, he denounces the gross abuses arising from the indiscriminate issue of indulgences. On this point he suggests, without qualification, important limitations, especially with regard to the grant of indulgences to the Franciscan Order and the special privileges relating to confession. The approaching year of Jubilee offers a fitting opportunity for sweeping changes in this matter. The rebuilding of St. Peter's, a debt of honour for every Pontiff, need not be hindered on this account; Christian Princes must be called upon to pay a yearly contribution towards its completion.

In a third section the "Promemoria" considers the general interests of the Christian Church; the return of the Bohemians to unity; the restoration of peace, especially between Charles V. and Francis I., in order to promote a crusade against the Turks, in which Russia also must be induced to join; finally, the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy by the fulfilment of the terms of the Edict of Worms.

Campeggio's memorial also pleads for a thorough reform

of the judicial courts. In future, let all causes be referred to the ordinary courts, without any private intervention of the Pope in this domain. The judges of the Rota, where bad, should be replaced by good; the auditors' salaries should be fixed, and the charges for despatches, which had risen to an exorbitant excess, must be cut down and settled at a fixed scale. Similar reforms are recommended for the tribunal of the Auditor of the Camera. Supplementary proposals are added concerning a reform of the Senate, of the Judges of the Capitol, of the city Governors, Legates, and other officials of the States of the Church. Last of all, means are suggested for alleviating the financial distress. The Cardinal deprecates an immediate suspension of those offices which Leo X. had created in exchange for money, since such a proceeding might shake men's confidence in Papal promises; he advocates a gradual suppression and their exchange for benefices. Further recommendations have reference to the appointment of a finance committee of Cardinals, the sequestration of the first year's rents of all vacant benefices, and the levy of a voluntary tax on the whole of Christendom. Other proposals Campeggio keeps in reserve for oral communication.

Bitter lamentations over Rome as the centre of all evil are also contained in another letter through which Zaccaria da Rovigo endeavoured indirectly to influence Adrian VI. Here the principal abuse inveighed against is the appointment of young and inexperienced men to Church dignities, even bishoprics; this paper, composed at the moment of the Pope's arrival, also exhorts him to be sparing in the distribution of privileges and indulgences.¹ An anonymous admonition, also certainly intended

¹ *Letter of Zaccaria da Rovigo to Carastosa da Agrado (*cf.* FEA, Notizie, 67) in Cod. Vatic., 3588 (Vatican Library).

for Adrian, singles out, as the most important and necessary matter for reform, the episcopal duty of residence in the diocese. Henceforth Cardinals should not receive bishoprics as sources of revenue. Their incomes should be fixed at a sum ranging from 4000 to 5000 ducats, and a Cardinal-Protector should be given to each country. The author advocates a strict process of selection in appointing members of the Sacred College; their number should be diminished, for thereby unnecessary expenditure would be avoided and the respect due to the Cardinalate increased. The importance of appointing good bishops, intending to reside in their sees, is justly enforced. Under pain of eternal damnation, says the writer, the Pope is bound to appoint shepherds, not wolves. As regards the inferior clergy, he lays stress on the necessity for a careful choice of priests anxious for the souls of their people, performing their functions in person, and not by deputy, and faithful in all their duties, especially that of preaching.¹

By these and other communications² Adrian was accurately informed of the true state of things and of the existing scandals, as well as of the means for their removal. Having had experience in Spain of the success of a legitimate Church reform, working from within, he was determined to bring all his energies to bear in grappling with a decisive improvement in Rome itself, on the principle of ancient discipline, and extending this amelioration to the whole Church. He had hardly set foot in Rome before he removed all doubt as to his intentions of reform by appointing Cardinal Campeggio to the

¹ * *Consilium dat. summo pontifici super reform. christ.*, in *Cod. Vatic.*, 3917 *seq.*, 20 *seq.* (Vatican Library).

² The composition of L. Ferreri, *De reformatione ecclesiae suasoria . . . ad Hadrianum VI.*, which I only know from MORSOLIN, Ferreri, 116 *seq.*, may well belong to this period.

Segnatura della Justizia, and nominating Enkevoirt as Datary.¹ He also soon addressed the Cardinals in no uncertain language. In his first Consistory, on the 1st of September 1522, he made a speech which caused general astonishment. He had not sought the tiara, he declared, but had accepted it as a heavy burden since he recognized that God had so willed it. Two things lay at his heart before all others: the union of Christian princes for the overthrow of the common enemy, the Turk, and the reform of the Roman Curia. In both these affairs he trusted that the Cardinals would stand by him, as the relief of Hungary, then sorely threatened by the Sultan, and of the knights of Rhodes, admitted of as little delay as the removal of the grievous ecclesiastical disorders in Rome. Going more closely into the latter question, Adrian cited the example of the Jews, who, when they refused to amend, were constantly visited by fresh judgments. Thus was it with Christendom at that hour. The evil had reached such a pitch that, as St. Bernard says, those who were steeped in sins could no longer perceive the stench of their iniquities. Throughout the whole world the ill repute of Rome was talked of. He did not mean to say that in their own lives the Cardinals displayed these vices, but within their palaces iniquity stalked unpunished; this must not so continue. Accordingly, he implores the Cardinals to banish from their surroundings all elements of corruption, to put away their extravagant luxury, and to content themselves with an income of, at the utmost, 6000 ducats. It must be their sacred duty to give a good example to the world, to bethink themselves of the honour and welfare of the Church, and to rally round him in carrying out the necessary measures of reform.

¹ Cf. the **letter of G. de' Medici of August 29, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

The Pope, according to a foreign envoy, made use of such strong expressions that all who heard him were astonished; he rebuked the ways of living at the Roman Court in terms of severity beyond which it would be impossible to go. A lively discussion thereupon arose, since, as the Venetian Ambassador declares, there were a score of Cardinals who considered themselves second to none in the whole world. The Pope's strongest complaints were probably aimed at the Rota, where the administration of justice was a venal business. On this point it was decided, most probably on the advice of Schinner, to take prohibitive measures at once; any Auditor who should in future be guilty of illegality, especially in the matter of fees, was to be liable to peremptory dismissal.¹

The Curia realized very soon that Adrian was the man to thoroughly carry out his projects of reform. The Cardinals in Curia, who had taken up their residence in the Vatican, were obliged to leave; only Schinner, whose name was identified with the programme of reform, was allowed to remain.² To Cardinal Cibo, a man of immoral

¹ Along with the version of the Pope's speech in *Cod. Vatic., 3920, f. 103 *seq.*, of the Vatican Library, see Acta Consist., printed by LAEMMER, Melet, 201-202 (after moribus, curiae is here omitted), and the account in SANUTO, XXXIII., 433, 440, giving important additions to this very summary report, as well as in Appendix, 7 and 9, the *reports of G. de' Medici of September 1, and of G. M. della Porta of September 6, 1522 (State Archives, Florence). See also BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS, *Diarium in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, and Cod. Barb., lat. 2799, of the Vatican Library.

² Besides BREWER, III., 2, n. 2611, *cf.* the *letter of G. M. della Porta of September 4, 1522: *Il papa non ha restituito ad alcun cardinale stanze in palazzo salvo che a Sedonense (State Archives, Florence). G. Merino, Archbishop of Bari, writes on September 20, 1522, ex Puyi non procul a Parisiis, to Schinner: *Gaudeo vehementer

character, the Pope showed his displeasure in the most evident manner; when he presented himself for an audience, he was not even admitted to his presence.¹ Still greater astonishment was caused when Cardinal Medici, who had carried the Pope's election, was treated in exactly the same way as all the others. To the Cardinals it seemed an unheard-of proceeding that the prohibition to carry weapons should be at once enforced with rigour on members of their own households.² A clerk in Holy Orders who had given false evidence in the Rota, was punished by the Pope with immediate arrest and the loss of all his benefices. Unbounded consternation was aroused by the steps taken against Bernardo Accolti, who had been accused of participation in a murder during the vacancy of the Holy See, and had fled from his threatened punishment. The favourite of the court circle of Leo X., who had given him the sobriquet of "the Unique," was cited to appear instantly for judgment, or, in case of contumacy, to suffer the confiscation of all his property, movable and immovable. "Everyone trembles," writes the Venetian Ambassador, "Rome has again become what it once was; all the Cardinals, even to Egidio Canisio, a member of the Augustinian Order, have put off their beards." A few days later, the same narrator reports: "The whole city is beside itself with fear and terror, owing

D. V. R^{mo} apud S. D. N. in s. palatio residere. Spero enim S^{tem} suam ex dominatione V. R^a pro illius in rebus gerendis experientia zeloque et fide incomparabilia erga S^{tem} Suam et Ap. Sedem maxima servitia percepturam. Cod. 1888, f. 21^b, Angelica Library, Rome.

¹ See the ** reports of G. M. della Porta of September 14, 1522, to the Duchess Eleanora of Urbino (State Archives, Florence). For the case in which Cibo was implicated later on, see STAFFETTI, 35 *seq.*

² ** See the letter of G. Staccoli of December 2, 1522, to the Duchess Eleonora of Urbino (State Archives, Florence).

to the things done by the Pope in the space of eight days."¹

Already, in the above-mentioned Consistory, on the 1st of September, Adrian had annulled all indults issued by the Cardinals during the provisional government, subsequent to the 24th of January. Soon afterwards the number of the referendaries of the Segnatura, which had been raised by Leo to forty, was reduced to nine;² in this matter also Adrian followed the advice of Schinner. At the same time, it was reported that the Pope had commanded the Datary Enkevoint to appoint no one in future to more than one benefice. When Cardinal Agostino Trivulzio asked for a bishopric on account of his poverty, the Pope asked the amount of his income. When Adrian was informed that this amounted to 4000 ducats, he remarked: "I had only 3000, and yet laid by savings out of that which were of service to me on my journey to Italy."³ He also published strong enactments, in the middle of September, against the laxity of public morals in Rome.⁴ In Germany, Adrian insisted on the strict observance of the decree of the last Lateran Council that every preacher should be furnished with a special licence by his bishop.⁵

¹ SANUTO, XXXIII., 444-445; *cf.* ROSSI, Pasquinate 112, and GUARNERA, Accolti, Palermo, 1901, 116 *seq.* "Questo papa è homo che non parla mai se non di la giusticia" is the *report of G. M. della Porta, September 11, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² See SANUTO, XXXIII., 445; *cf.* Ortiz in BURMANN, 199; REUSENS, XXXII. According to T. Campeggio (*Letter of September 11, 1522, in State Archives, Bologna), Adrian VI. only appointed eight referendaries to the Segnatura.

³ See in Appendix, No. 8, the *report of G. M. della Porta of September 2, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ See the **account of G. M. della Porta, September 15, 1522, to the Duchess Eleanora of Urbino (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ This decree, on which GUGLIA (Studien zur Geschichte der

The wholesome fear which had fallen on the Curia was still further increased by the news that Adrian intended to suppress the College of the Cavalieri di San Pietro,¹ and to recall collectively many of the offices bestowed by the deceased Pope.² Everyone who had received or bought an official place under Leo X. dreaded the loss of position and income. Numberless interests were at stake. Thousands were threatened in their means of existence as Adrian proceeded to divest "ecclesiastical institutions of that financial character stamped upon them by Leo, as if the whole machinery of Church government had been a great banking concern."³ In addition to this, the Pope at first held himself aloof as much as possible from the decision of questions of prerogative, and even in matters of pressing importance generally answered with a "Videbimus"—"We shall see."⁴ Not less firm were the Datary Enkevoirt, the private secretary Heeze, and the Netherlander Petrus de Roma, who was responsible for the issue

Laterankonzils, N.F., 46) throws doubt, was expressly mentioned later by Chieriegati; see Reichstagsakten, III., 446. It was also under discussion at the Council of Trent; see MERKLE, I., 63, and *the original Acts for the general Congregation of May 21, 1546, in De Concilio, 62, f. 227 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ The incomes of the Cavalieri were to be spent on the fugitives from countries taken by the Turks. *Letter of G. M. della Porta of September 4, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² Account of **G. M. della Porta of October 9, 1522, in State Archives, Florence.

³ HÖFLER, 220.

⁴ That the "Videbimus" reported by the Venetian Ambassador (ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 112) is not mere gossip is clear from the *letter of G. de' Medici of August 29, and from the *report of G. M. della Porta, October 5, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. The expression "Videbimus et cogitabimus" became a catchword. See VIRGILI'S edition of Berni's *Rime*, 36.

of Papal dispensations.¹ Rome rang with innumerable complaints. The verdict on Adrian was that he carried firmness to excess, and in all matters was slow to act.²

Among the few who did justice to the conscientiousness of the Pope were Campeggio,³ Pietro Delfino,⁴ and the representative of the Duchess of Urbino, Giovanni Tommaso Manfredi. As early as the 29th of August the last-named had reported: "The Holy Father appears to be a good shepherd; he is one of those to whom all disorder is displeasing; the whole of Christendom has cause for satisfaction."⁵ On the 8th of September Manfredi repeats his good opinion; even if Adrian is somewhat slow in coming to his decisions, yet, he remarks very justly, it must be taken into consideration that, at the beginning of his reign, a new Pope has to take his bearings.⁶ At the end of December the envoy of Ferrara is emphatic in calling attention to the Pope's love of justice. Leo is certainly aimed at when he says expressly, at the same time, that Adrian is a stranger to dissimulation and a double tongue.⁷ 11.

¹ Cf. Ortiz in BURMANN, 169.

² See the *letter of G. M. della Porta of September 21, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. The Venetian Ambassador reports on September 7, 1522, that 10,000 petitions had been received, of which one only, in favour of Cardinal de' Medici, had been granted; SANUTO, XXXIII., 446. v. DOMARUS (Hist. Jahrb., VI., 75-76), having in view the volumes of petitions in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, treats this account as mythical.

³ Cf. his letter to Wolsey in BREWER, III., 2, n. 2506.

⁴ Cf. RAYNALDUS, 1522, n. 18 *seq.*

⁵ Questo nostro beatissimo padre mi pare un bon pastore et è persona a chi despiace le cose mai fatte e mi penso che tutta la christianità ne habbi ad rimanere bene soddisfatta (State Archives, Florence).

⁶ G. T. Manfredi to the Duchess Eleonora of Urbino, dated Rome, September 8, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁷ *Letter of L. Cati, December 30, 1522, in State Archives, Modena.

Also, in January 1523, Jacopo Cortese praises in the highest terms, to the Marchioness Isabella of Mantua, the tenacious conscientiousness, the justice, and the holy life of the Pope.¹

The above opinions, however, among which that of the Portuguese Ambassador² may, to a certain extent, be included, form an exception. The general verdict was increasingly unfavourable. This we must connect, in the first place, with Adrian's limited expenditure, in order to relieve the finances which, under Leo, had become so heavily involved.³ Regardless of the fact that the Pope, face to face with empty coffers and a mountain of debt, had no other course open to him than that of extreme economy,⁴ he was soon reviled as a niggard and a miser.

The prodigal generosity and unmeasured magnificence of the Popes of the Renaissance had so confused the general standard of opinion that, to an Italian of those days, a homely and frugal Pope was a phenomenon none could understand. Leo X. was popular because he piled up debt on debt; his successor was unpopular "because he

¹ "Di la timorosità, rectitudine e sanctimonia di S. B^{ne} non se ne potrebe predicare tanto quanto è in efecto." *Letter of January 5, 1523, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua; cf. also in Appendix, No. 14, the *letter of January 12, 1523.

² Cf. his opinion in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 121, 153.

³ Cf. the *reports of G. M. della Porta of September 6 and 9, and October 5 and 9, 1522, in State Archives, Florence: see Appendix, No. 9. See also the *letters of B. Castiglione of September 14 and December 4, 1522, and *that of A. Germanello of December 21, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ * N. S^{re} rafferò la guardia delli Suizeri e riductò la de Cavalli leggieri a numero di 45. Capitan d'epsi Vincentio da Tigoli; rafferò e Pietro Chiavelluzi di nuovo e li altri cassi. Così per ogni verso va diminuendo la spesa. G. de' Medici, October 3, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

neither could make money nor wished to make it."¹ The sharp break with all the traditions of the Medicean reign disappointed the hopes and damaged the private interests of thousands, who now bitterly hated the foreign Pope, and looked with hostility on all his measures.² Even in cases where one might with certainty have expected his actions to meet with general approval, they incurred censure. A nephew of Adrian's, a student at Siena, had come to him in haste; the Pope at once made it clear to him that he ought to return to his studies. Other relations who had come to him on foot, full of the highest expectation, were dismissed after receiving some very slender gifts. The same persons who could not sufficiently blame the Pope for surrounding himself with Netherlanders, now pointed to his sternness towards his own family as the very acme of harshness.³

What currency was given to the most unfair criticism of

¹ HÖFLER, 210, 223. The conduct of Adrian VI. on the death of Cardinal Grimani shows how far removed he was from all covetous greed. NEGRI acknowledges this; see *Lett. d. princ.* I., 117^b; *cf.* also Ortiz in BURMANN, 226-227. SCHULTE, I., 229, says appositely, "Adrian sought nothing for himself; but still less did he wish the Curia to be the great gold-mine from which everyone was to extract riches. The difficulties of the political situation demanded the strictest economy, and his predecessor had already squandered his share in the lavish stream of bounties. Often, to the blessing of a family, the spendthrift is succeeded by the thrifty restorer of its fortunes." See also v. DOMARUS in *Histor. Jahrb.*, XVI., 74.

² A good example is given in the *report of G. de' Medici of September 8, 1522, printed in Appendix, No. 10 (State Archives, Florence).

³ JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani*. Adrian's freedom from nepotism, remarks HÖFLER, 383, was "an example which few understood and still fewer respected, a fact that his contemporaries could not realize. They placed the Pope, who thought it necessary to abstain from nepotism, in the same category with those who regarded it as a scandal."

Adrian is shown, not only in the reports of the Imperial Ambassador¹ who, on political grounds, was bitterly opposed to him, but in those of most of the other envoys. Adrian was not turned aside by the general dissatisfaction; with that firmness which had always been one of his characteristics, he set himself with determination to carry out what he saw to be necessary. His programme consisted in, first of all, giving help in the Turkish troubles; and secondly, in making headway with his Church reforms; his responsibilities towards the States of the Church he placed, for the present, in the background.²

The gigantic tasks which he had thus undertaken were made more difficult not merely by the hostility of the Curia and the want of funds, but by a calamity for which also the Pope was not responsible. Early in September 1522 the plague had broken out afresh in Rome. Isolated cases had been reported on the 5th of that month, a season always dreaded on account of its unhealthiness. Later on the pestilence became epidemic, and on the 11th the daily death-rate was reckoned at thirty-six.³ Adrian did not delay in taking the necessary measures. He took care that the spiritual needs of the sick should be attended to under strict regulations; at the same time he endeavoured to check the spread of the disease by forbidding the sale

¹ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 483, 490, 502, 509, 540.

² *N. S^{re} attende sollecitamente ad ordinaire l' armata sua per mandarla al soccorso di Rhodi. Fatto questo attenderà S. S^{ta} alle cose de la Chiesa spirituali, poi alle temporali et di le gente d' arme. G. M. della Porta, September 11, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Cf. the *report of G. de' Medici of 5, 9 (La peste al continuo fa più danno), 11 (*La peste va impliando ogni giorno più e ne more trenta sei per giorno), 12 and 14 September, 1522. See also the *letters of G. M. della Porta of 9, 11, 13 and 14 September 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

of articles belonging to those who had died¹ of the disorder.

The members of the Curia wished the Pope to abandon the city, now plague-stricken in every quarter.² They could remember how even a Nicholas V. had thus ensured his safety.³ Not so the Flemish Pope: with courage and composure he remained steadfast at his post, although the plague gained ground every day. In answer to representations made on all sides that he might be attacked, his reply was, "I have no fear for myself, and I put my trust in X God."⁴ Adrian kept to his resolve, although on the 13th of September he was indisposed. It is to be noted that, notwithstanding his ailment, he did not abstain from saying Mass and attending to the despatch of business. The fever, however, had so much increased on the 15th that he was obliged to suspend his daily Mass.⁵ As soon as he felt

¹ See in Appendix, No. 10, the report of G. de' Medici of September 8, 1522. The statement of JOVIUS (*Vita Adriani VI.*), that the Pope neglected to take measures against the plague, is also an invention.

² On September 8, 1522, G. de' Medici had already stated that the Pope would leave Rome; but on the 11th he had to report: **Il Papa non parla di partirsi* (State Archives, Florence). On the spread of the plague Stef. Saffa writes, on September 12, 1522: **La peste qui tocca malamente et hormai ha compreso ogni parte di Roma ne mai è di che non si trovino due et tre morti per stradi.* A Spanish chamberlain of the Pope's also died. (State Archives, Modena.)

³ Cf. our remarks, Vol. II. of this work, p. 86 *seq.*

⁴ **Le papa mostra non la (sc. peste) temer et dice che si confida in Dio.* G. M. della Porta, September 13, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ Cf. the detailed **accounts of G. M. della Porta of September 15 and 20, 1522 (cf. Appendix, No. 11), and that of G. de' Medici of September 14. The latter says, **S. S. hieri hebbe un po di doglia di testa e questa nocte passata dubitoron d' un po di febbre.* *Hoggi ha dato audientia.* On September 15: The Pope keeps his bed from fever. On September 16, 17, 18, and 19: The fever continues. On September 20 and 21: The Pope goes on better. (State Archives, Florence.)

better, he devoted himself again to business, although his physicians implored him to take some rest.¹ Notwithstanding the exertions into which Adrian, in his zeal for duty, threw himself, regardless of the claims of health, he made such improvement that on the 22nd of September his recovery was regarded as complete.² He now redoubled his activity, and the audiences were once more resumed. "The Cardinals," writes an envoy, "besiege the Pope and give him more trouble than all the rest of Christendom put together."³ Meanwhile the plague still lasted, and once more the Pope was advised from all quarters to secure the safety of his life by flight, but to their counsels Adrian would not listen; regardless of the danger, on the 28th of September he visited S. Maria del Popolo.⁴ The only concessions he at last consented to make were to defer the Consistories, and to permit the affrighted Cardinals to leave Rome.⁵ At the end of September the daily death-rate amounted to thirty-five, and the cases of sickness to forty-one.⁶

¹ G. M. della Porta, September 20, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² *Letter of G. de' Medici, September 22, 1522, in State Archives, Florence.

³ See **the report of G. M. della Porta, September 26, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ *Letters of G. de' Medici, September 25, 27, 28, 29, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ *Letter of G. M. della Porta, September 27, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. Enea Pio *reports previously, September 17, 1522: "Molti signori cardinali si sono partiti et altri pensano partire excusandosi sopra la peste, ma in veritate per mal contentezza" (State Archives, Modena).

⁶ *Letter of G. de' Medici, September 30, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. Many of Medici's letters contain the *official lists of the dead and sick as registered in the different quarters of the city. Cf. also the *reports of T. Campeggio, September 27 and 30, 1522, in the State Archives, Bologna.

Cardinal Schinner died on the 1st of October of a fever which had attacked him on the 12th of September.¹ His death was a heavy loss to the cause of reform, of which he had been the eager champion. It was already reported in Germany that the Pope had succumbed to the plague.² In the first week of October, under ordinary circumstances the pleasantest month in Rome, the mortality made great strides;³ on the 8th the death-roll numbered a hundred.⁴ All who could took to flight; only the Pope remained. He attended to the Segnatura and even still continued to give audiences; not until two inmates of the Vatican were stricken did he shut himself up in the Belvedere.⁵ The Cardinals were directed to apply to the Datary for affairs of pressing importance.⁶ On the 10th of October

¹ * Letters of G. de' Medici, September 12 and October 1, 1522, in State Archives, Florence. Also Blasius de Martinellis (Secret Archives of the Vatican) and T. Campeggio (*letter, October 4, 1522, in State Archives, Bologna) report that Schinner's death took place on October 1. Accordingly, SCHMIDLIN, 294, is subject to correction.

² REDLICH, Nürnberger Reichstag, 33.

³ Already, on October 1, 1522, *Bart. Prospero reports thirty-two deaths (State Archives, Modena). On October 2, 1522, *G. M. della Porta writes: "Questa peste è cresciuta et cresce ogni dì tanto che tutta Roma pensa d' andarsene." On the 5th: *La peste fa grandissima strage. Many fly. "Gli Cardinali fanno grande istanza a N. S. che se ne vada fori." On the 10th: The plague has appeared in Marino and Viterbo (State Archives, Florence). Cf. also LANCIANI, I., 216 *seq.*

⁴ SANUTO, XXXIII., 477.

⁵ *Letters of G. T. Manfredi, September 29, and G. de' Medici of October 7 and 9, 1522 (State Archives, Florence), and *letter of T. Campeggio of October 4 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. the reports of Saffa of October 7 and 17, *La peste qui fa male et ognuno si fugge sicche Roma non ha più quasi faccia di quella era (State Archives, Modena), the *Literae de Roma of October 10, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and BERGENROTH, II., n. 479.

⁶ Cf. *Literae de Roma of October 10, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

Cardinals Ridolfi and Salviati left Rome, followed on the 13th by Giulio de' Medici and on the 14th by the Imperial Ambassador Sessa.¹ The members of the Curia were of opinion that the Pope ought to do the same at any cost, but found Adrian as irresponsible as ever; he remained in the Belvedere and held audiences at a window.² In November even this was given up;³ of the entire College of Cardinals only three remained in Rome and, at last, one only, Armellini. The Italian officials had almost all taken to flight; only the faithful Flemings and some Spaniards refused to leave the Pope.⁴

No diminution in the plague was observable in October, nor yet in November. At the end of the former month there were 1750 infected houses in Rome.⁵ Baldassare Castiglione draws a fearful picture of the misery in the city. In the streets he saw many corpses and heard the cries of the sufferers: "Eight out of ten persons whom one meets," he writes, "bear marks of the plague. Only a

¹ *Letters of G. de' Medici of October 11, 13, and 14, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² SANUTO, XXXIII., 497. According to the registers of deaths collected by G. de' Medici, the return on October 17 was 60, on the 18th, 59, on the 19th, 63. Galeotto de' Medici about this time also left Rome. On October 28 he writes from the Vigna del Card. de' Medici, "more than 60 deaths are reckoned daily." On October 31 Sessa gives a still higher figure (150). BERGENROTH, II., n. 496. Cf. also TIZIO, *Hist. Senen. (Chigi Library, Rome).

³ G. de' Medici reports "della Vigna dello ill. Medici." On *October 30: The plague continues. On *November 7: Many die. Cardinal S. Quattro (L. Pucci) has fled in consequence. *November 10: The Pope has ceased to give audience. *November 13: The plague has taken firm hold. (State Archives, Florence.)

⁴ See SANUTO, XXXIII., 493 *seq.*; Ortiz in BURMANN, 202.

⁵ *Hanno facto la descriptione delle case infecte e heri eran mille septem cento cinquanta. G. de' Medici, October 28, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

few men have survived. I fear lest God should annihilate the inhabitants of this city. The greatest mortality has been among grave-diggers, priests, and physicians. Where the dead have none belonging to them, it is hardly any longer possible to give them burial."¹ According to Albergati, the confusion had reached such a pitch that the living were sometimes interred with the dead.² With the arrival of cold weather in the first half of December signs appeared that the pestilence was on the wane. On the 9th of December the daily sum of deaths was still thirty-three, on the 15th thirty-seven, on the 18th only nine.³ Since the Cardinals hesitated about returning—on the 10th of December only six had been present in Consistory—the Pope gave orders that they must all return to their places in the Curia.⁴ The cases of sickness having very greatly lessened by the end of the year,⁵ the Pope resumed his

¹ Letter of B. Castiglione, October 31, 1522. Castiglione on November 6 writes: *Che la peste procede più acerbamente che mai, ch' è miracolo atteso la poca gente ch' era rimasta in Roma. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. See also *letter of V. Albergati, November 30, 1522, in State Archives, Bologna.

² Albergati in HÖFLER, 221.

³ See the *registers of deaths forwarded by G. de' Medici in State Archives, Florence. Cf. GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 391. When the danger of pestilence was over, the little church, S. Mariae portae paradisi liberatricis pestilentiae, on the Ripetta, was rebuilt as a thank-offering; see besides MORICHINI, 145, also FORCELLA, XII., 91, 93. The date of the inscription is here given incorrectly as 1522 instead of 1523. The latter date is still clearly legible.

⁴ SANUTO, XXXIII., 548, 559, 596. *Heri el Papa fece consistorio, dove intervennero solum li rev. card^{li} Jacobacci, S. Sixto, Siena, Hivrea, Campezo et Trivulsi. *A. Germanello on December 11, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). BLASIVS DE MARTINELLIS, *Diarium (Papal Secret Archives), says that seven cardinals took part in the Consistory.

⁵ *Letter of G. de' Medici, December 27, 1522, in State Archives, Florence.

audiences; the fugitive Italians, one by one, returned to Rome and the business of the Curia was once more reopened.¹

While the plague raged four precious months were lost. It is indeed worthy of our admiration that Adrian, as soon as the greatest danger was over, should have returned immediately to his work of reform. As early as the 9th of December 1522 there appeared a measure of great importance and utility in this direction. All indults granted to the secular power since the days of Innocent VIII. concerning the presentation and nomination to high as well as inferior benefices were repealed, thus leaving the Holy See free to provide for the choice of fit persons. Even if this general ordinance were limited to no small extent by the concordats entered into with separate countries, still, it was made known "that the Pope had no intention of stopping at half measures, and that, whenever he found a bad condition of things, he was determined to replace it by a better."² On the 5th of January 1523 Adrian reopened the Segnatura for the first time. He took this opportunity of expressly enjoining that only such persons should receive benefices as were fitted for and worthy of them.³

An actual panic was caused in the first months of 1523 by the renewal, in a more circumstantial form, of the report that the Pope was busy with his scheme for abolishing all the new offices created by Leo X. and bestowed or sold by him, and for making a great reduction of all

¹ Ortiz in BURMANN, 208; cf. LANCELLOTTI, I., 429; BERNI, *Rime ed Virgili*, 277. On December 4, 1522, B. Castiglione had still to report: *N. S. sta ristretto senza dare audientia a persona del mondo (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Bull. VI., I *seq.*; HÖFLER, 240. See also the *letter of A. Germanello of December 21, 1522, and *that of J. Cortese to the Marchioness Isabella, January 5, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ *Letter of A. Germanello, January 5, 1523, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

officials, especially of the scribes and archivists.¹ In the beginning of February a Congregation of six Cardinals was in fact appointed in order to draw up proposals with regard to the recently made Leonine appointments.² Adrian had now brought himself into complete disfavour with the ecclesiastical bureaucracy—of all bureaucracies the worst. It gave rise to astonishment and displeasure when Adrian, in the beginning of April 1523, dismissed most of the Spaniards in his service from motives of economy and soon afterwards made further reductions in his establishment.³ If strong expression had before this

¹ Cf. also with SANUTO, XXXIII., 620, the *letters of G. de' Medici, February 11 and 14, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

² Cerca el papa tuctavia reterare ad se le intrate de la chiesa et revocar le cose alienate da papa Leone et ha incommensato con li officii creato da lui et deputati sei card^{li} ad la revisione de epsi, che sonno li r^{mi} de Vulterra, Flisco, Monte, Ancona, Jacobasi et Campezio, li quali han facte più congregationi sopra de questo et par satisfar al papa per che inclinino ad la revocatione de dicti officii, ma li sono molti clamori de officiali, et quando se facesse serria periculo de qualche scandalo per esserli molti brigate intricate et maxime non possendolo fare el papa di rascione; anchora non è successo altro; laltro dì fo facto da tucti dicti card^{li} congregatione ai casa de Vulterra dove comparsero li officiali et allegarono suspecti alcuni di dicti card^{li} et protestarono che non se procedesse ad ulteriora nisi prima discussa la causa de la suspitione et forono dicte de male parole contra dicti card^{li}; la cosa restì così suspesa. A. Germanello, February 13, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ *El Papa se excusa non haver el modo de posserli far le spese. A. Germanello, April 11, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. *the reports of L. Cati of April 14 (If it had been possible, the Pope would have dismissed even his Spanish secretary), and May 29, 1523. In the latter he says: *La S^{ta} N. S. licentia molti de la sua famiglia che ritornano in Spagna, et a questo proposito gia disse a me, che volea parco vivere. Et fra gli altri licentia certi giovanotti soi ragazzi gentil-huomini che havea menati di la (State Archives, Mantua). The latter regulation was carried out in order to put an end to scandalous reports.

found vent in the Curia on the subject of Adrian's parsimony, or, as they preferred to call it, his miserliness,¹ now indignation knew no bounds. According to the Ferrarese envoy, no Pope had ever received so much abuse as Adrian VI.² Prelates and Cardinals accustomed to the pomp and luxury of the Leonine period found a continual stumbling-block in the asceticism and simplicity of Adrian's life. The contrast was indeed sharp and uncompromising. While Leo loved society and saw much of it, delighted in state and ceremony, in banquets and stage plays, his successor lived with a few servants in the utmost possible retirement; he never went abroad save to visit churches, and then with a slender retinue.³ He gave his support, not to poets and jesters, but to the sick and poor.⁴

It was a moment of the greatest importance for the Papal schemes of reform when, in March 1523, Dr. John Eck, a staunch supporter of loyal Catholic opinion in Germany, came to Rome. The cause of his visit was certain matters of ecclesiastical policy in the Duchy of Bavaria, which were happily settled through the advances of Adrian VI.⁵ Amid the interests of his sovereign Eck

¹ Cf. in Appendix, No. 19, *the letter of L. Cati, March 21, 1523 (State Archives, Modena).

² *Supplement to L. Cati's letter of May 29, 1523 (State Archives, Modena).

³ See *letter of G. de' Medici, April 1, 1523: *Il papa è andato questa mattina con poca compagnia alle VII. chiese (State Archives, Florence). Cf. *letter of A. Germanello, April 2, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ Cf. PERICOLI, L'osped. di S. Maria d. Consolazione, 73; VOLPICELLA, Studi, 213.

⁵ Besides the taxation of the Bavarian clergy up to a fifth of their income, the Pope agreed to the appointment of a Commission of Visitation vested with plenary authority of a comprehensive kind, to the

was not unmindful of the welfare of Christendom; both the question of the Turkish war and that of reform were thoroughly discussed in his interviews with the Pope. Eck's notes have been preserved;¹ they form an important contribution to the history of Church reform at this time.

Eck thoroughly reviews the situation. Not only the rapid spread of the Lutheran teaching even in South Germany, but also the grievous harm wrought within the Church itself, was known to him down to the smallest detail. In the existing political situation of Europe he did not, in the first place, hope much from a general council; quite as little, he thought correctly, would be gained by a mere condemnation of the heretical doctrines. In agreement with the most enlightened men of the age, above all with the Pope, he calls for comprehensive reform in Rome itself. He unsparingly discloses the abuses there existing, especially in the matter of indulgences; he points out that there is a crying necessity for a substantial reduction in the different classes of indulgence;

separation of the Bavarian Augustinians from the Saxon province, and to means for maintaining the theological faculty of Ingolstadt; see *Eichstätter Pastoralblatt*, 1869, 176; JANSSEN-PASTOR, II., 18th edit., 361, note; HÖFLER, 324 *seq.*; SUGENHEIM, *Volkszustände*, 181, note; RIEZLER, IV., 95 *seq.*

¹ Published by Friedensburg in KOLBE'S *Beitr. zur bayr. Kirchengesch.*, II., 159 *seq.*, 222 *seq.*; *cf.* DITTRICH in *Hist. Jahrb.*, V., 371 *seq.*, and the excellent articles by J. B. GÖTZ, *Beratungen und Rathschläge des Dr J. Eck in Rom anno 1523*, in the *wissenschaftl. Beil. der Germania*, 1902, No. 17-20, of which I have made special use for the following pages. In March 1523 Bishop Johann von Meissen, who was also in Rome, presented a memorandum to the Pope on the spread of the new teaching and the difficulties in his diocese. (*Cod. Ottob.*, 2366, f. 211 *seq.*, Vatican Library). *Cf.* v. DOMARUS in *Hist. Jahrb.*, XVI, 86, and POSTINA in the *Römischen Quartalschr.*, XIII., 337 *seqq.*

he also wishes to see some limit set to the bestowal of faculties to hear confessions.

Eck draws an equally interesting and repulsive picture of the doings of the benefice-hunters and their countless tricks and artifices. He remarks with truth that, since many of these men came from Rome, the odium they incurred recoiled on the Holy See. On this point he implores Adrian without reserve to take decisive measures; the system of pluralities had been the source of abuses profoundly affecting the life of the Church. Eck especially recommends the diminution of pensions and expectancies and the entire abolition of commendations and incorporations. If Eck's proposals with regard to indulgences and the system of patronage command our entire approval, not so entirely satisfactory are his suggestions for a reform of the Penitentiary. The complete removal of the taxes on dispensations goes too far; in order to produce an effect he exaggerates in many particulars. On the other hand, he speaks to the point in dealing with the misuse of the so-called lesser excommunication, the laxity in giving dispensations to regulars in respect of their vows and habit, and the too great facility with which absolutions were given by the confessors in St. Peter's. A thorough reform of the Penitentiary officials and of the whole system of taxation was certainly necessary.

Eck made extensive proposals for a reform of the German clergy, the need of which he attributes to the unfortunate neglect of the decrees of the last Lateran Council. With a minute attention to detail, he here gives his advice concerning the conduct of the bishops, prelates, and inferior clergy, the system of preaching, diocesan government, and the excessive number of festivals. For a realization of his projects for the reform of the Curia, Eck hopes great things

from the German Pope, whom he also counsels to pledge himself to convoke a general council. Eck also recommends the issue of a fresh Bull against Luther and his chief followers, the suppression of the University of Wittenberg, the appointment of visitors for each ecclesiastical province, furnished with Papal authority and that of the ruler of the country, and lastly, the restoration of the ancient institution of diocesan and provincial synods, for the summoning of which and their deliberations he makes extensive suggestions; these synods are to form an organizing and executive centre for the systematized struggle with the innovators.

We have, unfortunately, no authentic information in detail as to the attitude of Adrian towards this comprehensive programme of reform, nor as to the more immediate course of the conferences on the question of indulgences.¹ One thing only is certain, that although the capitulations of his election afforded Adrian an opportunity for approaching the subject directly, yet the difficulties were so great that he did not venture on any definite step. If he did not here anticipate the decision of the council which it was his intention to summon, yet, in practice, he proceeded to issue indulgences most sparingly.²

Not less serious were the obstacles to be met with when Adrian began his attempts to reform the Dataria. It was

¹ SARPI'S account (Geneva edition, 1660, 21 *seq.*) has been so thoroughly and admirably refuted by PALLAVICINI, II., 4 *seq.*, that even MAURENBRECHER (Kathol. Ref., 401) declares this account to be a free invention of the anti-Papal author. For the whole controversy *cf.* also BRISCHAR (overlooked by Maurenbrecker), Beurteilung, I., 56 *seq.*, and WENSING, 203 *seq.*

² The assertion of SCHULTE, I., 233, that Adrian issued no indulgences, is incorrect; *cf.* SANUTO, XXXIX., 123, 138, and PERICOLI, L'osped. di S. Maria d. Consolazione, 119. PALLAVICINI also, II., 6, only says: "fu parchissimo nell' indulgenze."

soon shown that salaries only could not take the place of the customary fees without introducing laxity of discipline ; besides, the abolition of fees for the despatch of Bulls and the communication of Papal favours could not take effect, at a time of such financial distress, without great loss to the already exhausted exchequer, still chargeable, irrespective of these minor sources of revenue, with the remuneration of the officials. Thus the Pope saw himself forced in this department also, to leave things, provisionally, for the most part as they were ; nevertheless, he kept close watch over the gratuities of the Dataria in order to keep them within the narrowest possible limits.¹

Still more injurious to the cause of reform than the difficulties referred to was the growing peril from the Turks, which made increasing claims on Adrian's attention. "If Adrian, in consequence of the fall of Rhodes, had not been occupied with greater concerns, we should have seen fine things," runs the report of a Venetian unfriendly to reform.² Excitement in the Curia ran high when Adrian withdrew a portion of their income from the Cavalieri di San Pietro, the overseers of corn, and others who had bought their

¹ See PALLAVICINI, II., 6, who here accepts Sarpi's account ; cf. MAURENBRECHER, *Kathol. Ref.*, 401, who is certainly wrong in saying that Pallavicini here appeals to papers left behind by Chieregati, for the quotation in question refers only to the fate of Chieregati. The details in Sarpi's account are very suspicious. He repeatedly invents and falsifies them in his work, and mixes up truth and falsehood. (See EHSES in *Histor. Jahrb.*, XXVI., 299 *seq.*, XXVII., 67 *seq.*, and *Histor. Zeitschr.*, XCVII., 212.) In particular, Sarpi's assertion that the opposition to Adrian's plans of reform proceeded from Pucci and Soderini is without corroboration ; indeed, Egidio Canisio, a witness of high authority, remarks : "Reformationi Anconitanus (Accolti) restitit." This evidence, long since published by HÖFLER in his *Analekten*, 52, has also been overlooked by Maurenbrecker.

² SANUTO, XXXIII., 620.

places under Leo X. The Pope excused himself for these hard measures on the plea that, in order to satisfy all, he was forced to a certain extent to make all suffer.¹ The charges of greed and avarice were now openly brought against him in the harshest terms, and the total ruin of the city was proclaimed as inevitable.² On the 25th of February 1523 one of these officials, whose means of subsistence was threatened by Adrian's course of action, tried to stab the Pope, but the vigilance of Cardinal Campeggio baulked this attempt made by one whose mind had become deranged.³

Neither by dangers of this kind nor by the piteous complaints which assailed him from all sides could Adrian be diverted from his path. Where it was possible he took steps against the accumulation of livings, checked every kind of simony, and carefully watched over the choice of worthy men for ecclesiastical posts, obtaining the most accurate information as to the age, moral character, and learning of candidates; moral delinquencies he punished with unrelenting severity. He never made any distinction of persons, and the most powerful Cardinals, when they were in any way blameworthy, received the same treatment as the humblest official of the Curia.⁴

In the beginning of February 1523 thirteen Cardinals complained of the small importance attached by Adrian to the Sacred College, since he limited their prerogatives and in all matters consulted only his confidants, Teodoli,

¹ JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani VI.*; HÖFLER, 382 *seq.*

² See the *letters of G. de' Medici, dated Rome, February 11 and 14, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

³ NEGRI in *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 111-112; JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani VI.*, *Deutsche Städtechroniken*, XXV., 189.

⁴ Cf. Ortiz in BURMANN, 225; GIOVIO, *Lettere* ed. Luzio, 28; SANUTO, XXXIII., 592, XXXIV., 30, 93; HÖFLER, 225.

Ghinucci, and Enkevoirt. The Pope answered that he was far from intending any disrespect towards the dignities and rights of the Cardinalate; the reason why his choice of confidential advisers had lain elsewhere than with them was that he had never before been in Rome, and that during the time of the plague he had not been able to become acquainted with the members of their body.¹

In the despatches of Ambassadors the chief complaint is directed against his parsimony and his dilatory method of transacting business. As regards the first point, the complaints were not justified, but as to the second, they were not altogether groundless. Even when allowance is made for exaggeration on the part of the numerous malcontents, there can still be no doubt that unfortunate delays arose in the despatch of business. The officials of Leo X. who had most experience in drafting documents were either dead or had left Rome. Since Adrian took no pains to make good this deficiency, intolerable delay often occurred in the preparation of deeds and papers. Moreover, business was often performed in a slovenly way; it was expressly stated that the persons appointed by the Pope were not only few in number but for the most part ill-acquainted with affairs and naturally slow;²

¹ *S. Sta rispose, se il s. collegio si tenea offeso dello honore o commodo fussino certi non era di sua voluntà, e dello haver facto electione di quelle persone, con le quali sì confidava questo l' haveva facto per non essere stato in corte e non conoscer lor S. R^{me}. G. de' Medici, dated Rome, February 3, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. also in Appendix, No. 15, *the letter of A. Germanello, of February 9, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² See in Appendix, No. 17, the letter of Balbi's of February 23, 1523 (State Archives, Vienna); cf. Ortiz in BURMANN, 197, and the *letter of A. Germanello of February 9, 1523, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua (see Appendix, No. 15). Among those who were retained in the service

in addition, occupants of important posts, such as Girolamo Ghinucci, the acting Auditor of the Camera, caused delays by an exaggerated scrupulosity.¹ The Datary Enkevoirt also was very dilatory; he often kept Cardinals waiting for two or three hours, and even then they were not sure of admission.²

Adrian's intense dislike of the motley crew of officials belonging to his predecessor was undoubtedly connected with the fact that many of them were persons of irregular life. That such elements should have been expelled from the Curia is cause for commendation, but it was a deplorable mistake when Adrian quietly acquiesced in the withdrawal of such an eminent man as Sadoletto, an enthusiast for reform and one ready to render the cause willing service.³ "The astonishment in Rome," writes Girolamo Negri in March 1523, "is general. I myself am not astonished, for the Pope does not know Sadoletto." Negri on this occasion repeats the saying then current in the city, "Rome is no longer Rome." He adds with bitterness, "Having escaped from one plague, we have run into another and a worse. This Pope of ours knows no one. No one receives tokens of his grace. The whole world is in despair. We shall be driven again to Avignon or to the furthestmost ocean, Adrian's home; if God does not help us, then all is over with the Church's monarchy, in this extremity of danger."⁴

of Adrian appears Evangelista (Tarrasconio), in the *Reg. brev. Lat., 8 (1521-1553), of the Secret Archives of the Vatican.

¹ Albergati in HÖFLER, 220.

² *Literae de Roma of October 10, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ Cf. LANCELOTTI, I., 383.

⁴ Lett. d. princ., I., 113; cf. TIRABOSCHI, VII., i., 16 *seq.*; JOLY, 121 *seq.* It was reported in January 1523 that the Pope intended to reinstate Sadoletto as private secretary. *Letter of A. Germanello of January 5, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

In a later letter Negri, like Berni, corrects his at first wholly unfavourable impressions. He asserts that the Pope raises extraordinary difficulties in conferring any graces. This reluctance proceeds from his ignorance of Roman life and from distrust of his surroundings, but also from his great conscientiousness and fear of doing wrong. When the Pope grants favours, though they may be few, they are in the highest degree just: he does nothing contrary to rule, which, to a court accustomed to every gratification, is certainly displeasing. Cicero's remark on Cato might be applied to the Pope: "He acts as though he were living in some republic of Plato's, and not among the dregs of Romulus."¹ This expression indicates with precision an undoubted weakness in the character of Adrian. Gifted by nature with high ideals, he only too often judged others by himself,² set before them the most lofty vocations, and attributed the best intentions even to the least worthy men. The many disappointments which he was thus bound to experience made him in consequence too distrustful, unfriendly and even hard, in circumstances where such feelings were misplaced.

The majority of the Sacred College were men of worldly life, and severity towards them in general was certainly justified. But Adrian distinguished too little between the worst, the bad and the good elements among them.³ With

¹ Lett. d. princ., I., 114. On July 8, 1523, B Albergati, who afterwards was of an entirely different opinion, wrote to Bologna: *Il modo di questa corte al presente è d'andar molto in lungo ne le expeditioni, ma al fine le cose pigliano poi tal verso che facilmente si conosce questo tardare procedere da summa prudentia di N. S. più che da nessun altra cose. State Archives, Bologna.

² BOSCH, 63, brings this out forcibly.

³ Cf. SCHULTE, I., 230.

none of the Cardinals was he on confidential terms; even Schinner, Campeggio, and Egidio Canisio, who as regards the reform question were thoroughly at one with him, were never on an intimate footing. How unnecessarily rough the Pope could be is shown by an incident at the beginning of his Pontificate which the Venetian Ambassador has put on record. It was then the custom to hand over the Neapolitan tribute amid great ceremony. Cardinal Schinner presumed to call the Pope's attention to this pageant. At first Adrian made no reply, and when the Cardinal again urged him to appear at the window, Adrian flatly gave him to understand that he was not to pester him.¹ If he thus treated a fellow-countryman and a man of kindred aspirations, it can be imagined how it fared between him and the worldly Italians.

In course of time, however, Adrian seems to have perceived that he must come into touch with his Italian sympathizers if he was to carry out effectually his ever-widening projects of reform.² He therefore summoned Gian Pietro Caraffa and his friend Tommaso Gazzella to Rome with the avowed object of strengthening the cause of reform. Both had apartments assigned to them in the Vatican.³ Unfortunately we do not know the precise date

¹ SANUTO, XXXIII., 449. Campeggio was appointed Protector of England at Rome. Henry VIII., in thanking the Pope in a *letter of February 22, 1523, expressed high praise of Campeggio. Archives of Sant' Angelo, Arm., IV., c. 2.

² In May 1523 it was rumoured that he intended to dismiss all the Legates. SANUTO, XXXIV., 194-195.

³ Accounts of the summons to Caraffa and Gazzella in JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani VI.* Those in Egidio Canisio (*Abhandl. der Münchener Akad.*, IV., Abt. B, 52), and in the *Ist. di Chiusi* (TARTINIUS, I., 1024) are unfortunately very short. Caracciolo also, **Vita di Paolo IV.* (Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome), c. 10, and BROMATO, I., 87 *seq.*, have nothing more detailed to give. The statement that Adrian VI. also called

of this important invitation, nor have we any further information as to the results of the visit; we can only infer from Giovio that the summons was sent towards the end of the pontificate, when Adrian's plans for the reform of the corrupt city were taking a yet wider range; special measures involving the severest punishments were to be taken against blasphemers, scoffers at religion, simonists, usurers, the "New Christians" of Spain (Marani), and corrupters of youth.¹

That the coming of so strong and inflexible a man as Caraffa could only add to Adrian's unpopularity in Rome admits of no doubt.² The general dissatisfaction found utterance in bitter satire and invective. What insults, what infamous and senseless accusations were permitted is shown by the notorious "Capitolo" of Francesco Berni which appeared in the autumn of 1522.³ It combines in itself all the contempt and rage which the strong and upright Pontiff with his schemes of reform, his foreign habits, and his household of foreigners provoked in the courtiers of Leo X. The talented prince of burlesque poets has here produced a satire which ranks as one of

Gaetano di Tiene to Rome, as given in REUMONT, III., 2, 153, GREGORIVS, VIII., ed. 3, 396, and SCHULTE, I., 232, rests on an unfortunate confusion of Gazzella with Gaetano, which PALLAVICINI, II., 4, and JENSEN, Caraffa, 41, had already refuted. The combined invitation to Rome of Pighius (BURMANN, 138) and Nicolas von Schönberg was also connected with Adrian's plans of reform; see *TIZIO, Hist. Senen., *loc. cit.* Chigi Library, Rome.

¹ JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.; *cf.* HÖFLER, 534. The Jewish community in Rome was friendly towards Adrian VI.; see VOGELSTEIN, II., 37 *seq.*

² It was even said that he was to be made a Cardinal; see ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 378.

³ BERNI, Rime, ed. Virgili, 30-38. For the date of composition (August 29 to December 20, 1522) see VIRGILI, Berni, 62 *seq.*

the boldest in the Italian literature of that age.¹ It is a masterpiece of racy mendacity breathing hatred of the foreigner, of the savage set down amid artistic surroundings, of the reformer of men and manners. But the hatred is surpassed by the studiously displayed contempt for the "ridiculous Dutch-German barbarian."

Against such ridicule, deadly because so laughable, the Pope was powerless. When he forbade, under the severest penalties, the feast of Pasquino on St. Mark's day 1523 and its pasquinades,² the measure was useless: for satire is like the Lernæan hydra with its crop of heads. The public were determined to take the Pope on his ludicrous side, and the story ran that Adrian had only desisted from having Pasquino's statue flung into the Tiber because he was assured that, like frogs in water, he would make a greater noise than before.³

Almost all contemporary accounts make it clear that the mass of public opinion in Rome was very ill-disposed towards the foreign Pope. Even critics who recognized

¹ Besides VIRGILI, Berni, 68 *seq.*, *cf.* FLAMINI, 209 *seq.*, and Studi dedic. a d' Ancona (1900), 190. Berni saw afterwards that he had treated Adrian unjustly; see VIRGILI, 278.

² Lett. d. princ. I., 114^b *seq.*; SANUTO, XXXIV., 194. Of the carnival A. Germanello reports on February 19, 1523: * Son state facte mascare in Roma solum li ultimi tre dì de carnevale, ma macramente, et non è stata facta altera festa. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ SANUTO, XXXIV., 194; JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.; BURCKHARDT, Kultur I., seventh ed., 175 *seq.*; BERTANI, 30 *seq.* I abstain from a publication of the Satire * Confessione di M. Pasquino a Fra Mariano martire et confessore in * Cod. Ottob., 2812, f. 16^a *seq.* (Vatican Library), since GNOLI (Nuova Antologia, LI. [1894], 88 *seq.*, 530 *seq.*) intends to take it in hand. For the pamphlet, probably composed by a German courtier: Ein elegichs Gesprèch . . . wider den frommen Papst Adrianum, see CRISSTOFFELS, 79 and 102. This pamphlet also appeared in French: Dialogue et un merveilleux parlement fait par ung abbé, ung cortisan et ung diable. S. l. et a.

his good and noble qualities thought him too much the Emperor's friend, too penurious, too little of the man of the world. An instructive instance of this is given in a letter of the Mantuan agent Gabbioneta of the 28th of July 1523 in which—an exception to the Italian chroniclers of those days—he to a certain extent does justice to Adrian's good qualities. Gabbioneta describes the Pope's majestic appearance; his countenance breathes gentleness and goodness; the impression he gives is that of a religious. In tones of grief Gabbioneta deploras the change that he has seen come over the animated and light-hearted court of Leo X. "Rome is completely altered, the glory of the Vatican has departed; there, where formerly all was life and movement, one now hardly sees a soul go in or out."¹ The deserted state of the Papal palace is also accounted for in other ways, though the change had taken place gradually. For months Adrian had been forced, owing to the danger of the plague, to seclude himself in the Vatican and keep entirely apart from the life of the city. Always a great lover of solitude, this "cloistered" existence had so delighted the serious-minded Pope that he determined later on to adhere to it as much as possible. In this resolve he was strengthened by those around him, for they found it to their advantage that Adrian should see as few people as possible.² Another inducement was the fear of poison, by which from the first the Pope had been haunted.³ In January 1523 it

¹ See the phraseology of the characteristic letter (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua) in Appendix, 27.

² Ortiz in BURMANN, 207. That Enkevoirt made access to the Pope as difficult as possible had already been reported by G. M. della Porta on September 26, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

³ See LANZ, I, 64, and Appendix, No. 8, the *letter of G. M. della Porta of September 2, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

was even believed that a conspiracy to murder him had been detected.¹ By occurrences such as these Adrian's original distrust of most Italians was only intensified.² He therefore continued to be waited on, by preference, by his own countrymen, whom he was satisfied that he knew thoroughly.

The complaint of Adrian's inaccessibility was combined with another, that of his excessive confidence in those about him. There must have been some ground for the imputation when it is raised by such an enthusiastic partisan of the Pope as Ortiz. Some of those in his more immediate circle did not deserve the confidence placed in them by Adrian. From the reports of the Imperial Ambassador Sessa it is only too plain that many who were nearest to the Pope's person were very open to bribes; this was especially true of the secretary Zisterer, a German. What

¹ Lope Hurtado de Mendoza reports on this in a *letter to the Emperor, dated Rome, February (day missing) 1523: "El Papa fue avisado del governador que tiene en la Marca como venian aqui ciertos criados del duque de Camariño a darle ponçoña y con este aviso hizo prender algunos. El que le traía hugó. Los otros non confesado; ahunque creo que no se averigua bien la verdad, ha seido obra del duque y non se dize la causa, hase hecho secreto lo mas que han podido. Son X. los presos, estan en Santangeli" (Biblioteca de la Acad. de Historia, Madrid, Colec. Salazar, A 27, f. 124). Cf. also Ortiz in BURMANN, 218 *seq.*, and Appendix, No. 14, the *letter of J. Cortese of January 12, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). The inquiry directed against Giov. Maria Varano, Duke of Camerino, who had French sympathies, came, however, to nothing, and Clement VII. spoke of the Duke as free from suspicion of having taken part in this attempt or in the murder of Sigismondo Varano; see BALAN, *Storia*, VI., 67; HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 326; STAFFETTI, *Cybo*, 37. Further, the authorities give no support to the notion of HÖFLER, 486, that the affairs had a connection with the intrigues of Soderini.

² Cf. Corp. dipl. Port., II., 93, and report of Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, quoted in the preceding note.

Sessa also reports concerning the Pope's confidential friends, especially his allegation of Enkevoirt's dependence on Cardinals Monte and Soderini, is not confirmed from other quarters.¹ There is no doubt that Enkevoirt, now as always, had the greatest influence with Adrian,² and that from the beginning this was a cause of friction between the former and Ruffo Teodoli.³ In consequence the latter lost for a considerable time his position of confidence;⁴ as, however, he was an excellent man of affairs, his absence was perceptibly felt, and all the more so because Adrian was very often unlucky in the choice of his officials. Blasio Ortiz attributes the delays in the transaction of business which were so generally found fault with to the slackness and dilatoriness of the officials, since Adrian personally did more hard work than any other Pontiff before him. That in spite of this the despatch of affairs was very protracted, was also owing to Adrian's extreme conscientiousness, which

¹ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 490, 496, 502, 540, 544.

² Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 502; Corp. dipl. Port., II., 93, 132 *seq.*
*Letter of Balbi to Salamanca of April 12, 1523 (State Archives, Vienna).

³ G. M. della Porta reports to the Duke of Urbino, on September 24, 1522, a conversation with Ruffo Teodoli about the "*mala satisfactio* che tutta la corte riceva di questo si confuso et longo negotiar di S. S^{ta}." Ruffo Teodoli describes how Enkevoirt takes everything into his own hands "*et ha ottenuto di sostituir dui in loco suo da datare le supplicationi, cosa che mai più non fu concessa a persona del mondo se non in caso di infirmità, et stimase che fra poco spatio di tempo si habbiano di scoprir mille falsità, et il povero papa son sa di che importanza sia il sostituir datario*" (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ See JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI., who unfortunately does not give the exact date. The fall of Ruffo Teodoli must have taken place after March 1523, for up to that time he was still described as being, along with Enkevoirt and G. Ghinucci, the Pope's chief confidential adviser. Corp. dip. Port., II., 132-133. Quite at the end of Adrian's reign Ruffo regained his influence; see Ortiz in BURMANN, 217.

often went the length of pedantry. The Pope attempted to attend to all kinds of business in person, especially spiritual matters, without discriminating between what was important and what was not. This devotion to duty, which made him sacrifice himself to public affairs, was so great that his early death was thought by some to have been caused by over-exertion in one already advanced in years and exposed to an unaccustomed climate.¹

The shortness of Adrian's pontificate—it lasted one year and eight months—was the primary cause why the movement of Church reform produced such meagre positive results. As the period of delay in Spain and of the plague in Rome² can hardly be taken into account, the duration of his actual government was shorter still. Quite irrespective of his own idiosyncrasies and his advanced age, it is therefore not surprising that, among the new as well as arduous conditions in which, by an almost marvellous turn of events, he was placed, he was unable to strike any very deep roots. He had come to Rome a total stranger, and such he remained until his death; therefore, for the execution of his noble

¹ Ortiz in BURMANN, 207; *cf.* Corp. dipl. Port., II., 93. On September 3, 1523, the Florentine envoys sent to offer obedience, report: * Le S. V. hanno a sapere che questo Papa vuol vedere et intendere ogni cosa et non da auctorità a persona (State Archives, Florence).

² *Cf. supra*, p. 100 *seqq.* Since February 1523 the plague had again broken out, so that the carnival fêtes had to be given up; see *a letter of Albergati, February 14, 1523, in the State Archives, Bologna. *Cf.* in Appendix, No. 16, Acta Consist. of February 11 (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican); BERNI, Rime, ed. Virgili, 278; MAZZUCHELLI, I., 1, 396; Corp. dipl. Port., II., 139, 143, 169, and *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris). In May only a few cases of plague were reported: see *a letter of Girol. Staccoli of May 17, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). By the beginning of August 1523 the plague had entirely disappeared; see the letter of Giovio in BRAGHIROLI, Lett. inedit., Milano, 1856, 25.

intentions and great plans he was more or less dependent on the Italians with whom he was never able to find genuine points of contact. The circumstance that his knowledge of their language was always inadequate not only led to great misunderstandings,¹ but also made an interchange of ideas impossible. A stranger, surrounded by intimates of foreign birth, the Flemish Pope could not make himself at home in the new world which he encountered in Rome.² Just as Adrian was beginning to recognize the disadvantages inherent in his isolated position, and was making the attempt to ally himself with the Italian party of reform, and also to devise some improved and accelerated methods of business,³ he was seized by the illness of which he died. But even if his reign had lasted longer the Pope would with difficulty have reached the full solution of his great tasks. The proper machinery for the accomplishment of his measures of reform was wanting. Moreover, the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the case were too vast, the evils too great, the force of deeply rooted conditions—which in a naturally conservative atmosphere like that of Rome had a twofold strength—too powerful, and the interests at

¹ Enea Pio reports on October 5, 1523, to the Duke of Ferrara: *La lettera di V. E. ho presentato a N. S^{re}, la quale ha molto gratiosamente acceptato e non la sapendo legere la dete a M. Jo. Vincler, ne lui anchor la sapea molto ben legere di modo che io fui lo interprete (State Archives, Modena).

² Cf. REUMONT in his recension of Höfler in the *Allgem. Zeitung*, 1880, Beil. No. 149. HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 280, thinks that as Adrian placed more trust in his honest but inexperienced Netherlanders than in the Italians, the tactlessness of the former often did him more harm than the craftiness of the latter could have done.

³ Cf. the *report of Albergati, September 6, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

stake too various¹ to permit of the great transformation which was necessary being accomplished within the limits of a single Pontificate. The accumulated evils of many generations could only be healed by a course of long and uninterrupted labour.

Adrian, who had sometimes found himself driven by exceptional and weighty reasons to relax the stringency of the ecclesiastical laws,² perceived with grief in hours of depression that all his work would be but fragmentary. "How much does a man's efficiency depend," he often said, "upon the age in which his work is cast."³ On another occasion he said plaintively to his friend Heeze, "Dietrich, how much better it went with us when we were still living quietly in Louvain."⁴ At such times he was sustained only by the strong sense of duty which was always a part of his nature. Providence, he was strongly convinced, had called him to the most difficult post on earth, therefore he braced himself unflinchingly for the task, and devoted himself, heedless of his failing health,⁵ to all the obligations of his office until the shadows of death closed around him.

If Adrian is judged only by the standard of success, no just verdict will be given. The significance of his career lay not in his achievements, but in his aims. In this

¹ A good example in SANUTO, XXXIII., 540. Cf. CANTÙ, *Eretici*, I., 359 *seq.*

² Cf. MORING-BURMANN, 73 ; HÖFLER, 443.

³ Cf. *infra*, Chapter V.

⁴ This expression, given in a somewhat different form by JOVIUS (*Vita Adriani* VI.), is thus reported by G. M. della Porta in his letter, September 23, 1522, given in Appendix, No. 11 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ Even Adrian's enemy, Sessa, was disturbed by the extent to which the Pope's health had suffered under the weight of his duties ; see the Report, November 22, 1522, in BERGENROTH, II., n. 502.

respect it is to his undying credit that he not only courageously laid bare the scandals in the Church and showed an honest purpose of amending them, but also with clear understanding suggested the right means to be employed, and with prompt determination began reform at the head.¹

¹ See REUMONT, *loc. cit.*

CHAPTER IV.

THE MISSION OF FRANCESCO CHIEREGATI TO THE DIET OF NUREMBERG.—ADRIAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GERMAN SCHISM.

IN taking in hand the thorough regeneration of the Roman Curia, Adrian not only aimed at putting an end to a condition of things which to him must have been an abomination, but also hoped in this way to remove the grounds for defection from Rome in the countries beyond the Alps. But as the reform of the Curia was by no means a matter of swift realization, no other course remained open to the Pope than "to make a qualified appeal to the magnanimity of his enemies."¹ This explains the mission of Francesco Chieregati to the Diet convened at Nuremberg on the 1st of September 1522.

This native of Vicenza, chosen by the Pope for this difficult mission in Germany, where the elevation of a fellow-countryman to the Holy See had at once been accompanied by the highest hopes,² was no novice in Papal diplomacy; already under Leo X. he had been Nuncio in England, Spain, and Portugal. At Saragossa and Barcelona Adrian, then Viceroy for Charles V., had come to know him as a man of learning and earnest moral character, and

¹ HÖFLER, 242.

² Cf. Hochstratani Ad. s. d. n. pontificem modernum cuius nomen pontificale nondum innotuit. . . . Colloquia, pars prima [Coloniae], 1522, f. 2. Cf. PAULUS, Dominikaner, 103 seq.

one of his first appointments as Pope was to present him to the bishopric of Teramo in the Abruzzi.¹ Almost immediately afterwards he was nominated Nuncio in Germany.² Chieregati must have entered at once on his difficult and responsible mission to the country then in the ferment of revolt, for by the 26th of September 1522 he had already entered Nuremberg with a retinue. Two days later he had his first audience with the Archduke Ferdinand. On this occasion he directed himself to obtaining measures against the Lutheran heresy, and dwelt upon the Pope's serious intention of carrying on the war against the Turks and removing ecclesiastical abuses; at the same time he stated, in the Pope's name, that henceforth annates and the fees for the pallium should not be sent to Rome, but retained in Germany and applied exclusively to the expenses of the Turkish war.³

The Diet having at last been opened on the 17th of November, Chieregati appeared before it for the first time on the 19th, and appealed for the aid of the Hungarians in a forcible speech. He wisely avoided weakening the effect of his words by any reference to Church affairs. Not until the 10th of December, when he made a second speech on

¹ For F. Chieregati *cf.* BARBARANO, *Hist. Eccles. di Vicenza* IV. Vicenza, 1760; PORTIOLI, *Quattro documenti d' Inghilterra*, Mantova, 1868; MORSOLIN, *Fr. Chieregati*, Vicenza, 1873. *Cf.* also BURCKHARDT, I., ed. 7, 329; GACHARD, *Bibl. Nat.*, II., 64, and *Giorn. d. lett. Ital.*, XXXVII., 240, as well as *Cod. Barb.*, lat., 4907, of the Vatican Library.

² Stefano Saffa writes from Rome, September 12, 1522, that Chieregati "in penultimo concistoro" was appointed Bishop of Teramo and Nuncio in Germany. *Saffa calls him "homo noto al papa per atto a negoziare" (State Archives, Modena). According to the *Acta Consist., I., f. 186 (Consistorial Archives), the Consistory was held on September 7, 1522.

³ *Cf.* Planitz' account, published by WÜLCKER and VIRCK, 201 *seq.*; REDLICH, 21 *seq.*, and Reichstagsakten, III., 384.

the Turkish question, did he consider the opportune moment to have come for introducing his errand as it bore on Church affairs, and then, at first, only cautiously. He was commissioned by the Pope to call the attention of the States of the Empire to the spread of Lutheran teaching, a peril even more threatening than that of Turkish invasion, and to ask for the enforcement of the Edict of Worms. The Pope also did not deny the existence of many abuses in the Roman Curia, but had decided to take steps against them with the utmost promptitude. The States declared that before they could confer and come to any final judgment on these matters they must have the Papal proposals put before them in writing; they had evidently little inclination to meddle with this delicate matter. It was not until the arrival, on the 23rd of December, of Joachim of Brandenburg, who had already fought energetically at the Diet of Worms on the Catholic side, that matters seem to have come to a head.¹

On the 3rd of January 1523 Chieregati read before the Diet and the representatives of the Empire several documents which had been sent after him clearly setting forth the intention and proposals of the Pope. The first was a Brief of the 25th of November 1522, addressed to the Diet assembled at Nuremberg, in which Adrian, after mentioning his assiduous efforts to restore peace in view of the danger arising from the Turks, went thoroughly into the question of the religious confusion in Germany. The originator of the trouble was Luther, who had himself to blame if he, Adrian, could no longer call him a son. Regardless of the Papal Bull of condemnation and of the Edict of Worms, he continued, in writings full of error, heresy, calumny, and destruction, to corrupt the minds

¹ See Reichstagsakten, III., 321 *seq.*, 385, 387 *seq.*, 876 *seq.*; REDLICH, 42 *seq.*, 61 *seq.*; DITTRICH in *Histor. Jahrbuch*, X., 99 *seq.*
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and morals of Germany and the adjacent countries. It was still worse that Luther should have adherents and abettors among the princes, so that the possessions of the clergy—this perhaps was the first inducement to the present disorder—and the spiritual and secular authority were attacked, and a state of civil war had been brought about. Thus, at what was perhaps the worst moment of the Turkish danger, division and revolt had broken out in “our once so steadfast German nation.” The Pope recalled how, when residing in Spain as Cardinal, he had heard with heartfelt sorrow of the disturbance in his beloved German fatherland. He had then consoled himself with the hope that this was only transitory, and would not long be tolerated, especially among a people from whom in all ages illustrious antagonists of heresy had arisen. But now that this evil tree—perchance as a chastisement for the people’s sins or through the negligence of those who ought to have administered punishment—was beginning to spread its branches far and wide, the German princes and peoples should take good heed lest through passive acquiescence they come to be regarded as the promoters of so great a mischief: “We cannot even think of anything so incredible as that so great, so pious a nation should allow a petty monk, an apostate from that Catholic faith which for years he had preached, to seduce it from the way pointed out by the Saviour and His Apostles, sealed by the blood of so many martyrs, trodden by so many wise and holy men, your forefathers, just as if Luther alone were wise, and alone had the Holy Spirit, as if the Church, to which Christ promised His presence to the end of all days, had been walking in darkness and foolishness, and on the road to destruction, until Luther’s new light came to illuminate the darkness.” The Diet might well consider how the new teaching had renounced all obedience and gave permission to every man

to gratify his wishes to the full. "Are they likely," continued Adrian, "to remain obedient to the laws of the Empire who not merely despise those of the Church, the decrees of fathers and councils, but do not fear to tear them in pieces and burn them to ashes? We adjure you to lay aside all mutual hatreds, to strive for this one thing, to quench this fire and to bring back, by all ways in your power, Luther and other instigators of error and unrest into the right way; for such a charitable undertaking would be most pleasing and acceptable to us. If, nevertheless, which God forbid, you will not listen, then must the rod of severity and punishment be used according to the laws of the Empire and the recent Edict. God knows our willingness to forgive; but if it should be proved that the evil has penetrated so far that gentle means of healing are of no avail, then we must have recourse to methods of severity in order to safeguard the members as yet untainted by disease."¹

¹ The best copy of the Brief is in Reichstagsakten, III., 399 *seq.*; *cf.* also REDLICH, 97 *seq.* This document alone is sufficient to establish the incorrectness of the assertion of Gregorovius, VIII., edit. 3, 403, that Adrian "wished to settle the Lutheran controversy by a compromise on matters of doctrine." Beside this Brief intended for the Church at large, Papal letters had also been sent, by the end of November, to prominent princes and towns. Some of these are merely credentials for Chierigati; others, such as those sent to Bamberg; Strassburg, Spire, and Constance, prohibitions to print and sell the writings of Luther; see WALCH, XV., 2562 *seq.*; VIRCK, Korrespondenz Strassburgs, I., 77; REMLING, Speier, II., 247 *seq.*, and specially Reichstagsakten, III., 404 *seq.* In the last named see also the Brief to the Elector Albert of Mayence, of November 28 (*infra*, 141, n. 2) and also that to the Elector Frederick of Saxony, of December 1, 1522, in which Adrian exhorts him, in accordance with his promise given beforehand to Cardinal Cajetan, to give no longer his protection to Luther after the condemnation of the latter by the ecclesiastical and secular authorities, but to proceed against him and his followers. This

Besides this Brief, Chieregati read an Instruction closely connected with it, and then demanded the execution of the Edict of Worms and the punishment of four preachers who had spread heretical teaching from the pulpits of the churches of Nuremberg.¹

This Instruction, which Chieregati communicated to the Diet, is of exceptional importance for an understanding of Adrian's plans of reform, and his opinion of the state of things.² The document, unique in the history of the Papacy, develops still more fully the principles already laid down in the foregoing Brief for the guidance of the German nation in their opposition to Lutheran errors.

¹ The text escaped KALKOFF, who gives (*Forschungen*, 208 *seq.*; *cf.* 85, 136) a text differing in particulars from the Cod. Vat., 3917. The letter to Frederick, often printed and widely disseminated in MS. form, also a copy in the Theodosian Library at Paderborn, Lib. 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, which begins with the words "Satis et plus quam", was looked on as genuine by RAYNALDUS himself, 1522, n. 73, but it is a forgery; see KOLDE in *Kirchengeschichtl. Studien*, 202-227. The singular letter to the Archduke Ferdinand, see *Reichstagsakten*, III, 1, contains a reference to BALAN. Mon. Ref., 297 *seq.*, is added. On December 18, 1522, Adrian wrote to Hildesheim about the disaffection of the chapter there; printed in LAUENSTEIN, *Hist. ep. Hildesheim.* I, 40.

² The report, January 4, published by WÜLCKER and VIRCK, *Mon. Hildesheim.* III, 385; REDLICH, 103 *seq.* The doings of the mentioned preachers gave rise to quite exceptional measures concerning the advance of the heretical teaching; see also G. Albergati, dated Rome, January 12, 1523 (*State Papers*, 1523).

³ Manuscripts and printed copies of the Instruction see *Mon. Hildesheim.* III, 391 *seq.*, where there is also an exact duplicate of the passage on the plague (see *infra*, p. 136) points with certainty to the end of November as the time of composition; *cf.* *Mon. Hildesheim.*; TIZIO (*Hist. Senen.*, Cod. G, II., 39, f. 179; Chigi *Mon. Hildesheim.*); the Instruction to November 25, 1522, which was the date of the plague.

Besides the glory of God and the love of their neighbour, they are bidden to remember what is due to their glorious loyalty to the faith, whereby they have won the right to be considered the most Christian of all peoples, as well as the dishonour done to their forefathers by Luther, who has accused them of false belief and condemned them to the damnation of hell. Moreover, they must consider the danger of rebellion against all higher authority introduced by this doctrine under the guise of evangelical freedom, the scandals and disquiet already aroused, and the encouragement to break the most sacred vows in defiance of apostolic teaching, by which things Luther has set an example worse than that of Mohammed. On all these grounds Chieregati is justified in demanding the execution of the Papal and Imperial decrees; yet at the same time he must be ready to offer pardon to penitent sinners.

The objection, which ever gained wider acceptance, that Luther had been condemned unheard and upon insufficient inquiry, meets with thorough refutation in the Papal Instruction. The basis of belief is divine authority and not human testimony. St. Ambrose says: "Away with the arguments by which men try to arrive at belief; we believe in the Fisherman, not in dialecticians." Luther's only vindication lay in the questions of fact, whether he had or had not said, preached, and written this or that. But the divine law itself, and the doctrine of the sacraments, were to the saints and to the Church an irrefragable truth.

Almost all Luther's deviations of doctrine had already been condemned by various councils; what the whole Church had accepted as an axiom of belief must not again be made a matter of doubt: "Otherwise, what guarantee remains for permanent belief? Or what end can there be to controversy and strife, if every conceited and puzzle-

headed upstart is at liberty to dissent from teaching which puts forth its claims not as the opinion only of one man or of a number of men, but as established and consecrated by the unanimous consent of so many centuries and so many of the wisest men and by the decision of the Church, infallible in matters of faith? Since Luther and his party now condemn the councils of the holy fathers, annul sacred laws and ordinances, turn all things upside down, as their caprice dictates, and bring the whole world into confusion, it is manifest, if they persist in such deeds, that they must be suppressed, as enemies and destroyers of public peace, by all who have that peace at heart."

In the last and most remarkable portion of the Instruction, Adrian set forth with broad-minded candour the grounds on which the religious innovators justified their defection from the Church on account of the corruption of the clergy, as well as that corruption itself. "You are also to say," so run Chieregati's express instructions, "that we frankly acknowledge that God permits this persecution of His Church on account of the sins of men, and especially of prelates and clergy; of a surety the Lord's arm is not shortened that He cannot save us, but our sins separate us from Him, so that He does not hear. Holy Scripture declares aloud that the sins of the people are the outcome of the sins of the priesthood; therefore, as Chrysostom declares, when our Saviour wished to cleanse the city of Jerusalem of its sickness, He went first to the Temple to punish the sins of the priests before those of others, like a good physician who heals a disease at its roots. We know well that for many years things deserving of abhorrence have gathered round the Holy See; sacred things have been misused, ordinances transgressed, so that in everything there has been a change for the worse. Thus it is not surprising

that the malady has crept down from the head to the members, from the Popes to the hierarchy.

"We all, prelates and clergy, have gone astray from the right way, and for long there is none that has done good; no, not one. To God, therefore, we must give all the glory and humble ourselves before Him; each one of us must consider how he has fallen and be more ready to judge himself than to be judged by God in the day of His wrath. Therefore, in our name, give promises that we shall use all diligence to reform before all things the Roman Curia, whence, perhaps, all these evils have had their origin; thus healing will begin at the source of sickness. We deem this to be all the more our duty, as the whole world is longing for such reform. The Papal dignity was not the object of our ambition, and we would rather have closed our days in the solitude of private life; willingly would we have put aside the tiara; the fear of God alone, the validity of our election, and the dread of schism, decided us to assume the position of Chief Shepherd. We desire to wield our power not as seeking dominion or means for enriching our kindred, but in order to restore to Christ's bride, the Church, her former beauty, to give help to the oppressed, to uplift men of virtue and learning, above all, to do all that beseems a good shepherd and a successor of the blessed Peter.

"Yet let no man wonder if we do not remove all abuses at one blow; for the malady is deeply rooted and takes many forms. We must advance, therefore, step by step, first applying the proper remedies to the most difficult and dangerous evils, so as not by a hurried reform to throw all things into greater confusion than before. Aristotle well says: 'All sudden changes are dangerous to States.'"

In some supplementary instructions based on Chiericati's reports, Adrian also undertook that in future there

should be no infringement of the concordats already agreed upon. With regard to cases decided in the Rota, in which a reversal of judgment was desired in Germany, he would, as soon as the Auditors, who had fled before the plague, were reassembled, and as far as was consistent with honour, come to some understanding; he anxiously awaited proposals as to the best way to hinder the advance of the new teaching, and wished to be made acquainted with the names of learned, pious, and deserving Germans on whom Church preferment could be bestowed, as nothing had been more hurtful to the saving of souls than the appointment of unworthy priests.

The unprecedented publicity which Adrian in this Instruction gave to the abuses so long dominant in Rome, and the communication of this document to the Diet, certainly not in opposition to the Pope's wishes, have often been blamed as impolitic acts; even the Papal admission of guilt has itself been questioned as incorrect and exaggerated.¹ The charge of exaggeration cannot be

¹ The different objections to the contents of the Instruction and the manner of its publication are summarized by PALLAVICINI, II., 7, but with courtesy and moderation (*cf.* WENSING, 223). REUMONT (*Allgem. Zeitung*, 1880, Beil. No. 149) remarks on this point: "Various judgments may be formed as to the opportuneness of the Instruction imparted to the Nuncio Chieregati at Nuremberg; there was something lofty-minded in the public acknowledgment of shortcomings and sins in the very quarter from which amendment ought to have proceeded, and Adrian was justified by the subsequent reforms carried out by the Tridentine decrees. If the results, at least the momentary results, did not correspond with his noble intentions; if the opposition, refusing to take the hand held out to them, showed themselves averse to a real and equitable peace and only took advantage of the open avowal of wrong-doing to suit their own interests; if they mixed up Church questions with matters foreign to them and proposed measures bound to be ineffectual owing to the already altered turn in affairs and the opposition to spiritual authority,—who, on that account, shall hold

sustained: the corruption in Rome was undoubtedly as great as Adrian described it to be. If there was to be any effectual cure, it was necessary that this lofty-minded Pope, in his enthusiasm for reform, should lay bare, with heroic courage, the wounds that called for healing.

On looking at the Instruction as a whole, we see that the Pope did not surrender, even on the smallest point, his firm ecclesiastical principles. He draws a sharp and definite line between the divine and human elements in the Church. The authority of the latter rests on God only: in matters of belief it is infallible. The members of the Church, however, are subject to human corruption, and all, good as well as bad, must not shrink from confession of guilt before God, the confession which every priest, even the holiest, has to lay on the steps of the altar before offering the sacrifice of the Mass. Such a confession Adrian as High Priest made before the whole world openly, solemnly, and

the Pope responsible? the Pope who, from his first accession onwards, had put the peace of Christendom in the forefront of all his pronouncements, ecclesiastical as well as political, and, on the other hand, had stood out against the pernicious violence of hostile writers and the obvious illegality of princes in their encroachments on the constitution of the Church? An agreement with the reforming Papacy might have saved Germany from the horrible disorders which broke out in the struggle between the German nobility and their princes, and in the peasants' war, all carried on in the name of the Gospel and the Divine Law,—disorders of which the final result, after horrible bloodshed, has been that worst of all forms of ecclesiastical government, a Cæsaro-Papism, from which the Evangelical Church, as the outcome of its very origin, still suffers to-day. For even after the removal of the worst evils of an incongruous relationship, after the most strenuous efforts to make its constitution secure, this Church is still always face to face with the danger of succumbing to State domination or to anarchy. An agreement with this all-reforming Papacy had in itself ceased to be a matter of practical consideration, and, besides assuming its possibility, was beyond the powers of the leaders of the opposition to carry out."

explicitly in expiation of the sins of his predecessors and as the earnest of a better future. Firmly convinced of the divine character of the Church, he nevertheless does not shrink one jot from speaking freely, though in grief, of the evils and abuses that lay open as day before the eyes of the world and brought dishonour on her external system of government.¹

What is to be said of the charge of impolicy brought against the Instruction? Was the Pope's uncompromising admission of the corruption of Rome a short-sighted blunder whereby he sharpened one of the keenest weapons of the enemy? Many staunch partisans of the Church have thought so; but this is a narrow conception, without justification. Adrian was right in rising to a much higher idea of the Church; moreover, he was too clear-sighted a theologian to feel alarm for the true interests of the Church from a confession of guilt which was an actual matter of fact. It is sin itself, not its acknowledgment, which is dishonouring. With genuine German frankness and sincerity, which on this very account were unintelligible to the Romans, Adrian VI., in a magnanimous and honourable spirit, had turned to the noble and well-loved nation from which he came, with a courageous confession of abuses, promises of thorough reform, and exhortations to the maintenance of unity, law, and order in the Church. "It lay with the nations to reply in the same noble temper. But the existing tone was one of discord, and the prospect of reconciliation vanished never to return; the gulf grew wider and wider, and no power on earth was able to close it."²

Had it depended upon the Archduke Ferdinand and the Elector Joachim of Brandenburg, the Pope's solicitations

¹ Cf. BUCHOLTZ, II., 17 *seqq.*, and WENSING, 249 *seq.*

² HÖFLER, 275.

for the execution of the Edict of Worms would have been acceded to. But neither succeeded in having his way. Hans von der Planitz, who was devoted to the new teaching and an active and astute champion of the Saxon Elector, knew how to procrastinate; the majority determined not to commit themselves at first to any definite answer, but to refer the whole matter to a consultative committee. In addition to the pressure put upon them by the unsettled condition of the Empire, they were influenced by an outbreak of indignation cleverly worked up by the Lutheran party on account of Chieregati's demand for proceedings against the four preachers of Nuremberg. The town council had already, on the 5th of January 1523, decided to prevent this, if necessary by force. As Chieregati still remained obstinate, this matter also was referred to the committee.¹ The Papal Nuncio soon found himself exposed to such insults, threats, and acts of violence that he hardly any longer dared to show himself in the streets.²

The preachers, on the other hand, only became more vehement; "If the Pope," declared one of them from the pulpit in the church of St. Lawrence, "were to add a fourth crown to the three already on his head, he would not on that account rob me of the word of God."³ This feeling in the city, as well as the critical condition of the Empire, had from the first a strong influence on the conduct of affairs. The result gave satisfaction to neither party.⁴ The Lutherans certainly in no way

¹ REDLICH, 106 *seq.*; Reichstagsakten, III., 386; JANSSEN-PASTOR, II., ed. 18, 290 *seq.*

² Report of Chieregati, January 10, 1523, in MORSOLIN, 111 *seq.*; cf. SANUTO, XXXIII., 599.

³ RANKE, Deutsche Geschichte, II., ed. 6, 38.

⁴ REDLICH, 114 *seq.*; Reichstagsakten, III., 387; JANSSEN-PASTOR, II., ed. 18, 293 *seq.*

derived a complete victory, but the Catholics and the Pope were equally unsuccessful in achieving their most important object, the execution of the Edict of Worms.¹ This was postponed as being at the time impracticable; simultaneously demands were made on the Curia in a more imperative and aggressive form for the removal of German grievances² and the convocation of a free Council on German soil; until then nothing else was to be preached except "the Holy Gospel as laid down in the Scriptures approved and received by the Christian Church, and nothing new was to be printed or offered for sale unless first examined and approved by learned persons especially appointed for that purpose."³ Had the clergy, with their decided preponderance in the Diet, fulfilled their duties in a corporate capacity, the unsatisfactory result of the negotiations would be inexplicable. But both courage and good-will were wanting in too many of the prelates. The critical condition within the Empire, threatened by an outbreak of revolution, "put them," as Planitz wrote, "in fear of their skins." Had it not been for the determined action of the Papal Nuncio, the affairs of the Church might well have been entirely neglected.⁴

The prelates were not only weak-spirited, they were also steeped in worldliness. Heedless of the necessities of

¹ Cf. BAUMGARTEN, II., 234 *seq.*, 247; HÖFLER, 284 *seq.*; HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 308; *Histor. Zeitschr.*, LX., 110-111.

² In order to avoid the presentation of these demands, Chierigati left Nuremberg on February 16, 1523; see Planitz' reports, 383. Cf. Reichstagsakten, III., 645 *seq.*, and EHSES in *Römischen Quartalschr.*, 1904, 373, note. On Eck's advice regarding the German "grievances" see GÖTZ' article, No. 18, quoted *supra*, in note 1, p. 109.

³ Reichstagsakten, III., 447 *seq.*; JANSSEN-PASTOR, II., ed. 18, 296. For the meaning of the demands of the Council, see EHSES' excellent remarks, *Conc.*, IV., xvi. *seq.*

⁴ REDLICH, 147.

the age, they thought more of worldly enjoyments, the banquet and the dance, than of the deliberations of the Diet.¹ The earnestness of the Nuncio was displeasing to them, still more the frank avowal of general blame and responsibility by a Pope who knew only too well the laxity of the German hierarchy.² Adrian's hope that the German prelates would search their own hearts, and even now smite their breasts as penitent sinners, was proved to be futile. Far from it, these worldly-minded men felt themselves affronted and roused to wrath at the bare idea of paying attention to the Papal declarations. Such small amount of zeal as there was for co-operation in Adrian's wishes very soon sank below zero. Moreover, among the Catholic secular princes opinion was for the most part "out-and-out Lutheran."³

The party of the new belief, cleverly led by Planitz and Johann von Schwarzenberg, opposed at first a discreet silence to the Pope's magnanimous candour, in order there and then to bring to the front the demand for the punishment of the preachers and afterwards to fall upon the Nuncio. Even a man of so refined a culture as Melancthon was not ashamed⁴ to describe the latter as no better than a weathercock; still worse was the license with which he and Luther inveighed against Adrian. In the spring of 1523 they issued a foul pamphlet aimed, under allusions to a monstrosity discovered in Rome in the reign of Alexander VI., at the strictest and most austere Pope ever raised to the

¹ Cf. Chieregati's report, November 28, 1522, in MORSOLIN, Chieregati, 108.

² Cf. the Brief to the Elector Albert of Mayence, November 28, 1522, in the Reichstagsakten, III., 406 *seqq.*

³ Cf. REDLICH, 104 *seq.*, 148; BAUMGARTEN, II., 234, 244.

⁴ Cf. Corp. Ref., I., 605 *seq.*

Chair of Peter.¹ Luther did not think it worth his trouble even to take notice of Adrian's good intentions.² He saw in him only the Antichrist: the whole "injustice and savagery of his polemic"³ is shown in the gibes at "the stupidity and ignorance" ascribed by him to this great man. "The Pope," he wrote, "is a *magister noster* of Louvain; in that University such asses are crowned; out of his mouth Satan speaks."⁴

Luther and his associates show thus plainly that their object was not the removal of abuses from the Church, but its fundamental overthrow. Regardless of the stipulation of Nuremberg, they urged on their politico-religious agitation. On the 28th of March 1523, Luther addressed to the heads of the German religious orders his appeal, calling on them to break their vows, contract marriages, and divide amongst themselves the property of their orders. He continued as before to revile the noble German Pontiff as a blind tyrant, a charlatan, even as the special minister of Satan.⁵

For this Luther found a pretext on the 31st of May 1523 in Adrian's canonization of Bishop Benno of Meissen. On the same day the Florentine Archbishop Antonino was raised to the altars of the Church. The lavish expenditure hitherto associated with such ceremonies was prohibited by Adrian.⁶ The canonization of such

¹ LANGE, *Der Papstesel* (Göttingen, 1891), 82 *seq.*, 86.

² REDLICH'S opinion, 146.

³ HARNACK uses this expression of Luther's controversial style, *Dogmengesch.*, III., 3rd ed., 733.

⁴ See WALCH, XV., 2658 *seq.*; DE WETTE, II., 351 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 297, 299 *seq.* Cf. JANSSEN, *An meine Kritiker* (1891), 74 *seq.*

⁵ See JANSSEN-PASTOR, II., 18th ed., 298 *seq.* Cf. *Mittel. für Gesch. von Meissen*, II., 130, and LEMMENS, *Alfeld* (Freiburg, 1899), 67 *seq.*

⁶ See RAYNALDUS, 1523, n. 89-101; Bull V., 15 *seq.* Cf. *Acta

illustrious examples of the bygone episcopate was intended to appeal to their less spiritual successors.¹ But the Pope's lofty intention of thus uplifting the higher clergy was as little understood in Italy as in Germany;² he also experienced a bitter disappointment in Erasmus,³ who had written to his former teacher immediately after his election, assuring Adrian of his orthodoxy and dedicating to him his edition of Arnobius. In answer, Adrian addressed Erasmus on the 1st of December 1522

Consist., May 29, 1523 (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican); SANUTO, XXXIV., 244; Corp. dipl. Port., II., 170; Lett. di princ., I., 115 *seq.*; Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris; Ortiz in BURMANN, 210 *seq.*; *letters of V. Albergati, May 13 and 18, 1523, State Archives, Bologna; *letter of L. Cati, June 6, 1523, in State Archives, Modena; LANDUCCI, 366; Mitteil. für Gesch. von Meissen, 127 *seq.*; KALKOFF, Forschungen, 35; SCHMIDLIN, 270. The canonization of Giustiniani (*cf.* SANUTO, XXXIV., 285) was not carried out.

¹ HÖFLER, 302.

² Of importance in this respect is a *letter of Abbadino, May 18, 1523, who, after speaking of the Consistory in the case of Antonino, adds: "Hoggi se fatto un altro consistoro pur publico, nel quale se publicato Beato Bennone Alemano. Credo che questo papa habbi designato de far santi li morti et cazar disperati a casa del diavolo li vivi, maxime che havevano a negociar in questa corte, nella quale non si sono altri che disperati e malcontenti." Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. In a similar spirit of mockery writes *L. Cati, May 29, 1523. State Archives, Modena.

³ Adrian's correspondence with Erasmus is printed by BURMANN, 493 *seqq.*, from the: Opera Erasmi, a German translation (by Schlosser), Frankfurt-on-Main, 1849; *cf.* DANZ, Anal. Crit. de Had. VI., I., II., Jenae, 1813 *seq.*; WOKER, De Erasmi studiis irenicis. Bonnae, 1872, 25; BAUER, Hadrian VI. (Heidelberg, 1876), 107 *seq.*; MAURENBRECHER, Kath. Ref., 211 *seq.*, 400, where a gross mistake of NIPPOLD, Reformbestrebungen Adrians VI. (Hist. Taschenb., 1875, 205 *seqq.*) is corrected; HÖFLER, 333 *seq.*, and HARTFELDER, 134-143.

in a lengthy and paternal Brief,¹ thanking him for the dedication, setting his mind at rest with regard to certain accusations brought against him, and at the same time urgently entreating him to use his great literary gifts against the new errors. This practical Netherlander, now seated in the Papal Chair, wished to see Erasmus doing something and not merely conveying to him graceful words of compliment. He shrewdly remarks that Erasmus by such activity would best put to silence those who wished to implicate him in the Lutheran business: "Rouse thyself, rouse thyself to the defence of the things of God, and go forth to employ in His honour the great gifts of the Spirit thou hast received from Him. Consider how it lies with you, through God's help, to bring back into the right way very many of those whom Luther has seduced, to give steadfastness to those who have not yet fallen, and to preserve from falling those whose steps are tottering." He recommends as best that Erasmus should come to Rome, where he would find at his disposal literary resources and the society of learned and pious men. Adrian, who was well aware of the disinclination of Erasmus to any violent treatment of the innovators, very adroitly seizes this opportunity of impressing upon him that he also was much more desirous of the voluntary return of those who had been misled than of their compulsion under spiritual and secular penalties; to the attainment of this end, Erasmus would best conduce by engaging in a literary warfare with the friends of Luther. In the same spirit and at the same time, Adrian also admonished the University of Cologne.²

¹ From Alexander's original draft (*Cod. Vat., 3917, f. 16-17; cf. PAQUIER, 290 *seq.*) Adrian had removed all terms of recrimination and harshness.

² This Brief, dated Rome, December 1, 1522, is to be found in

On the 22nd of December 1522, Erasmus himself wrote a second letter to Adrian, in which he already makes sufficiently clear the advice that he purposes to communicate to the Pope in a more confidential manner; he only begs that there shall be no measures of suppression, no intrusion of personal hatreds, to the dishonour of the cause of Christ. To this Adrian answered in the most friendly way on the 23rd of January 1523, again inviting Erasmus to Rome. He looks forward with eager anticipation to the promised advice, "since he has no greater desire than to find the right means of removing from the midst of our nation this abominable evil while it is yet curable, not because our dignity and authority, so far as they concern us personally, seem endangered in the stormy tempests of the times—for not only have we never set our heart on these things, but, seeing that they come upon us without any connivance of ours, have greatly dreaded them, and, God be our witness, would have declined them altogether had we not feared thereby to offend God and injure our own conscience—but because we see so many thousands of souls, redeemed by the blood of Christ and committed to our pastoral care—souls, moreover, belonging, after the flesh, to peoples of our own race—led away on the direct path of destruction through the hope of an evangelical freedom which, in very truth, is a bondage to the Devil."

The answer of Erasmus to this letter is only preserved in part. Enough remains, however, to show what his position at this time actually was. He coldly declines the enthusiastic summons of the Pope to devote his learning, reputation, and influence to the cause of the Church; he has not the adequate knowledge, nor

a rare contemporary copy: Adrianus Papa Sextus | delectis filiis
Re | ctori et Universi | tat. Colonien. | Five printed pages with the
Papal arms on frontispiece. Copy in the Floss Library, Berlin.

does he enjoy a sufficient reputation, seeing that both parties, the Lutherans and their opponents, tear him in pieces. Even if his frail health permitted him to make the journey to Rome, he could get through much more work in Basle; besides, if he were to write against Luther in measured and decorous terms, he would appear to be jesting with him. "If I were to imitate his own style of writing and make a hostile onslaught on Lutheranism, I should raise about me a hornet's nest." To this excuse Erasmus joins a warning against violent measures; yet, in contradiction to this, he expresses the wish that the authorities "may beat back the innovations"; further, he trusts that the Pope may lead the world to hope that some of the things justly complained of may be altered. He recommends that incorruptible, moderate, and dispassionate men should be convoked from every country in Europe, in order to deliberate on reform. Here the letter breaks off. We are left in uncertainty whether Erasmus still adhered to his scheme of settling the Lutheran question by means of the arbitration of learned men; in any case, the conditions were less favourable for such a course than they had been in 1520, when Erasmus exerted himself to carry out this favourite project.¹

Adrian VI. had also made attempts to win back the man who, in connection with the Lutheran ideas, had intro-

¹ Cf. our previous remarks, English ed. of this work, Vol. VII., p. 422. REDLICH, 65, believes Erasmus to have held fast to his original project. This is certainly probable, but not certain as long as the close of the letter remains undiscovered. On September 16, 1523, Erasmus addressed a letter to Adrian's Sacristan, Petrus Barbirius, the sound Catholic sentiment of which is strongly marked; printed by NOLHAC, *Erasme en Italie*, 112 *seq.* The letter reflects the mental distress of the harassed scholar, urged from both sides by the parties in a great national movement to take up a clear position.

duced into German Switzerland a movement of apostasy from Rome. The Pope's position was one of twofold difficulty in respect of Switzerland, as there remained a debt of 30,000 ducats due from Leo X. to the cantons. With great exertions Adrian VI. succeeded, in the first instance, in finding the money required to pay the Zurichers, and in January 1523 he handed over to them 18,000 Rhenish gulden.¹ In April he sent Ennio Filonardi to the Swiss in order to secure their neutrality, and, in case of a French invasion of Italy, an alliance; he gave him a letter to Ulrich Zwingli promising him rewards if he supported the Nuncio.² But in the meantime Zwingli had already initiated his breach with Rome in his first discourse at Zurich on religion.³ Similar designs occupied the mind

¹ Cf. SCHULTE, I., 235. The reports of **A. Germanello of December 11 and 29, 1522, give fresh details of the transactions with the Swiss Envoys. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² ZWINGLI, Opera, VII., 264. The letter contains no definite promise, and Zingg's later assertions, "that every inducement was put before Zwingli to keep silence, even the Papal chair itself," is wanton exaggeration. Not until Clement VII. became Pope was it recognized how dangerous the reformer might be to the Curia, and then the latter had recourse not to promises but to threats. Before that his influence had not yet been rated so highly. As parish priest of Glarus he was simply offered the prospect, in the event of his supporting the Nuncio in his political mission, of obtaining a canonry at Coire or Basle, and he was made a Papal acolyte—a merely nominal position, which he accepted. How could anyone for a moment suppose that a man who, up to a short time before, had been content, even as senior priest of Zurich, with a pension of fifty marks for placing his influence at the Pope's service, was so distinguished as to be marked out for the purple? WIRZ, Filonardi, 59–60. For Zwingli's discreditable distrust of Adrian's crusading energy see RIFFEL, III., 43 *seq.*

³ Cf. RIFFEL, III., 49 *seq.*, and G. MAYER in Kathol. Schweizerbl., 1895, 51 *seq.*

of the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Albert of Brandenburg, despite his still repeated asseverations of loyalty to the Pope and the Church. He had even instructed the Roman procurator of the Order to obtain from the Pope a penal edict against any of his knights who had joined the party of Luther! Adrian, who had ordered Albert to accept without alteration¹ the reforms of the Order already prescribed by Leo X., was spared the experience of seeing this German Prince, in violation of his vows, obtain the secularization of the lands of the Order for which he had denounced in Rome the King of Poland.²

Next to Germany the countries of Scandinavia repeatedly claimed Adrian's attention. The want of determination shown by Leo X. with regard to the arbitrary government of the tyrannical Christian II. of Denmark had inflicted serious injury on the Church in those countries. That under Adrian a stronger conception of duty prevailed is clear from the transactions of a Consistory held on the 29th of April 1523.³ But before a decree against Christian was drawn up, the King had been compelled to leave his kingdom, where the government was taken over by his uncle, Frederick of Gottorp.⁴ On the ground of the Union of Colmar, Frederick also claimed acknowledgment in Sweden; but in vain. Gustavus Wasa, the gifted leader of the Swedish national party,

¹ VOIGT, *Geschichte Preussens*, IX., 685 *seq.*; JOACHIM, III., 45 *seq.*, 63, 243 *seq.*; PASTOR, Albrecht von Brandenburg in, *Katholik*, 1876, I., 180. *Cf.* *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXXI., 331 *seq.*

² *Cf.* JANSSEN-PASTOR, III., ed. 18, 79 *seq.*; KALKOFF, *Capito*, 117.

³ See KALKOFF, *Forschungen*, 84, and MARTIN, G. Vasa, 127.

⁴ The news reached Rome in the beginning of May; see *letter of V. Albergati, May 7, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna); *cf.* *Corp. dipl. Port.*, II., 168.

since 1521 administrator of the kingdom, was, on the 6th of June 1523, proclaimed in the Diet of Strengnäs "King of Sweden and of the Goths."

Luther's teaching had also made its way into Sweden through the efforts of Olaus Petri, and during the confusion of the war of independence had spread unhindered. As an apt pupil of the Wittenberg Professor, at whose feet he had sat, Olaus Petri declaimed quite openly in Strengnäs against the sacrament of penance and the veneration of the saints; at the same time he proclaimed the duty of the Church to return to apostolic poverty. He soon found a like-minded colleague in Laurentius Andrea. Their anti-Catholic agitation was able to make unimpeded progress as long as the see of Strengnäs was vacant. The state of disorder into which the Swedish Church had fallen, in consequence of the turmoil of the preceding years, is best illustrated by the fact that, with the exception of the excellent Johann Brask in Linköping, and the revered Ingemar in Vexjö, there were no other bishops in the whole country.¹

Adrian did not neglect the needs of the Swedish Church; in order to help, he sent, in the person of Johann Magni, a legate of Swedish extraction, with whom he had been personally acquainted from the Louvain days.² Magni arrived in Strengnäs when the election of Gustavus Wasa to the throne was already accomplished. The cunning sovereign, at heart estranged from the Church, and covetous

¹ See WEIDLING, 122 *seq.*, 131; GEIGER, II., 34; MARTIN, G. Vasa, 164 *seq.*, 222 *seq.*; *cf.* also SCHÜCK, *Svensk. Litt.-hist.*, Stockholm, 1890, and BERGGREN in *Upsala Universitets Åskrift*, 1899.

² See JOH. MAGNI, *Hist. metr. in Script. rer. Suec.*, III., 2, 75; WEIDLING, 132 *seq.*, 138; MARTIN, 172, 174. The latter calls attention, rightly, to the discreet reserve of the Brief of March 11, 1523, announcing Magni's mission (in THEINER, *Schweden*, II., 5).

of the rich possessions of the clergy,¹ concealed his real feelings and received the Pope's representative with every token of honour. Johann Magni's mission resembled that of Chierigati: he was to announce Adrian's readiness to remove abuses in the Church, but at the same time to call upon the government of the kingdom to take steps against the Lutheran innovations. In reply, the royal council, inspired by the King, first expressed satisfaction at the Pope's promises of reform, but immediately went on to insist, as indispensable preliminaries for the Swedish Church, on the formal deposition of the Archbishop of Upsala, Gustavus Trolle "the turbulent," who had been sentenced to perpetual exile as a partisan of the Danish king Christian II., and the institution of good native-born bishops to the vacant sees, and especially of a peace-abiding primate. Until this was done it would be a hard task to eradicate the many errors introduced into the Christian religion—the name of Luther being intentionally omitted. The question of the Episcopate being settled, the Papal Nuncio was to return and undertake the best reform possible.²

When the Legate on a further occasion made personal representations to the King respecting the payments of money to the Church, and the Lutheran heresy, he received such a very conciliatory answer that he believed his mission to have come to a prosperous issue.³ The too trustful Magni seems to have shut his eyes to the fact that the King, for all his courtesy, had shirked the essential points,

¹ REUTERDAHL insists that this, and not inward conviction, was the cause of G. Wasa's apostasy (*Svenska Kyrkan's Historia*, IV., 179). Cf. MARTIN, 227.

² THEINER, *Schweden*, II., 7 *seq.*; WEIDLING, 135.

³ Cf. Magni's letter to Brask in *Handlingar rörande Skandin. Hist.*, XVII., 157 *seqq.*

and had not forbidden Olaus Petri to preach Lutheran doctrine in Strengnäs. On the 10th of September 1523 Gustavus Wasa wrote himself to the Pope that, when the vacant bishoprics were filled by peace-abiding bishops who would be loyal to the Crown, and the Legate returned with newly constituted powers, he would then do all in his power, after taking counsel with the bishops, to extirpate the destructive heresies, and to forward the union of the Muscovites with the Church and the conversion of the Laplanders. A few days later the King forwarded to the Pope the list of bishops chosen by the Swedish chapters, with the name of the Papal Nuncio at their head as Archbishop of Upsala, and asked for their confirmation and for the remission of the customary dues.¹

It was an extremely clever move thus to link the personal interests of Magni with the formal deposition of Trolle.² Magni was on the point of starting for Rome, when a Brief from Adrian arrived to the effect that Trolle was still to be considered Archbishop of Upsala and to be reinstated as such. The Nuncio declared that the document was spurious, but his supposition was wrong: the Pope had actually taken this impolitic step.³ The King now dropped his mask. Evidently under the influence of the events that had recently taken place at the Diet of Nuremberg, and guided by his secretary, Laurentius Andrea, a man of Lutheran opinions, he sent to the Holy See in the beginning of October a threatening ultimatum;

¹ THEINER, *Schweden*, II., 8 *seqq.*; BALAN, *Mon. ref.*, n. 131; MARTIN, 185 *seq.*; WEIDLING, 127 *seqq.*

² WEIDLING, 139. MARTIN (176 *seq.*) opposes this view of Magni's character, but he admits that he was too credulous.

³ "Les termes d'un autre bref à Frédéric de Danemark confirment que la bonne foi du nouveau pontife s'était laissé surprendre par les intrigues de l'archevêque dépossédé." MARTIN, 189.

that if the Pope did not withdraw his demands respecting Trolle, the rebel and traitor to his country, he would, on the strength of his royal authority, dispose of the bishops and the Christian religion in his territories in such a manner as would, he believed, be pleasing to God and all Christian princes.¹ To Magni, Gustavus used still plainer language: if his patience and goodness were unavailing, he was determined to let his prerogative have full play and free his people from the intolerable yoke of strangers. A royal letter of the 2nd of November 1523 informed the Pope, the news of whose death had not yet come, that if the confirmation of the proposed candidates for the vacant sees was refused or any longer delayed, he, the King, had made up his mind to care for the orphaned Church in other ways and would enforce the confirmation of those chosen by Christ, the highest Pontiff.² All doubt was removed that the King had determined to sever his countries from that Church to which they owed their culture and civilization.

As a consolation amid the sorrow caused to Adrian by the dangers and losses of the Church in Germanic lands came the reconciliation of Theophilus, the schismatic Patriarch of Alexandria,³ the dawning hopes of a reunion with the Russian schismatics,⁴ and the spread of Christianity

¹ The letter to the Sacred College of October 10, and to the Pope of October 4, 1523, in THEINER, II., 11 *seq.*, 13 *seqq.*, and Gustav d. Förstes Registratur, I., 143 *seq.*, 146 *seq.*; *cf.* WEIDLING, 140 *seq.*, and MARTIN, 187 *seq.*

² Gustav d. Förstes Registratur, I., 172 *seq.*, 181.

³ RAYNALDUS, 1523, n. 107; PAQUIER, Aléandre, 296.

⁴ G. M. della Porta announces, on May 21, 1523, the overthrow of Sickingen, and adds: *Par pur che Dio voglia aiutar la religione christiana, che in questo tempo medesimo gli Moschoviti offeriscono a N. S. voler lasciar in tutto et per tutto le loro eresie et redursi sotto la total ubedienza de la sede Ap., dal quale non vogliono di sorte

in the New World. To promote the missionary activity of the Franciscans in America, the Pope conferred upon the Order in that continent extensive privileges: they were to elect their own superior every three years, to possess the full powers of the Minister-General, and even to exercise episcopal functions, except those of ordination.¹ This new organization encouraged the hope that races which, notwithstanding highly developed civilization, were yet votaries of a blood-stained heathen worship, would soon be delivered from the night of idolatry and be won over to the truth of Christianity.

alcuna altro privilegio salvo chel loro principe sia creato et nominato re. State Archives, Florence.

¹ WADDING, XVI., ed. 2, 136 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 173; MEIER, Propaganda, I., 301 *seq.*; HERNAEZ, Colec. de bullas rel. a la Iglesia de America, I., 332. Adrian VI. gave support to the Franciscans in other ways also, and to the Dominicans as well; see WADDING, XVI., 2nd ed., 148, 561; Bull. ord. praed., IV., 408, 410 *seq.* A unique instance there recorded is the appointment of a lay inquisitor in the person of Franz van der Hulst. This, however, was accompanied by strict limitations, especially in protecting the rights of the Episcopate; see DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Kerkhervorming in Nederland (1873), 181 *seq.*, and FINKE in Hist. Jahrbuch, XIV., 337 *seq.*

CHAPTER V.

ADRIAN'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE AND PROMOTE THE CRUSADE. — THE FALL OF RHODES AND THE SUPPORT OF HUNGARY.

ADRIAN'S attitude towards the complicated politics of the European States, then involved in a dangerous crisis, through the rivalry between Francis I. and Charles V. and the renewed aggressiveness of the Ottoman power, was inspired by that lofty earnestness and magnanimity which had directed his treatment of ecclesiastical affairs. As Vicar of the eternal Prince of Peace the lofty-minded Pope had felt most bitterly the protracted state of war, with its menace to the future of Christendom. Since the greatest danger came from without,¹ from the side of the infidel, he deemed it a twofold duty, towards God and his own conscience, to leave nothing undone to procure the reconciliation of the two monarchs who confronted one another in deadly enmity.

The pacification and union of the Christian powers in presence of the onslaught of Islam, the reform of the Church, and the restoration of ecclesiastical unity, so especially threatened in Germany, were the three great ideas dominating his Pontificate.

¹ The, *Epistola D. Marci Maruli Spalatens. ad Adrianum VI. P. M. de calamitatibus occurrentibus et exhortatio ad communem omnium Christianorum unionem et pacem. Romae, 1522*, describes the situation in language of great emotion.

From the first Adrian had shown a firm determination, in contrast to his predecessors, not to attach himself to any of the contending parties, but by all the means in his power to bring about a peace, or at least a truce, so that all the united forces of Europe might be turned against the hereditary foe of Christendom. In this sense he had already written to the Emperor on the 25th of March 1522, urging him to conclude peace or an armistice with the French King;¹ for identical reasons he despatched Gabriele Merino, Archbishop of Bari, from Spain to Paris, and Alvarò Osorio, Bishop of Astorga, to England, to confer with the Emperor and Henry VIII.²

Immediate help was necessary, for it was no longer doubtful that the Sultan Suleiman I., following up the capture of Belgrade in August 1521, was preparing to deal another deadly blow by an attack on Rhodes, the last bulwark of Christendom in the south. Held by the Knights of St. John, this island, on account of its situation and exceptional strength, was as great a hindrance to the development of the Turkish sea power as it was for Christendom a position of incalculable value.³ Suleiman was determined to capture it at all costs. On the 1st of June 1522 he sent his declaration of war to the Grand Master; at the same time he moved against Rhodes a powerful fleet conveying an armament of 10,000 men and all the requisites for a siege. The Sultan at the head

¹ GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 50 *seqq.*

² Cf. HÖFLER, 169, and *Bullet. de la commiss. royale d'hist.*, 3 Series, III., 297 *seq.* On September 20, 1522, G. Merino wrote, "ex Puysi non procul a Parisiis" to Cardinal Schinner: *In re pacis nihil adhuc factum est nec quid faciendum sit facile iudicari potest cum ex aliorum principe voluntate pendeat, sed si quid per me fieri poterit, is ero semper qui fu et esse debeo. Cod. 1888, f. 21^b (Angelica Library, Rome).

³ See BAUMGARTEN, II., 137-138.

of 100,000 men proceeded through Asia Minor along the coast of Caria. Although the Grand Master had little over 600 knights and 5000 soldiers, he was yet determined to resist to the last. The preparations for holding the strongly fortified and well-provisioned fortress were so thorough, the heroism of the defenders so great, that, at first, all the assaults of the Osmanli were repulsed, but in spite of serious losses the enemy held on. Everything depended on the arrival of relief for the besieged, and for this the conditions of Western Europe were as unfavourable as possible. The spread of the religious upheaval in the German Empire was the precursor of a social revolution, so that men feared the overthrow of established order. Things were no better in Hungary, torn by party strife; while Venice, the mistress of the seas, seemed now, as always, occupied only in safeguarding her own possessions.¹ The great powers of central Europe were embroiled in internecine strife; only an immediate cessation of their quarrels could justify the hope that they would take part in a defensive movement against the Turk. No one worked for this more zealously than Adrian VI., for the danger besetting Rhodes occupied him as a personal concern.² Although there was little prospect of his efforts to reconcile the contending Christian powers being successful, he tenaciously adhered to his purpose; in spite of all failures he stood firm.

The Pope's position as the intermediary of peace was from the first exceptionally difficult. He had to try and convince Francis I. that he was not a partisan of his former pupil, sovereign, and friend, Charles. From the latter he had, at the same time, to remove the suspicion that he was too favourably inclined towards Francis. A further difficulty

¹ ZINKEISEN, II., 626.

² See BAUMGARTEN, II., 250.

arose from the decisive turn of affairs on the scene of war in Italy, when the French, defeated at Bicocca on the 27th of April 1522, soon after (May 30th) lost Genoa also.¹ The alliance between the Emperor and Henry VIII. was drawn even closer than before; on his journey into Spain, Charles paid Henry a visit, during which a joint expedition into France was agreed upon; both monarchs confidently hoped to win the Pope as the third confederate against Francis. While Adrian's proposals of mediation fell upon deaf ears at the English as well as at the Imperial Court, Francis, in his humiliation, assumed a conciliatory mien. This induced Adrian to make a fresh appeal to the Emperor; but Charles, in a letter of the 7th of September 1522, declared himself unable to make peace without the King of England; he observed that the French terms of agreement did not admit of acceptance.² Adrian called the Emperor's attention to the danger of Rhodes; adjured him in the most impressive terms to help the island, to put his private interests in the background, and to consent to a truce. If Charles were in Rome, Adrian wrote, and were to hear the appeals from Rhodes and Hungary, he would not be able to keep back his tears. He, the Pope, was doing what he could; the money he had sent he had been forced to borrow. He did not ask Charles to conclude a peace without the concurrence of the English King, but thought that he might at least induce the latter to consent to an armistice.³

The Pope sent to England Bernardo Bertolotti, who, as

¹ For the history of the warfare in the Milanese up to the capture of Genoa by the Spaniards see BARNHAGEN, *Lautrecho*, an Italian poem by Francesco Mantovano, Erlangen, 1896, I.-LVI. For the battle of Bicocca cf. JÄHNS, *Gesch. des Kriegswesens*, 1088 *seq.*

² GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 112 *seqq.*

³ Letter of September 16, 1522, in GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 115 *seqq.*

well as the Spanish Nuncio, was to work for peace.¹ Besides this, in respect of the Turkish war, Tommaso Negri, Bishop of Scardona, had already, in August, been entrusted with a comprehensive mission to the Princes of Christendom. He first of all betook himself to Venice.²

In a letter to Charles V., written in French, on the 30th of September 1522—an admirable memorial of Adrian's lofty and truly Christian disposition—the Pope quiets the Emperor with regard to the report that he had a greater partiality for Francis than for himself; he then declares that it is utterly impossible for him to take part in the war as a confederate of Charles, since he is totally without the material means for so doing. Since his accession to the Holy See—*ce siège plein de misère*—he has not had enough money to meet the current expenses of government; but even had the means been his, let the Emperor himself say whether it would become him to sacrifice his exertions for the welfare of Christendom in order to hand it over to greater turmoil and danger. In a second letter of the same date he beseeches the Emperor to come to the help of Rhodes; willingly would he shed his own blood to rescue this bulwark of Christendom.³ On the anniversary of his coronation and on the 1st of September respectively he had earnestly exhorted the Ambassadors and the Cardinals in Consistory to raise funds for the support of Rhodes and Hungary, and on the 4th of September a commission

¹ Along with the authorities produced by GACHARD, Corresp., XLV. *seq.*, cf. BREWER, III., 2, n. 2607, and the letter *of G. M. della Porta, dated Rome, September 13, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² SANUTO, XXXIII., 409 *seq.* Later (January 1523), T. Negri was sent to Poland to work against the Lutherans and bring about a peace with the Teutonic Order. Acta Tomic., VI., 222 *seq.*

³ GACHARD, Corresp., 122–124, 125–127.

of Cardinals was appointed to attend exclusively to this matter.¹

By means of rigid economy Adrian collected a sufficient sum to provide the equipment of a few ships.² He did not disguise from himself how little this amounted to; but it was impossible for him to do more.³ A thousand men, who were landed at Naples in October, deserted because they had received no pay. To the Imperialists the defence of Lombardy against the French seemed a much more urgent necessity than the relief of Rhodes. The Pope, writes the Venetian Ambassador, is in despair, since he sees no possibility of forwarding to Rhodes the troops he has collected.⁴ To crown all, there was a fresh outbreak of the plague in Rome, and the solemn occupation of the Lateran, hitherto deferred for want of money, had once more to be postponed;⁵ in the subsequent course of events it did not take place at all.⁶

Together with the Turkish danger, the quieting of the States of the Church claimed the Pope's attention at the beginning of his reign. All recognition is due to the promptitude with which he met the difficult situation and resolutely carried out what seemed to him the necessary measures for saving what there was to save.⁷

¹ Besides *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican), and SANUTO, XXXIII., 440, 444 *seq.*, see the *letter of Ant. Taurelli of September 5, 1522 (State Archives, Modena), and the *reports of G. de' Medici of September 3 and 4, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² Owing to adverse circumstances they never reached their destination; see JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI., and HÖFLER, 479.

³ G. M. della Porta lays stress on this in his *report, September 23, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ SANUTO, XXXIII., 523; *cf.* JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.

⁵ See *Acta Consist. of January 12, 1523 (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican).

⁶ See CANCELLIERI, Possessi, 88.

⁷ BROSCHE, Kirchenstaat, I., 71.

Since grave charges were made against the governors appointed by Leo X., a general change in every city of the Papal States was already under consideration in September 1522.¹ While Adrian was disposed to leniency towards the Dukes of Ferrara and Urbino, and even suffered the return of the Baglioni to Perugia,² he had determined from the first not to recognize the usurpation (hitherto vainly opposed by the College of Cardinals³) of Sigismondo Malatesta in Rimini.⁴ In December 1522 he ordered Sigismondo's son to be arrested in Ancona,⁵ and at the same time despatched the Spanish soldiers who had accompanied him into Italy against Rimini.⁶ The undertaking, which had at first appeared difficult,⁷ proved all the easier as Malatesta had brought upon himself the bitter hatred of those who had submitted to him.⁸

¹ *Letter of Enea Pio, September 27, 1522 (State Archives, Modena). *Il papa manda novi governatori alle città di tutto il stato, che non è altro se non un levar le legationi, says G. M. della Porta, October 12, 1522 (State Archives, Florence). The measures do not, however, appear to have been completely carried through.

² Cf. Bollett. per l'Umbria, V., 694.

³ See the *letter of the Cardinals to Rimini, dated Rome, May 29, 1522. Copy in the Library at Mantua, I., c. 3-4.

⁴ "N. S^{re} desegna recuperar Armini," *G. de' Medici, "D. vigna dello ill. Medici," November 30, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ *G. de Medici, D. vigna dello ill. Medici, December 21, 1522 (State Archives, Florence), and *V. Albergati, from Rome the same date (State Archives, Bologna).

⁶ *Letter of V. Albergati, December 6, 1522 (State Archives, Bologna). G. de' Medici announces on December 28, 1522, the arrival of the Papal troops before Rimini (State Archives, Florence).

⁷ It was believed in Rome that Malatesta had the secret assistance of one of the Signoria, and had raised the banner of St. Mark. *Letter of A. Germanello, dated Rome, December 16, 1522 (Library, Mantua, I., c. 3-4).

⁸ Malatesta was obliged, after long negotiations, to surrender

As vassals of the Church both Alfonso of Ferrara and Francesco Maria della Rovere of Urbino, now fully reconciled to the Holy See, gave Adrian their loyal support. As early as the 15th of September 1522 Alfonso's son had come to Rome,¹ where negotiations had at once been opened for his father's absolution and reinvestiture.² They proceeded with astonishing expedition, and by the 17th of October everything was arranged. In the investiture with the Dukedom of Ferrara the fiefs of San Felice and Finale were also included,³ and Adrian even showed an inclination to reinstate the Duke in the possession of Modena and Reggio; but this did not take effect owing to the opposition of the Cardinals.⁴ According to Contarini, it was also the Pope's fixed intention to restore Ravenna and Cervia to the Venetians; in favour of the credibility of this statement is the circumstance that Adrian detested the excessive eagerness of the clergy to acquire wealth and property; from the standpoint of his high ideals an overgrowth of the States of the Church

Rimini; *cf.* *letter of V. Albergati, February 3, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna); *Reports of G. de' Medici of February 19 and 25 and March 1, 1523, as well as a *letter of T. Manfredi, February 23, 1523 (State Archives, Florence); JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.; Ortiz in BURMANN, 202 *seq.*; CARPESANUS, 1340; LANCELLOTTI, I., 427-438.

¹ *Letter of G. de' Medici, September 17, 1522 (State Archives, Florence), and *Diarium of BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² *Letter of G. de' Medici of October 5 and 12, 1522 (State Archives, Florence). *Cf.* BALAN, Storia, VI., 64.

³ THEINER, Cod. dipl., III., 528 *seq.*; *cf.* V. DOMARUS in Hist. Jahrb., XVI., 73; see also SANUTO, XXXIII., 482 *seq.*

⁴ *Cf.* *letter of L. Cati, December 30, 1522 (State Archives, Modena); *Acta Consist., January 23, 1523 (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican); GUICCIARDINI, XV., 1.

was an evil likely to divert the Papacy from its true vocation.¹

The transactions with Francesco Maria della Rovere lasted longer. He had already, on the 11th of May 1522, on the recommendation of the Sacred College,² been absolved from all censures,³ but not until he reached Rome in person,⁴ on the 18th of March 1523, was the definite treaty of peace concluded with him. He was reinstated in the Dukedom of Urbino, with the exception, however, of Montefeltro; this fief remained in the hands of the Florentines, to whom it had been ceded in payment of debts incurred by the Apostolic Chamber.⁵

¹ BROSCHE, *Kirchenstaat*, I., 72. HERGENRÖTHER'S doubts (*Konziliengeschichte*, IX., 283) are hardly well grounded.

² Cf. Adrian's *Brief of May 8, 1522, in Appendix, No. 4 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ SANUTO, XXXIII., 333 *seq.* In the State Archives, Florence, Urb. Eccl., is a *Brief of August 30, 1522, in which the Duke's apologies for not coming to Rome, on account of illness, are accepted. In two *Briefs of December 1, 1522, Adrian had asked the Duke to support the undertaking against Rimini. He thanked the Duke for his help on December 23, the Duchess on December 24, 1522, and renewed his thanks again in *Brief of January 9, 1523. All these *Briefs are in the State Archives, Florence.

⁴ See *letter of G. de' Medici, March 18, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and another, of the same date, *from Andrea Piperario, in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Francesco Maria of Urbino had audience on March 20. *Diarium of BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁵ Cf. the *letters of G. de' Medici of March 16, 18, 24, and 26, 1523 (State Archives, Florence); *Acta Consist. of March 26, 1523 (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican); *Abbadino's letter, March 26, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua); SANUTO, XXXIV., 54 *seq.*; GUICCIARDINI, XV., 1, and HÖFLER, 493 *seq.*; a copy of the Bull of Restitution of March 27 is in the Colonna Archives, Rome. The departure of the Duke of Urbino from Rome on May 8, 1523, was

Adrian's success in restoring order to the Papal States¹ could not compensate him for the insurmountable obstacles which stood between him and his efforts for the union of the chief powers of Christendom against the Turks. True to his original plan of undertaking the office of peacemaker, he steadily refused to enter into the league for offensive purposes, which was the object of the Imperial diplomacy. This led to a difference with Charles's representative in Rome and to strained relations with Charles himself, between whom and Adrian in other matters (*e.g.* with regard to the retention of Naples as an appanage of the Empire) there had always been a good understanding.²

Seldom was an Ambassador placed in such an unsuitable position as that of Manuel at the Court of Adrian VI. This unscrupulous and masterful Spaniard was a man of such one-sided political understanding that he was quite incapable of comprehending a character such as Adrian's, who approached everything from the point of view of his religious ideals.³ In Manuel's estimation the Pope owed everything to the Emperor, and was therefore under the self-evident obligation to subordinate himself in all respects to the wishes of Charles. The more he perceived that Adrian was pursuing his own policy, the greater grew his displeasure. Before Manuel came really to know the Pope, he had convinced himself that he was a weak and

consequent on the arrival, on that day, of a *letter from Abbadino (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

¹ The *Brief addressed to Perugia on December 15, 1522, in the Communal Library, Perugia, was directed to maintaining peace and order in that city. At the same time the Pope was making similar efforts for Osimo; see *Brief for "Joanni Casulano, commiss. nost.," December 13, 1522 (Communal Archives, Osimo).

² See RAYNALDUS, 1522, n. 17.

³ See BAUMGARTEN, II., 221.

incompetent personality, and Adrian's part of peacemaker filled him with anger and mistrust. In his reports he described the Pope as miserly, ignorant of all the affairs of the world, and weak and irresponsible as a child; he even denounced him, entirely without grounds, to the Emperor, as carrying on secret intrigues with France.¹

Adrian, who had at first received Manuel with friendliness, and indeed with confidence,² could not disarm his hostile feelings. Their mutual relations, already rendered acute by disputes concerning the appointment to bishoprics in the Milanese,³ became in a very short time so strained that Manuel saw how untenable his position had become and applied for his recall. Half in despair he left Rome on the 13th of October 1522, with the firm resolve to bring about a breach between the Emperor and the Pope.⁴ He at once advised Charles to pay no *obedientia*,⁵ hoping thus to force the Pope to relinquish his position of neutrality.⁶

¹ Manuel to Charles V. on October 8, 1522, in BERGENROTH, II., n. 485.

² See in Appendix, No. 6, the report of G. de' Medici, August 27, 1522. The latter reports, September 9, 1522: *Il sig. Don Giovanni questi dì con bellissima compagnia è andato a palazzo a presentar a N. S. una achinea molto richamente ornata per il censo di Napoli, al quale N. S. fa careze e dimonstrazioni assai di confidar in lui. (State Archives, Florence.)

³ *Letter of Manuel to Charles V., dated October 8, 1522, decifrado del orig. in Col. Salazar, A, 26 seq., 83 seq.; Biblioteca de la Acad. d. Historia in Madrid.

⁴ See NEGRI in Litt. d. princ., I., 109^b, 112^b; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 397.

⁵ Manuel to Charles, October 8, 1522 (Biblioteca de la Acad. d. Historia, Madrid, *loc. cit.*).

⁶ In a *cipher of Castiglione's which certainly belongs to this time, although we have not, unfortunately, the exact date, it says: "Il S. Don Giovanni va tanto malcontento del papa quanto se possa dire ne dice assai male, pur mostra di credere chel Papa bisogni esser imperiale a

His place was taken in October 1522 by Luis de Corduba, Duke of Sessa,¹ who, although he had no hope of success,² nevertheless, in his very first audience, invited the Pope to enter into alliance with the Emperor. The Pope replied that he had neither the money nor the wish to wage war; all his energies were directed to procuring an armistice and later on a peace.³ As Adrian stood firm in his conviction that, as Father of universal Christendom, it was his paramount duty to restore peace in Europe,⁴ Sessa soon became of the same mind as Manuel.⁵ In addition, disputes arose over territorial claims.⁶ The French in their dealings with the Pope showed themselves cleverer diplomatists than the Imperialists. While the latter incessantly repeated that Adrian's love of peace only made the French more stubborn, and that his one hope of safety lay in the league with Charles, Francis sent the Cardinal Castelnau de Clermont to Rome with instructions to praise the Pope's love of peace and to assure him that the French King was animated by the same dispositions.⁷

Adrian, who had shown great patience towards the Emperor's Ambassadors and the Emperor himself, was, however, at last put upon his mettle; this is discernible in his two Briefs of the 21st and 22nd of November 1522. In

suo dispetto ancorche lui dica voler esser neutrale" (Library, Mantua).

¹ *Letter of G. de' Medici, October 9, 1522 (State Archives, Florence); *cf.* Corp. dipl. Port., II., 98.

² *Letter of Manuel to Charles V., October 8, 1522 (Biblioteca de la Acad. d. Historia, Madrid, *loc. cit.*).

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 490.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 496.

⁵ *Cf.* his reports in BERGENROTH, II., n. 502, 509, 540.

⁶ *Cf.* SAUER, Die Schrift des G. Valle Rhegiens. über das Exarchat in Italien. Göttingen, 1905, 12 *seq.*

⁷ GACHARD, Corresp., XLVI. *seq.*, 140.

these he once more urgently calls on Charles to give help to Rhodes, and complains bitterly of the excesses of the Imperial forces in the Papal States; the favour shown to him by Charles consists in words and not in deeds.¹ Under these circumstances he felt it strange that the Imperial Ambassador should continue to bring forward an inexhaustible series of fresh wishes and suggestions touching ecclesiastical policy and finance; many of these requests Adrian was obliged to refuse from a sense of duty.² The Spanish Ambassador now had recourse to bribery in order to gain the ear of the Papal entourage. He succeeded in learning a good many secrets from the Secretary, Zisterer, but concerning the principal point he learned nothing, and his surmise that Adrian was a puppet in the hands of his confidential servants proved to be quite beside the mark.

The general opinion formed of the new Pope at the Imperial Court was entirely erroneous. There he was looked upon exclusively as the former subject of Charles, to whom he owed everything, and to whom he was expected to give unconditional support in fulfilment of his dutiful allegiance. Gattinara presumed to remind the Head of the Church of these obligations in the arrogant language of his Court.³

The tactless pressure of the Spaniards confirmed Adrian more than ever in his previous policy of a firm neutrality: not until Francis I. attacked Italy, he declared, would he take a hostile part against him.⁴ About this time the

¹ GACHARD, *op. cit.*, 133 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 459 *seq.*, 465. Cf. BAUMGARTEN, II., 223.

² LÉPITRE, 298 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 460 *seq.* For Charles's numerous requests see a characteristic *letter to Margaret of Austria, August 15, 1522 (State Archives, Brussels, Pap. d'état. reg., n. 35, f. 26 *seq.*).

³ BREWER, III., 2, n. 2718; cf. BAUMGARTEN, II., 257-260.

⁴ HÖFLER, 467.

unscrupulous Manuel intervened in a way which was sure to touch Adrian to the quick. Cardinal Castelnau de Clermont had provided himself, for his journey to Rome, which he reached on the 6th of December 1522,¹ with a safe-conduct from the Spanish Government as security against the Imperial troops. In spite of this Manuel allowed the Cardinal's servants to be made prisoners and their property to be seized. He thus fell under the penalty of excommunication to which those who put hindrances in the way of persons travelling to Rome were liable. Moreover, Castelnau was not only the Ambassador of the French King, but a Cardinal and Legate of Avignon. Thus a direct challenge was offered to the Pope. As an amicable settlement proved futile, Adrian pronounced the sentence of excommunication against Manuel, and requested the Emperor to repudiate the conduct of his Ambassador. The transactions over this matter added considerably to the Emperor's irritation.²

Notwithstanding these occurrences, Adrian persisted in his hopes of a change of mind on the part of his former pupil. That he might propitiate his interest in the common cause of Christendom, the Pope had determined to present him with the sword, consecrated on Christmas Day, which the Popes were accustomed to send to the

¹ G. de' Medici *reports this on December 8, 1522 (State Archives, Florence). In a *letter of A. Germanello of December 16, 1522, it says: "El Card. de Aus è venuto ad habitare ad una vigna del commendator de S. Spirito poco lontano dal palazzo per haver commodità negociar con el Papa" (Library, Mantua).

² Cf. GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 139 *seq.*, 153 *seq.*, 160, 185; SANUTO, XXXIII., 580 *seq.*; *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 109; LEPITRE, 301 *seq.* For Charles's excitement, cf. his *letter to Sessa in BERGENROTH, II., n. 521. From Manuel's *letter to Charles V., dated October 8, 1522, I got the interesting fact that he had advised the Emperor to give no letter of safe-conduct to Cardinal Castelnau (Bibl. Acad. Hist., Madrid).

defenders of the Faith. This solemnity was disturbed by an unlucky accident; the architrave of the doorway of the Sistine Chapel fell down and crushed one of the Swiss guards standing close to the Pope.¹ Already, on the 10th of December 1522, Adrian had once more called the attention of the Doge to the urgency of the Turkish danger and had instructed the Nuncio Altobello to exhort him to levy subsidies for the war.²

¹ Lett. d. princ., I., 110; SANUTO, XXXIII., 561; BREWER, III., 2, n. 2763; Ortiz in BURMANN, 205; JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI. (*cf.* STEINMANN, Sixtina, I., 166); *letter of L. Catì, December 26, 1522, State Archives, Modena; *letter of A. Germanello of December 29, 1522, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua (see Appendix, Nos. 12 and 13). The Florentine envoys report on June 8, 1522, from Valladolid, *Hier-mattina nella chiesa di S. Paolo con solenne ceremonie prese questa M^a la spada et el capello mandati della S. di N. S. (State Archives, Florence).

² *Brief of December 10, 1522 (original in the Secret Archives of the Vatican), Arch. s. Angeli, Arm., IV., c. ii., n. 31. *Ibid.*, n. 32, a *Brief to Cardinal de' Medici of December 10, 1522, suggesting that he should himself give help to Hungary. On the 21st of December 1522 the Pope sent the following Brief to the Marquis F. Gonzaga of Mantua:—Adrianus Papa VI. Dilecte, etc. Inter varias sollicitudines, quae nos ad apostolatus apicem Dei clementia sublimatos excipiunt, ea praecipua est et esse debet, quae ex periculis christianae reipublicae ab impio Turcharum tyranno imminentibus nascitur, qui occupato Belgradi propugnaculo, ipsa nimirum ianua ad nos pro arbitrio invadendum, nihil non timendum Christianorum capitibus reddidit; atque ideo omni adnitendum esse ope periculi magnitudo ac necessitas persuadet, ut a tam formidabili iugo reipublicae christianae cervicem tutam reddere studeamus. Implorat auxilium nostrum, qui pro salute nostra assidue periclitatur, charissimus in Christo filius noster Ludovicus Hungariae et Bohemiae rex ill., cui si defuerimus, nobis ipsis nos defuisse rerum exitus declarare facile posset. Quis enim defendet Italiam, Hungaria in tam potentis hostis ditionem redacta? Nos quidem in summa sedis apostolicae egestate, quam gravi etiam aeris alieni summa obstrictam invenimus, et contulimus et nunc denuo pecuniam illi conferemus, nihilque omissuri sumus, quod ad sanctam

On the 1st of January 1523 Adrian VI. informed the Emperor that Francis I. had given his Ambassador full powers to conclude a peace. Before this came to pass an armistice was to be entered into for three years, and the Pope hoped that Charles would be a consenting party; on account of the Turks the necessity for such a course was greater than ever.¹ The letter had hardly been despatched before news arrived that the Imperialists had plundered the town of San Giovanni in the Papal States and had made prisoner the resident Papal Commissary. Adrian, usually so mild-tempered, was now roused to an indescribable pitch of excitement. He summoned at once to his presence Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, and informed him that nothing but his great regard for the Emperor held him back from an immediate alliance with Francis; the authors of this deed of violence, Juan Manuel and Prospero Colonna, he would lay under the ban of the Church.²

ac pernecessariam hanc expeditionem pertinere noverimus. Idemque ut faciant principes et respublicas christianas hortamur, imprimisque te, quem cum nostri et sedis apostolicae observantissimum experiamur, christianae religionis et fidei, de ea enim nunc agitur, amantissimum non veremur. Rem vero latius explicabit dilectus filius Franciscus Sperulus noster de numero participantium cubicularius, quem in hac re nuntium constituimus et cui fidem a te ac caeteris cupimus adhiberi. Quantum autem per te fuerit in hoc negotio deliberatum, litteris tuis ipsi nuntio ad nos datis declarare non pigeat, ut quae reliqua sunt celeriori ac certiori consilio maturare possimus. Datum Romae apud sanctum Petrum sub annulo piscatoris die XXI decembris MDXXII, pontificatus nostri anno primo. T. Hezius. (Original in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.)

¹ BERGENROTH, II., n. 518.

² *Ibid.*, n. 519: *Qua è notorio che la S^{ta} di N. S. sta malissimo con li ill. s. Prospero Columna et marchese di Pescara per le invasioni, incendii et rapine de li castelli de Pallavicini de Piacentino et se la venuta di questo s. duca oratore Cesareo non la medica et tempera overo attramente si componga per certo si tiene ne habi a

The Imperialists saw that some steps must be taken to appease the Pope. Accordingly, Sessa invited the Viceroy of Naples, Charles de Lannoy, who had formerly been a friend of Adrian's in the Netherlands, to come to Rome.¹ There was meanwhile another reason for bringing the Viceroy thither. For some time the most disquieting reports of the fate of Rhodes had been coming in,² and Lannoy brought the announcement that, according to credible information from private sources, Rhodes had capitulated. On hearing this Adrian burst into tears. "Still," he exclaimed, "I cannot believe it." Henceforward, so he informed the Cardinals, he could make no more payments whatsoever; his whole income must be spent on the defence of Christendom, even if he had to content himself with a linen mitre.³

On the 28th of January 1523 a Consistory was held which the Pope opened with a speech about Rhodes; he declared himself ready to sell all his valuables for the funds of the Turkish war. It was decided to appoint a Commission of Cardinals to take measures for the restoration of peace in Christendom and the collection of money for the

seguire qualche dimostrazione vindicativa. Jac. Cortese to the Marchioness Isabella from Rome, January 5, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

¹ *Letter of G. de' Medici, January 25, 1522 (State Archives, Florence), and BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS, *Diarium (Secret Archives of the Vatican). According to the latter, Lannoy left "de improvviso" on January 31.

² *Letters of V. Albergati of January 9 and 12, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

³ SANUTO, XXXIII., 505. *Rhodi certissimamente è perso a patti zoe per deditione spontanea. . . . Hozì N. S. ha lachrimato per pietate excusandosi non haver potuto tirar li principi christiani al suo soccorso. L. Cati, January 27, 1523 (State Archives, Modena).

prosecution of the war against the Turks.¹ The Commission met on the following day.² The alarm caused by Lannoy's intelligence was all the greater as it coincided with news from Germany announcing a further advance of the Lutheran errors.³

Subsequently different reports came in, affirming that Rhodes still held out, and even Adrian seems for a long time to have been loath to believe that the island had fallen. On the 3rd of February 1523 he still wrote, in a most affectionate letter to the Emperor, "As long as Rhodes was in such great danger he could not under any con-

¹ *Die merc. 28. Januarii 1523: S. D. N. fecit verbum de rebus Turcarum et de periculo in quo versatur insula Rhodi, et ad hoc deputavit nonnullos rev. dominos cardinales ad cogitandum modum et formam in quo possit fieri concordia et pax inter principes christianos et ad inveniendas pecunias pro manutentione belli contra praefatos hostes fidei christianae (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican). Cf. BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS, *Diarium (Secret Archives of the Vatican); *letter of V. Albergati, February 1, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna). It is clear from the report of G. de' Medici of January 28, 1523, that a letter from the King of Hungary was also read in the Consistory (State Archives, Florence).

² *Letter of G. de' Medici, January 29, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS, *Diarium (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ *Heri giunse la infelice et dolorosissima nova della perdita de la isola et città di Rodi, la quale ha fatto restare tutta questa corte et maxime quelli che hanno intelligentia attoniti e supefati. Piaccia a N. S. per sua misericordia pigliare la protectione de sua santissima fede, perche da uno lato et Turco, da l' altro Luttero et tra li principi tanta dissensione et rabie fanno che molti secoli sono la religione christiana non si trovò a maggior pericolo. N. S^{re} per sua somma bontà non mancherà de fare tutte le possibile provisioni per la publica salute. V. Albergati, January 27, 1523. Cf. also the *letter of January 12, 1523, on the hold of Lutheranism on Germany (State Archives, Bologna).

sideration join the league, as Lannoy had requested.”¹ But the allocution which Adrian addressed to the Consistory on the 11th of February shows that he then looked upon the bulwark of Christendom as lost. In this assembly the Pope informed the Cardinals that he had determined to enjoin on the Christian Princes a truce of three or four years’ duration, to levy a tithe on them, and to send Legates, especially to Hungary.² A few days before, King Ferdinand’s embassy to do homage had laid before the Pope in most urgent terms the danger to which the country was exposed and had appealed for help against the Turks.³

On the 23rd of February another Consistory was held. The Pope announced that Francis had declared his readiness to make peace, but that the answers of Charles V. and Henry VIII. were not yet forthcoming; he therefore proposed that the Sacred College should again invite both these princes to agree to a peace or at least to a truce. The nomination of the Legates to the Christian princes was entrusted to the Pope,⁴ and on the 27th of February the first appointment followed, that of Colonna to Hungary.⁵

¹ BERGENROTH, II., n. 525. Many others did not even then believe in the fall of the island; see *letters of V. Albergati of February 6 and 10, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

² See *Acta Consist. in Appendix, No. 16. Cf. SANUTO, XXXIII., 615; Ortiz in BURMANN, 200 *seq.*

³ See *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives) and V. Albergati on February 10, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna). The Pope had already before this counselled the support of Hungary; for his plans see *letter of G. de’ Medici, January 23, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ See *Acta Consist. in Appendix, No. 18; cf. Lett. d. princ., I., 111^b.

⁵ Besides *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives) cf. the *letter of G. de’ Medici of February 27, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), *that of A. Germanello of March 5, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and *that of V. Albergati of the last day of February 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

Adrian was justified in now concentrating his attention on the defence of Hungary. The fall of Rhodes had long been disbelieved in Rome; for the most contradictory accounts—even such as the repulse of the Turks with great loss—had been received. Up to the last it had been hoped that the island would hold out.¹ All the more overwhelming was the effect when the truth became known that on the 21st of December 1522 the Grand Master had been forced to capitulate.² The Knights had withstood the enemy with exemplary valour; twenty times they had victoriously driven back their assailants, and only when their last ammunition was expended were the defenders, deserted in their extremity by the rest of Western Christendom, driven, in spite of Adrian's most earnest exhortations,³ to consent to a capitulation, the terms of which, on the whole, were entirely honourable.⁴

¹ Cf. Lett. d. princ. I., 111^b. On March 2, 1523, *G. M. della Porta still announced that Rhodes was holding out (State Archives, Florence). Cf. LANCELOTTI, I., 437.

² The Pope had, as is evident from his letter to Queen Catherine of England (GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 273), received, by the 23rd February at the latest, the certain intelligence of the loss of this great bulwark of Christendom.

³ Nonnunquam Papa Adrianus scribebat in calce brevium ad reges et presertim ad imperatorem hanc clausulam: Benedicat te, fili carissime, Deus omnipotens tribuatque omne optatum ad defensionem fidei sancte sue (Cod. 1888, f. 29, Angelica Library, Rome).

⁴ Very complete accounts of the fall of Rhodes in SANUTO, XXXIII., and TIZIO, *Hist. Senen. (Chigi Library, Rome). Cf. also JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani* VI.; VERTOT, *Hist. d. Hospitaliers*, III., 291–396; CHARRIÈRE, I., 92 *seq.*; ZINKEISEN, II., 621 *seq.*; GUGLIELMOTTI, *Guerra*, I., 217 *seq.*; HERTZBERG, 674 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 477 *seq.*; HOPF, *Griechenland*, 169 *seq.*; *Züricher Taschenbuch*, 1888; *Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins*, 1895, 576 *seq.*; RÖHRICHT, *Pilgerreisen*, 2nd ed., 58 *seq.* The complaints brought against Adrian by his enemies in Italy and Switzerland, that he had neglected the affairs of

When the Venetian envoy was relating fuller details of the fall of Rhodes, the Pope exclaimed, with tears in his eyes: "Alas for Christendom! I should have died happy if I had united the Christian princes to withstand our enemy."¹

The Pope saw clearly the far-reaching significance of the fall of Rhodes and its dependent islands. The passage between Constantinople and Alexandria, hitherto barred, was now opened to the Ottoman navy and a wedge driven in between the islands of Cyprus and Crete, still in the possession of Venice. As the Turks were preparing to sieze the mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean, they had also taken one important step towards the conquest of Italy.² Rumours had already spread of their intention to attempt a landing in Apulia. The Pope, reported one of Wolsey's agents, was in mortal anguish, and so were all men. When Hannibal stood before the gates of ancient Rome the terror was not half so great, for now men knew that they had to do with the greatest ruler in the world. Many persons of note made preparations to leave the city. It was believed that the Pope would retire to Bologna, the plague having again broken out in Rome,³ and the dread in-

Rhodes, are denounced as "false and senseless" by HÖFLER, 395. Cf. also Ortiz in BURMANN, 204 *seq.*; RAYNALDUS, 1522, n. 20, and in 1523, n. 118, the opinion of Panvinius, as well as HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 284 *seq.*

¹ SANUTO, XXXIV., 28.

² HÖFLER, 482.

³ Besides the despatches to Wolsey in BREWER, III., 2, n. 2891, and those of Miguel da Silva in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 121 *seq.*, cf. SANUTO, XXXIV., 28, and *letter of G. de' Medici to the Otto di Pratica, dated Rome, March 3, 1522 [st. fl.]. It runs: *Per lettere di Vinetia affermono la perdita di Rodi e che in Candia havea cominciato a comparir de cavalieri di Rodi. N. S^{se} benchè sempre l' habbia creduta, ne sta

creased when several Turkish spies were arrested in the city.¹

The notable loss which had befallen Christendom formed a heavy indictment of the negligence of the Western Powers, and a proportionately weighty justification of Adrian's policy. As to leaving Rome, the Pope had no such thoughts. In spite of the dangers from the plague and the enemy, he remained steadfast at his post, anxiously endeavouring to save from destruction what could be saved.² In the first place, he took a step of which the secret was so well kept that—as the Imperial Ambassador, with a watchful eye on everything, reports—neither the Secretary, Zisterer nor anyone else had the slightest knowledge of it.³ After Adrian, in a letter of the 2nd of March 1523, had declined to enter into the proposed special league with Charles V., and had complained of the misdemeanours of Charles's servants and of those of Manuel in particular, he addressed, on the following day, another letter to his former pupil and sovereign, not less candid in expression. In it he recalled his hitherto fruitless efforts to bring the Emperor and the other princes to terms of peace and to take active measures against the Turks. There was no doubt that the Sultan, being in possession of Belgrade and Rhodes, would prosecute his war of conquest in Hungary, as well as on the Mediterranean.

di mala voglia ne si pensa habbia a tenersi sicuro qui per ogni piccola novità facessi el Turco in Puglia o le Marche e di già intendo si ragiona di fuggir la peste a Bolognia seguitandoci di far danno (State Archives, Florence). See also the *letter of V. Albergati, March 6, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

¹ See the *report of V. Albergati, March 6, 1523 (*Qui in Roma si sono discoperti alcuni Greci spioni di esso Turcho), in State Archives, Bologna, and *letter of G. de' Medici, Rome, March 11, 1522 [st. fl.] (State Archives, Florence).

² See HÖFLER, 482 *seq.*

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 534.

This danger could only be averted by the conclusion of peace among the princes. He had been deceived in his hope that the Emperor would have been the first to do this. If Charles and the Kings of England and France were still unwilling at least to arrange a truce for three years and to begin a general war against the Turks, the Emperor was in danger of being driven out of his hereditary dominions, and this danger was all the greater because not a few Christian princes ruled their subjects more oppressively than the Sultan. He, the Pope, in virtue of his office, was compelled to call upon the contending princes to make a peace or, at least, a truce.¹

On the same day letters of similar import were sent to the Kings of France, England, and Portugal, and soon afterwards to other Christian princes, such as Sigismund of Poland. The Pope reminded Francis I. of the fate of those Asiatic rulers who had been vanquished by the Turks because they had lulled themselves into a false security. In the name of that obedience due to Christ's representative on earth, he adjured him by the vengeance of God, before whose tribunal he must one day stand, to give his consent forthwith, on the receipt of the letter, to a truce, and then to take his part with vigour in war against the Turks. The letter to the King of Portugal also was couched in most earnest language. "Woe to princes," so it ran, "who do not employ the sovereignty conferred upon them by God in promoting His glory and defending the people of His election, but abuse it in internecine strife."² The Sacred College was invited to exhort by special letters the

¹ BERGENROTH, II., n. 532-533.

² The letters referred to are in CHARRIÈRE, I., 96 *seqq.*; RYMER, XIII., 790; Corp. dipl. Port., II., 116 *seq.*; Acta Tomic, VI., 254 *seq.* Cf. Ortiz in BURMANN, 208 *seq.*

Christian Kings to do their duty.¹ To Cardinal Wolsey Adrian pointed out that Rome would be the most suitable place for the truce negotiations.² Bernardo Bertolotti was also sent back to England as Nuncio, with instructions to sound Francis on his journey through France.³ With tears in his eyes Adrian addressed to the envoys resident in Rome the most urgent representations.⁴ He already saw the Turks in Italy,⁵ for they had, it was believed, on their entrance into Rhodes and Constantinople, shouted "To Rome, to Rome."⁶

Along with these earnest remonstrances to the Christian powers Adrian took decisive measures for the collection of the funds necessary for the crusade. Owing to the emptiness of his exchequer the Pope was forced, against his will, to find means of supply by a levy of tithes and taxes. Before the end of January these measures had been discussed, and Adrian then told the Cardinals that he was ready to sell his silver plate. Before taxing other countries for the Turkish war he wished to make a beginning in his own dominions.⁷ His measures were at once put into execu-

¹ CHARRIÈRE, I., 103 *seqq.*; BREWER, III., 2, n. 2871.

² *Ibid.*, n. 2849.

³ See *letter of A. Piperario, Rome, March 16, 1523, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. also the report of G. de' Medici, March 1, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and GACHARD, Corresp. LIII.

⁴ Corp. dipl. Port., II., 123.

⁵ *N. S. sa del certo che il Turco fa una spaventissima et tremenda armata a Costantinopoli per la impresa de Italia. V. Albergati, March 11, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁶ *In la sua intrata et uscita di Rhodi li Turchi mai fecero altro che gridare Italia, Italia, a Roma, a Roma et altre tante hanno fatto nel suo triomphante ingresso in Costantinopoli. "The Pope does everything, collects money, exhorts to peace." So relates V. Albergati, March 16, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁷ See the report of *G. de' Medici, Rome, January 29, 1522 [st. fl.], VOL. IX.

tion. A Bull of the 11th of March 1523 laid upon the whole body of the clergy and on all officials of the Papal States the payment of a Turkish tithe for the next two years, Cardinal Fieschi being entrusted with its collection. Adrian justified this ordinance by the danger then menacing Rome and all Christendom.¹ The immediate publication of this Bull was expected,² but the Cardinals, it seems, still raised objections. They did not give their consent until the 16th of March, in a Consistory at which the Ban of Croatia appealed to them for help.³ On the 18th of March a second Bull was agreed to in which a hearth-tax was levied at the rate of half a ducat throughout the Papal States.⁴

By these taxes it was hoped to raise a sum sufficient to equip a force of 50,000 men for the Turkish war; the

in which he says: *S. Sta . . . disse quando bisogni che vuole vender quanti argenti ha et altri che puo per tale impresa ne voler si gravassi per ancora altri potenti, ma che li sua subditi fussino li primi a cominciar ad aiutar (State Archives, Florence).

¹ Bull "Etsi ad amplianda esclesiarum omnium commoda" in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 104 *seqq.* *Io non fo altro di et notte che fare minute et bolle per decime et impositione per tutta la Christianità, etc., writes V. Albergati on March 11, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

² *Domani si publicano le decime per tutto il dominio ecc^{co} alli preti et qui sopra a tutti li uftiali. G. de' Medici, March 10, 1522 [st. fl.] (State Archives, Florence). Cf. SANUTO, XXXIV., 39.

³ Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives). Cf. also the *letter of G. de' Medici, March 16, 1523, in State Archives, Florence, and that of Andrea [Piperario], March 18 [1523], in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

⁴ "In Consistorio di stamatina è suto publicato la bolla di porre mezo ducato per fuoco a tutti li subditi della chiesa." G. de' Medici, March 18, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives); *Report of A. Germanello, March 28, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and letters of V. Albergati, March 20 and 31 (State Archives, Bologna).

chief command was given to the Duke of Urbino.¹ It was an indication of the Pope's zeal that, contrary to his usual principles, he accepted payments for offices and dignities; he pleaded the needs of Christendom, which made such methods permissible. "Adrian," writes one, "is so beaten down by anxiety that he almost repents having accepted the tiara."² But he never relaxed his efforts for the protection of Christendom and, before all, of the kingdom of Hungary, then exposed to the greatest danger; this formed the subject of lengthy deliberation in the Consistory held on the 23rd of March. The point of chief importance was the means of raising the money to be supplied to the Legate appointed to Hungary. Full power was also given him—but under secret instruction and only to be used in case of necessity—to alienate church property for the defence of that kingdom against the Turks.³ In a Bull of the 11th of March 1523 Adrian, having the same object in view, granted King Ferdinand I. a third of the year's income of the whole clergy of the Tyrol, secular and regular.⁴

The Portuguese Ambassador, Miguel da Silva, in a despatch to his sovereign, advances, together with other reasons why he should contribute ships and money for the war, the eminently holy life of the Pope, which must arouse in every good Christian feelings of love and the

¹ Thus reports Andrea [Piperario] in a *letter, March 18 [1523] (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. also the *letter of V. Albergati, March 23, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

² BREWER, III., 2, n. 2893.

³ See *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives) in Appendix, No. 20.

⁴ See HIRN, *Gesch. der Tiroler Landtage von 1518 bis 1525* (Erläuterungen zu Janssens *Gesch.* herausgeg. von Pastor, IV., 5, Freiburg, 1905), 59, where more details are given concerning the opposition to this Bull. Cf. BAUER, *Anfänge Ferdinands I.*, 220.

wish to give him practical help.¹ More impression was made on the princes by the concessions which Adrian determined to make. Thus he bestowed on the Portuguese King for life the command of the Order of Christ; to this were afterwards added other marks of favour.²

In order to secure the English King's support of the crusade, Adrian made exceptional use of dispensations, thus gratifying, in various ways connected with the bestowal of benefices, the wishes of Henry's all-powerful minister, Cardinal Wolsey;³ and even at last conferred on the latter Legatine power in England for life.⁴ Wolsey thereupon succeeded in obtaining from the King the appointment of a special envoy, Dr. Clerk, to attend to the negotiations with regard to the peace and armistice.⁵ Francis I. continued the line of action that he had hitherto employed in his dealings with Adrian. His attitude was apparently most conciliatory, and he gave verbal assurances of his inclination to peace and his sympathy with the crusade, but, at the same time, declared frankly that, as a first step, his rightful inheritance, the Milanese, must be restored to him.⁶ After his receipt of the urgent Brief of the 3rd of March, it was rumoured that Francis had given

¹ Corp. dipl. Port., II., 121.

² *Ibid.*, 131 seq., 134 seq., 139 seq., 140 seq.; SCHÄFER, Portugal, III., 89, V., 151, 159.

³ Cf. CREIGHTON, V., 203; HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 281.

⁴ Henry VIII. thanked him on February 22, 1523. I found the *original of this letter in the archives of St. Angelo, Arm., IV., c. 2, n. 26.

⁵ Cf. GACHARD, Corresp., LV.

⁶ Cf. the two *letters of Francis I. to Adrian VI., dated Paris, February 5, 1523, and St. Germain-en-Laye, February 28, 1523 (contemporary copies in the State Archives, Vienna). Both letters are uncommonly interesting. In the second there is already mention of the fall of Rhodes, which Francis I. deploras. He expresses his zeal

carte blanche for the terms of peace.¹ But at the end of that month a letter came from the King again demanding, in haughty language, the aforesaid restoration of Milan.² This was all the more painful to Adrian since Francis I., on the previous 5th of February, had expressed his desire in the humblest terms that the Pope would use his authority in taking in hand the peace negotiations.³ The Pope lost all self-control when Cardinal Castelnau de Clermont tried to justify the proceedings of Francis. The King, said Adrian to the Cardinal, was the cause of the obstruction of this indispensable peace. The Cardinal, who deplored his master's obstinacy to the Pope, kept saying that no tree was ever felled at one stroke; Adrian must address him in another Brief.⁴ This advice the Pope followed,⁵

for the Turkish war in the strongest terms (* Nous qui desirons ne porter le titre de très chrétien sans cause), but Milan must be restored to him, since "charité bien ordonnée commence par soy."

¹ This important account, which confirms, de Praet in GACHARD, Corresp., LIV., is found in a letter of *Andrea Piperario of March 16, 1523: Da Franza se intende che 'l re ha mandato la carta bianca al papa de la pace quasi per acquistare la benivolentia del papa et irritare S. S^{ta} contra di Cesare (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Gradenigo on April 1, 1523, in SANUTO, XXXIV., 93, and BERGENROTH, II., n. 540. See our remarks *supra*, p. 180, note 6.

³ * Très saint père nous supplions et requérons encore très dévotement V^{re} d. S^{te} qu'il luy plaise prendre en mains le faict de la paix universelle ou trêve et en usant de son auctorité mectre peinne de la conduyre, faire treiter et concluire telle, que nul des d. princes n'ait cause de la réffuser. *Letter, dated Paris, February 5, 1523. Copy in State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ GRADENIGO, *loc. cit.*

⁵ I found this * Brief, missing in Charrière, dated Rome, April 2, 1523, and beginning with these words: "Litterae M^{ts} tuae ult. februarii (see *supra*, p. 180, n. 6) proxime praeteriti ad nos datae et paucis ante

always hoping to bring about a change of mind in the French King.

The Emperor showed more statesmanship. Adrian's determination and the circumstance that in Picardy as well as in the Pyrenees the war with Francis had not been successful, had inclined Charles, before the middle of February, somewhat to reconsider his position. He then instructed Sessa to make known the conditions under which he would be ready to accept an armistice or peace, but without letting this come to the knowledge of the French or English Ambassadors. By means of this understanding Charles sought especially to secure the grant of the "Cruzada" hitherto asked for in vain, and the assignment to his own use of a fourth of the ecclesiastical revenues in his dominions.¹ The fall of Rhodes had unquestionably made a deep impression on Charles, but his courtiers were of a different mind, and Gattinara advised him to send no answer to the Brief of the 3rd of March.² Charles, however, determined to give Sessa full powers to conclude an armistice subject to the clauses agreed to by Adrian. At the same time he sent a memorandum to Rome intended to justify his previous conduct and to bring the Pope round to his views. Most of the proposals in this document were simply nothing else than a list of conditions laid down with a view to Charles's personal advantage.

diebus exhibitae non modica animi admiratione nos affecerunt," in the original in the National Archives, Paris, L. 357.

¹ GACHARD, *Corresp.*, LI., 174; BAUMGARTEN, II., 263-264. The *Instruction for Claude de Bissy of February 14, 1523, quoted here from the Vienna State Archives, is also found in the State Archives of Brussels (*Correspondence de Charles V. avec divers en Italie*). Here also is the *answer of Adrian VI. to the Emperor, dated Rome, April 15, 1523.

² BERGENROTH, II., n. 534.

Simultaneously a wholesale system of bribery was set in motion amongst those who were in the Pope's immediate confidence.¹ Affairs having gone thus far an event occurred to change at one blow the whole situation in Rome.

¹ GACHARD, *Corresp.*, LVI., 175 *seqq.*; BERGENROTH, II., n. 540; HÖFLER, 487 *seq.*

CHAPTER VI.

THE INTRIGUES OF CARDINAL SODERINI AND THE RUPTURE
WITH FRANCE.—ADRIAN VI. JOINS THE IMPERIAL LEAGUE.
—HIS DEATH.

ON his arrival in Italy Adrian had found the College of Cardinals split into factions. The anti-Medicean party brought the heaviest reproaches against him, especially with regard to the proceedings connected with the conspiracy of Cardinal Petrucci. Adrian found it impossible to have the case revised,¹ a step, moreover, which could not have led to any result. An attempt to reconcile Cardinal Francesco Soderini, whose animosity was exceptionally virulent, with the Vice-Chancellor Cardinal de' Medici, failed completely;² this was not surprising, for the latter had information of Soderini's complicity in the conspiracy contrived in Florence.³

Medici, who could not console himself for the loss of

¹ Soderini was especially active in this respect; see *letters of G. M. della Porta of September 13, 1522 (State Archives, Florence).

² "N. S. stringe de metter bona pace et concordia fra mons. rev^{mo} et Volterra" reports* G. T. Manfredi on September 29, 1522; *cf.* also the report of G. de' Medici of September 29, 1522 (State Archives, Florence), and the *letters of A. Taurelli of September 28 and October 1, 1522 (State Archives, Modena).

³ See for this *Giorn. stor. d. Arch. Toscani*, III., 121 *seq.*, 185 *seq.*, 239 *seq.*; *Giorn. d. lett. Ital.*, XXXIX., 328 *seq.*; PERRENS, III., 89 *seq.*, and ZANDONATI, *La congiura contra il Card. G. de' Medici*, Rovereto, 1891: *cf. Arch. stor. Ital.*, 5th Series, X., 235.

his powerful influence in the Curia, had gone back to Florence in October 1522.¹ This left full scope to his opponent Soderini in Rome. Adrian's misunderstandings with the Emperor and the crafty temporizing of Francis I. proved helpful to Soderini, and the former partisan of France gained more and more influence with the Pope. He managed successfully to conceal from Adrian his one-sided devotion to the interests of Francis. He appeared to throw himself eagerly into the Pope's endeavours for peace, and warned him against the warlike and Imperialist leanings of Medici, whom he even accused of enriching himself dishonestly under Leo X.² Meanwhile Sessa and the Vice-Chancellor were carefully watching the alliance of their enemy with Francis I. At the end of March 1523 Medici succeeded in securing the person of a Sicilian, Francesco Imperiale, who had been sent by Soderini on a commission to his nephew, then residing in Venice and France; on this man letters of the Cardinal's were found to the effect that, if Francis delayed longer his entrance in person into Italy, he would alienate the Venetians and all his other friends in the Peninsula; when the cipher, used in certain passages of the letters, was interpreted, the discovery was made that a plot was on foot to raise an insurrection in Sicily against the Emperor, which, when it had taken shape with French connivance, was to be the signal for the descent of Francis upon Upper Italy. The Pope besides was described in the letters, quite contrary to the truth, as making common cause with the Emperor. Medici at once made known his discovery to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome, who made haste to lay all before the

¹ His departure on October 13 is announced by G. de' Medici (see *supra*, p. 104) and Castiglione in a * letter of October 13, 1522, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

² JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.

Pope.¹ Medici and the representative of King Ferdinand were overjoyed at having in their hands clear evidence of French knavery; they were confident that Adrian would now be led to renounce his neutrality,² and every effort was made to reach this end.³

Adrian was, at first, unwilling to believe in the treachery of his friend, but soon he had to convince himself that Soderini had not shrunk from thwarting his ardent wishes for peace and, at the moment when the Turkish danger was at its worst, wantonly stirring up the fury of war in Italy itself. He determined to unmask the guilty party and to visit him with heavy punishment; it was also no longer doubtful that Soderini had deceived him as regards Cardinal de' Medici, and before taking any other steps he

¹ Together with the reports of the Portuguese envoys (Corp. dipl. Port., II., 143 *seqq.*, 162 *seqq.*) and those of Venice (SANUTO, XXXIV., 122 *seq.*), see the despatch of F. Strozzi in Arch. stor. Ital., 5th Series, XIV., 38; CORNELIUS DE FINE, *Diary (National Library, Paris); *Balbi's report, April 12, 1523 (State Archives, Vienna), in Appendix, No. 21, and the *letter of G. de' Medici, dated Rome, 1522 [st. fl.], April 10 (State Archives, Florence). The captured messenger, Francesco Imperiale, is here mentioned by name. Cf. also the document in BERGENROTH, II., n. 539. See also BREWER, III., 2, n. 3002; JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI., and VON NEUEREN, V. Epifanio, in Atti d. congress. internaz. di scienze storiche, III., Roma, 1906, 385 *seq.*

² Many in Rome believed that the whole case against Soderini was a cleverly devised Spanish *pratica, per fari saltare questo christianazo del papa a pedi gionti in la parte imperiale con questo mezo che non potra dire più de volere essere neutrale. See a cipher *despatch from L. Cati to the Duke of Ferrara, Rome, April 29, 1523 (State Archives, Modena).

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 544. G. de' Medici writes already, April 10, 1523: *Non so quel che farà il papa per la sua bontà, pure questi Imperiali intendo li caricheranno li panni adosso quanto porranno (State Archives, Florence). See also Balbi's report in Appendix, No. 21 (State Archives, Vienna).

summoned the latter, the head of the Imperial party in the Sacred College, to Rome. Medici, who till now had been living in Florence, expectant and discontented, obeyed the call with great delight. With an almost royal retinue of more than a thousand horsemen he made his entry into Rome on the 23rd of April 1523; the most notable personages, many Cardinals, and even deadly enemies of long standing such as Francesco Maria della Rovere, met him at the Ponte Molle. He was present in Consistory on the 25th and 26th of April; on the latter day the Pope received him after dinner in private audience, and it was said that they both withdrew to the Belvedere and then to a country-house, spending the whole afternoon in one another's company.

On the next day, the 27th of April, about seven o'clock in the evening, Adrian sent for Cardinal Soderini, who hastened on horseback to the Vatican accompanied by his retainers. As he passed through the streets astonishment was roused that a Cardinal should go to an audience at such an unusual hour. Half an hour later his suite returned without him, and it was soon understood that he had been arrested; such, in fact, was the case.

When Soderini came into the Pope's presence in the Borgia tower he found there Cardinal de' Medici and Sessa. To Adrian's inquiry whether he had written to the French King, he answered in the negative; then the Pope at once placed before him the intercepted letters. As he even then tried to persist in a denial, Adrian broke out into great excitement and pronounced him under arrest. Soderini begged in vain to be detained in the Vatican, but he was conveyed to St. Angelo, whither none of his household were allowed to follow him, and that same evening all his papers and valuables were seized. At a Consistory held on the following morning the Pope

explained his action, and entrusted to Cardinals Carvajal Accolti, and Cesi the superintendence of Soderini's trial. In prison the Cardinal refused food until the castellan, in pity, first tasted the dishes in his presence. Even the Pope felt compassion for the aged man, and subsequently allowed three of his servants to wait upon him and restored to him his property. He pushed on the judicial process with all the more expedition because it had become known that, during Adrian's absence from Italy, Soderini had, with the help of France,¹ worked for a schism.

The fall of Soderini gave at once a commanding position in the Curia to the Vice-Chancellor Cardinal de' Medici. His palace became a more active centre of life than the Vatican, and his antechambers were crowded with visitors waiting for an audience. Not a day passed without four, or even five, Cardinals coming to see him, and before long he was spoken of as the coming Pope.² Henceforward Adrian himself was greatly influenced by Medici, and the Imperialists saw with satisfaction a change

¹ Together with SANUTO, XXXIV., 122-123, 137, 149, 221-222; STROZZI in Arch. stor. Ital., 5th Series, XIV., 39; Ortiz in BURMANN, 209; *letter of A. Germanello, April 27, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua; see Appendix, No. 22); *letters of V. Albergati, April 27 and 30, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna); Sessa in BERGENROTH, n. 545; BREWER, III., 2, n. 3002, and especially the very important but hitherto insufficiently appreciated despatch of Miguel da Silva in Corp. dipl. Port., III., 63 *seq.*, see also P. MARTYR, Op. Epist., 778, and JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI. HÖFLER, 489, is wrong in stating that Sauli was on the Commission of Cardinals, for the latter had been long dead (see English ed. of this work, VII. p. 200). Later, E. de Cardona and G. Ghinucci were associated with the three Cardinals; see Epifanio, *loc. cit.*, 401. For the Consistory of April 28, 1523, see Appendix, No. 23 (Consistorial Archives).

² SANUTO, XXXIV., 221; *cf.* 123, and ALBÈRI, 2nd Series, III., 110, 125.

for the better in the Pope's feelings towards Charles. But they were deceiving themselves if they believed that Adrian had any intention of identifying himself with the Spanish party. Even if, in giving his sanction on the 4th of May to the permanent incorporation of the three grand-masterships of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcantara in the Spanish Crown, he made a remarkable concession,¹ yet in the great questions of European politics he continued steadfast to the neutrality becoming the Father of Christendom, and to his efforts on behalf of peace.² With this aim in view he issued on the 30th of April a Bull enjoining, in the name of his supreme authority, a truce of three years' duration for the whole of Christendom, compliance with which was demanded from the princes under pain of the heaviest penalties of the Church, immediate interdict and excommunication. There had been enough fraternal bloodshed he said, the sovereigns had already indulged too much in mutual enmity; they had every reason for behaving in such a way as not to forfeit that power which had been lent to them by God.³

For Hungary,⁴ now in extreme danger, Adrian did all he could.⁵ The despatch of the Legates had been delayed,

¹ Bull. V., 13 *seq.*; HÖFLER, 491.

² *N. Sig^{re} al presente non attende ad altro che a procurare la pace trali principi Christiani. V. Albergati, April 18, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

³ Bull *Monet nos* in Acta Tomic., VI., 271 *seq.*; Bull. V., 10 *seq.*; and in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 145 *seqq.*; in the latter place, 149 *seq.*, see the Brief of May 1 accompanying the former. The Bull of April 26 (*letter of A. Germanello, April 27, 1523, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua) is also in SANUTO, XXXIV., 180 *seqq.* Cf. RYMER, XIII., 780.

⁴ Cf. V. Albergati's *letters of April 24 and May 5, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁵ Cf. Panvinus in RAYNALDUS, 1523, n. 119. See also BURMANN, 67, 125, 212, 338.

for the nominees, first Colonna¹ and then Campeggio, had declined the post;² the greatest difficulties had accompanied the collection of the funds intended for the support of that kingdom, and in view of the vivid descriptions brought to him of the perilous situation there,³ the Pope was deeply grieved that he could not give immediate help.

Fear was already felt in Rome that the King of Hungary might make peace with the Turk.⁴ When at last, in the person of Cajetan, a suitable Legate had been found, it cost a great amount of trouble to raise the 50,000 ducats of which he was to be the bearer. In a Consistory on the 8th of May Cajetan's appointment as Legate to Hungary, Poland, and Bohemia was announced;⁵ but on the 27th of the same month the arrangements for getting in the money were still under consideration.⁶ The Romans objected strongly to the payment of the Turkish tax.⁷ Many were bold enough to say, in their

¹ Cf. *Letter of A. Germanello, April 14, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² To the many errors in MAURENBRECHER'S *Geschichte der katholischen Reformation*, belongs also the statement that Campeggio was, at that time, actually sent to Hungary (232).

³ Acta Consist., April 24, 1523 (Consistorial Archives).

⁴ *Qui sono lettere d' Ungheria e dubitasi forte chel re non s' accordi col Turco visto le poche provisione che si sono facte e disengnono da farsi per la cristianità. *Letter of the envoys from Florence to tender obedience, dated Rome, April 28, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ *Acta Consist. (May 8, 1523, Consistorial Archives). Cf. SANUTO, XXXIV., 149, and *letter of G. M. della Porta, May 10, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

⁶ *Acta Consist. (May 27, Consistorial Archives); see in Appendix, No. 24, *letter of V. Albergati, May 30, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁷ *Letter of Abbadino, May 24, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. Lett. d. princ., I., 114 *seq.*

ill humour with the new imposts, that the Pope's project of a crusade was a chimera.¹ This lack of self-sacrifice distressed the Pope not less than the continuance of the plague in Rome.² About the 19th of May he had himself been suffering from fever; by the 27th he had recovered.³ On the same day he heard that the ruler of Wallachia had already come to terms of peace with the Turks.⁴ "The Turkish trouble," reported the Portuguese Ambassador, "is the Pope's daily subject of talk."⁵ The Con-

¹ Andrea [Piperario] reports in cipher on March 18 [1523]: *Qui ognuno se trova mal contento per il pessimo governo del papa e se dubita che la cosa de queste decime non sia una chimera e che non si faccia nulla che vaglia Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. also TIZIO, *Hist. Senen., Chigi Library, Rome.

² Cf. SANUTO, XXXIV., 188; *letter of the Florentine envoys to tender obedience, dated Rome, May 22, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and Acta Consist. (May 15, 1523, Consistorial Archives).

³ The special envoys from Florence who had tendered obedience on April 27 (*Acta consist. in Consistorial Archives), report on May 20, 1523: *N. S^{re} hebbe hyeri uno poco di scesa e con epsa alquanto id febre. Sta nocte passata posò. . . . Questo giorno è stato assai quietamente in modo si spera che non habbia haver altro è così a Dio piaccia che sarebbe troppa gran perdita. May 22: The Pope is better, but not yet free from fever. May 27: *El papa questa mattina cavalcò a S. Maria del Popolo (State Archives, Florence). Cf. *letter of Abbadino, May 24, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). The Imperial envoy was already asking for instructions in case of a conclave. BERGENROTH, II., n. 553. HÖFLER's assumption (521) that Adrian's illness was the result of poison, is not supported by any contemporaneous authorities. See *infra*, p. 216.

⁴ *D'Ungheria heyeri ci furon lettere come il Valacho Transalpino sera accordato col Turcho, la quale cosa non è di piccolo momento e da dispiacere assai a tucti quelli che sono fauctori dalla fede christiana. *Letter of the Florentine envoys to tender obedience, Rome, May 28, 1523. Cf. *letter of G. M. della Porta, May 29, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ Corp. dipl. Port., II., 161.

sistory was repeatedly occupied with appeals for help from Hungary and Croatia.¹ A well-meant suggestion, emanating from the Franciscans, that troops should be raised from each religious order, had to be dismissed by the Pope as fantastic.² Adrian was in the extremest perplexity, for he could not send out the Legate empty-handed.³ At last, on the 1st of July, everything was in order; on that day Cajetan took leave in Consistory, and on the following morning set out post-haste.⁴ On the 9th of July the Pope sent his chamberlain Pietro with fresh sums of money to the markets to buy grain for the Hungarian levies.⁵ For some time longer fear prevailed in

¹ *Acta Consist., June 1 and 17, 1523 (Consistorial Archives). Cf. the *letters of G. M. della Porta of June 6, 10, and 21, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), also SANUTO, XXXIV., 194-195, and the *letter of V. Albergati, June 3, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

² Ortiz in BURMANN, 213; *letter of V. Albergati, April 30, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna); CHARRIÈRE, I., 102; ZINKEISEN, II., 638 *seq.*; Histor. Taschenb., 3, Folge, VII., 575 *seq.*; HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 285.

³ Cf. *letter of A. Germanello, June 25, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ Acta Consist. in KALKOFF, Forschungen, 134; *V. Albergati, July 1, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna). Cf. Corp. dipl. Port., II., 168; SANUTO, XXXIV., 193, 292, cf. XXXV., 114 *seq.*; Ortiz in BURMANN, 212 *seq.*; FRAKNÓI, Ungarn, 22 *seq.*; *letters of A. Germanello of July 1 and 3, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁵ *N. S. oltre le bone provisione ha fatte et mandate col rev^{mo} legato hiersera mandò m. Pietro da Roma suo cameriere in la Marca per la posta con bona summa de denari a comprare frumenti et altre vituaglie necessarie da mandare in Ungheria et Croatia per sussidio di quelli paesi. V. Albergati, July 10, 1523 (State Archives Bologna). For the support given to Hungary by Adrian VI., detailed information is given in a *Brief of Clement VII. to J. A. Pullio, baro Burgii, Rome, March 30, 1534. Thus: *Cum sicut accepimus fe. re. Hadrianus VI. praed. nost. triginta tria millia et 700 ac 50 ducat. monetæ novæ

Ragusa, as well as in Rome, that the Turks, by sending a fleet against Italy, might attempt to separate the Christian forces and cut off support from Hungary. "The Pope," wrote Vianesio Albergati, "has done all that he could possibly do to restore peace, but the hearts of Christians are hardened. Francis I. will make any sacrifice to get Milan, Charles V. Fuenterrabia, and Henry VIII. Brittany. Help now can come from God alone."¹

An event that brought joy to Adrian was the final reconciliation of Venice with the Emperor. For this, though for long without success, he had been labouring directly for many months by means of the Nuncio.² On the 12th of June he was informed that the reconciliation was at hand;³ but this report was premature. As late as the 14th of July the Papal Legate Tommaso Campeggio had to use sharp words to the Doge⁴ on account of the little love of peace shown by the Republic. The Pope himself addressed most pressing representations to the Venetian Ambassador in Rome and even threatened him with a *monitorium*;⁵ but not until considerable

ad rationem centum denarior. pro quolibet ducato in Ungariam miserit, etc. Min. brev., 1534, vol. xlviii., n. 140 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ Letter of V. Albergati, May 5, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

² For this see together with accounts in SANUTO, XXXIV., and HÖFLER, 512 *seq.*, the **Briefs to T. Campeggio of January 15, 20, 31, and February 12; that to Ferdinand I. of February 4, and to H. Adorno of February 12, 1523 (this Brief is in Spanish), in State Archives, Venice, under "Milan." Cf. Libri commem., VI., 172.

³ *Letter of the Florentine envoys to tender obedience, June 12, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ SANUTO, XXXIV., 298; cf. 263 *seq.*

⁵ G. M. della Porta reports on June 30, 1523: *N. S. con molta istanza sollecita Venetiani alla pace con Cesare; and on July 3: *Il papa ha parlato all' ambasciatore Venetiano sopra l' accordo tanto gagliardamente che quasi ghi ha chiarito dever esser sforzat di

concessions had been made by the Imperial envoy did the situation change. At the last hour, though in vain, French diplomacy did all it could to keep the Republic firm. It was of great importance in this respect that Lodovico di Canossa, who had been sent into Italy as early as May, fell ill in Geneva and could not reach Venice until the beginning of July.¹ Thence he wrote to the French Queen, on the 10th of July, that Venice was of so much importance that Francis I. should consent to everything rather than lose such an ally.² The diplomatic Canossa came too late, for on the 29th of July a treaty was made between the Emperor, his brother Ferdinand, the Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan, and Venice to defend Italy against attack from any European power. For this end the Pope had co-operated without giving up his neutrality;³

publicar contro quel stato il monitorio quando recusi l' accordo, et S. S. si more sanctissimamente per la pace d' Italia. (State Archives, Florence.) Cf. also SANUTO, XXXIV., 307.

¹ The accounts in ORTI-MANARA (Lodovico di Canossa, Verona, 1845), 18, of the mission of the Bishop of Bayeux in the year 1523 are very unsatisfactory. The above statements are based on Canossa's still unpublished correspondence, which I found in the Capitoline Library and the Communal Library at Verona, and which will be dealt with in another place when considering information very kindly placed at my disposal by R. Rolland. Cf. especially the *letters to Francis I. of May 16, to F. Robertet (cf. BOURRILLY DE VAISSIÈRE, 34 *seq.*) of May 18, 21 (from Lyons), 28 (from Geneva), and of July 2, 1523 (from Grezzano). Cf. also the *Brief to the Queen of France, July 1, 1523.

² *Solo gli voglio dire che importando li sig^{ri} Venetiani per le cose de Italia quanto importano che la M^{ta} del re deve dare ogni cosa per non li perdere. *Canossa a Madama la regina di Francia. Venice, July 10, 1523 (Communal Library, Verona).

³ SANUTO, XXXIV., 316 *seqq.*; cf. Libri commemor., VI., 171 *seq.*, 173; BERGENROTH, II., n. 566, 568, 570, 572, 576-577; see BAUMGARTEN, II., 278; SISMONDI, XV., 54 *seq.*

this only gave way owing to the violent behaviour of the French.

The French party in Rome, like Francis himself, looked upon the arrest of Soderini as an overt act of hostility on the part of Adrian, who had unjustly yielded to the wishes of Medici and the Emperor's party. Cardinal Trivulzio took the liberty of saying to the Pope's face that they had not elected him in order that he might imprison Cardinals in St. Angelo without cause.¹ Other members of the Sacred College also complained of the Pope's action, as showing little respect for the dignity of their office.² These complaints had as little effect on Adrian as the menaces of Francis I.; the trial went on its way. The Pope was determined that it should be conducted in strict accordance with order.³ As Soderini at first denied everything, fell ill in June, and no advocate could be found to plead for him, the affair was long protracted. The general opinion was that it would end in the deposition of Soderini, whose high treason was proved, but that Adrian would not permit the death sentence to be carried out.⁴

Although, on his return from his mission, in the middle of May, Bernardo Bertolotti brought back very unfavourable accounts of the disposition of the Christian

¹ SANUTO, XXXIV. 149.

² *Letter of Abaddino, Rome, May 6, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ *Reported by V. Albergati, May 21, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁴ Besides SANUTO, XXXIV., 194, 237, 244, 257, 262, 285, 292, 302, 359; BERGENROTH, II., n. 555; State Papers, VI.: Henry VIII., V., 122; LUZIO, Lett. di Giovio, 25, 29, *cf.* the letters of the Florentine envoys to render obedience: May 28 (*Questo giorno sono stati incontanente a esaminare mons. di Volterra e tre Cardinali deputati), June 4 (L' examina del Card. di Volterra si va continuando. As he was ill, he asked leave to see a physician, which was granted), June 14 (*La examina del Card. di Volterra e di Bernardo d' Averragano

princes towards union, Adrian persisted in his pursuit of peace.¹ The French were willing to suspend hostilities for two months at the utmost, while the Imperialists wished a truce of at least half a year. The Pope was of opinion that it was of the greatest importance that

non se potuto finire respecto che l' uno di loro e l' altro hanno facto ammalato et N. S. non mostra di curarsene molto forse parendoli che quello che ha confessato et confermato sino aqui sia abastanza per poterne pigliare ogni deliberatione), July 17 (*La examina di Volterra è finita). G. M. della Porta reports very thoroughly, May 16: *Il processo di Volterra si fa et trovase che ha errato gravamente contra N. S., la cui S^{ta} par che gli usi troppo clemenza a lasciarlo tanto vivere. May 29: *Gli tre rer^{mi} deputati giudici ne la causa di Vulterra havendo prima renuntiati di esser hanno ubediti a N. S., che ha voluto così et sono stato allo examine, del quale intendo che non ne hanno per ancora cavato altro se queste due parole: non so, non mi ricordo. June 3: *Mi vien detto che havendo minacciato la giustizia di dar la tortura a Vulterra ha confessato tutto quello che prima havea negato. June 10: *Dicesi chel processo contra Vulterra è finito et che dimani gli giudici hanno da fare la relatione in consistoro. June 17: Soderini will be condemned (Lett. d. Princ., I., 116). June 24: *Il processo contra Vulterra non si solecita più con diligenza; The Pope has given him an advocate. June 30: *N. S. rinova la diligenza nel processo di Vulterra. July 4: Soderini is lying, but still admits some things. July 11: *Le cose di Vulterra si sollecitano assai; ello sta di la persona peggio assai del solito e N. S. ha commesso agli physici soi che lo visitino. July 17: The views taken of Soderini differ greatly (State Archives, Florence). Cf. also *letter of A. Germanello, July 11, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Soderini's trial goes on, writes Sessa on July 28, 1523, to the Duchess of Savoy, "y creo sin duda que Su B^d le castigara conforme a sus demeritos que no-son pequenios" (State Archives, Vienna). On July 8, 1523, V. Albergati reports: The Pope wished, but in vain, to bring the case to an end before the Cardinals left Rome for the summer change of air (State Archives, Bologna). On August 8, 1523, Jovius writes: Volterra sta per esser scappellato. BRAGHIROLI, Lett. Ined. Milano, 1856, 25.

¹ *Letter of the Florentine envoys to tender obedience, May 15, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

at least a beginning should be made; from the mission, already mentioned, of Canossa to Rome he had hoped favourable things.¹ But that diplomatist did not come, while the negotiations of the Imperialists with Cardinal Clermont proved more and more hopeless. The latter, in complete despair, went back to Avignon on the 23rd of June.² On the 15th of June Adrian had asked the French King to open fresh negotiations with the Nuncio; he might, urged the Pope, in conformity with his high station and with his name of most Christian King, at last take the step which was so necessary for the protection of Christendom.³

The "most Christian" had not the slightest intention of giving ear to such representations. The turn in favour of Charles which had shown itself in the Curia in consequence of Soderini's treachery had thrown Francis into uncontrollable fury. When Adrian ordered a truce for the sake of the Turkish war, Francis exclaimed that the real Turk was the clergy.⁴ To the Venetian Ambassador he remarked in the latter half of June that the Pope was forbidden by Canon Law to impose a truce under penalty of excommunication. If Adrian persisted in so doing, he, Francis, would set up an antipope.⁵

¹ *La tregua per dui mesi si pratica ancorché gl' Imperiali dicono volerla almeno per sei, pur N. S^{re} inclina a darvi in ogni modo qualche principio et tanto più venendo Bayosa, come dicono che vene col mandato di prorogarla bisognando et che l' arivata sua sarà al più alto a S. Giovanni. G. M. della Porta from Rome, May 15, 1523; *cf.* also his letter, *May 13, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

² SANUTO, XXXIV., 149, 156, 193, 262; *Letter of G. M. della Porta, May 17 and June 24, 1523 (*Mons. d' Aus parti hieri), State Archives, Florence.

³ CHARRIÈRE, I., 106 *seqq.*

⁴ Mantuan report from Rome in SANUTO, XXXIV., 193.

⁵ Letter of Badoer, June 24, 1523, in SANUTO, XXXIV., 289.

To this period must also belong the quite unprecedented letter in which Francis threatened the Pope with the same fate that had befallen Boniface VIII. in Anagni, *i.e.* the loss of freedom and even of life through violent French intervention in the Vatican.¹ At the beginning of this threatening letter Francis first recounts the services rendered by his kingdom to the Holy See from the days of King Pepin down to his own time. The very persons who ought to acknowledge those services have denied the rights of the French Crown and used their power to prevent the restoration of Milan to France. He further goes on to remind the Pope in incisive language that the Roman Pontiffs had always feared the Imperial

¹ Original draft in the National Library, Paris. MS. Franc., 3002, f. 1-6. Copy (used by LEPITRE, 315) in MS. Franc., 8527, f. 1 *seq.* The letter, with the wrong address, "to Clement VII.," is published with a good many mistakes in Arch. Stor. Ital., App. I., 396 *seq.* There is a better, but not quite accurate, copy in the Cabinet hist., XIII. (1867), I., 62 *seq.* : the letter is here antedated to May 1523. HÖFLER (507 *seqq.*), who gives a very good account of the contents of the letter of which I have made use in the text, only remarks : "This cannot possibly be the same letter of which BERGENROTH says (Introduct., CLXXIV.) that Adrian received it on March 28, 1523," and then subsequently (524) suggests that the right date might be July 4. LEPITRE (315) believes that Adrian replied in the friendly letter of June 15 to this insolent communication. But this is to attribute too much to the Pope's love of peace. But Höfler's surmise is also inadequate. Two *despatches of G. M. della Porta show this and also afford evidence that the letter was actually sent. The former says on June 25, *Dicesi chel re di Franzia ha scritto al papa mirabilmente sopra la liberation di Vulterra. On June 26 : E stato vero chel re di Franza ha scritto al papa ferventemente sopra la liberation di Vulterra licentiando da la corte sua il nunzio d. S. S^{ta} et revocando Bayosa, il quale deve esser a questhora in Venetia et l' altri che veneano in sua compagnia se ne sono ritornati di longo al suo re et parlase del impresa de Italia (State Archives, Florence).

power in Italy and had found protection from it on the part of France. The champions of the Papal States now suffer loss, and the enemies reap the advantage. Even if, at first, he had had fears that Pope Adrian would allow himself to be drawn into the policy of Leo X., yet he had become more and more convinced that the Pope's sense of honour and goodness, as well as considerations for the safety of his soul and for his dignity and age, would never allow him to lose sight, as the common father of Christendom, of impartial justice and equity. Unfortunately his former fears had not proved groundless, since the arrest of Soderini had only taken place because the Pope relied on Medici's information that the Cardinal was favourable to France; if equal justice prevailed, the enemies of France ought to receive the same treatment. Francis I. characterized as strange the Pope's proclamation, under ecclesiastical censures, of a three years' peace as if he, the King, were averse to peace. Yet for this very reason he had had an envoy at Calais, he had sent his secretary to the Pope at Nice, and then Cardinal Clermont to Rome, and when Adrian had called upon him to conclude a truce, for the defence of Christendom, he had declared his readiness to comply provided that Milan, his lawful possession, was restored to him. When the Pope found this condition excessive, he had sent Ambassadors to Rome to conclude a peace or a truce for two months or longer. More he could not do. When he became aware that the Pope was determined to proclaim an unconditional truce, he had forbidden his representatives to enter into it, and had explained to the Pope why he considered one lasting for three years useless.

If Adrian ordered a truce under ecclesiastical censures, without consulting the Christian princes, without making

any stipulation where the crusading contingents were to be sent, the French army would be attacked on its arrival in Italy. Adrian had given Bulls to raise money to the enemies of Francis; but Francis himself had been forgotten. When it was such an easy matter for Popes to excommunicate princes, evil results always followed, and this could be no cause of satisfaction. The privileges of the French Kings would be defended by their subjects with the last drop of their blood; moreover, no censure could be pronounced against him except with the observance of the accompanying forms and ceremonies. Adrian's predecessors had always observed this. Pope Boniface, to be sure, had taken certain steps against Philip the Fair which had miscarried. "You, in your prudence, will certainly not forget this." A three years' truce would tie his, the King's, hands and hinder him from protecting his dominions, while Charles, during this time, could enter Italy on the pretext of his coronation as Emperor. It was astonishing that the Cardinals, who were now recommending such a truce, did not recommend to the Emperor the course which Leo X. had intended, namely, to take Milan from the French, although at that moment the Turks were beleaguering Belgrade. Adrian's present intentions had certainly the appearance of being directed against the Turks, but were really aimed at him, the King. May the Pope be preserved from bringing about, instead of peace, still greater confusion, which would ill become the part of a good and wise pastor. Ever since the report of the truce had got abroad his enemies had done nothing but increase their strength, which he would yet humble. On the other hand he was ready, if the Turks invaded Hungary or Naples, to take the field against them in person; if, therefore, his Holiness were willing to grant him Bulls to raise

money similar to those granted to his enemies, the Pope would only be acting in faithful accordance with his duty.

Simultaneously with this letter of menace the news reached Rome that Francis I. had broken off diplomatic relations with the Papal Nuncio.¹ What Adrian had endeavoured to prevent by his strictly neutral attitude—he stood, wrote the Ambassador of Henry VIII., as immovable as a rock in the sea—now came to pass, an incurable rupture with France.

Nothing could have been more gratifying to the enemies of Francis than his brusque treatment of the Pope. The Ambassadors of the Emperor and Henry became more urgent than ever in pressing upon Adrian the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance to protect Italy against France, the common enemy, and to render Francis incapable of continuing the war. Cardinal de' Medici, whose influence over Adrian was becoming increasingly great, took their side; the Pope, nevertheless, still refused to enter into party combinations of this sort.² His conviction that he was thus doing his duty was strengthened by the knowledge that a final breach with France would be followed by consequences of incalculable gravity. "I shall not declare myself against France," he wrote to Charles de Lannoy, the Viceroy of Naples, "because such a step would be immediately followed by the stoppage of all supplies of money from that kingdom, on which I chiefly depend for the maintenance of my Court, and because I know on good authority that the French King would become a protector of the Lutheran heresy,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 198, n. 1, the * letter of G. M. della Porta of June 28, 1523.

² See Clerk's despatch of June 11 in BREWER, III., 2, n. 3093; cf. DE LEVA, II., 172.

and make a resettlement of ecclesiastical order in his dominions."¹

Some of the Cardinals, moreover, who were interceding on behalf of Soderini, emphatically pointed out to Adrian the danger of some violent display of French power, prompted by the youthful energy of Francis and his advisers, unfriendly to the Court of Rome.² If counsels such as these were kept within the bounds of a wise moderation, there were not wanting others who spoke as open partisans of France. These mischievously represented to the Pope that he could confer no greater advantage on his countrymen and those who had helped to raise him to the tiara than by the strictest observance of his neutrality, otherwise he would make himself contemptible in the sight of the other sovereigns of Europe. These same advisers laid it down as an axiom that Lombardy must be a French possession.³

Although it was known by the beginning of July that Francis I. had forbidden all payment of money to Rome,⁴ Adrian still put off a final decision. He wished

¹ * Lannoy to Charles V., dated Naples, July 15, 1523. Biblioteca de la Acad. de Historia, Madrid, A 28. Cf. DE LEVA, II., 172.

² We know from SANUTO (XXXIV., 359) that the Cardinals were asked to give opinions on the case of Soderini. * Three such opinions, addressed to Adrian VI., I found in the Vatican Library in Cod. * Vat., 3920, f. 60-61, 137-137^b, and 140-140^b. I intend to publish them in the *Acta pontif.* It is worth noting that these opinions treat the letters in which Soderini urged on Francis I. to war as undoubtedly genuine.

³ Cf. the *Oratio ad S. D. N. Adrianum VI. in Cod. Vat., 3890, f. 35-40, and 6559, f. 81-83^b, Vatican Library. v. DOMARUS (Hist. Jahrb., XVI., 85) mistakes this document for a speech of the Hungarian envoy.

⁴ *El re di Francia ha levate tucte le expeditioni de Francia ad la corte di Roma et non vole li ne venga alcuna. Darà gran danno ad li officii. A. Germanello to the Mantuan Chancellor, dated Rome, July 3, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

to hear first the opinion of his friend of early days, Lannoy, and in a Brief of the 18th of July he begged him to pay a secret visit to Rome without delay.¹

Lannoy came at once. He, Sessa and Medici, as well as the English Ambassadors,² urged an alliance with the Emperor in the strongest terms.³ Medici especially, who visited the Pope at least once a day, was untiring.⁴ The Ambassadors were able to show that Francis I. had vast forces assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, in Switzerland, and on the immediate frontiers of Italy, ready to give effect to his long-standing and repeated threats and to begin the war for the reconquest of Milan. At an opportune moment for the Imperialists, a fresh letter from the

¹ *Brief of July 18, 1523 (State Archives, Vienna), in Appendix, No. 26.

² Hannibal and J. Clerk, who had arrived on June 3 with a repeated tender of obedience. See *letter of G. M. della Porta, June 3, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. HÖFLER, 502 *seqq.*

³ Besides the report in BERGENROTH, II., n. 573, cf. the *letter of the Florentine envoys to tender obedience, of July 24, 1523. According to this Lannoy arrived on the evening of the 23rd, "et questo giorno decte desinare a mons. ill^{mo}. Dipoi se ne andorno insieme a palazzo e con loro el duca di Sessa e li oratori Inglesi, dove sono stati infino ad nocte e vedesi che da ognuno è sollecitato forte questa lega." On July 25 G. M. della Porta reports that Lannoy leaves by the evening: "Dicesi che N. S. farà concistoro lunedì o martedì." See also *G. M. della Porta's *letter of July 26, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). According to V. Albergati's *letter of July 27, 1523, Lannoy did not leave till July 26 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁴ *El Card. de Medici ogni dì una volta almeno è col papa: "They discuss what is to be done, if the French invade Italy," report the Florentine envoys on July 17, 1523. According to the *letter of the Archdeacon Gabbioneta, Rome, July 25, 1523, Medici was then already saying that the league of Pope, Emperor, and England would certainly be published by Wednesday (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). In a *letter to Francis I., July 22, 1523, Adrian refused to confirm the election of the Bishop of Sitten. MS. Beth., 8535, f. 65, National Library, Paris.

French King arrived on the 18th of July. This left no room for any further doubt as to his utter want of conscience in respect of the ever-increasing Turkish danger.¹ The Pope now saw that he must give up as hopeless the part of peacemaker to which he had hitherto clung with such tenacity.² In so doing he did not believe himself to be untrue to his previous policy, for he had already made it plainly known that, in the event of an invasion of Italy by Francis, he would be compelled to take part against him.³

The letter of Francis I. threatening Adrian with the fate of Boniface VIII. was present all the more persistently to the Pope's mind because the King, in a letter to the Cardinals written in June, had expressed himself in similar terms.⁴ On the 16th of July Adrian appealed for

¹ Cf. the Nuncio's *letter from Hungary, June 25, 1523, transmitted by G. M. della Porta on July 16. See also the latter's *report, July 22 (State Archives, Florence).

² See M. Foscari's report in SANUTO, XXXIV., 350. G. M. della Porta writes on July 13, 1523: *Il papa ha detto have per certa la deliberatione della passata de Francesi in Italia, et hieri mandò per l' homo del s. Alberti di Carpi usandogli queste parole: Gli Francesi vengono et tuo padrone è Francese. Noi vogliamo la rocca nostra di Reggio. Scrive che subito ne la restituisca, et così appresso S. S^{ta} gli ne scrisse breve. Hor in tutta Roma non si parla d' altro che di questa callata. On July 15: *S. S^{ta} non ha nova alcuna del suo nuncio in Franza, anzi teme, chel non sia in sua libertà. . . . Qua dicono bisognando di far duo millia fanti Spagnoli. . . . Al papa era stato proposto dal Colonna che in tanta necessità di denari S. S^{ta} facesse la restitution di Modena e Reggio con ducento millia duc. et far il duca confalloner de la chiesa, la quale non monstra de volervi attendere (State Archives, Florence).

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 166.

⁴ SANUTO, XXXIV., 340 *seqq.* In Cod. *Vat., 6198, f. 1 *seq.*, the Brief is not, as in Sanuto and Cod. Vat., 3890, f. 18, dated the 4th, but 5th July 1523.

help to Henry VIII.¹ How much he feared an attack from the French is shown by the fact that he took precautions for the security of the gates of Rome.² He openly took measures to ensure his own life and freedom, and not until matters had reached an extremity and he was compelled to bend before the force of circumstances did he quit the neutral attitude he had hitherto observed.³ In spite of the hostile conduct of Francis, he was even now indisposed to make an offensive treaty such as the Imperialists wished. He declared that he was not ready to go beyond a treaty of defence; this attitude he considered due to his position as the common Father of Christendom. The general well-being of Europe, the peace of Italy, and the repulse of the Ottoman power were now as heretofore the ruling principles of his policy.⁴

A Consistory was held on the 29th of July; Adrian opened it with a speech on the Turkish danger and pointed out that the Christian princes, instead of destroying the peace of Europe, should take united action against the infidels. In proof of the warlike intentions of Francis I.,

¹ BREWER, III., 2, n. 3185.

² This interesting fact is reported by A. Germanello to the Mantuan Chancellor in a *letter of July 22, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). There was also a suspicion that the outbreak of fire in the Vatican, on the night of the 11th July 1523, was not accidental; see in Appendix, No. 25, *letter of A. Germanello, July 12, 1523.

³ HÖFLER, 511.

⁴ Cf. Ortiz in BURMANN, 214, and the *letter of G. M. della Porta, Rome, July 27, 1523, who, discussing Adrian's hesitation in taking steps against France, adds: *Dio faccia che N. S. sia degli soi desiderii tutti pienamente soddisfatto essendo la mente de S. S^{ta} dirizata al ben de la religion christiana tanto sanctamente quanto fosse mai animo d' altro pontefice (State Archives, Florence). On July 28 Sessa announces to the Duchess of Savoy the Pope's entrance into the League. *Letter in the State Archives, Vienna.

the letter, full of threats and complaints, addressed by him to Adrian, was read as well as the other in the same tone sent to the Cardinals. Opinions were exchanged as to the conclusion of an alliance for the protection of Italy in view of the threatened French invasion. When the final vote was taken only four, out of eight-and-twenty present, said "No." They were Monte, Fieschi, Orsini, and Trivulzio.¹

By the terms of the League,² signed by Adrian on the 3rd of August, the Pope, the Emperor, Henry VIII. of England, the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, and Cardinal de' Medici, on behalf of Florence, Genoa, Siena, and Lucca, undertook jointly to raise an army to prevent the French from

¹ Cf. *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives) in Appendix, No. 28; Sessa in BERGENROTH, II., n. 594; the *letter of the Florentine envoys, July 29, 1523 (*N. S. questa mattina publicò nel consistoro la lega da farsi. . . . Li rer^{mi} da pochissimi infuora aprovarno unitamente la lega da farsi, e crediamo si publicherà sollemente in S. Maria del Popolo el dì di S. Maria della neve. A Dio piaccia che e sia la salute e quieta de la christianità come si desidera), and the *report of G. M. della Porta, Rome, July 30, 1523. Here it is expressly stated that the letter of Francis I. to the Pope, as well as that to the Cardinals, was read in Consistory. The report goes on to say: *Tra gli Cardinali nel votare questa deliberation quatro ve ne sono stati contrarii: Monte, Fiesco, Ursino, et Trivulzi; gli dui Venetiani Grimani et Cornaro non vi si sono trovati (State Archives, Florence). That only *one* Cardinal opposed (BAUMGARTEN, II., 280) is incorrect. Cf. also the *report of V. Albergati, July 31, 1523, in State Archives, Bologna, and *that of L. Cati, July 31, 1523, in State Archives, Modena, in which Fieschi, Trivulzio, and Orsini are named as in opposition.

² Cf. *Letter of the Florentine envoys, August 3, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and that of Gabbioneta on the same day (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). See also RAYNALDUS, 1524, n. 111, and Ortiz in BURMANN, 214 *seq.* LEPITRE, 317, incorrectly dates the League as far back as April 3.

entering Lombardy; Adrian made himself responsible for a monthly contribution of 15,000 ducats and appointed Lannoy Commander-in-Chief, Charles V. signifying his approval.¹

The Imperialists were in high glee. The League and the agreement between Venice and Charles V. have, wrote Sessa, entirely altered European politics. Medici's influence, it seemed, was now firmly established.² In Rome, as well as throughout Italy, the new turn of affairs met with almost unanimous approval; even those who had formerly been Adrian's enemies now praised the Pope for the excellence of his dispositions and his conspicuous piety. His behaviour in the trial of Soderini had also remarkably enhanced his reputation, and many now realized that the charges of indecision were not justified.³ It was widely believed that the danger of a French invasion was over, and that the possibility of a campaign against the Turks was secured.⁴ On the 5th of August, the Feast of Our Lady of

¹ The text of the treaty is not published, the substance only is known; see especially GUICCIARDINI, XV., 2, who produces a clause, among others, according to which the stipulations were to be binding during the lives of the contracting parties and for one year after the death of any one of them; the contributions in money and troops were to be guaranteed at first for three months only. Cf. SISMONDI, XV., 56 *seq.*, and EHSES, Politik Clemens VII., 561. The latter has already remarked that Vettori gives the Pope's subsidy at 15,000, and Guicciardini at 20,000 ducats. The Imperialists wished the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief to be entrusted to Charles V.; see **Responsio data per oratores Cesaris duci Albaniae in urbe* (Royal Library, Turin, Miscell. polit., N 75, p. 242 *seqq.*).

² *See BERGENROTH, II., n. 502; BAUMGARTEN, II., 280.

³ JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI. TIZIO belonged naturally to the party which viewed Medici's influence with much dissatisfaction; cf. his *Hist. Senen., Cod. G, II., 39 (Chigi Library, Rome).

⁴ Cf. the characteristic *letters of V. Albergati, July 24 and August 5, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna); that of L. Cati, August 3, 1523

the Snow, the League was solemnly published in S. Maria Maggiore. For this purpose the Pope went very early to the Basilica; he seems to have feared some attempts by the French party; for, contrary to the custom of Julius II. and Leo X., he rode thither surrounded by his Swiss guard. It was the first time he had ridden through Rome in pontifical attire; on his return to the Vatican he was greatly fatigued.¹ The ride in the blazing August sun, followed by a chill, and still more, the mental excitement, brought on an attack of illness, and the Pope, whose health for some time had not been of the best,² had to take to his bed immediately after the ceremony. The contest between the French and Imperial parties had kept him in a state of constant agitation, and, now that a decision had been reached, he broke down.³ It was a heavy burden on his soul that, for all his love of peace, he should have been forced, even as a measure of necessity, to take part in a war against the disturber of the peace of Christendom.⁴

Great as was the rejoicing of the Emperor⁵ and his (State Archives, Modena); and that of G. M. della Porta, August 20, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). See also JANSSEN-PASTOR, II.¹⁸, 332 *seq.*

¹ The above remarks are founded on an exhaustive *report of Gabbioneta, August 5, 1523, in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Cf. also the *letter of the Florentine envoys, August 5, 1523, in State Archives, Florence, and NEGRI in *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 116.

² He had been unwell already in the middle of July in consequence of the great heat; see *letters of L. Cati, July 13 and 19, 1523 (State Archives, Modena).

³ With BERGENROTH, II., n. 594, cf. the *letter of Gabbioneta, August 7, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani* VI.

⁴ See HÖFLER, 526.

⁵ With Charles's letter, quoted in GACHARD, LXVI., cf. also his *letter to Lannoy, dated Burgos, September 1, 1523 (State Archives, Brussels, *Corresp. de Charles V.*).

adherents, they do not appear to have been satisfied with a merely defensive alliance. They hoped to have been able to bring Adrian to decide in favour of an offensive treaty against Francis I., but for the moment the Pope's condition made all negotiations impossible; all audiences were deferred,¹ and when the Datary Enkevort also became unwell, business was for some time at a complete standstill. An intolerable heat prevailed, causing much sickness; Cardinal Grimani,² among others, was seriously ill.

The Pope's condition was said to be the result of a chill which had first settled on his neck and then gone down to the kidneys.³ When an abscess in his neck broke, Adrian

¹ "Tutti li aditi sono preclusi," writes Gabbioneta on August 10, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). See also the report of the Florentine envoys, August 11, quoted below in note 3.

² *El card. Grimani ha la febre e se dubita asai di lui, as he was weak, and owing to the extreme "caldo et quodamodo insuportabile che fa adesso in Roma, quale è tanto che non gli è memoria che mai el fosse simile et per questo infiniti caschano amalati. La peste va pur picigando ma non fa molto danno." Gabbioneta, August 10, 1523. Cf. also his *letter of August 12 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua) and SANUTO, XXXIV., 363, 371, 378, 385. *Molti se amalano et moreno et gli caldi sono eccessivi da pochi dì in qua, writes G. M. della Porta on August 10, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Cf. Ortiz in BURMANN, 216. The Florentine envoys report on August 10, 1523: *N. S. è stato indisposto 4 giorni d' un poco di scesa che ha facto capo, secundo intendiamo, sotto l' orecchio, e questa mattina ha rocto di dentro: sperasi che in brevissimi dì sarà libero a ogni modo. On August 11: *El papa va guarendo e domatina ha decto di voler dare audientia al m. di Pescara; è stato 5 o 6 giorni che non ha dato audientia a persona ne voluto fare faccende di nessuna sorte (State Archives, Florence). Gabbioneta also speaks in his report of August 10 of the "descesa asai gagliarda nella maxilla destra" from which Adrian VI. suffers (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). V. Albergati mentions expressly the disease of the kidneys in his reports of August 5, 9, and 12, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

felt relieved, and on the 12th of August he was so much better that he was able to receive the Marquis of Pescara, who had come with all speed to Rome on behalf of the Emperor.¹ Although the heat continued,² the Pope went on improving; he left his bed, said Mass, and did a certain amount of business; although he had become very thin and still felt very weak, his complete recovery was believed to be at hand.³ An unexpected legacy enabled him at this time to contribute his quota to the funds of the League.⁴

Cardinal Grimani died in the night of the 27th of

¹ "Pescara visits the Pope to-day, who is feeling better, as the *apostema* has burst." Gabbioneta, August 4, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Gabbioneta also fell ill of fever; see his *letter of August 20, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. the *letter of G. M. della Porta, August 23, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Besides the **letters of the Florentine envoys of the 17th, 19th, 22nd, 23rd, 25th, 26th, and 30th August 1523, cf. the *reports of V. Alberghi of the 12th, 16th, and 21st of August (State Archives, Bologna) and the *letters of G. M. della Porta of August 14: *N. S. sta bene et promette fra dui dì dar undienza; August 19: *N. S. sta pur ancora un poco indisposto di dolore di renelle, et la discesa che comenzò all' orecchia è callata nel braccio, ma del uno et l' altro S. S^{ta} sta in miglioramento; August 20: *N. S. sta pur rinchiuso come di molti dì in qua. Hoggi intendo, che si ha fatto cavar sangue, ma di certo nulla si pò intendere, chel palazzo sta abondanato et gli medici non escano mai de le camare, dove habita S. S^{ta}; pur credesi chel mal sia poco; August 27: *N. S. ha cominciato ad negociare qualche poco et puossi dir guarito del tutto (State Archives, Florence). Cf. also the letter *of A. Germanello of August 20, 1523. He reports on the 28th: *El papa sta meglio, ma è anchora debile e ha quasi perso lo appetito (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ G. M. della Porta reports on August 23, 1523: *N. S. va migliorando, ma fa adagio come fanno e vechii; è morto un chiericho di camera chiamato mons. d' Illermet, chi gli ha lasciato meglio di XX^m duc. d' ufittii, che è cosa da farlo guarire afacto (State Archives, Florence). For the amount see VETTORI, 347.

August.¹ Adrian, on the other hand, seemed entirely recovered, although he still suffered from loss of appetite.² On the 27th of August he granted an audience to the Ambassador of Venice;³ peace and the League had been proclaimed there on the Feast of the Assumption. Greatly rejoiced, he bestowed on the Signoria two-tenths of the clerical revenues of the Republic;⁴ at the same time he asked the Doge to send troops to places threatened by the French. The Marquis Federico Gonzaga of Mantua was ordered to join the Imperial army at Piacenza and to undertake the defence of Alessandria.⁵ On the 31st, the anniversary of his coronation, the Pope held a Consistory in his own chamber; he was still too weak to take part in the public function.⁶

On the 1st of September, de Lisle Adam, the Grand

¹ G. M. della Porta, who on *August 23 reports Grimani's condition to be hopeless, writes on the 27th that the Cardinal is dead (State Archives, Florence). Cf. SANUTO, XXXIV., 387, *letter of V. Albergati, August 28, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna), and *Diary of BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² Cf. reports of V. Albergati of August 21, 24, 28, and 29, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

³ *El papa . . . non da anchora audientia; heri solo la decte a lo orator Veneto. A. Germanello, August 28, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ The original of the Brief to the Doge, with the "facultas imponendi clero duas decimas," is dated September 5, 1523 (State Archives, Venice). Cf. SANUTO, XXXIV., 394 *seq.*, 400, 413 *seqq.*, and Libri comm., VI., 175. The 1st September in HÖFLER, 528, is a mistake.

⁵ GACHARD, Corresp., 227 *seq.*, 279 *seq.*, and in Appendix, Nos. 29-31, the Briefs of August 26 and September 8, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁶ Cf. Lett. d. princ., I., 118; *letter of V. Albergati of September 2, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna), and *letter of L. Cati, same date (State Archives, Modena).

Master of the Knights of St. John, arrived in Rome. Adrian gave him a residence in the Vatican, and showed him every kind of honour;¹ he took steps to find a new home for the exiled Order. From the Grand Master's lips Adrian heard all the details of the deplorable fall of Rhodes.² The narrative could not fail to tell unfavourably on the aged and weakly man. Not less depressing were the accounts of the war now beginning in Lombardy, which threw into the background all his noble designs for the peace of Europe, the Crusade, and the reforming Council.³ Feelings of sorrow undoubtedly contributed to the fresh attack of illness which declared itself on the 3rd of September.

The report of his death was soon spread through Rome, and the Cardinals began to be busy with the prospects of a Papal election.⁴ Adrian's strong constitution seemed

¹ See the *letter of the Florentine envoys of September 1, 1523, and *that of G. M. della Porta of same date (State Archives, Florence), as well as L. Cati, September 2, 1523 (State Archives, Modena); SANUTO, XXXIV., 395; *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris); Lett. d. Princ., I., 118; *Diary of BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS (Secret Archives of the Vatican). "The Grand Master lived in the stantie di Innocentio [VIII.]," says V. Albergati on September 2, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna). Cf. CHARRIÈRE, I., 110. Already, on June 30, 1523, Adrian VI. had become acquainted with the views of the King of Portugal as to a new residence for the Knights of Rhodes, Corp. dipl. Port., II., 171 seq.

² It is clear, from LUZIO in the Lett. di P. Giovio, 29, that Giovio also had heard from the mouths of the defenders of Rhodes the interesting details of the siege related in his Vita Adriani VI.

³ SANUTO, XXXIV., 378, 385; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 411. G. M. della Porta reports, September 6, 1523: *È gionto un cavallaro hoggi, che testifica la venuta del Christianissimo con potentissimo exercito (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ See Foscari in SANUTO, XXXIV., 398, as well as the *reports of the Florentine envoys of September 3 and 5, 1523; the two *letters

once more to get the better of his malady; on the 6th and 7th of September he felt decidedly better.¹ He then signed the Bull conferring on Charles V. and his successors the right to appoint prelates of their own choice to the bishoprics and consistorial abbacies of the Spanish Crown, excepting only when a vacancy in Curia occurred.² Adrian's improvement was deceptive; in the night of the 8th of September he became so much worse that he had no longer any doubt as to the fatal nature of his illness. The next morning he summoned the Cardinals to him and asked them to agree to the nomination of Enkevoirt, consecrated on the 11th of March 1523 Bishop of Tortosa,³ to the Cardinalate. This request, made by a dying man on behalf of a most deserving friend, met with opposition, for the Datary was greatly disliked on account of his rough and downright ways. In the evening the Pope was so weak that he could hardly speak. On the following morning (the 9th of September) he was no better, and therefore

of G. M. della Porta of September 6, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and * that of V. Albergati of September 5, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

¹ The Pope, state the Florentine envoys, is much better: * *passeggia senza affanno, non ha febre e ha la voce gagliarda et parlì sentirsi meglio*. G. M. della Porta states on September 7: * *N. S. ha continuato, Dio gratia, il miglioramento*. He has heard with dissatisfaction of the negotiations set on foot with regard to the election of his successor (State Archives, Florence). Cf. * letter of L. Cati, September 7 (State Archives, Modena).

² Rigant. in reg., I cancell., I., n., 284, 285; MARIANA, *De reb. Hisp.*, XXVI., 2; HÖFLER, 533; LA FUENTE, V., 139; *Archiv für Kirchenrecht*, X., 16; GAMS, III., 2, 155.

³ * *Acta Consist.* of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican). To Enkevoirt and his successors in the see of Tortosa Adrian granted the privilege of wearing a red biretta; see BARBIER DE MONTAULT, *Le Costume*, I., Paris, 1898, 230, and *The Burlington Magazine*, 1905, 287.

allowed Heeze to make representations to the Cardinals, in consequence of which some of them promised to vote for Enkevoirt's promotion. On the 10th, Adrian once more assembled a Consistory in his sick-room. Referring to the ancient custom whereby a Pope bestowed his own Cardinalitial title on a confidential friend, he asked the members of the Sacred College to consent that he should confer this grace on a person of goodness and learning. When all had given their assent, he named the Datary Enkevoirt, who at once, to the vexation of the Court, was received into the ranks of the purple.¹

After the Consistory the Pope took some food ; this was followed by a sharp access of fever. On the next day at noon, the fever having abated, the invalid could not be prevented from again turning his attention, with a touching devotion to duty, to the despatch of business. He sent off some Bulls and Briefs, attached his signature to petitions, and even gave audiences, although speaking was very trying to him.² This improvement only lasted till the 12th of September ; notwithstanding their efforts, the physicians, who had been assiduous in their attention, held out no hope, since they could do nothing to check the fever and rapid decline of strength. Worn out with sorrow and care, age and sickness, a life was running swiftly to its end, the

¹ See the important **reports of A. Germanello, September 12, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. also the letter ** of Salamanca, September 12, 1523 (State Archives, Vienna), and the *letter of the Florentine envoys, September 10, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and *those of V. Albergati, September 8 and 10, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna). BERGENROTH, II., n., 597 ; SANUTO, XXXIV., 402, 409-410 ; Ortiz in BURMANN, 217 ; Blasius de Martinellis in HÖFLER, 532.

² See the **report of A. Germanello, September 12, 1523, the *letter V. Albergati, September 12, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna), the *letter of L. Cati, September 12, 1523 (State Archives, Modena), and SANUTO, XXXIV., 410.

preservation of which was of the utmost importance to Christendom.¹ With the consent of the Cardinals the dying Pope now made his last dispositions, in which he once more clearly showed his horror of nepotism. His household got only the property which he had brought with him from Spain to Rome, but nothing that had belonged to him as Pope. His possessions in the Netherlands, particularly in Louvain and Utrecht, Enkevoirt was to dispose of for the poor, and for pious purposes for the good of his soul; his house in Louvain he set apart as a college for poor students, giving it a rich endowment. Being asked about his burial, he forbade any funeral pomp; he did not wish more than twenty-five ducats to be spent on his obsequies. He received Extreme Unction with the greatest devotion; so long as he could speak he comforted his friends. "He died," wrote one of them, "even as he had lived—in peace, piety, and holiness."²

¹ HÖFLER, 534. L. Cati had written on September 11, 1523: *In summa le cose di N. S. vanno peggiorando—his condition is hopeless per esser extenuato et fiaco et ridotto ad extrema magrezza; più si parla del novo papato che di altro (State Archives, Modena). The Florentine envoys report on September 13, 1523: *N. S. ha passato questa nocte senza accidenti e così questa mattina, nondimeno è molto debole, e si questa febre glia a durare al caso suo non si vede rimedio (State Archives, Florence).

² See the letter of Wilhelm von Lochorst in BURMANN, 218 *seq.*, 507; *cf.* also Blasius de Martinellis in GATTICUS, 440; Ortiz in BURMANN, 218 *seq.*; SANUTO, XXXIV., 410, 439, and Corp. dipl. Port., II., 174 *seq.* According to SANUTO, XXXIV., 438, Adrian expressed a wish that the case of Soderini should be settled by the future Council. For the testamentary dispositions entrusted to Enkevoirt and their execution see, Archief v. kerkelijke geschiedenis, IX. (1838), 152 *seq.*, 185; Kerkelyk Nederlandsch Jaarboek (1848), 171, and Archief v. h. Aartsbisdom Utrecht, XXVIII. (1902), 141 *seq.* For the still existing college in Louvain see BURMANN, 22 *seq.*,

On the 14th of September, at the nineteenth hour, this noble spirit passed away, the last German and last non-Italian Pope.¹ The greedy Romans suspected him of having hoarded great treasures in his carefully guarded study in the Borgia tower.² But they found there, together with a few rings and jewels of Leo X., nothing but briefs and other papers. He left behind him, at the highest estimate, not more than 2000 ducats.³

As the corpse was disfigured and much swollen, the rumour was at once spread that Adrian had been poisoned, and the Spaniards accused the Netherlanders of carelessness in allowing Frenchmen to come into the Pope's kitchen. The autopsy of the body afforded no ground for supposing that Adrian had fallen a victim to foul play; nevertheless the suspicion gained ground with many, especially as Prospero Colonna had died from poisoning.⁴ The diagnosis of Adrian's illness affords no proof of other than natural death. In all probability he succumbed to a disease of the kidneys⁵ consequent

31 *seq.*; *Annuaire de l'univ. de Louvain*, 1879, and *Anal. p. s. à l'hist. eccl. de la Belgique*, XVII. (1882), 87 *seq.*

¹ CORNELIUS DE FINE, *Diary (National Library, Paris), says he died at 6 P.M., the Florentine envoys (State Archives, Florence) say 6.30 P.M.; Germanello, agreeing with Blasius de Martinellis, says Adrian died at 7 P.M. (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² JOVIUS, *Vita Adriani VI.*

³ SANUTO, XXXIV., 410, 430, 439. HÖFLER, 536, has already pointed out that neither the Venetian despatches nor the diary of Blasius de Martinellis know anything of the scene described by Sessa (BERGENROTH, II., n. 601). Nor can I find any confirmation thereof in the numerous diplomatic papers of which I have made use from other sources.

⁴ Ortiz in BURMANN, 219 *seqq.*

⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 209; SANUTO, XXXIV., 439; and the *reports of the Florentine envoys of September 3 and 5, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

on the exhaustion of a naturally delicate body through exposure to a strange climate,¹ and under the pressure of care and excitement. The reports of poisoning admit of explanation, since the French party and the opponents of reform pursued Adrian, even in the grave, with their fierce hatred, and since, during his lifetime, there had been talk of assassination.²

Adrian was laid, provisionally, in the chapel of St. Andrew in St. Peter's, between Pius II. and Pius III., who had been so closely connected with German affairs. The temporary epitaph ran, "Here lies Adrian VI., who looked upon it as his greatest misfortune that he was called upon to rule."³

It was due to the gratitude of Cardinal Enkevoint that a monument worthy of his master was erected. This was finished ten years after Adrian's death; on the 11th of August 1533 the body was taken from St. Peter's and transferred to Santa Maria dell' Anima, the church of the German nation.⁴ The monument was raised on the right hand of the choir. Baldassare Peruzzi had prepared the plan; the execution in marble was carried out by Tribolo, a pupil of Sansovino, and Michelangelo of Siena. The

¹ Adrian, like a thoroughly unpractical man of learning, never thought of adapting himself to the climatic conditions in which he lived.

² As late as June 12, 1524, Castiglione wrote to the Marquis of Mantua from Rome: *Qui è preggione un fornaro, il quale dà certi indicii assai manifesti che papa Adriano fosse avenenato (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. SANUTO, XXXVI., 368.

³ Cf. *Acta caerem.* in GATTICUS, 479 *seq.*; BREWER, III., 2, n. 3464; SCHMIDLIN, 271. See also the inscriptions in MÜLLER, *Het oudste cartularium v. het sticht Utrecht, 's Gravenhage*, 1892, 182 *seqq.* The funeral sermon of Conradus Vegerius (see GIORDANI, App. 67) was soon printed; cf. *Serapeum*, XXIV., 363.

⁴ Cf. GATTICUS, 479 *seq.*; SCHMIDLIN, 288 *seq.*

architecture of this somewhat clumsy construction is copied from the tombs of prelates and Cardinals with which previous generations had adorned so many Roman churches, especially that of Santa Maria del Popolo. In the central niche is seen the over-richly decorated sarcophagus with Adrian's coat of arms and the plain inscription, "Adrianus VI. P. M."; the supporters are two boys with reversed torches. Above the sarcophagus lies the life-size statue of the Pope on a bed of state; he is represented in full pontifical vesture; as if taking his sleep after exhausting labour, with his left hand he holds on his head the tiara which had been so heavy a burden. On his noble countenance, with its expression of reverential awe, are deep traces of earnestness and sorrow. In the lunette above appears, in accordance with ancient custom, the figure of Our Blessed Lady, the mighty intercessor in the hour of death, with the Apostles Peter and Paul by her side. On the architrave hover two angels carrying branches of palm, and the tiara and keys.

In the side niches, between massive Corinthian columns, are the imposing figures of the four cardinal virtues. Below the sarcophagus a fine relief represents Adrian's entry into Rome, where a helmeted figure symbolizing the city hastens to meet him at the gates. A broad marble slab on brackets contains the obituary inscription composed by Tranquillus Molossus; on each side, under the niches, boys hold the Cardinal's hat and armorial bearings of the founder, Enkevoint. Between the sarcophagus and the relief of the entry into Rome a prominent place is given to the pathetic inscription, "Alas! how much do the efforts, even of the best of men, depend upon time and opportunity."¹

¹ Proh dolor, quantum refert in quae tempora vel optimi cuiusque virtus incidat. Cf. FORCELLA, III., 447. Concerning the tomb and its founder, full details are given in SCHÖNFELD, Sansovino, 19, 54

Few more appropriate epitaphs have been written than these words of resignation and regret to which the dead Pope had once given utterance respecting himself. In large letters they set forth the life-work of the last German Pontiff, one so often misunderstood and despised, who saw with his dying eyes the unity of the Church and of his beloved Fatherland simultaneously rent asunder. They form the best commentary on the destiny of his life, and on that short span of government in which misfortune and failure followed each other in one unbroken chain. Without ever having sought high place, this humble and devout Netherlander rose, step by step, from the lowliest circumstances, until it was his lot to attain the tiara; he was never dazzled by its splendour. The dignity of the Papacy came to him at a highly critical moment, and he looked upon it as an intolerable burden. Wherever he turned his glance his eye met some threatening evil; in the North a dangerous heresy, in the East the onward advance of the Turk, in the heart of Christendom confusion and war. After an exhausting journey he at last reached his capital, there to find an empty exchequer, a Court composed of officials animated by national pride, personal ambition, and the most unfriendly spirit, and a city ravaged by plague. Moreover, as a thorough northerner, he was neither by

seq.; GRÄVENITZ, *Deutsche in Rom*, 118 *seq.*, and SCHMIDLIN, 281 *seq.* To the copious literary references of the last-named may be added: DOLLMAYR in the, *Zeitschr. für bildende Kunst*, N.F., I. 295 *seq.*; L'Arte, III. (1900), 255 *seq.*, and FRASCHETTI in, *Emporium* (1902), 124. Schmidlin is right in pointing out that the early pictures of the tomb (in BURMANN, 80, and CIACONIUS, III., 440) show that the ornamentation was originally much richer than now; but he makes a mistake in supposing that "the four coins of Adrian were introduced above the tomb in order to form a row of medallions." They were introduced here and elsewhere by Ciaconius as additions of his own, as he has shown in his notes.

bodily nor mental constitution fitted for the position in which Providence had suddenly placed him. Heedless of all these difficulties, he did not flinch, but concentrated all his powers on coping with the almost superhuman tasks set before him. He entered on his work with the purest intentions, and never for a moment turned from the path of duty, which he followed with conscientious fidelity until his wearied eyes were closed in death.

But not one of the objects which he so honestly pursued was he permitted to achieve. Personally an exemplary priest, genuinely pious and firmly attached to the ancient principles of the Church, he threw himself with courage and determination into the titanic struggle with the host of abuses then disfiguring the Roman Curia and well-nigh the universal Church. Strong and inflexible as he was, the difficulties confronting him were so many and so great that at no time was he able to carry out all the reforms he had decreed, as, for example, the rules concerning benefices.¹ His best endeavours were unavailing against the insuperable force of circumstances, and the upshot of his short-lived efforts was that the evils remained as they were before. The generous appeal to his own people to make open confession of their guilt, which he had addressed by his Nuncio to the Diet of the German Empire, was met by the reforming party with scorn and ridicule. So far from checking the schism brought about at Luther's evil instigation, Adrian

¹ Cf. SANUTO, XXXIII., 481, and TIZIO, *Hist. Senen. The latter relates as follows—and it is weighty evidence that Adrian was no pedantic rigorist, but was open to the lessons of experience: **coepitque Italico more atque curialium . . . beneficia conferre, ad tria incompatibilia dispensationem concedere . . . dicebat quidem in hujusmodi dispensationibus se exhibuisse difficilem quando putabat Italica beneficia sicut Hispanica esse pinguiora.*

had, perforce, to realize that the breach was daily growing wider.

As he laboured in vain for the unity and reform of the Church, so did he also for the protection of Christendom, threatened by the Ottoman power. Although the exchequer was empty and the Holy See burdened with debt, he was called upon to give help on every side. If he saved and taxed in order to help the Knights of Rhodes and the Hungarians, he was called a miser; if he spent money on the Turkish war instead of pensioning artists and men of letters, he was called a barbarian. In vain he grieved over Rhodes and Hungary; in vain he begged, entreated, and threatened the Christian princes who, instead of uniting against their common enemy and that of Western civilization, were tearing each other to pieces in unceasing warfare. The young Emperor, with whom he had so many and such close ties, was unable to understand the neutral position enforced upon his fatherly friend as Head of the Church, if the duties of that great office were to be rightly fulfilled. The Ambassadors of Charles felt nothing but contempt and ridicule for Adrian's actions; their short-sighted policy was exclusively confined to their master's immediate advantage. The crafty French King rewarded Adrian's advances with treachery, threats, and deeds of violence. It was the invasion of Italy by Francis which forced the Pope, true to the last to his principle of neutrality, to join the Emperor in a league which, although intended by Adrian to be solely defensive, at length involved him in the war. His death, on the very day on which the French crossed the Ticino, freed the most peace-loving of all the Popes from participation in a sanguinary campaign. He was thus spared from experiencing the shameful ingratitude of those for whose true welfare he had been working.

Few were the Italians who did justice to the stranger Pope; by far the greater number hailed his death as a deliverance,¹ and looked back on his Pontificate as a time of trouble.² In Rome the detestation of "barbarians" went hand in hand with the hatred felt by all those whose habits of life were threatened by Adrian's moral earnestness and efforts for reform. To these motives were added the dissatisfaction caused by the introduction of direct taxation and the withdrawal of the outward splendour to which the Romans, especially since the accession of Leo X., had become accustomed. That Adrian's physician³ should have been hailed as a liberator was not by any means the worst insult. The neglected *litterati* took atrocious vengeance in countless attacks on the dead Pope. The most venomous abuse was written up in all the public places. The dead man was assailed as ass, wolf, and harpy, and compared to Caracalla and Nero; Pasquino's statue was decorated with ribald verses.⁴

¹ Cf. GORI, Archivio, IV., 246; ALFANI, 301, and *ibid.*, note 2, Bontempi's opinion: "Nihil boni fecit in ejus papata et in ejus morte fuit infamatus de haeresi, prout audivi." Guicciardini wrote on September 16, 1523, to Modena: "Con più dispiacere ho inteso li Franzesi avera passato il Tesino, che la morte di N. S^{re}, perchè di questa nuova potria uscire qualche buon frutto, di quella non si vede altro che disfavore e danno." Disp. 217. One of the few favourable verdicts of his Italian contemporaries is in SANUTO, XXXIV., 410. Some elegiac verses in the Coryciana, Rome, 1524, JJ, 2^b seq.

² Tempus Aerumnarum, CARPESANUS, 1353.

³ Giov. Antracino (see JOVIUS, Vita Adriani VI.). Among other physicians of Adrian's were Garzia Carastosa, a Spaniard, and the Italian, Franc. Fusconi; see MARINI, I., 320 seqq.

⁴ See the report of the English envoys in BREWER, III., 2, n. 3464; cf. LUZIO, Aretino e Pasquino, 12 seq.; Giorn. d. Lett. Ital., XVII., 298; CREIGHTON, V., 323, and BERTANI, 36. A series of these pasquinades in TIZIO, *Hist. Senen., *loc. cit.* (Chigi Library, Rome). V.

The death of the hated Adrian was acclaimed with frantic joy; every conceivable vice, drunkenness, and even the grossest immorality were attributed to one of the purest occupants of the Roman See.¹ Every act of the great Pope, the whole tenor of his life and all his surroundings, were distorted by a stinging and mendacious wit, and turned into ridicule with all the refinement of malice. An impudent spirit of calumny, one of the greatest evils of the Renaissance, pervaded all classes; slander and vilification were incessant. A month after Adrian's death a Mantuan envoy reported on the mad excesses of this plague of wits; he sent his master one of the worst sonnets then in circulation, "not in order to defame Adrian, for I dislike those who do so, but in order that your Excellency may know how many wicked tongues there are in this city where everyone indulges in the worst backbiting."²

Adrian with his piety and moral earnestness had become,

Albergati mentions others; see *infra*, 224, n. 2. Cf. also BESSO, *Roma e il Papa nei proverbi*, 2nd ed., Roma, 1904, 276.

¹ See the letter of C. Batti to Parma in BURMANN, 436-440, and WOLF, *Lect. II.*, 191 *seq.* Cf., on the other hand, SCHRÖCKH, *Allgem. Biographie*, V., 114 *seq.*

² *Non per dirne male, che mi dispiacquon quelli, che ciò fano, ma per far che V. Ex. lo veda et comprenda quante malissime lingue sono dal canto di qua, dove non è che dica se non male. G. B. Quarantino, Rome, October 13, 1523. The sonnet there mentioned begins thus:—

*Perfido come il mare Adriano,
Ipocrito, crudel, invido, avaro,
Odiosa ad ciascun, a nesun charo,
Incantator, mago, idolatra, vano
Rustico, inexorabil, inhumano,
Falsario, traditor, ladro, beccaro,
Solitario, bestial e fatuchiaro, etc.

(Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.)

in the fullest sense of the words, "the burnt-offering of Roman scorn."¹ It was long before the cavillers ceased to talk. There were some, especially in the literary world, whose hatred was unappeasable. To what extent it was carried may be seen from the report of Vianesio Albergati on the Conclave of Clement VII. While Leo X. is there belauded as the chief mainstay of Italy and the wonder of his century, the writer cannot find words enough to depict the greed, the harshness, the stupidity of Adrian. There was no misfortune, not even the fall of Rhodes, for which this barbarian and tyrant was not responsible.² Even after the visitation of God on Rome, in the sack of the city, Pierio Valeriano still reviled the "deadly enemy of the Muses, of eloquence, and of all things beautiful, the prolongation of whose life would have meant the sure return of the days of Gothic barbarism."³ How deep-

¹ BÜRCKHARDT, *Kultur*, I., 7th ed., 75.

² The report of V. Albergati exists under various titles:—*Clementis VII. P. M. conclave et creatio*; *Commentaria conclavis Clementis VII.*; *Commentarii rerum sui temporis*; *Obitus Adriani VI. et conclave Clementis VII.*; *Historia Adriani VI.*; *Gesta Romae et Italiae ab excessu Adriani VI. ad elect. Clementis VII.* I noted the following MSS.: (1) Florence, National Library, Cod. Magliab., XXXVII., 204, f. 6 *seq.* (2) Naples, National Library, VIII., B 37. (3) Mantua, Capilupi Library. (4) Rome, Secret Archives of the Vatican: *Varia polit.*, 8, f. 403, n. 174; Vatican Library: *Ottob.*, 986, Cod. Barb., XXXII., 85, and 260, XXXIII., 45, 92, 163, XXXIV., 13 (*cf.* RANKE, III., 14* *seq.*); Corsini Library, 34, G 13. (5) Vienna, Domestic, Court, and State Archives. BACHA in the *Comptes rendus de la commiss. d'hist.*, 5 Series, I., Bruxelles, 1891, 109–166, gives a by no means accurate copy, based on the Roman versions. For Albergati *cf. ibid.*, 4 Series, XVII., 129 *seq.*, and FANTUZZI, I., 136 *seq.* Fantuzzi's remark on the Bishopric of Cajazzo is incorrect, for Albergati, in his *letter, October 29, 1522, *seq.* (State Archives, Bologna), signs himself "electus Caiacen."

³ *De infelicit. lit. ed. Menken*, III., 382.

rooted was the abhorrence of the foreigner, how habitual it had become to make him matter of burlesque, is best seen in Paolo Giovio's biography of Adrian. Written at the command of Cardinal Enkevort, it ought to be essentially a panegyric; but only a superficial reader can receive this impression. We have scarcely to read between the lines to see that the ungrateful Giovio introduces, when he has the chance, piquant and humorous remarks, and tries in a very coarse way to draw a ludicrous picture of the German Pope, in nervous anxiety for his health, interrupting the weightiest business when a meal draws near, and at last dying from too copious potations of beer.¹ Even those Italians who refrained from the general mockery and abuse of Adrian were not sympathetic. A characteristic instance is the judgment of Francesco Vettori, who remarks, "Adrian was undoubtedly a pious and good man, but he was better fitted for the cloister; moreover, his reign was too short to enable one to form a correct estimate of his government and character."²

At the beginning of Adrian's pontificate the catchword

¹ BURCKHARDT, I., 7th ed., 176; VIRGILI, Berni, 71. For the origin of the Vita *cf.* Denkschriften der Münchener Akad. Hist. Kl., 1891, 532. In his writing "De piscibus" Giovio also talks contemptuously of the Pope; see CIAN in Giorn. d. lett. Ital., XVIII., 298.

² VETTORI, 347. See also GUICCIARDINI, XV., 2, and CHIESI, 118. With a few exceptions (Foscari in ALBÈRI, I Series, III., 125; PARUTA, I., 218 *seq.*) all Italians, not merely Sannazzaro (*cf.* BURMANN, 428, and GOTHEIN, Kultur-entwicklung, 460), but also ALBERINI (325 *seq.*) and Bembo (*cf.* CIAN, 19), were thoroughly unjust to Adrian VI. Justiniani (Hist. rer. Venet., 1611, 256) certainly recognizes the Pope's simplicity of character, but immediately relates a very trivial anecdote. How unfair and absolutely inept opinion in Rome concerning him was, even in the latter half of the sixteenth century, may be seen from the *Vita in Cod. 38, A, 6 (Corsini Library, Rome).

in political circles was that the Pope was no statesman;¹ this was now repeated.² This kind of criticism was uncommonly characteristic of the Renaissance; the men of that period had become so accustomed to look upon the Popes³ as secular princes, politicians, and patrons of art and letters only, that they had lost the faculty of understanding a Pontiff who placed his ecclesiastical duties before everything, and aimed at being, above all, the shepherd of souls. This saintly man from the Netherlands, with his serious purposes, his indifference to classical and humanist culture, his strict avoidance of Machiavellian statecraft and his single-hearted anxiety to live exclusively for duty, was to the Italians of that age like an apparition from another world, beyond the grasp of their comprehension.

The difficulty of forming a just and thorough appreciation of Adrian was increased to an extraordinary degree by the removal from Rome, by his secretary Heeze, of the most important documents relating to his reign, his correspondence with other princes and with the Nuncios, thus withdrawing sources of the greatest value for historical research.⁴ In this way even Pallavicini, adhering to the

¹ See *letter of G. M. della Porta, September 22, 1522 (State Archives, Florence), who brings forward as evidence an instance of forgetfulness on Adrian's part. Cf. also the *letter of Castiglione's, September 14, 1522 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). TIZIO also wrote at that time: *De pontifice vero multi judicabant, litteras atque bonitatem non sufficere ad regnum ecclesiae, Aristoteles namque in libris de regimine "non decet," inquit "bene principari, qui non sub principe fuit," Hist. Senen., Cod. G, II., 39, f. 139 (Chigi Library, Rome).

² SANUTO, XXXIV., 439, and *letter of V. Albergati, September 14, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

³ See Vol. VIII. of this work, p. 460.

⁴ Gregory XIII. tried in vain in 1575 to recover these important "scripturae"; cf. THEINER, Annal. eccl., II., 130; DE RAM in Bullet.

commonly accepted view of the Italians, sums up Adrian as an admirable priest, bishop, and cardinal, but only a mediocre Pope.¹

As early as 1536 a fellow-countryman and contemporary of Adrian, Gerhard Moring, had passed a sounder judgment in a biography which found, however, little circulation. Nor did much success attend the attempts of impartial historians in Italy, such as Panvinio, Raynaldus, Mansi, and Muratori, to defend the memory of their noble

de la commiss. royale d'hist., 2 Series, XI., 59 *seq.*, and BACHA in the Comptes rendus de la commiss. d'hist., 1890, 125 *seq.* All the writings of Adrian VI. cannot here be meant for, as v. DOMARUS proves in his excellent and often quoted article in the, *Histor. Jahrbuch.*, XVI., 75 *seq.*, the Secret Archives of the Vatican contain numerous volumes of registers, cameral papers, and petitions of Adrian's reign. To these must be added the volume of petitions in the Vatican Library (Cod. Vat., 8655) and some volumes in the State Archives, Rome, as well as the eighth volume of the *Regest. brev. Lateran.*, which did not find its way into the Vatican Library until after the appearance of v. Domarus' article. In spite of the existence of this important stock of manuscripts, PIEPER (*Histor. Jahrb.*, XVI., 777 *seq.*) adheres firmly and rightly to the statement of Gregory XIII. that Heeze took away with him to Liège "omnes scripturae" of Adrian VI.; meaning only by this expression the foreign correspondence of that Pope. This would include the letters of Princes and Nuncios and the Pope's own Briefs, thus forming sources of information of the most important kind; for the *Regesta* in the Vatican are, as v. Domarus, who had gone through them thoroughly in regard to German affairs, informed me on January 20, 1900, "Very important for local research." I can only give this opinion for what it is worth. Considering the important character of the writings removed by Heeze, I undertook a long journey in Belgium and Holland in the autumn of 1896 with the object of their discovery; but all my efforts to trace out these valuable papers in those countries were fruitless.

¹ PALLAVICINI, II., 9. A protest against this estimate was at once raised by J. Launoy (see BURMANN, 360 *seq.*). It is certainly quite incorrect, as HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER also points out, IX., 326.

Pope. In Germany the effects of Luther's contemptuous depreciation lasted for a long time. Catholic opinions, such as that of Kilian Leib, that the saintly Pope was too good for his age,¹ gained no hearing.² It was not until 1727, when the jurist Kaspar Burmann, of Utrecht, dedicated to the Flemish Pope a collection of materials, compiled with much industry, and full of valuable matter, that an impulse was given to the formation of a new opinion. This Protestant scholar, whose work is of permanent value, deserves the credit of having initiated a change in Adrian's favour.³ Subsequently, in the nineteenth century, the labours of Dutch,⁴ Belgian,⁵ German,⁶ French,⁷

¹ ARETIN, Beiträge, IX., 1030; *cf.* also the, Chronik in Archiv für ältere deutsche Geschichte, N.F., VII., 182.

² *Cf.* the unfair judgment of SPITTLER, Werke, IX., 270.

³ Burmann's influence is seen especially in SCHRÖCKH, Allgem. Biographie, V., Berlin, 1778, 1-133.

⁴ BOSCH, Jets over Paus Adrian VI., Utrecht, 1835; WENSING, Het leven van Adriaan VI., Utrecht, 1870; CHRISSTOFFELS, Paus Adriaan VI., Amsterdam, 1871.

⁵ GACHARD (1859); REUSENS (1861), as quoted *supra*, p. 34, n. 1, and CLAESSENS in the Rev. Cath. de Louvain, 1862, 543 *seqq.*, 596 *seqq.*, 725 *seqq.*

⁶ HÖFLER'S work (Vienna, 1880) combines all the excellences as well as the defects of this writer (see my reference in Histor. Jahrb., III., 121 *seqq.*). His book must always be unsatisfactory, as it contains hardly any documentary material, although access was then free to the archival sources in Bologna, Mantua, Modena, and Florence of which I was the first to make use. NIPPOLD (Reformbestrebungen Hadrians VI., in Hist. Taschenb., 1875) and GSELL (Der Pontificat Adrians VI., in the Theol. Zeitschr. aus der Schweiz, 1894) are of no value. Somewhat better, but very far from satisfactory, is BAUER (Hadrian VI., Heidelberg, 1876: *cf.* Lit. Rundschau, 1876, 161). The best Protestant view is that of BENRATH, whose work is as free from party spirit as it is full of matter (Herzog, Realencyklopädie, VII., 3rd ed., 311 *seqq.*).

⁷ LEPITRE, Adrien VI., Paris, 1880.

English,¹ and also Italian² students helped to remove the long-standing misconception.

It is matter for rejoicing that on this point difference of creed has imposed no limitations. A distinguished scholar, of strong Protestant convictions, has recently expressed his view of Adrian in the following terms:—"To a judgment unaffected either by his scanty successes or his overt concessions, Adrian VI. will appear as one of the noblest occupants of the chair of Peter. He will be recognized as a man of the purest motives, who wished only to promote the welfare of the Church, and, in the selection of means to serve that sacred end, conscientiously chose those that he believed to be truly the most fitting. He will have claims on our pity as a victim sacrificed to men around him immeasurably inferior to himself, tainted by greed and venality, and to the two monarchs who, caring exclusively for their own advantage, and thinking nothing of that of the Church, wove around him the network of their schemes and intrigues."³

The history of Adrian VI. is full of tragic material. Yet it confirms the maxim of experience that, in the long run, no honest endeavour, however unsuccessful, remains unrecognized and barren of result. The figure of this great Pope, who had written on his banner the peace of Christendom, the repulse of Islam, and the reform of the Church, so long belittled, is once more emerging into the

¹ CASARTELLI, *The Dutch Pope*, Dublin Review, CXXXV., London, 1904, 1-45. Creighton, unfortunately, moves in the old groove.

² Cf. DE LEVA, II., 192 *seq.*; CIPOLLA, 875 *seq.*; CAPPONI, *St. di Firenze*, III.² 158 *seq.*; MARCHESI, *Papa Adriano VI.*, Padova, 1882. The first Italian in the nineteenth century who did justice to Adrian was C. Cantù: see P. CAMPELLO DELLA SPINA, *Nel centenario di C. Cantù*, Firenze, 1906, 13.

³ BENRATH in Herzog, *Realencyklopädie*, VII., 3rd ed., 135.

light in full loftiness of stature. He is numbered to-day by men of all parties among the Popes who have the highest claim on our reverence. No one will again deny him his place among those who serve their cause with a single heart, who seek nothing for themselves, and set themselves valiantly against the flowing stream of corruption. If within the limits of his short term of sovereignty he achieved no positive results, he yet fulfilled the first condition of a healer in laying bare the evils that called for cure. He left behind him suggestions of the highest importance, and pointed out beforehand the principles on which, at a later date, the internal reform of the Church was carried out. In the history of the Papacy his work will always entitle him to a permanent place of honour.

CHAPTER VII.

CLEMENT VII.—HIS ELECTION, CHARACTER, AND THE BEGINNING OF HIS REIGN.—HIS INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND HIS ALLIANCE WITH FRANCIS I. OF FRANCE.

IN consequence of Adrian's delicate state of health, Imperial diplomacy was already busying itself, in the summer of 1523, with the prospects of a Papal election. Charles V. knew how much would depend, in his struggle with France, on the policy of the new Pope. On the 13th of July he sent to his Ambassador at Rome, the Duke of Sessa, special instructions concerning the Conclave; their gist was that everything was to be done to secure the election of the Vice-Chancellor, Cardinal Giulio de' Medici. To the candidature of this Prince of the Church, who during two pontificates had been his staunch adherent, Charles continuously remained steadfast.¹

This attitude of the Emperor was sure to lessen considerably the prospects of Cardinal Wolsey, whose position and reputation were almost on a level with those of Medici. All the lofty expectations of the English Cardinal who, in conjunction with Henry VIII., was eagerly canvassing for his own election,² were nullified by the circumstance that the great majority in the Sacred College were more than

¹ GACHARD, *Corresp. de Charles-Quint*, n. 17, 23; *cf.* BERGENROTH, II., n. 562, 604.

² REUMONT, *Wolsey*, 24 *seqq.*; SÄGMÜLLER, *Papstwahlen*, 155 *seqq.*; BAUMGARTEN, *Karl V.*, II., 295 *seqq.*; MARTIN, 352 *seqq.*

ever unwilling to hear of a foreigner and absentee as the Pope's successor. But, in spite of the most zealous exertions,¹ even Cardinal de' Medici was far from certain of his own success, as the entire French party was in decided opposition to this loyal champion of Imperial interests. Further, the group of older Cardinals were all unfriendly to him as leader of the juniors nominated by Leo X.

The parties in the College of Cardinals were formed on the same lines as those in the Conclave of Adrian VI. The Mantuan envoy, in a despatch of the 29th of September 1523, reports that Medici can count certainly on about seventeen votes, although he cannot affirm the same of any other Cardinal. The chances of Cardinal Gonzaga are very seriously considered.² This opinion corresponded more closely with the actual position of things than the more sanguine surmises of the Florentine representative who, on the same day, writes of the rising prospects of Cardinal de' Medici.³ It was particularly prejudicial to the latter that, as in the last Conclave, Cardinal Colonna, otherwise strongly affected towards the Emperor, and in spite of his promise given to Sessa, was coming forward as Medici's strongest

¹ Cf. **Lettera del card. Medici al padre del card. M. Cornaro, dat. Rome, September 19, 1523, in Cod. Urb., 538, f. 64 *seq.* (Vatican Library).

² *Solum li significo che tra questi r^{mi} card^{li} succedono quasi le medeseme secte che eramo ad le morte de Leone. El r^{mo} de Medicis ha de hi voti circa XVII li quali concurrano in la sua persona, ma non li po voltar dove vole come posseva li XV ad lo altro conclave per la morte de Leone. Il r^{mo} card^{le} de Mantua è anchora lui in gran predicamento de papatu, spero che Dio ne adiutarà. Angelo Germanello to the Marquis of Mantua, dated Rome, September 29, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 605 and 606.

³ Despatch of Galeotto de' Medici, Rome, September 29, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

opponent. He sided with the older Cardinals and even with the party of France.¹ It was not less embarrassing that Medici's mortal enemy, Soderini, had been freed from his imprisonment and admitted to the Conclave through the efforts of the older Cardinals, who were threatening to cause a schism.² In addition to this, Farnese, since the 27th of September, had come to the front as a dangerous rival of Medici.³ The latter, while making every exertion to secure the support of the foreign powers,⁴ was resolutely determined either to become Pope himself at any cost, or, if this was impossible, to assist in the election of one of his own party.⁵

Such being the state of things, a long and stormy conclave was looked for when, on the 1st of October 1523, the five-and-thirty electors assembled in the Sixtine Chapel, while without a heavy thunderstorm was raging.⁶ This, as well as the circumstance that Medici's cell had been erected under the fresco, by Perugino, of "St. Peter's elevation to the Primacy," was looked upon as an augury of the future. Nor were prognostications in favour of Medici wanting in other ways,⁷ for the Duke of Sessa worked

¹ JOVIUS, *Vita Pomp. Columnae*, 151-152; *cf.* DE LEVA, II., 196, n. 5.

² *Cf.* the reports of V. Albergati, Rome, September 18 and 21, 1523 (*State Archives, Bologna*).

³ SANUTO, XXXIV., 438, 452 *seq.*, 461, XXXV., 35; *cf.* BERGENROTH, II., n. 606, and *letter of A. Germanello, September 28, 1523 (*Gonzaga Archives, Mantua*).

⁴ *Cf.* the *letter to the Doge in GREGOROVIVS, VIII., ed. 3, 414, n. 1.

⁵ GUICCIARDINI, XV., 3, and LANCELLOTTI, *Cron. Mod.*, I., 476.

⁶ SANUTO, XXXV., 55. *Despatch of Galeotto de' Medici, October 1, 1523 (*Questa sera a hora 24, the Cardinals entered into conclave. Our Cardinal's hopes are good*). *Cf.* *the diary of CORNELIVS DE FINE (*National Library, Paris*).

⁷ SANUTO, XXXV., 67 *seq.*, and *Conclave Clementis VII., "Medici

for him at fever heat.¹ His opponents were no less indefatigable; they first of all tried to put off any decision until the arrival of the French Cardinals;² consequently, in the meantime only the Bull of Julius II. against simony was read. The first scrutiny should have taken place on the morning of the 6th of October. But this intention was abandoned when suddenly, on that very day, to the no small annoyance of the Imperialists, the French Cardinals, Louis de Bourbon, François de Clermont, and Jean de Lorraine appeared in conclave; in order to travel with greater speed they had put on short laymen's clothes, and entered, booted and spurred, into the midst of their colleagues;³ all business now came to a

cella obtigit sub pictura quae est Christi tradentis claves Petro, quae Julio 2^o obvenisse aiunt." Cod. XXXIII., 142, f. 161 (Barberini Library, Rome).

¹ Sessa made special efforts to win over the party of Soderini. *Lope Hurtado al Emperador, Rome, October 5, 1523. Colec. Salazar, A 29, f. 170 *seq.* (Biblioteca de la Acad. de Historia, Madrid). In a *letter to Charles V., April 14, 1524, Clement VII. acknowledged Sessa's services in securing his election. Miss. brev., Arm., 40, vol. 8, n. 162 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² In this sense G. de' Medici reported on October 5, but without losing hope of Medici's election: "et ancora che la venuta loro habbi a far delle difficoltà e ne bisogni dua vocie più che prima non dubitamo ne perdiamo di speranza, ma sol ne dispiacie che la cosa andrà più lunga non saria andata" (State Archives, Florence).

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 606; BREWER, III., 2, 3464; *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (Library National, Paris); **Report of Gabbioneta, October 7, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). G. de' Medici wrote, October 6: *Questa mattina si doveva far lo squittino. Non era finito ancora la messa che le 3 Cardinali Francesi in poste arrivarono; montarono in palazzo e stivalati e fangosi entrarono in conclavi sollecitati dalli loro respecto dubitavano per lo scrutino si dovea far questa mattina non venissi facto el papa come facilmente posseva lor riuscir. La venuta lor intorbidò tutto e senza si facessi scrutino si misono a mangiare (State Archives, Florence).

standstill.¹ The wooden cells set apart for the electors were separated from each other by small spaces and distinguished by letters of the alphabet. The cells prepared for the Cardinals appointed by Leo X. were decorated in red, those of the others in green. The Swiss guards were appointed to watch over the Vatican. Fifteen Cardinals stood firm for Medici, the Emperor's candidate; four others, also Imperialists, at whose head was the powerful Colonna, it had been impossible to win over. Twelve Cardinals formed the French party; six were neutral.² Each of these three parties had no thought of giving in. On the first day of the Conclave were named as Medici's competitors: Fieschi, the French candidate; Jacobazzi, who was supported by Colonna; last, and most important of all, Farnese; in Rome it was repeatedly said that he was already elected.³

Farnese was, in fact, the only one among the electors who could measure himself with Medici. He was his senior, and a Roman by birth, and he was unquestionably superior to his rival in political penetration, in the largeness of his conceptions, and in his understanding of ecclesiastical affairs.⁴ It was also to his advantage that he was

¹ See the *report of V. Albergati, October 6, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

² See SANUTO, XXXV., 223-224. The vacillation of some of the Cardinals at the beginning of the Conclave is shown by two **lists contained in reports of the Mantuan envoys. The first belongs to September, the second is in a *report dated October 10, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ SANUTO, XXXV., 66, 77, 88, 90; *Letters of V. Albergati of October 5, 6, 8, and 9, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna); *Despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, October 8, 1523 (State Archives, Florence); *Report of Giovanni Batt. Quarantino, Rome, October 10, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ Opinion of REUMONT, Wolsey, 42.

neutral, although his leanings were more towards the Emperor than otherwise.

In the first scrutiny, on the 8th of October, the different parties measured their strength: the French candidate, Cardinal Fieschi, had eleven votes, and the same number were given to Carvajal, an Imperialist.¹ The next scrutinies were also without result. All hoped for a speedy end of the war in Lombardy, and, on that account, tried to prolong the election.² Under these circumstances it was great good fortune that no serious disturbances took place in Rome, which remained as quiet as before the beginning of the Conclave.³ The populace could not be blamed when, on the 10th of October, they began to complain of the long delay. In consequence of these demonstrations, an attempt was made on the 12th, by Colonna and the French, to obtain the tiara for Cardinal Antonio del Monte, but without success.⁴ "Our Cardinal," the Florentine envoy

¹ SANUTO, XXXV., 88, and *despatch of G. de' Medici, October 8, 1523: **Li rer^{mi} di conclavi hanno facto questa mattina il primo scruttino senza accesso e ciascun di lor sig. r^{me} è stato lontano al papato* (State Archives, Florence).

² *Despatch of G. de' Medici, October 9, 1523, with the postscript: "*Stamattina li rev^{mi} deputati soliti di venir allo sportello non volsono si mettesi dentro che una sola vivanda.*"

³ See the *despatches of G. de' Medici, Rome, September 15 and 23, 1523: "*Le cose qui vanno quietissime e non pare che sia sedia vacante*"; October 4 and 8: "*La terra sta pacifica senza rumor alcuno; le bottege stanno aperte come se non fossi sede vacante*" (State Archives, Florence). *Cf.* the *letters of V. Albergati, September 20 and 23, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁴ SANUTO, XXXV., 118; *cf.* BERGENROTH, II., n. 611; *Report of Giov. Batt. Quarantino, October 13, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and G. de' Medici, who writes on October 13, 1523: **In lo squittino di hier mattina il rev. Monte andò avanti a tutti che hebbe sedeci voti e tre d' accesso ne per questo si crede il papato habbia di venir in lui che ha facto l' ultimo suo sforzo e evi concorso tutta la faction francese*

reports on the 13th, "is in close alliance with his friends and stands firm." Colonna also, in spite of Sessa's representations, relaxed nothing of his opposition to the hated Medici.¹ The situation was unchanged. Once more, but in vain, the Romans begged that the election might be settled quickly. Armellini sent them answer: "Since you can put up with a foreign Pope, we are almost on the point of giving you one; he lives in England." This gave rise to a great tumult. The Romans shouted, "Choose us one of those present, even if he be a log of wood."²

Even in the days that followed, Medici, with his sixteen to eighteen followers, stood out obstinately against the opposition, now increased from twenty to two-and-twenty Cardinals. The closure had become a dead letter. Uninterrupted communication was kept up with the outer world.³ On the 19th of October a Venetian reports: "Things are just where they were on the first day." "The Cardinals," exclaims a Mantuan envoy in despair, "seem

e Colonna. Vannosi a questo modo berteggiando l'un l'altro ne si vede segno si deliberino o convenghino in alcuno (State Archives, Florence). Cf. PETRUCELLI DELLA GATTINA, I., 542 *seq.*

¹ G. de' Medici, October 13, 1523: *Di conclavi ritrago m^{or} nostro ill. si mantiene ben unito con li amici suoi e sta forte (State Archives, Florence). Cf. PETRUCELLI DELLA GATTINA, I., 543.

² Despatch of the English envoys in State Papers: Henry VIII., Foreign, VI., n. 64; cf. BREWER, III., 2, n. 3464; SANUTO, XXXV., 135; *despatch of G. de' Medici, October 15, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

³ SANUTO, XXXV., 119; BERGENROTH, II., n. 606. *G. de' Medici, October 19, 1523: "In conclavi non si fa ancora resolutione per stare obstinati li adversarii di non voler dar li voti ad alcuno della parte nostra. . . . La confusione è grande più che mai perchè li adversarii non s'accordano a chi di loro voglino voltare il favore. . . . Li nostri stanno uniti (hopes for the breakdown of the opposition)"; and October 20: "Li amici di mons. ill. stanno unitissimi" (State Archives, Florence).

determined to spend the winter in conclave."¹ Each party watched with anxiety for some turn of events in Lombardy.² The Romans grew more and more restless, and Farnese tried to calm them.³ Several new candidates besides Farnese appeared at this time, such as the Franciscan Cristoforo Numai, Achille de Grassis, and, above all, Sigismondo Gonzaga.⁴ On the 28th of October the Romans again made remonstrances, but the Conclave went on as before, Medici and Farnese holding the scales between them. November came, and, notwithstanding fresh popular impatience, the end of the proceedings was not yet in sight. The Court was in despair; fear of a schism was already occupying men's minds.⁵ Once more a pause in the transactions of the Conclave was caused by the arrival, on

¹ SANUTO, XXXV., 135. **Report of Giov. Batt. Quarantino, October 21, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² *Reports of G. de' Medici, October 22, 23: "In conclavi sono stati dua o tre dì senza far scrutinio tractando modo d' accordarsi. . . . Il Cardinale nostro con li amici suoi stanno unitissimi e gagliardi e vanno acquistando continuamente"; and 24: "Credo staranno ancora qualche dì venendo a proposito la dilation a ciascuna della parte per veder il successo delle cose di Lombardia" (State Archives, Florence). Cf. *report of Giov. Batt. Quarantino, October 25, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ **Galeotto de' Medici, October 25, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ SANUTO, XXXV., 148; *Galeotto di Medici, October 26, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). For Gonzaga's prospects see in detail the **reports of Gabbioneta of October 17, 21, 28, and November 15, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁵ Cf. despatch of the English envoys, November 7, in BREWER, III., 2, n. 3514; JOVIUS, Pomp. Columna, 152, where there is also a contemporary poem; SANUTO, XXXV., 149, 150, 167, 168; Ortiz in BURMANN, 223; *G. de' Medici, November 4, 5, 1523 (State Archives, Florence); *Report of Gabbioneta, November 7: "Tutta questa corte sta desperata e mal contenta per questa tardità de fare el papa" (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua); *Letters of V. Albergati, November 2, 6, 8, 10, and 11, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

the 12th of November, of Cardinal Bonifacio Ferreri, whose sympathies were French. He brought up the number of Medici's opponents to three-and-twenty, and that of the electors to thirty-nine.¹ If the Venetian Ambassador is to be believed, Cardinal Farnese now succeeded, by large promises, in detaching the Duke of Sessa from the party of Medici and bringing him over to his own.²

Medici, nevertheless, had not the slightest intention of giving in; in fact, he had good grounds for raising his hopes even higher than before, since his party stood by him firm as a rock.³ The position of his adversaries was very different; they had only one point of union, the determination to prevent Medici from becoming Pope; in other respects they were divided from the first, for

¹ SANUTO, XXXV., 198. *G. de' Medici, November 9, 1523: "La venuta del rev. Ivrea dopoi se intesa ha facto fermar in conclavi ogni practica e vi stanno le cose nel medesimo modo che il primo di v' entrarono" (State Archives, Florence). *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris). The number 39 given also in a notarial communication in GORI, Archivio, IV., 246, in the *Diarium of BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS (Cod. Barb., lat. 2799), and in the French *diary in Cod. Barb., lat. 3552 (Vatican Library), is undoubtedly correct, although 38 is given by the *Acta Consist. (both in the digest in the Secret Archives of the Vatican and in that of the Consistorial Archives). VETTORI, 347, gives 33+3+1, and REUMONT, III., 2, 161, follows him in part. GUICCIARDINI, XV., 3, puts, incorrectly, the number of members at the opening of the Conclave at 36. The difficulty raised by GRETHEN, 21, note 1, that Clement on December 23 distributed his benefices among his thirty-seven electors, is solved, as he had already conjectured, by the fact that Grassis had died on November 22.

² BAUMGARTEN, Charles V., II., 284; cf. also O. R. REDLICH in Hist. Zeitschr., LXIII., 128.

³ SANUTO, XXXV., 197-198; *G. de' Medici, October 7 and November 3, 7, 11, and 13, 1523: "Ogni giorno li rev^{mi} fanno scrutinio e danno li voti in modo compartiti che nessuno d' epsi passa 10 voti" (State Archives, Florence).

most of them had pretensions to the tiara themselves.¹ "But," as Guicciardini remarks, "it is difficult to keep up a partnership when its chief supports are discord and ambition." Medici, for some time past, had built his hopes on this state of things, and used all the means in his power to produce dissension among his adversaries.² It is especially remarkable that help came to him from, of all people, the French Ambassador.

On the death of Adrian VI., Francis I. wished immediately to enter Italy in person,³ but the difficulties arising from the desertion of the Constable de Bourbon to the Emperor had forced him to give up the idea. He was thus obliged to limit his activities to using the influence of the French Cardinals, to whom he had named Fieschi, Soderini, and Scaramuccia Trivulzio as his candidates, and that of the envoys he had delegated. Lodovico di Canossa, who was such an active agent on behalf of French interests, received the royal commands to go to Italy too late,⁴ so that only Count Carpi reached the Conclave in

¹ SANUTO, XXXV., 199; BERGENROTH, II., n. 606; *G. de' Medici, November 1, 3 and 14, 1523 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. the **report of Gabbioneta, October 28, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Cf. the important *despatch of G. de' Medici, October 15, 1523: "Mons. nostro ill. per tutte le vie e modi puo va ghodendo il tempo giudicando li habbia ad esser molto a proposito per andar al continuo guadagniando delli adversarii e rompendoli la unione facto non sarà punto stabile per non esser d'acordo infra epsi che di loro habbi ad esser papa per voler ciascuno di loro essere" (State Archives, Florence).

³ RAWDON-BROWN, III., n. 756; SÄGMÜLLER, Papstwahlen, 159.

⁴ Cf. the **letters of L. di Canossa to Francis I., dated Gargnano, September 29, 1523, to Bonnivet, the French Admiral, dated Verona, September 30, and to Cardinal Trivulzio, dated Verona, October 4 (Capitular Library, Verona).

time.¹ "Our enemies," wrote Sessa on the 28th of October, "had a triumph at first, since Carpi is openly on the side of France, and came, moreover, as the representative of King Francis; but his old friendship with Medici is stronger than his party spirit. He has succeeded in splitting up our opponents." It was not, however, old friendship only which induced Carpi to take up this surprising position, but in all probability a promise of neutrality from Medici, the hitherto stout Imperialist.²

The final decision was reached by Cardinal Colonna at last renouncing his opposition to Medici. This change of mind was the result of a quarrel between Colonna and his French friends, because the latter refused to vote for Jacobazzi, the Imperialist. One of the French Cardinals, François de Clermont, seeing that confinement in the vitiated atmosphere of the Conclave was becoming daily more trying to the older Cardinals, now went the length of proposing Cardinal Orsini, who was hostile to Colonna as well as to the Emperor. Medici pretended to be in favour of this old friend of his family. Then Colonna, in great alarm, saw that he must give in, a course which he was

¹ GRETHEN, 21, puts the arrival of Carpi too early. He had overlooked the Florentine report in PETRUCELLI, I., 543, which gives the date as the evening of October 17.

² BERGENROTH, II., n. 606; *cf.* n. 612. According to Venetian reports of October 18 and 31, in SANUTO, XXXV., 136, 169, Medici made such lavish promises to Francis that they seem in themselves incredible; besides, these promises are absolutely irreconcilable with the subsequent attempts of Francis I. to obtain the Papal recognition of his lordship over Milan. There is more probability in GRETHEN'S (p. 22) conjecture, that Medici bound himself to neutrality. Immediately after the death of Adrian VI., L. di Canossa tried to enter into negotiations with Cardinal de' Medici; but the latter was not drawn into them. See Canossa's *letter to Francis I., October 20, 1523 (Capitular Library, Verona).

advised to take by his brother, then in the service of the Emperor. He joined sides with Medici, who promised him the pardon of Soderini¹ and personal advantages as well. This reconciliation of the two enemies, who had so long been at strife, took place on the evening of the 17th of November.

Colonna immediately drew with him a number of Cardinals, first his friend Jacobazzi, followed by Cornaro and Pisani, then Grassis, Ferreri, and others. Medici could now count on twenty-seven votes, and his election was certain. On the same day, the 18th of November, two years before, he had entered Milan. The proclamation of the new Pope was deferred until the pardon of Soderini should be settled and the capitulations signed; the latter guaranteed that the benefices held by the Pope as Cardinal should be divided among his electors. The twelve Cardinals forming the French party now gave up further resistance as useless, and on the morning of the 19th of November, the votes having been once more taken for the sake of security,² Giulio de' Medici was proclaimed as unanimously

¹ Cf. EPIFANIO in *Atti d. Congresso internaz. di scienze storiche*, III., Rome, 1906, 419 *seqq.*

² The best sources are in such thorough agreement, in essentials, as to the circumstances that led decisively to the election of Medici, that the differing account of Blasius de Martinellis (in CREIGHTON, V., 325 *seq.*), who is otherwise so trustworthy, must here be rejected. Besides GUICCIARDINI, XV., 3, and JOVIUS, *Pomp. Columna*, 151 *seq.*, cf. especially the Florentine reports in *Giorn. d. Archivi Toscani*, II., 117 *seq.*, 122 *seq.*, and in PETRUCELLI, I., 550, the Venetian in SANUTO, XXXV., 207, 225, the Portuguese in *Corp. dipl. Port.*, II., 178 *seq.*, 180 *seq.*, 198 *seq.*, the *letters of V. Albergati, November 18 and 19, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna), the letter of the English envoys in *State Papers: Henry VIII.*, Foreign, VI., 195 *seqq.*, and in BREWER, III., 2, n. 3592, Sessa's letter in *Colec. d. doc. inedit.*, XXIV., 333, and Negri's letter (November 19, not 18) in *Lettere di principi* (Venetian

chosen Pope.¹ The victor, on emerging from this hard contest of fifty days, assumed the name of Clement VII. His first act of government was to confirm the capitulations, but with the additional clause that they might, if necessary, be altered in Consistory.²

The respect which Clement VII. had won for himself as Cardinal under Leo X. by his statesmanlike efficiency and admirable administration in Florence, as well as by his

edition of 1570, f., the one which is always used in the following notes), I., 100^b. To these published accounts two others, confirmatory and hitherto unknown, may be added, viz. a **despatch of G. B. Quarantino, November 23, 1523 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and a *letter of Andrea Piperario to B. Castiglione, dated Rome, November 19, 1523, in transcript in the Town Library, Mantua. With regard to the promises said to have been made by Medici to Colonna, there is in Giovio only a general statement, while Guicciardini mentions a written engagement concerning the Vice-Chancery and the Riario Palace. The diplomatic authorities named above say nothing of this.

¹ Blasius de Martinellis in CREIGHTON, V., 326. Gabbioneta, like other reporters of news, announced at first that the new Pope had taken the name of Julius III. (despatch of November 18, 1523). How this mistake, current throughout Rome, arose is explained by Quarantino in a **report of November 19 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). The official proclamation of the election on the part of the Cardinals (Giorn. d. Arch. Tosc., II., 123 *seq.*), as well as on that of the Pope himself (in a letter beginning: Salvator, etc.), took place on November 26, the coronation day. Announcements drawn up in a different form had previously been despatched on November 22 to individuals such as the city of Florence (see Giorn. d. Arch. Tosc., II., 121 *seq.*) and the Marquis Federigo of Mantua. See the original of the announcement (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Francis I. also was informed prior to the coronation, *cf.* RAYNALDUS, 1523, n. 128.

² The election capitulations published in Giorn. d. Arch. Tosc., II., 107 *seq.*; the conditions in CREIGHTON, V., 326. A comparison with the capitulation of Adrian shows a sharper precision in details and a number of new provisions (Art. 6, 7, 20-25) in favour of the Cardinals and the Knights of Rhodes.

seriousness, moderation, and avoidance of all frivolous pleasures, threw a lustre over the beginning of his pontificate. Seldom had a new Pope been welcomed with such general rejoicing and such high-pitched expectation. In place of an Adrian VI., simple-minded and exclusively devoted to ecclesiastical interests, a Pope had arisen who satisfied the wishes of the majority in the Curia. He was a great noble and an expert politician. The Romans were delighted; a Medici Pope encouraged their hopes of a renewal of the happy days of Leo X., and of a long and brilliant reign fruitful of results in art and science. Their expectations were strengthened when Clement at once drew into his service classical scholars like Giberti and Sadoleto,¹ showed his care for the maintenance of justice, gave audiences with the utmost freedom of access,² was marked in his courtesy to persons of all classes,³ and bestowed graces with great generosity. "He granted more favours," wrote the Bolognese envoy, "on the first day of his reign than Adrian did in his whole lifetime."⁴ The satisfaction of the electors was not less, among whom the Pope distributed the whole of his benefices, representing a yearly income of upwards of 60,000 ducats. Cardinal Colonna got, in addition, the Riario palace, the Cancellaria,

¹ Cf. along with *Lettere di principi*, I., 100^b *seq.*, the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris), the *despatch of G. de' Medici, November 21, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and two *letters of Piperario to B. Castiglione, Rome, November 19 and 23, 1523 (Library, Mantua).

² *Despatches of G. de' Medici, November 24 (*S. Sta sana, lieta e attende ad ordinar tutte le cose necessarie e maxime della justitia*) and December 8, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Cardinal Gonzaga dwells on this in a *letter to the Marchioness Isabella, Rome, November 19, 1523 (Library, Mantua).

⁴ Letter of V. Albergati, November 19, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

and office of Vice-Chancellor, and Cornaro the palace of San Marco; the amnesty granted to Soderini was full and complete.¹ The coronation took place on the 26th of November with great pomp, and in presence of an incredible concourse of people. On the tribune could be read the inscription, "To Clement VII., the restorer of peace to the world and perpetual defender of the Christian name." "It seems," wrote Baldassare Castiglione, "that here everyone expects the very best of the new Pope."²

In upper Italy also, especially in the States of the Church, the election made a very favourable impression.³ Alfonso of Ferrara had taken advantage of the vacancy in the Holy See to seize on Reggio and Rubbiera; he was even preparing to advance on Modena, when he heard of Clement's election. He at once gave up this design and sent a messenger to the Pope, and somewhat later his

¹ Cf. *letter of Piperario to B. Castiglione, November 23 (Library, Mantua), and *despatch of G. de' Medici, November 29 (State Archives, Florence). The division of the benefices is here already reported; the *Bull concerning it (Clem. VII., Secret, IV. [1440], f. 44, Secret Archives of the Vatican) is dated December 23; cf. EHSES, Politik Clemens VII., 562, and Appendix, Nos. 32 and 33.

² *B. Castiglione to the Marquis of Mantua, dated Ravenna, November 30, 1523 (Library, Mantua); SANUTO, XXXV., 235, 243. Cf. also BREWER, III., 2, n. 3594; Lettere volgari, I., 6^b-7, and *letter of V. Albergati of November 26, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna). On December 13, 1523, Giberti received "duc. 945 pro expensis factis pro coronatione S. D. N." (*Intr. et Exit., 561, in Secret Archives of the Vatican). See further *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives), *G. de Medici, November 27, 1523 (State Archives, Florence), and *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris). On the coronation day Cardinal L. Pucci received the "gubernium" of Bagnorea, Cardinal Cesi that of Sutri, Cardinal Pallavicini that of Montefiascone (*Regest., 1239, f. 36, 38, 127), Cardinal Jacobazzi that of Pontecorvo (*Regest., 1243, f. 85, Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ *Report of December 1, 1523 (State Archives, Bologna).

eldest son, to tender his homage and prepare the way for an understanding ; this was not arrived at, but a truce for one year was agreed to. The disturbances in the Romagna, promoted by Giovanni da Sassatello in the name of the Guelph party, but at the secret instigation of France, came to an end at once with the appearance of the name of Medici from the electoral urn.¹ In Florence the advantages of another Medicean pontificate were calculated with true commercial shrewdness, and there were many who started for Rome in quest of fortune.² In Venice the expressions of congratulation were exuberant ; the Doge wrote that he would send the most illustrious citizens of the Republic to honour Clement as a deity on earth. "Praised be the Lord for ever," exclaimed Vittoria Colonna when she received the news of Clement's election ; "may He further this beginning to such ends, that men may see that there was never wrought a greater blessing, nor one which was so grounded on reason." The thoughts and hopes of this noble woman were then shared by many. A canon of Piacenza declared that Medici by his skill and sagacity would bring the endangered barque of Peter safely into harbour.³ The Marquis of Pescara considered

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XV., 3. The safe-conduct for Ercole, Alfonso's son, is dated *Rome, December 11, 1523. To the same date belongs a *Brief of Clement VII. to Alfonso in which it says : "Nunc autem nobilitatem tuam si, ut ipse nobis Franciscus [Cantelmus bearer of a letter from Alfonso to the Pope] affirmavit, officium suum debitamque observantiam huic S. Sedi praestiterit, omnia a nobis sibi proponere atque expectare volumus quae sunt ab optimo pastore amantissimoque patre requirenda." (Both of these documents are in the State Archives, Modena.)

² *Tutta Firenze concorre quà, writes V. Albergati from Rome, December 7, 1523 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Callisti Placentini [can. regal.] *Dialogus ad Clementem VII. de recte regendo pontificatu.* Cod. Vat., 3709 (Vatican Library).

that by the result of the election the wishes of the general majority had been met in a measure which was, perhaps, unprecedented. "Clement VII.," said Bembo, "will be the greatest and wisest, as well as the most respected Pope whom the Church has seen for centuries."¹ Almost everyone overlooked the great weaknesses which were combined with undeniable good qualities in the character of the new Pontiff.

Unlike most members of his house, Clement VII.² was a good-looking man. He was tall and had a graceful figure; his features were regular and refined, and only a close observer would have remarked that he had a slight squint in his right eye. At this time his face was beardless, as Raphael had depicted it in his portrait of Leo X.³ Clement's health left nothing to be desired; being extremely temperate and of strictly moral life, there was reason to expect that his reign, on which he entered in

¹ SANUTO, XXV., 216 *seqq.*; TOLOMEI, 5; REUMONT, V. Colonna, 42 *seq.*; BEMBO, Op., III., 54 (letter of December 11, 1523).

² For the early life of Clement VII., see Vol. VII. of this work, p. 81 *seq.*

³ The outward appearance and the character of Clement VII. are described minutely in the reports of the Venetian ambassadors Foscari (1526), Contarini (1530), and Soriano (1531), first printed by ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., in parts more correctly by SANUTO; *cf.* also the notices in GORI'S Archivio, IV., 269, and GUICCIARDINI. Fine portraits of Clement VII. were taken by Sebastiano del Piombo (Parma gallery; see HOFMANN, Villa Madama, Dresden, 1900, plate i.), Bronzino (from a phot. Alinari in HEYCK, Mediceer, 119), and Vasari (*cf.* GIORDANI, Doc. 129). For these and other portraits *cf.* GOTTI, I., 162, 268; GRUYER, Raphaël peint. d. portr., 348 *seq.*; CROWE and CAVALCASELLE, VI., 401 *seq.*; GASPARONI, Arte e lett., II., 164; NOLHAC in Gaz. d. Beaux Arts, 1884, I., 428; KENNER, 145, and Giorn. d. lett. Ital., XXXVIII., 178, note. The best busts of the Pope are those of A. Lombardi and Montorsoli; see MÜNTZ, III., 210, 432.

his forty-sixth year, would be a long one.¹ Although, as a genuine Medici, he was a patron of literature, art, and music, Clement was yet by nature essentially prosaic.² Without approaching Leo X. in versatility and intellectual resources, he had, on the other hand, none of the frivolity and pleasure-seeking, the extravagance and ostentation of the latter. It was noticed with satisfaction by sober-minded observers that his coronation banquet was arranged without the superfluous luxury and the presence of professional jesters which had marked that of Leo X.³ With such empty recreations Clement, who for years had been a man of great industry, did not concern himself. Nor had he any taste for noisy hunting parties and expensive excursions, in which he saw only a waste of time. He very rarely visited Magliana, and only saw at intervals his beautiful villa on Monte Mario.⁴ As a Medici and as a statesman of the Renaissance, Clement VII. was far superior to Leo X. in caution and acumen. "This Pope," Loaysa reported to the Emperor, "is the most secretive

¹ "È continentissimo nè si sa di alcuna sorte di luxuria che usi," says Foscari, SANUTO, XLI., 283. Likewise VETTORI, 381, and GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5. See also the testimony of Campeggio and Eck in EHSES (Concil., IV., cix.). The contrary reports (see GAUTHIEZ, 66) are not supported by evidence. Although Clement as Pope led a moral life, his youth had not been free from excesses. Soriano's remarks (ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 277) are quite clear on this point; *cf.* also HEINE, Briefe, 378. That Alessandro de' Medici, born in 1510, was a bastard of the Cardinal's, as GAUTHIEZ, 62 *seq.*, on the authority of Varchi, supposes, is by no means certain. Well-informed contemporaries, such as Contarini in his report of 1530, say expressly that Alessandro was an illegitimate son of Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino. REUMONT, one of the best authorities on Medicean history, holds the same view (Toscana, I., 20) strongly.

² *Cf.* REUMONT, III., 2, 432.

³ SANUTO, XXXV., 243; XXXVII., 10.

⁴ Foscari in SANUTO, XLI., 283.

man in the world, and I have never spoken with one whose sayings were so hard to decipher."¹

In the discharge of his duties the new Pope was indefatigable; he devoted himself to affairs with the greatest punctuality, earnest attention, and an assiduity that never flagged.² Only at meal-times did he allow himself some recreation; a good musician himself,³ he then took pleasure in listening to motets,⁴ and engaged in serious conversation with artists and men of learning. At his table, which was very frugal, two physicians were always present; save at the chief meal of the day, the Pope ate very little, and kept fast days rigorously; but he only said Mass on great festivals. His bearing during all religious ceremonies was full of

¹ HEINE, Briefe, 86, 401; cf. 195.

² Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5.

³ SANUTO, LII., 648; cf. ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 278.

⁴ See CELLINI, Vita, I., 4; cf. PLON, 10; see also SANUTO, LVIII., 610. Eleazar Genêt dedicated his celebrated Lamentations to Clement; cf. AMBROS, III., 276, and HABERL, Musikkatalog der päpstlichen Kapelle, Leipzig, 1888, 22, 43. For the singers of the Papal Chapel, which Clement had already reorganized in April 1528 at Orvieto (SANUTO, XLVII., 270), cf. SCHELLE, 258 seq. Singers were engaged at that time in France and Flanders (cf. *Nunziat. di Francia, I., 303, 337, Secret Archives of the Vatican). A musician from Cambrai also appears in the *accounts for 1524 (S. Maria Novella, 327, State Archives, Florence). See also BERTOLOTTI, Artisti Urbinati a Roma, Urbino, 1881, where a Cristoforo da Urbino is mentioned as *cantore* in the year 1529. In December 1524 a Petrus Maler (probably a German) *et socii musici* appear (*Intr. et Exit., 561, Secret Archives of the Vatican). The names of twenty-four singers of the chapel are entered in the *Mandati, IV. (1529-1530), f. 68, for April 1530; *ibid.*, *VI. (1530-1534), twenty-three singers are entered, also the *magister* and *sacrista* (State Archives, Rome). In a *Brief, dated Marseilles, November 9, 1533, Clement VII. thanks F. Sforza for sending him the "tibicen" Moscatellus. Original in the State Archives, Milan.

reverence and dignity. "There is no one," wrote Soriano, "who celebrates Mass with so much beauty and piety of demeanour."¹ If Clement VII. had none of his predecessor's strength as an ecclesiastical ruler, and showed generally more knowledge and experience in political than in spiritual affairs,² yet, contrasted with the levity of Leo X., he marked a beneficial change in the pontifical character.

The Venetian Ambassador, Marco Foscari, who, during his three years' embassy, was able to observe Clement VII. closely, considered that "he was full of uprightness and piety. In the *Segnatura* he would do nothing to the prejudice of others, and when he confirmed a petition, he would not, as Leo did, withdraw his word. He neither sold benefices nor bestowed them simoniacally. In contrast to Leo and other Popes, when he conferred graces he asked no services in return, but wished that everything should proceed in equity."³

Clement VII.'s great parsimony gave rise to many unmeasured accusations.⁴ The extremes to which he went in this respect explain, but do not in every instance justify, the charge of miserliness brought against him. This is clearly shown from the fact that in his almsgiving he was as open-handed as Leo X.⁵ He deserves praise

¹ ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 278. SANUTO, XXXV., 241; XLII., 27. Even during his imprisonment in St. Angelo, Clement kept the fasts; see *Hist. Zeitschr.*, XXXVI., 168.

² Cf. EHSES, *Concil.*, IV., xvii.

³ SANUTO, XLI., 283.

⁴ This charge was raised by Ziegler with great vehemence in his *Vita* in SCHELHORN, *Amoenitat.*, II., 300 *seq.*, a work which has more resemblance to a passionate invective than to a study in history. For Ziegler see Vol. VII. of this work, p. 198 n.; HÖFLER, *Adrian VI.*, 408, and RIESLER, VI., 410, 521.

⁵ Foscari's accounts of Clement's benevolence are fully confirmed

rather than blame in avoiding the extravagance of his cousin, whose debts he was obliged to pay.¹ The shadows on Clement's character lay in other spheres; they were closely connected with idiosyncrasies which the Venetian envoy, Antonio Soriano, has minutely described. Soriano disputes the current opinion that the Pope was of a melancholy disposition; his physicians, he observes, thought him rather of a sanguine temperament, which would also account for his fluency of speech.² Contarini also insists on the good reputation enjoyed by Clement VII.; great ideas he certainly had not, but he spoke very well on any subject brought before him. Contarini accounts for Clement's slowness of decision and lack of courage by the coldness of his nature, wonderfully characterized by Raphael in his

by CIACONIUS, III., 474, and especially by the Papal account-books. Certain conventual houses received regular alms; thus, *e.g.*, the nuns of S. Cosimato, the abbeys of the Monast. Murat. de urbe, and the Fratres S. Crisogoni at Rome (see *Intr. et Exit., 561, Secret Archives of the Vatican), as well as the nuns of S. Maria Annunziata at Florence (see *Mandati, III., 1527, State Archives, Rome); also sums of money for the Lateran Hospital. In the *account-books of Clement VII. in the State Archives, Florence, there are entries of alms for the years 1524-1527 to the principe di Cipri and his daughter, to the frati d' Araceli, to Filippo Cipriota, to the frati della Minerva, to the Compagnia della Carità, to Madonna Franceschina (figliuola del gran Turcho), for the ransom of captives in Turkish slavery, to converted Turks, and to the Compagnia della Nunziata per maritar zitelle. In 1525 and 1526 respectively 300 ducats are booked as Easter alms (S. Maria, Nov. 327). In 1528 and 1529, besides gifts to the nuns of S. Maria in Campo Marzo, S. Cosimato, Tor de' Specchi and Monastero dell' Isola, others appear to the frati of San Giovanni e Paolo, S. Pietro in Montorio, and S. Onofrio, as well as to the poveri di San Lazaro (S. Mar., Nov. 329).

¹ See SCHULTE, I., 236.

² ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 278. For Clement VII.'s eloquence see BALAN, VI., Supplement XIX.

likeness of the Cardinal in the portrait of Leo X. Soriano also speaks strongly of the Pope as very cold-hearted.¹

Always a procrastinator, Clement belonged to that unfortunate class of characters in whom the powers of reflection, instead of giving clearness to the thoughts and strength to the will, perpetually call forth fresh doubts and suspicions. Consequently, he had no sooner come to a decision than he as quickly regretted it; he wavered almost constantly hither and thither between contending resolves, and generally let the fitting opportunity for action escape his grasp. The Pope's indecision and instability were bound to do him all the more harm since they were accompanied by great timidity. From this excessive want of courage, as well as from his innate irresolution and a parsimony often most mischievously employed, Guicciardini explains Clement's incapacity to act when the time came to put into execution decisions reached after long reflection.²

These fatal characteristics had almost escaped notice while Giulio de' Medici was Leo's adviser, and had not then reached their later stage of development. All men then knew that the Cardinal served the reigning Pope with untiring industry and the greatest fidelity. Of restless energy and the highest reputation, his political influence was appraised in those days at a higher value than it in reality deserved, and most, indeed, of the political successes of Leo X. were ascribed not to himself, but to his minister. When at last the latter rose to the head of affairs, he showed that he could neither come to a decision at the right moment nor, having done so, put

¹ ALBÈRI, 2 Series, III., 265, 278.

² GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5. L. di Canossa, in a *letter to Alb. di Carpi, October 6, 1526, also speaks severely of Clement's irresolution and timidity (Communal Library, Verona).

it resolutely into execution; for, in consequence of his over-subtle statecraft, he could never shake himself free from suspicion, and a constant dread of real and, still oftener, imaginary dangers impeded all his transactions and put a stop to any decided and consecutive course of action. A letter, a word was enough to upset a resolution formed after long balancing and calculation, and to throw the Pope back on the previous state of resourceless indecision.¹ At first Clement's contemporaries almost entirely overlooked these ominous characteristics. All the more painful was their surprise when they saw the great Cardinal, once held so high in men's esteem, sink into a Pope of petty and cheap reputation.²

The Imperialists were more disappointed than any, for they had indulged in the most sanguine and extravagant hopes. At the close of the Conclave, Sessa had written to Charles: "The Pope is entirely your Majesty's creature. So great is your Majesty's power, that you can change stones into obedient children."³ Sessa, in saying this, had failed to see that the election had not been altogether his work, and that even during the Conclave, Medici had taken up a more neutral attitude than before. Further, he overlooked the difference that must arise between the policy of Clement as Pope and his policy as Cardinal. The ideal evidently present to Clement's mind at the beginning of his reign⁴ was one of impartiality and independence towards the Emperor and Francis alike, in order that he might be of service in restoring peace, thereby securing the freedom of Italy and the Papacy, for which there was a double necessity owing to the Turkish danger and the

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5 ; *cf. supra*, Vol. VIII. of this work, p. 87 *seqq.*

² VETTORI, 348.

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 610, 615, 622.

⁴ *Cf.* BAUMGARTEN, II., 287.

spread of heresy in Germany. Unfortunately, although he was fully aware of the grave condition of affairs throughout the world,¹ he was entirely wanting in the determination, firmness, and fearlessness of a Julius II. From the first suspicious signs of weakness were discernible. How could it be otherwise when—a significant circumstance—the two leading advisers of the Pope were each respectively champions of the two great opposing parties? The one, Gian Matteo Giberti, an excellent and blameless man, who became Datary, drew closer to France the more he realized the danger to the freedom of Italy and the Papacy arising from the world-wide power of Spain; the other, Nicolas von Schönberg, was, on the contrary, a thorough Imperialist. To the conflicting influence of these two counsellors Guicciardini principally ascribes the instability of character which Clement, to the general astonishment, began so soon to display.²

Immediately after his election the Pope entered into secret negotiations with the Venetian Ambassador Foscari. He opened to him his scheme of joining himself with Venice and the Duke of Milan, so as to separate Switzerland from France and bring the former at the same time into alliance with himself. By these manœuvres he expected to cut off from France all hopes of predominance in Italy, and also, in the same way, to thwart the plans of the Emperor, showing himself to be a Pope in reality, and not, like Adrian, merely Charles's servant. Yet he did not wish to

¹ Cf. the *Brief to Canossa, Rome, December 11, 1523 (Secret Archives of the Vatican, Arm., 39, vol. 43, n. 36). TIZIO, *Hist. Senen. (Cod. G, II., 39, Chigi Library, Rome), depicts the state of the world in the gloomiest colours.

² GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5. That Giberti was "il cuor del Papa" was said already in the autumn of 1524; see SANUTO, XXXVI., 619; cf. Engl. Hist. Rev., XVIII., 34 *seq.*

push his undertakings against the Emperor further, but rather to keep at peace with him. He was not thinking of war, but how to arrange an armistice, the Curia at that moment being not only without money, but also burdened with Leo's debts. As he was beset on the one hand by the Emperor's party, and, on the other, by that of France, through Count Carpi, he was anxious to know the intentions of Venice before he committed himself to any declaration.¹ Sessa, who saw in Clement VII. only the former adherent of Imperial policy, was bitterly disappointed. The Pope flatly refused to turn the alliance made with Adrian from the defensive into the offensive. He would continue to pay the stipulated subsidy to the Emperor's forces, but as Father of Christendom his first duty was the restoration of peace. "Everything I have urged to the contrary," wrote another Imperialist diplomatist, the protonotary Caracciolo, on the 30th of November, "has failed." The Pope remarked that he could not declare himself in favour of an open league against France, he would much rather do all he could to bring about a general armistice among all Christian States;² to this object all his endeavours were now at first directed. This policy of peace, with special reference to the Turkish danger, he had already emphasized in the letters despatched to Francis before his coronation, announcing his election.³

Clement hoped to satisfy the Imperialists without taking any steps openly hostile to France,⁴ since each of those implacable enemies, Charles and Francis, wished him to

¹ Foscari to the Council of Ten on November 23, 1523, in BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 287.

² BERGENROTH, II., n. 613, 615; GRETHEN, 25 *seq.*

³ RAYNALDUS, 1523, n. 128.

⁴ Despatch of Foscari, December 7, 1523, in BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 299.

become his partisan. Not only were the Ambassadors and Cardinals on both sides busy in support of this object, but also special envoys from the French King and the Emperor. The representative of the former, Saint-Marceau, arrived in Rome on the 1st of February 1524. Great as his offers were, Clement refused to acknowledge the claims of Francis to Milan, and was at the greatest pains to avoid even the appearance of showing favour to France.¹ But he was just as little disposed to add to the concessions already contained in the treaty made by his predecessor with Charles V., which would not expire until September 1524. In spite of his financial distress, he paid the monies agreed upon, but secretly, on account of France.² Sessa was beside himself at the indecision of the Pope, who was the Emperor's ally, but was constantly coquetting with France. The more Sessa insisted, the more Clement drew back.³

¹ BROWN, III., n. 800, 804; BERGENROTH, II., n. 617, 619; SANUTO, XXXV., 394; BUCHOLTZ, II., 254; GRETHEN, 27 *seq.* G. de' Medici reported on February 10, 1524: * Mons. di San Marseo da buone parole a N. S. chel suo re farà quanto vorrà. S. Stà non viene a ristretto. Volentieri fariano una tregua con tener quello hanno acquistato in Lombardia. Li Imperiali non la vogliono ascoltare e sperono recuperare quello hanno perso (State Archives, Florence). The good services of Saint-Marceau are praised by Clement in * a letter to Francis I., April 10, 1524, Arm., 40, vol. 8 (Min.), n. 155 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² MIGNET, Rivalité, I., 457, note. EHSES, Politik Clemens VII., 563. In * Intr. et Exit., 561 (Secret Archives of the Vatican), on January 30, 1524, there is an entry of "duc. 24,000 Paulo Victori capit. pro subvent. belli in Lombardia." For the financial distress of Clement VII. see also the report of Castiglione, March 7, 1524 (Delle Esenzioni, 57), and the letter of May 4, 1524, in [P. Rajna] Tre lettere di Alessandro de' Pazzi (Per Nozze), Firenze, 1898, 14. On December 26, 1524, Fr. Gonzaga reported in the strongest terms of the Pope's urgent needs (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 619.

Another emissary of Charles, Adrian de Croy, had no better fortune. The Pope explained that he could work best for peace by being completely neutral,¹ and in this he was confirmed, as early as the spring of 1524, by the threatening reports of the progress of Lutheranism in Germany and the growing danger from the Turk.² That the Christian powers should be tearing each other to pieces in presence of such perils seemed to him intolerable; he hoped that his envoys might succeed in securing at least an armistice. Clement had already, on the 8th of December 1523, sent his chamberlain, Bernardino della Barba, to the Emperor in Spain with offers of mediation in the cause of peace.³ A discussion on the means of achieving the much-needed pacification of Europe, held in Consistory on the 9th of March 1524,⁴ resulted in the decision that Nicolas von Schönberg should visit the Courts of France, Spain, and England. By the 11th of March he had started, not overglad of his mission,⁵ the difficulties of which he fully understood, and knowing well that Giberti would now have a monopoly of influence.⁶ Schönberg's instructions left no

¹ BERGENROTH, II., n. 617, 624; SANUTO, XXXVI., 19, 27, 42; GRETHEN, 30 *seq.*

² Cf. the *despatches of G. de' Medici of February 15, 1524, and March 20 (State Archives, Florence); SANUTO, XXXV., 435, and Acta Consist. in KALKOFF, Forsch., 87.

³ Cf. EHSES, Politik Klemens VII., 571. The date of Barba's departure as given in the *letter of the Viceroy of Naples to the Emperor, dated Pavia, December 20, 1523 (State Archives, Brussels, Corresp. de Charles V. avec Italie, I.).

⁴ Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican).

⁵ Cf. the report in, Notizenblatt zum Archiv für österr. Gesch., 1858, 181.

⁶ The date of departure, hitherto uncertain, is ascertained from a *letter from B. Castiglione to Maria Equicola, Rome, March 12, 1524: "L' arcivescovo è andato mal volontieri. M. Giov. Matteo resta pur patrone d' ogni cosa" (Library, Mantua).

doubt as to Clement's sincere wish to prepare a way for peace; he travelled very quickly, and at the end of March was in Blois, where he stayed until the 11th of April; after conferring with Charles at Burgos, he returned again to Blois, and thence, on the 11th of May, set out for London.¹

In Rome, where, soon after the arrival of the Florentine embassy of homage² the plague broke out with fury,³ Sessa, Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, and the English envoys

¹ All details concerning Schönberg's mission are in the excellent review of, EHSES' *Politik Klemens VII.*, in the *Hist. Jahrb.*, VI., 571 *seq.*, 575 *seq.*, which also includes his instructions as given in *Cod. Vatic.*, 3924, f. 196-201. *Cf.* also *Rev. d. quest. hist.*, 1900, II., 61 *seq.* (I take this opportunity to express my grateful thanks to Mgr. Ehse for his kind permission to allow me to make use of his numerous excerpts on the history of Clement VII.) In his **letter of credence to the Emperor, dated March 10, 1524, Schönberg is thus recommended: "*fidemque in omnibus adhibere velis perinde ac si nos ipsi tecum colloqueremur*" (Secret Archives of the Vatican). The statement that Schönberg left Blois again on May 11 is confirmed by a *despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, May 25, 1524 (State Archives, Florence).

² The Florentine envoys to tender obedience (see *Giorn. degli Arch.*, II., 125) arrived in Rome on February 7, 1524, and were received in public audience on the 15th; see G. de' Medici, February 7 and 15, 1524 (State Archives, Florence), and **Acta Consist.* (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican).

³ Of the outbreak and ravages of the plague, G. de' Medici gives full information on February 20, 1524; March 18, 19, 21, 28, 31; April 1, 6, 8, 11, 17, 20; May 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 21, 25, 27; June 1, 3, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 22, 25, 28. Not until July 13 was he able to say: "*La pesta fa pocho danno o niente.*" All these reports are in the Florentine Archives. *Cf.* also Sanuto, *passim*; *letters of M. Salamanca to G. Salamanca, dated Rome, June 6 and 16 (State Archives, Vienna); SERASSI, I., 113 *seqq.*; CELLINI, *Vita*, I., 5; LUZIO, Mantova, 255; the **Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE* (National Library, Paris); the despatches of Alvarotti from Rome, May 14, 20, 31, and July 10, 1524 (State Archives, Modena).

were actively working on behalf of the Emperor, while Saint-Marceau and Carpi, supported by the powerful Giberti, worked for Francis. The timid Pope, meanwhile, still continued to shirk the decided avowal of partisanship desired by the Imperialists; under the influence of reports from Lombardy, where Bonnivet, the general of Francis, had had reverses, he leant, on the whole, more to Charles,¹ but without having any intention of openly taking his side. On the 10th of April Clement wrote strongly to the French King saying that, in spite of his great obligations to the Emperor, he had honestly tried to carry out his duties towards them both impartially. Four days later he laid before Charles, in detail, his reasons for being neutral, and consequently for declining to renew the league entered into by Adrian. The Pope, so ran the strongly worded letter, was as much as ever attached to the Emperor, but his position as the Father of all Christians demanded from him the utmost possible neutrality, so that in mediating for the much-needed peace, he should not appear to any to be led by party spirit. He would thus find all the readier obedience when he should summon his sons to take arms against the Turk.²

In May the situation of the French in Lombardy had gone from bad to worse. The Imperialists in Rome celebrated their successes with festive demonstrations.³ On

¹ Cf. especially, besides the Spanish and English reports in BERGEN-ROTH, II., n. 619, 621, 635, 636, 638, 642, 651, 654, the hitherto unknown, and, in parts, very important *reports of B. Castiglione to Calandra of April 9, 12, 19, 23, and 26, 1524 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). See also the *report of A. Germanello, Rome, April 9, 1524: "Io extimo che sia più inclinato a li Imperiali cha Franzesi."

² RAYNALDUS, 1524, n. 78-80. Cf. EHSES, Politik Klemens VII., 566; see also *ibid.*, 574, for the instructions of the English Nuncio, Melchior Lang.

³ *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

the 17th of May the anti-Imperialist Cardinal Soderini died, and at the same time Carpi fell into disgrace with the Pope. Clement was still more angry with the Duke of Ferrara, who was trying to make discord between him and Charles V., and was threatening Modena. But the Pope was also in the highest degree dissatisfied with Sessa, who was still intriguing against him in Siena.¹ In the beginning of June Clement addressed an exhortation to peace to Francis, pointing out to him how necessary it was to yield under the changed condition of things.² By the 16th of June Schönberg was back in Rome. In Sessa's opinion, what he brought back with him from France was not worth the cost of the journey.³

In the meantime Charles V. had determined to enforce peace and to pursue the French, now beaten in Italy, into their own country, and in July his forces entered Provence. At this very critical moment Francis did not lose heart; in the same month Bernardino della Barba brought the news to Rome that the King intended, at the head of his army, to invade upper Italy in person.⁴ Even then the Pope kept neutral and persevered in his efforts for peace.

On the 12th of August the Emperor's new Ambassador, de la Roche, arrived in Rome;⁵ supported by Sessa, he tried

¹ **Report in cipher of B. Castiglione to Calandra, of May 25, 1524 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² BALAN, *Mon. saec.*, XVI., 23-24; *cf.* EHSES, *loc. cit.*, 570.

³ SERASSI, I., 122; BERGENROTH, II., n. 663; *cf.* 655, 656. See also the *report of G. de' Medici, Rome, June 17, 1524: "Il rev. arcivescovo di Capua arivò heri sera di notte. . . . Ritragho è tornato senza conclusione; causa ne è il re de Inghilterra più che alchuno altro" (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ SERASSI, I., 126, 138; EHSES, *loc. cit.*, 580.

⁵ On August 4, 1524, Castiglione reported to the Marquis; *Fra quattro dì se aspetta mons. della Rocchia e per il camino se li fanno le spese et onor grandissimo (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). *Cf.* the

to induce the Pope to enter into an alliance, and to grant supplies of money. Clement would not give in, although he gave his assurances that he would not desert the Emperor.¹ He thus gave satisfaction to neither party and put himself in an equivocal position. De la Roche, who was exceedingly dispirited² by the failure of his attempts, fell ill on the 25th of August, so that the negotiations with him had to be put off. Clement did not, on that account, give up his pacific efforts; he hoped that at least an armistice for six months might be arranged, and that another mission under Schönberg might carry this through.³ The Imperialists, however, would not then hear anything of an armistice.⁴ De la Roche died on the 31st of August; Bartolomeo Gattinara, a nephew of the Chancellor, who was attached to the Embassy, and several of Sessa's servants, also fell ill; Sessa himself had to hasten from Rome to attend on his dying wife.⁵ The Spanish

printed letters, SERASSI, I., 137. Sessa announces the arrival on the 12th (GRETHEN, 42; SANUTO, XXXVI., 535); *letter of Schönberg's to G. Salamanca, dated Rome, ex palat. Apost., August 15, 1524 (State Archives, Vienna), and G. de' Medici in a *despatch of August 12, 1524 (State Archives, Florence). See also the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

¹ Cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 675, 677, 679, and the *reports of G. de' Medici of August 15, 17, and 18, 1524 (State Archives, Florence).

² Cf. the *report of de la Roche to Charles V., dated Rome, August 20, 1524 (State Archives, Brussels, Correspondance de Charles V. avec Italie, I.).

³ Besides the **report of G. de' Medici of August 25, 1524, see especially the *letter of Schönberg, August 15, 1524 (State Archives, Vienna), quoted *supra*, p. 260, n. 5.

⁴ *Li oratori Imperiali e Inglesi stanno molto alti e sul tirato ad non voler alcuno accordo. G. de' Medici, Rome, August 29, 1524 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ BERGENROTH, II., n. 681, 683; SERASSI, *loc. cit.*, I., 140 *seq.*; SANUTO, XXXVI., 584; *Diarium of Blasius de Martinellis in Cod.

Embassy being thus deserted, it was impossible to proceed with the negotiations. Clement therefore decided to send a Nuncio to promote the peace, now especially desirable on account of the Ottoman aggression.¹ On the 7th of September Nicolas von Schönberg crossed the Alps a second time to visit the Kings of France, England, and Spain.² In itself the Pope's diplomacy gave small ground for hope;³ on this occasion failure was complete; amid the wild turmoil of war, his voice was lifted in vain.

The invasion of Provence had miscarried owing to insufficient forces, and before the walls of Marseilles the Imperialist fortune changed. In France the feeling for King and country was running high; all that Francis had asked for had been given him. Soon the alarming tidings overtook the Imperialists that the French King with a great army was at Avignon. Thus the besiegers of Marseilles and the invaders of upper Italy were equally threatened. In order to save Milan for the Emperor, Pescara, on the 29th of

Barb., lat. 2799 (Vatican Library); *reports of G. de' Medici, August 31 and September 1, 1524 (State Archives, Florence). It was said, but certainly without grounds, that de la Roche had been poisoned; see *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

¹ Cf. Castiglione in SERASSI, I., 135.

² Schönberg did not visit England; he had previously been recalled from Lyons, January 5, 1525. SERASSI, I., 143; RAYNALDUS, 1524, n. 88; EHSES, Politik Klemens VII., 582; PIEPER, Nuntiaturen, 66; Rev. d. quest. hist., 1900, II., 65. Schönberg's letter of credence, dated September 6, 1524, to the Duke of Savoy, Francis I., Louisa of Savoy, Henry VIII., Wolsey, and Charles V., in Arm. 40, vol. 8 (Min.), n. 351-356 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). The brief to Charles in RAYNALDUS, *loc. cit.*

³ Cf. the remarkable letter in SANUTO, XXXVI., 626. In a *Brief, October 11, 1524, Clement VII. exhorts Schönberg, notwithstanding the hopeless condition of affairs, to persevere in his efforts after peace (Arm., 40, vol. 8 (Min.), n. 442, Secret Archives of the Vatican).

September, raised the siege of Marseilles. He crossed the maritime Alps by forced marches into upper Italy. At the same time Francis, with a splendid army, pressed forward through the Cottine chain. It was a race for the most blood-stained spot on earth, the plain of the river Po. Milan could no longer be held, for the plague was raging there. Pescara, by the end of October, had to fall back on Lodi before the superior strength of the French army, with his men dispirited and in the worst condition; the star of Charles V. seemed to be on the wane. It was a jest of Pasquino in Rome that an Imperial army had been lost on the Alps; any honest person finding it was asked to restore it for a handsome reward. Indeed, such was the state of things that if Francis had pursued his operations with equal swiftness and precaution, upper Italy would have been lost to Charles. But instead of taking advantage of the sorry plight of the Imperialists and falling upon them, the ill-advised King turned aside to besiege Pavia, strongly fortified and defended by Antonio de Leyva. The historian Giovio relates that when Pescara heard of this momentous resolve he cried out: "We were vanquished; in a short time we shall be victors."¹ The fate of Italy hung on the fight around Pavia. Francis I. did not understand this sufficiently, otherwise he would hardly have determined to detach 10,000 men from his army to be sent under the command of John Stuart, Duke of Albany, against Naples.

While the Imperialists and the French were entering the lists in upper Italy, the diplomatists on each side were competing at Rome for the favour of the Pope. Clement had seen Francis enter Italy with the greatest displeasure, for together with his disapproval of the King's conduct was associated the fear of the victorious arms

¹ JOVIUS, F. Davalus Pisc., 377.

of France. The Pope seems still to have clung to the possibility of a reconciliation between the two deadly enemies. Since the issue of the conflict was totally unknown, he proceeded with extreme caution. On the 7th of October 1524 Baldassare Castiglione, whose appointment as Nuncio dated a month before, left Rome. He was a true adherent of Charles, and a very experienced diplomatist.¹ In order to meet the French King also in a friendly spirit, Aleander, recently raised to the Archbishopric of Brindisi, was appointed as Nuncio to Francis.²

¹ Already, on July 19, 1524, the Pope had disclosed for the first time to Castiglione his intention of sending him to Charles V. (see SERASSI, I., 133, and MARTINATI, 43); on July 20 the Pope wrote to the Marquis of Mantua on the same subject (Brief of July 20, printed in: Delle Esezioni, V., 32-33; cf. LUZIO, Mantua, 254-255, where there is fuller information on Castiglione's embassy from Mantua to Rome), who at once gave his consent (*letter of Isabella d' Este to F. Gonzaga, August 1, 1524, in the Gonzaga Archives). His departure, however, was delayed until October 7 (*despatch of A. Germanello, October 7, 1524, *loc. cit.*). The letters of safe-conduct for Castiglione were ready on September 28; see the *original to the Marquis of Mantua in the Gonzaga Archives, and the Concepts in the Min. brev., 1524, III., n. 412 *seqq.* (Secret Archives of the Vatican); *ibid.*, *Regest., 1441, f. 80^a-84^b. Castiglione's full powers and faculties are dated Rome, 1524, Prid. Cal., Sept., A 1^o. For Castiglione's journey and transactions see MARTINATI, 45 *seqq.*

² Cf. matter published for the first time in the work of J. PAQUIER, *Nonciature d'Aléandre auprès de François Premier* (August 8, 1524, to February 24, 1525), Paris, 1897, and, Aléandre, 310 *seq.* GRETHEN (45) believes EHSES (Politik Klemens VII., 582, 594) to be mistaken in supposing that Aleander's mission was delayed because Francis had no settled headquarters, and thinks that it was only a little less than accidental that the mission should have coincided with the French invasion. It seems more probable that the Curia waited to see what turn things would take. As soon as they had definite intelligence from Schönberg, over and above what was known in the Consistory of October 12, the Nuncio's instructions were at once imparted to him,

Another extraordinary mission to that King was further given on the 13th of October to Count Roberto Boschetti, with instructions to seek out Lannoy, the commander-in-chief of the Imperial troops in Italy, on his return. He was also to do what he could on behalf of peace; but owing to illness he was unable to start on his journey.¹

The suspense with which all eyes in Rome were turned, in those days, on Lombardy, is clearly seen from the diplomatic reports of the time.² In Bologna, where calm had hitherto prevailed, signs of ferment began to appear; there was bitter jealousy of Ferrara.³ The news of the entry of the French into Milan, which reached Rome on the 28th of October, made the deepest impression.⁴ To the Pope this turn of affairs seemed but small compared with what was yet to come; his dread of France now reached

on the 14th. Against this, however, we have in the **Acta Consist.* of the Vice-Chancellor, about the Consistory: **S. D. N. fecit verbum de litteris rev. dom. Capuani d. d. 5 Oct.*, which report, that Francis I. was coming to Italy with his army—the Pope's dissatisfaction thereat—*nihil conclusum* (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ Cf. besides EHSES, *Politik Klemens VII.*, 594; also BALAN, Boschetti, II., 12-13.

² Cf. the **despatches* of G. de' Medici for the month of October, 1524 (State Archives, Florence).

³ As reported by the Bishop of Pola, Vice-Legate of Bologna, to Giberti in a **letter*, Bologna, October 23, 1524. On October 20 the Bishop had already written: "**Questi Pepoli non mi piaccino molto perchè io li veggho tanto allegri di queste nuove francesche quanto se la vittoria toccasse a loro.*" *Lit. divers. ad Clem. VII.*, vol. i. (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁴ "*La nova del entrata de Francesi in Milano è parso strano considerata la celerità del caso et il modo che havevan gli Imperiali de poter gagliardamente diffender esso Milano.*" **Despatch* of Fr. Gonzaga, Rome, October 28, 1524 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

its highest pitch.¹ Under these circumstances the mission of Giberti to Francis I. was decided on; by the 30th of October he had left Rome.² On the same day Cardinal Salviati took his departure, as it was stated, for his new legation, Modena and Reggio; it was at once surmised that he also was charged with a special communication for Francis I. The Venetian Ambassador had long interviews every day with Clement, and it was already rumoured in Rome that the Pope and Venice had entered into alliance with France;³ this report was premature, but things were tending in that direction.

Giberti, who appeared, on account of his French sympathies, to be the most suitable man for the business, received instructions drawn up under the impression that Francis, by the capture of Milan, having become absolute master of the situation, the duty of self-preservation called for an agreement with the conqueror. When later information announced a pause in the French successes, directions were sent after Giberti, telling him to find out Lannoy and Pescara first, and, then, on learning their conditions, to lay them before the King.⁴ On the 5th of November Giberti proposed an armistice to Lannoy at Soncino. The answer was an unqualified refusal; Pescara

¹ As reported on November 1, 1524, by Sessa, who was unwearied in trying to draw Clement from his neutrality and to attach him openly to the Imperial side. BERGENROTH, II., 692; *cf. ibid.*, n. 693, the report of the Abbot of Najera of November 4.

² *Cf.* SANUTO, XXXVII., 147; GRETHEN, 46, note 1.

³ SANUTO, XXXVII., 127; *cf.* 147. Salviati's departure on the morning of October 30 is also mentioned by Fr. Gonzaga in a *despatch of the same date (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). The appointment of Salviati as Legatus de latere to Francis I. was finally settled in the Consistory of November 7, 1524. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor's (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁴ EHSES, Politik Klemens VII., 595 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 46 *seq.*

replied in the same sense. When Giberti met Francis before Pavia on the 9th of November, he found him in an even less yielding disposition.¹ That Giberti had already, at that time, disclosed the terms of a secret treaty between Francis and Clement, is not supported by any convincing evidence.²

It was not until the peace-mission of Paolo Vettori to Lannoy had failed that the Pope held the moment to have come when he ought to take this step in order to secure his interests. On the 12th of December, but still in total secrecy, peace and alliance were concluded between Francis I., the Pope, and Venice;³ this was followed on the 5th of January 1525⁴ by an official agreement between the French King

¹ DESJARDINS, II., 788 *seqq.* Cf. BALAN, *Mon. saec.*, XVI., 307, and EHSES, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. EHSES, *Politik Klemens VII.*, 594, note 1, 597, and 554 *seq.*, where there is also a refutation of the absurd assertion of Ziegler (SCHELHORN, *Amoenit.*, II., 371) that Clement had asked Francis to undertake the expedition against Naples and had promised him that kingdom and Sicily. BUSCH (*Wolsey und die englisch-kaiserliche Allianz*, Bonn, 1886, 62) tries to find in a letter of Lautrec's (in CHAMPOLLION-FIGEAC, *Captivité de François I.*, 22 *seq.*), dated from the camp of Pavia, October 10, 1524, an argument against Ehse; but he forgot to notice that this document belongs to the year 1527; see EHSES in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, VII., 725, and BAUMGARTEN, *Karl V.*, II., 367 note. GRETHEN, who still tries to defend the earlier view that the Papal-French treaty was concluded in November, has to admit (49, note 3) that it is difficult to bring forward conclusive evidence in support of this. BAUMGARTEN (*Karl V.*, II., 369) also thinks "it is impossible to gauge accurately the nature of Giberti's negotiations with the French, owing to the conflict of contemporary statements."

³ Cf. *Libri commem.*, VI., 181; ROMANIN, V., 406; and JACQUETON, 67 *seq.*

⁴ EHSES' view (*Politik Klemens VII.*, 572), that the treaty was prepared on the 4th and received the Pope's signature on the 5th, is confirmed by a **report of Piperario, dated Rome, January 4, 1525, and a *despatch of Fr. Gonzaga, Rome, January 5, 1525 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

and Clement. In the preamble the necessity of a decided step on the part of the Pope was grounded on the French successes in Milan and the great dangers to which the States of the Church were exposed by the expedition to Naples. The Pope bound himself, in his own name and that of the Florentines, neither secretly nor openly to support the King's enemies; he assured to the Duke of Albany free right of passage and provision in the territories of the Church, and indirectly gave his consent to the acquisition of Milan. Francis promised the Pope the possession of Parma and Piacenza, the Papal salt monopoly in the Duchy of Milan, the maintenance of the Medicean rule in Florence, and protection against insubordinate vassals (Ferrara). Lastly, he made concessions of a political and ecclesiastical nature within French and Milanese territory and promised aid against the Turks.¹ Fully half a year before, Girolamo Campeggio had foretold to the representative of Ferrara that all this would come to pass. "Campeggio," wrote that diplomatist on the 21st of June 1524, "declares it to be a certainty that, if the Pope and Venice can come to terms, we shall soon see a league between Rome and France."² Nevertheless, it is certain that Clement took this most important step "more from compulsion than from his own free will." It was the influence of Giberti and Carpi, who made adroit use of the position

¹ See DESJARDINS, II., 812 *seq.*; SANUTO, XXXVII., 418 *seq.*; *cf.* 424 and MENCKEN, 650 *seq.*; EHSSES (Politik Klemens VII., 572 *seq.*, 579 *seq.*) suggests with probability that the treaty of January, known hitherto only through the so-called *Summarium* published at the time, contained other important stipulations in favour of the French.

² See the report of Alvarotti, June 21, 1524, in BALAN, Boschetti, II., 12. The passage in question, omitted in Balan, appears in cipher in the original (State Archives, Modena).

of affairs, that gave the impetus to the anxious Pope.¹ The promises and expectations opened out by Carpi were extremely enticing, but they certainly affected Clement less as a Pope than as a secular prince.² Mendoza had once given as his judgment: "Carpi is a devil; he knows everything and is mixed up in everything; the Emperor must either win him over or destroy him."³ How much to the point this remark was, was now seen. There was no intrigue, there were no means which the Ambassador of France was ashamed to use in order to draw and force into the net of French diplomacy the Pope, trembling for the safety of his States.⁴ Carpi intrigued with the Orsini and, as the Mantuan envoy relates in a cipher letter of the 28th of November 1524, offered the Pope the free disposal of Ferrara, although Alfonso was supporting the French with all his might.⁵ Knowing Clement's tendency to nepotism, Carpi also about this time proposed a marriage between Catherine de' Medici, the Pope's niece, and the second son of the French King.⁶ In support of Carpi, Francis twice sent

¹ GRETHEN, 54; EHSES, *Politik Klemens VII.*, 553; BAUMGARTEN, *Karl V.*, II., 367.

² Cf. EHSES, *Politik Klemens VII.*, 587 *seqq.*

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 612.

⁴ The *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor report on December 19, 1524, that the Pope set forth the dangers which would arise from the march of the French and Imperialist troops on Lombardy, and called upon the Cardinals to consult as to the defensive measures to be taken (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁵ See in Appendix, No. 34, the *report of A. Piperario of November 28, 1524 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁶ Besides Foscari's reports of December 4, 12, and 15 in BAUMGARTEN, *Karl*, II., 367-368, cf. BERGENROTH, II., n. 699, and the **report of Castiglione of November 29, 1524 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). SANUTO, XXXVII., 136, and Castiglione, in REUMONT-BASCHET, 274, mention a marriage treaty made with the Pope through Carpi as early as March.

special couriers to Rome bearing the most comprehensive concessions.¹

Sessa was all the less likely to prove a match for his opponents, as he could do nothing before the arrival of fresh instructions from the Emperor, and, it is to be noted, believed that the English envoys were cajoling Clement, who was almost entirely surrounded by French influences, when they told him that Henry VIII. had no intention of helping Charles in any way against the French.² At that time the belief was almost general in Rome that the victory of the French was assured.³ Above all, there was the serious danger into which the States of the Church were thrown by the expedition against Naples under John Stuart, Duke of Albany. It now seemed that the speedy safeguarding of the Papal interests was demanded for the sake of self-preservation, and thus, that which had for so long been feared came to pass at last. On the 5th of January 1525 Clement informed the Emperor of what had taken place in the most conciliatory and the least definite way possible; his affection for Charles was not lessened, but the movement against Naples, undertaken by Albany contrary to his (Clement's) will, had forced him into an agreement with Francis for the security of his own interests.⁴ Clement VII. evidently still hoped to keep up a tolerable understanding with Charles; in this he was completely deceived.

This step of the Pope's threw the usually cautious and moderate Emperor into a bitterness of resentment unknown before. He could hardly conceive that this same Medici

¹ WEISS, *Pap. d'État*, I., 290; BERGENROTH, II., n. 676; EHSES, *Politik Klemens VII.*, 590.

² BERGENROTH, II., n. 708, *cf.* 693; GRETHEN, 53.

³ *Cf.* SANUTO, XXXVII., 193, 349.

⁴ BALAN, *Mon. saec.*, XVI., 48-49.

who as Cardinal had always been on his side, should as Pope have turned over to the French. "I shall go," so he expressed himself, "into Italy, and revenge myself on those who have injured me, especially on that poltroon, the Pope. Some day, perhaps, Martin Luther will become a man of weight." In the Imperial Court the election of Clement was attacked on the grounds of his illegitimate birth.¹ In the council of the Archduke Ferdinand a proposal was made that all diplomatic relations with the Holy See should be broken off.² On the 7th of February 1525 Charles answered the Papal letter; nothing in his reply betrayed his inward agitation. The Emperor, such was its tenor, revered the Pope as a father, and was well aware that he had been deceived by the French party.³ But two days later he wrote a letter to Sessa, in which his wrath against Clement, for whose election he had "poured out streams of gold," broke out afresh. The Ambassador was distinctly told to inform Clement that the Emperor would carry his plans through, even if it cost him crown and life. The letter closed with the threat, "The present situation is not the best in which to discuss the affairs of Martin Luther."⁴ Thus to the internal confusion and warfare of Christendom was added a dangerous strain in the relations between Pope and Emperor, and this exactly at the opening of the year in which the social revolution broke out in Germany.

¹ BROWN, III, 400-402; DE LEVA, II., 233; DITTRICH, Contarini, 29. EHSES (*Politik Klemens VII.*, 578) doubts the authenticity of the sayings attributed to Charles V.

² *Report of H. Rorarius to Sadoletto, Innsbruck, January 28, 1525. *Lit. divers. ad Clem. VII.*, vol. i. (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ BERGENROTH, II., n. 716.

⁴ "En la materia de Luter no es tiempo ahora de hablar," BERGENROTH, II., n. 717; GACHARD, *Corresp.*, 212-213.

CHAPTER VIII.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF PAVIA.—QUARRELS BETWEEN THE POPE AND THE EMPEROR.—FORMATION OF A COALITION AGAINST CHARLES V. (LEAGUE OF COGNAC, MAY 22, 1526).

ON the 24th of January 1525 the Imperialists broke out of Lodi; in the first days of February they appeared before the French army, still besieging the stronghold of Pavia, with the intention of forcing a battle.¹ Peals of bells and beacon-fires from the towers of the old Lombard city welcomed the relief in this hour of need. For three weeks the hostile forces faced one another. The French camp was admirably protected by nature and art; on the right it was covered by the Ticino, on the left by a large park surrounded by a high wall, within which lay the famous Certosa.

On the 24th of February, the Emperor's birthday, his army, composed of Spaniards, Italians, and the dreaded German landsknechts, opened the attack. At daybreak the battle, which was to decide the "Italian imperium," began. In a few hours the murderous fight was over; the gallant troops of Francis were laid low before the onset of the German landsknechts and Spanish veterans; the King himself was a prisoner.²

¹ SANDOVAL, I., 551 *seq.*

² *Cf.* HÄBLER, Die Schlacht bei Pavia, in the *Forschungen zur Deutsche Gesch.*, XXV., 513 *seq.* To the literature of the subject here made use of, some important contributions have since been added; *cf.*

The victory of Pavia made the Empire of Charles the ruling power in Europe. It is impossible to describe the impression everywhere produced by this historical catastrophe. The bloodshed and strife in which France and the houses of Spain and Hapsburg had engaged for the mastery in Europe, seemed to be brought to an end by this unexpected blow. France lay at the Emperor's feet, while Italy, and with her the Papacy, were surrendered defenceless to his power. In Rome men were dumbfounded by the news of the great event. Clement, whose diplomats were seeking up to the last hour for accommodations that might lead to peace, looked to Lombardy with indescribable anxiety.¹ His position was in the highest degree precarious. The loss of the independence of Italy meant also that of the Holy See.² With Milan and Naples in the Emperor's hands, the Papacy was threatened with enclosure in a circle of iron. But Clement, in his anxiety and his statecraft, was as incapable of a great resolution,

i. a. Bolet. d. l. Acad. de Madrid, 1889; Arch. stor. Ital., 5 Series, VI., 248 *seqq.*; Deutsche Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissensch., VI., 366 *seq.*; Anz. f. schweiz. Gesch., N.F., XXIII., No. 2; Studi storici, X., 347; JÄHNS, Gesch. des Kriegswesens, 1091 *seq.*; Basler Zeitschr. für Gesch., 1903; Bollet. d. st. pavese, IV., 3 (1904); LEBEY, 282 *seqq.*; A. BONARDI, L'assedio e la battaglia di Pavia, in Mem. p. l. storia di Pavia, I. (1894-95); PRATO, Il parco vecchio e la battaglia di Pavia, Pavia, 1897. For pictorial representations see, Zeitschr. für Gesch. von Freiburg i. Br. VI. (1857), and the sumptuous publication of BELTRAMI, La battaglia di Pavia illustr. negli arazzi del Marchese del Vasto (now in the Museum, Naples), Milano, 1896; MORELLI, Gli arazzi illustr. la battaglia di Pavia, Napoli, 1899.

¹ Cf. Giberti's letter to Aleander, February 19, 1525, in Lett. d. princ., II., 66 *seq.* Aleander was made prisoner at Pavia (Lett. d. princ., I., 103), and was not, as Guicciardini relates, at once set at liberty; on the contrary, his ransom was a matter of protracted negotiation; see, Arch. stor. Ital., 5 Series, IV., 189.

² The opinion of GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 424.

such as a Julius II. would have taken, as he was of any definite action.

Persuaded by Giberti and Carpi, Clement had departed from his strict neutrality and linked his fortunes, for the worse rather than the better, with those of the French King,¹ whose superiority at the moment had seemed to promise him a lasting triumph. But the fortune of war is fickle; what would happen if Francis were defeated? At the last moment Giberti and Clement seem to have perceived their mistake. Hence the exhortations to Francis I. not to put his fortune to the proof, to refuse the wager of battle, and to have recourse to negotiations instead. As late as the 19th of February Giberti asked Aleander, the Nuncio, to represent matters in this way to the French King. He added, "As no sailor ever risks the storm of the open sea with one anchor only, so the Pope, confident though he be in the strength of Francis I., will not stake all upon the single throw of his success before Pavia."² In saying this, Giberti condemned his own policy, and a week later the news reached Rome that the cast of war had been thrown—not in favour of Francis I. and his ally the Pope.

On the evening of the 26th of February Clement received, in a letter from Cardinal Salviati, the first intelligence of the Emperor's victory. To him, as well as to all around him, the news seemed incredible;³ but later accounts, including one by an eye-witness, put all doubt at an end.⁴

¹ EHSES, *Politik Klemens VII.*, 587.

² Lett. d. princ., II., 67. EHSES, *loc. cit.* On January 15, 1525, Fr. Gonzaga reported in a cipher *despatch: "A me par che S. Sta faci poco bon judicio per essi Franzesi."

³ Cf. the *letter of V. Albergati, February 27, 1525 (State Archives, Bologna).

⁴ SANUTO, XXXVIII., 16; *Diarium Blasii de Martinellis* in CREIGHTON, V., 325; Arch. stor. Ital., 5 Series, VI., 255; *report of Fr. Gonzaga, Rome, February 27, 1525 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

The Pope was as one dead ;¹ his terror was increased by the reaction produced in his household by this event. All the Imperialists, the Spaniards, as well as the Colonna, gave way to the wildest rejoicing. Such a change of fortune surpassed their boldest hopes. Cardinal Pompeo Colonna held a brilliant festival in his palace ; throughout the city rang the echos of salvoes of congratulation, and the cries of rejoicing of " Empire, Spain, Colonna." ² The Orsini, who were of the French party, had the very worst to fear ; their leaders were absent ; they and their levies were with the Duke of Albany, who had returned from his march to Naples, to the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, and there had pitched his camp about the 10th of February.³

All thought of pursuing his expedition was given up, and Albany decided to return. On the 2nd of March two

¹ Rimase morto ; BAUMGARTEN, Karl, II., 419. Cf. SANUTO XXXVIII., 48, and Carte Strozzi, I., 2, 36 *seq.*

² SANUTO, XXXVIII., 17, 30. *Venit Romae rumor talis, quod non humanum videretur sed divinum, quod 26 februarii nuntiatum fuit s. pontifici prima hora noctis qualiter rex Franciscus Gallorum esset captus et exercitus ejus penitus dissipatus et qualiter multi ceciderunt gladio. Ab Imperialibus clamantibus Imperio, Spagna, Colonna habitae fuere maximae laetitiae tormentis bellicis et ignibus ; fere ab urbe condita talis rumor auditus non fuerat atque partialium laetitia, rumor ad astra tendis. *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris). Lett. d. princ., I., 103. *Letter of V. Albergati, February 27, 1525 (State Archives, Bologna).

³ The Duke of Albany came on February 13 to Rome (DESJARDINS, II., 827), and visited the Pope the next day (*despatches of G. de' Medici, February 13 and 14, 1525, State Archives, Florence). The Pope received him with great friendliness (cf. *letter of V. Albergati, February 17, 1525, State Archives, Bologna), because he was a brother-in-law of the deceased Lorenzo de' Medici. Clement VII. was against the expedition ; the plan, moreover, had originated with the French King. Cf. also GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 426 *seq.*, and *supra*, p. 263.

thousand five hundred men, consisting of Frenchmen and the Orsini, began their homeward march. Acting on a swift resolution, Colonna, supported by some of Sessa's retainers, fell upon them suddenly at the monastery of Tre Fontane, and drove them in hasty flight within the city. Wherever the Orsini sought refuge, the Colonna were at their heels; fighting took place in the Ghetto and on Monte Giordano. The whole city was in an uproar; the streets rang with the war-cries "Orsini—Colonna." The terrified inhabitants bolted their doors; artillery was placed to protect the Vatican, and the Swiss stood under arms all night.¹ The terror-stricken Pope did all he could to restore quiet, and was successful in inducing Albany to disband his forces. The Italians were left behind; the foreigners, under the Duke, fell back on Civita Vecchia, and at the end of March they were conveyed in French galleys to Marseilles. In the meanwhile Schönberg, who had returned to Rome on the 5th of March, succeeded in pacifying the Colonna.²

All these occurrences had made the deepest impression on the Pope. The fights, especially between the Orsini and the Colonna, engaged in under his very eyes, raised his alarm to the highest pitch.³ While in Rome the ground was trembling under his feet, his fears for Florence were also aroused, where the ideas of Savonarola were again

¹ Besides Lett. d. princ., I., 107, SANUTO, XXXVIII., 48, and ALBERINI, 329, *cf.* for this first raid of the Colonna the *report of J. Recordato, March 2, 1525 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris), who in part narrates as an eye-witness.

² *Cf.* SANUTO, XXXVIII., 97, 155 *seq.*, and *despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, March 29, 1525 (State Archives, Florence). For Schönberg's return see Giberti's letter in Arch. stor. Ital., 5 Series, VI., 257 *seq.*

³ SANUTO, XXXVIII., 67, 83, 85, 104.

springing into life. Still more precarious was the Papal rule in the Romagna, where the Ghibellines were rejoicing over the victory of Pavia.¹ The Imperialists lost no time in taking advantage of Clement's necessity. They held the trembling Pope, who in vain urged moderation,² in a vice of iron.³ Their troops carried fire and sword ruthlessly through the territory of Piacenza; Lannoy even uttered the threat that he would lead his soldiers on Rome.⁴ By such means Clement was forced first to pay 25,000 ducats, and then to make a treaty of alliance.⁵

The most zealous opponent of an alliance between the Pope and the Emperor was Giberti, who, supported by Lodovico di Canossa, who was in the service of France, and by the Venetian Ambassador, was doing all he could at this time to unite the whole of Italy, under Papal leadership, in a league against the Spanish domination, and was also trying to bring England, the jealous rival of Charles V., into the combination. There were moments when the Pope, in torments of indecision, lent such a ready ear to his proposals that Giberti believed the desired end to have been reached;⁶ but at the last moment the Imperialist Schönberg upset his plans.⁷ The most immediate danger

¹ Cf. PROFESSIONE, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 6 *seq.*

² Cf. the *letter of M. Salamanca to G. Salamanca, February 27, 1525 (State Archives, Vienna).

³ Opinion of REUMONT, III., 2, 170.

⁴ PROFESSIONE, *loc. cit.*, 10.

⁵ For the 25,000 ducats see GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 57. For the coercion on the part of the Imperialists see also REUMONT, III., 2, 170; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 439; and GRETHEN, 68.

⁶ Cf. Lett. d. princ., II., 74 *seq.*; GUICCIARDINI, XV., 1; SISMONDI, XVI., 162 *seq.*

⁷ For the negotiations cf. the *report of Fr. Gonzaga, March 18, 1525 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and the *despatches of G. de' Medici, Rome, March 27 and 30 (State Archives, Florence).

undoubtedly came from Charles V., who had it in his power to wrest Florence from the Medici.¹ At the same time Piacenza was sending pressing appeals for help against the unbridled licence of the soldiery. Lastly, the news concerning the social revolution in Germany and the advances of the Turk was of an exceptionally disturbing kind. Clement VII. saw that, cost what it might, he must come to terms with the Emperor.

On the 1st of April 1525 a treaty, defensive and offensive, was concluded between the Pope and Lannoy as Imperial Viceroy in Italy.² The terms of the agreement were that both should recognize Francesco Sforza as Duke of Milan, and that the Emperor should take the States of the Church, Florence, and the house of Medici under his protection, Florence paying in return 100,000 ducats. Lannoy, moreover, undertook to withdraw his forces from the Papal States and to place no garrisons therein in future without the Pope's permission. In the event of Charles not having ratified these conditions within four months, the 100,000 ducats were to be refunded by Lannoy. There were besides three other separate articles, to the following effect:—

1. The Pope was to hold, in the kingdom of Naples, the rights connected with benefices as settled in the Bull of investiture.

2. Milan was in the future to have the salt from the Papal salt-pits in Cervia.

3. Lannoy was to insist on the restoration of Reggio

¹ Cf. SANUTO, XXXVIII., 172.

² See *despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, April 1, 1525. He states, on April 4, that Bartolomeo Gattinara, who had carried on the negotiations with Sessa and Clerk, would leave on the day following (State Archives, Florence). Cf. VILLA, *Italia*, 33 *seqq.*

and Rubbiera to the Church by the Duke of Ferrara; on this restoration being made the Pope was to pay 100,000 ducats to the Emperor and absolve the Duke from all censures.¹

Without waiting for the Imperial ratification, Lannoy had already, in April, published the treaty in Milan. The Pope, who on receipt of favourable letters from the Emperor's court and from Lannoy had the best hopes of Charles's conduct, did the same in Rome in May. He combined with this solemnity his official *Possesso* of the Lateran.² From the Spanish Nuncio Castiglione

¹ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 1; SANUTO, XXXVIII., 157 *seq.*, 160 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 421 *seq.*; HELLWIG, 21, note 1. Clement wished to include Venice also in the League. At Rome it was looked upon at first as certain that this would be brought about (see *despatches of G. de' Medici, Rome, April 14 and 21, 1525), but the Signoria was alarmed at the amount of money asked for by Lannoy. In the Consistory of April 3 the Pope communicated to the Cardinals the terms of the League. *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² See Lannoy's letter of April 15, 1525, in BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 339-340, and Blasius de Martinellis, Diarium, in Cod. Barb., lat. 2799, Vatican Library. The favourable reports from the Imperial Court are mentioned by G. de' Medici in a *despatch, Rome, April 22, 1525, in which he adds: "Domane si publicherà qui la legha novamento facta" (Florentine State Archives). The delay, which G. de' Medici had already mentioned in a *despatch of April 25, was caused, no doubt, by the combination of the *Possesso* with the publication of the League. For the *Possesso* and the publication, see, as supplementary to CANCELLIERI'S scanty information (88 *seq.*), the reports in GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 87, 91; VILLA, Italia, 54; SANUTO, XXXVIII., 265, 268; the Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris), and the detailed description in the *letter of G. de' Medici of May 1. The latter had written previously, on April 27: "S. S^{ta} anderà domenica a S. Janni a pigliare la possessione per l' ordinario senza far spesa che ne è da ciascuno commendata et tanto più visto con che modestia Cesare si è governato della vittoria havuta" (State Archives, Florence).

came very reassuring accounts¹ of the moderation of the victorious Emperor, so that on the 5th of May Clement resolved to send Cardinal Salviati to Spain as Legate in order to work for the restoration of peace, the execution of the treaty, the prosecution of the Turkish war, and the suppression of Lutheranism.² Salviati at this moment was still in Parma; in order to accelerate his journey, it was determined on the 12th of June that he should proceed by sea instead of going through France, as at first intended; ³ he was also instructed to discuss the

¹ In the Consistory of April 29 the letter which Charles V. had, on April 6, addressed to Clement VII. on the subject of the Turkish war (printed in BALAN, *Mon. saec.*, XVI., 338-339; *ibid.*, 337-338, the letter of Charles, April 4, and 133-135, the Pope's answer, May 2) was first read; extracts from Castiglione's report of his friendly reception by the Emperor (*cf.* SERASSI, I., 146) and of the moderation shown by the latter after his victory, and a letter of Charles's to Germany on the affairs of Luther, were then communicated. It was determined to give thanks to God for the good disposition of the Emperor. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican). *Cf.* KALKOFF, *Forschungen*, 90 *seq.*

² *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor for May 5, 1525 (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican); *cf.* MOLINI, I., 194. The publication of the appointment was deferred. G. de' Medici reports on May 12, 1525: *Questa matina in consistorio è stato publicato legato di la dalli monti il rev. Salviati, la quale legatione principalmente è facta per andare ad Cesare et bisognando il venirà in Francia, in Inghilterra e dove sarà di bisogno per la quiete e pace di Cristianità. On May 16 G. de' Medici writes: *N. S. molto sollecita il rev. legato ad partire per esser in Francia alla madre del re, dipoi a Cesare (State Archives, Florence).

³ "Consistorium die lunae 12. Junii, 1525: S. D. N. fecit verbum de itinere rev. dom. legati ad Caesarem destinati, et fuit conclusum quod legatus, ut celerius applicare possit ad Caesarem, per mare iter arripiat cum triremibus S. R. E. et si opus fuerit uti illis quae sunt religionis Rodianae." *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican). *Cf.* *despatches of G. de' Medici,

Emperor's coronation and the question of a council.¹ Accordingly, the Legate left Parma on the 2nd of July and embarked at Genoa;² on the 23rd of August the Pope was able to give very favourable accounts of him in Consistory.³ But in reality the Cardinal's task was beyond his powers; he fell under the fascination of Charles and saw everything in the rosier light.⁴ The official correspondence also between the Pope and Emperor was carried on in the friendliest terms for some time longer; the points of controversy were slurred over as much as possible, and those of common interest emphasized.⁵

It was impossible, however, that each party should go on deceiving the other for ever. In spite of all assurances

June 14 and July 18, 1525: Dissatisfaction of the French at the Legate for travelling by sea (State Archives, Florence). See also the letter of Cardinal Salviati, June 17, 1525, published in, *Due Lettere inedite del Card. G. Salviati*, Vicenza, 1878 (per Nozze).

¹ SANUTO, XXXIX., 101. The *full legatine powers for Cardinal Salviati, dated Rome, 1525, III. Non. Maii A° 2°, in Regest., 1439, f. 1-13 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² Cf. PIEPER, *Nuntiaturen*, 69. G. de' Medici reports on July 26, 1525, that Salviati had reached Marseilles without having met with any hindrance from the French (State Archives, Florence).

³ Salviati reported, as Clement informed the Consistory on August 23, that the Emperor had received him as Legate in a friendly way, that everything tended towards a general peace, and that Charles held Clement in esteem: "itaque ex omnibus locis bene sperandum est." *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁴ Cf. his two optimistic reports from Alcalá, September 22, and from Toledo, October 3, 1525, in MOLINI, I., 191-199. For the scheme that Machiavelli should accompany the Cardinal, see DESJARDINS, II., 840-841.

⁵ See the Pope's letters dated May 7, June 15, 19, 22, July 4, and November 13, 1525, in BALAN, *Mem. Saec.*, XVI., 137 *seq.*, 154 *seq.*, 156 *seq.*, 157 *seq.*, 159 *seq.*, 162 *seq.*, 179 *seq.*, and Charles's letters, *ibid.*, 345 *seq.*, 347 *seq.*, 350 *seq.* Cf. EHSES, *Concil. IV.*, XXIII., n. 2.

of friendship, a breach was bound to come soon, since the Pope was becoming more and more convinced that the arrogant commanders of Charles's army had no intention of carrying out the terms of the treaty of April, and were, indeed, often acting in direct contradiction to them. Instead of the withdrawal of their troops from the Papal States, fresh occupations took place in the territory of Piacenza, whereby the country was exhausted and laid waste. Lannoy certainly made daily promises to Clement that, as soon as the 100,000 ducats were paid in full, the restoration of Reggio and Rubbiera would take place; but in secret he had already secured the possession of these places to Duke Alfonso of Ferrara. He also urgently advised the Emperor not to confirm the additional clauses of the treaty. Charles took his advice; the restoration of Reggio and Rubbiera, in which towns Clement saw the keys of Parma and Piacenza,¹ the Papal salt monopoly in Milan, and the arrangements for Church patronage in the kingdom of Naples, were consequently discarded and remained a dead letter. Nevertheless, the Imperialists refused to repay to the Pope the sums disbursed by him for the promised surrender of the towns. The more Clement saw that this behaviour had the Emperor's approbation, the greater became his mistrust and indignation. When the Imperial ratification of the principal treaty arrived, he declined to accept it, since it had not been executed within the stipulated four months, and proceeded to demand back the 100,000 ducats paid by Florence. This the Imperialists declined, under empty pretexts, to refund.² Clement, who was suffering from gout, was fully

¹ "Si non havemo Rezo, è perso Parma e Piasenza," said the Pope to the Venetian Envoy. SANUTO, XI., 345.

² GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 3; HELLWIG, 21; BREWER, IV., I, n. 1336, 1418. Cf. GRETHEN, 70 *seq.*, 72 *seq.*, who acknowledges the justice of

justified in saying that he had been cheated,¹ injured, and insulted. In addition to these grievances came Charles's heavy claims on the church patronage of Aragon. "If the affairs of the Church are treated in this way," said Clement to Sessa, "it were best that I should betake myself back to Soracte."²

The rumours concerning the intentions of Charles's advisers and of his commander-in-chief in Italy were of the kind most likely to throw the Pope into fear and despair. The proposal which came from this quarter, with a view to trampling under foot the independence of the whole Apennine Peninsula, aimed at nothing less than the total confiscation of the Papal States. Not merely were Florence, Siena, and Lucca to come under the Emperor's rule, but Modena also was to fall to the Duke of Ferrara, and the Bentivogli were to be re-established in Bologna. Lannoy, the soul of the anti-Papal intrigues, demanded also that Parma and Piacenza, Ravenna and Cervia, should be separated from the States of the Church; the first two were destined for the Duke of Milan, the two last for the Republic of Venice.³ The Pope was aware of these intrigues, but, being powerless, had to play a losing game with a cheerful countenance;⁴ for if the Emperor was able to come to terms with Francis at the expense of Italy, then Clement

the Pope's complaints. The damage done in the Papal territory by the Imperialist soldiery was reckoned at 200,000 ducats; see CREIGHTON, V., 259.

¹ GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 118.

² *Ibid.*, III., 1, n. 134.

³ Besides GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 3, and DE LEVA, II., 273, *cf.* an account in SANUTO, XXXVIII., 121, of which the value has not hitherto been appreciated,

⁴ GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 3.

was lost.¹ This eventuality seemed to be very close at hand when the captive King of France was removed to Spain² (10th of June 1525).

In Rome, in Venice, indeed throughout the whole of Italy, the impression prevailed that the Emperor intended to become reconciled to his prisoner at the cost of Italian independence, and the freedom of Italy would be destroyed for ever. The decisive moment seemed to have come to run the last risk and throw off the yoke of those whom they called "barbarians." In the sphere of literature and art the Italian of those days was unquestionably entitled to consider himself superior to the Spaniard, and indeed to all the other nations in Europe. This self-consciousness gave powerful nourishment to the revival of the national idea. "All Italy," declared Antonio de Leyva, the loyal general of the Emperor, "is at one in combining to defend the common interests and to resist any further increase of the power of Spain. There is not a single Prince among them who thinks any longer of the favours received from Charles."³

In other respects also affairs were tending more and more to the Emperor's disadvantage. After the defeat at Pavia, it had at first seemed as if the French kingdom must fall in pieces. But afterwards a complete change came over affairs. It was the Regent, Louisa of Savoy, the King's mother, who held the nation together and became

¹ Cf. the **despatches of Fr. Gonzaga, May 13, 1525 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Cf. MIGNET, II., 104 *seq.*; DECRUE, Anne de Montmorency, 54 *seq.*; GACHARD, Captivité de François I., in *Études conc. l'hist. des Pays-Bas*, I., 1890.

³ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 3; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 427-428; VILLA, Italia, 68 *seqq.*; PROFESSIONE, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 26.

its leader. She soothed the disaffected among the nobles and generals, reconciled factions, organized the defences of the country, and disclosed in all directions a capacity for rule which was as determined as it was prudent. She it was, also, who succeeded in detaching Henry VIII., envious of the good fortune of Charles, from the Emperor, and in concluding at the end of August a treaty of peace and alliance between France and England.¹

Some considerable time before this, the Regent had also entered into communications with the States of Italy. Her primary object was to win over the two most powerful—the Pope and Venice. For this purpose Louisa of Savoy employed the services of a man who, although by birth an Italian, was yet one of the most fervent adherents of her son. This was Lodovico di Canossa, Bishop of Bayeux. He was an intimate friend of Giberti, and was also held in great esteem at Venice. At the end of 1524 and in the spring of the following year he was in Rome, making himself personally active, and at that time he believed that he had already fully secured the anxious-minded Pope.² At the beginning of June 1525 Canossa gave out that he had to visit his family in Verona; he really went in haste to Venice, which he reached on the 15th of June.³ Thither on the 23rd came the French envoy, Lorenzo Toscano, with instructions from the Regent. On the following day

¹ The news reached Rome on September 25, 1525; see the *despatch of G. de' Medici of that date (State Archives, Florence).

² Cf. Lett. d. princ., II., 76. For the period of Canossa's journey to Rome see the rare monograph of ORTI MANARA, Canossa, 37.

³ In confirmation of GRETHEN'S (73) and JACQUETON'S (203) statements about Canossa's journey, I refer to the following **letters of the latter to F. Robertet: (1) dated Rome, June 2, 1525; (2) dated Urbino, June 11; (3) dated Venice, June 20: "Zobia passata io giunsi in questa terra dove aspetto che mi sia comandato quanto io habia a fare" (Communal Library, Verona).

Canossa laid his proposals before the Signoria, but the cautious Venetians declined to give a definite answer before the Pope had declared himself.¹ Canossa now worked with might and main, and his letters were despatched in all directions; while urging the French Government to come as quickly as possible to an understanding, he stirred up in Italy, wherever he could, the fires of national hatred against the Spaniard.² But his principal object was to move the Pope, who still clung to his old policy of "I will and I won't,"³ to declare himself openly.

The confidant of Canossa's plans and his best ally was Giberti, who, with Carpi's support, and with even greater perseverance than his friend, was working against the Emperor⁴ behind Schönberg's back, in France, Switzerland, and England, and, above all, trying to induce the Pope to come over finally to the side of Francis. On the 25th of June 1525⁵ Canossa wrote encouragingly: "All points to a swift and satisfactory conclusion." But it was precisely at this juncture that the two friends met with the greatest difficulties. "Although the Pope," wrote Giberti to Canossa on the 1st of July, "is a good friend to the emancipation of Italy, yet he will not fling himself headlong into an

¹ Besides Canossa's letter of June 21, which is printed for the most part in PROFESSIONE'S *Dalla battaglia di Pavia*, 10, see also his **letter to Giberti of June 25, that to Louisa of Savoy of June 28, 1525, and that to Giberti of July 5 (*Communal Library, Verona*).

² Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 428; *Miscell. d. stor. Ital.*, III., 351 *seq.*, and CIPOLLA, 891.

³ This expression is used by Giov. Maria del Monte in a letter of March 3, 1525. *Lett. d. princ.*, I., 107.

⁴ BAUMGARTEN, *loc. cit.* For Giberti's concealment of his activity from Schönberg, cf. *Lett. d. princ.*, II., 84. See also GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 135.

⁵ Letter to Giberti, dated Venice, June 25 (not 23), 1525, as given in PROFESSIONE, *Dalla battaglia di Pavia*, 28.

affair of such weighty responsibility, and is, in the first place, determined to await the arrival of Lorenzo Toscano." At the same time, Giberti urged the closest secrecy with regard to all their transactions, as success would be easy if they succeeded in taking the Spaniards by surprise.¹ In a letter addressed on the same day to the Swiss Nuncio, Ennio Filonardi, Giberti confirms his account of Clement's indecision. In consequence of the misconduct of the Imperialists, Giberti here insists, especially with regard to their infringements of the April treaty, war might easily arise; therefore the Nuncio ought to take secret measures to have from eight to ten thousand Swiss in readiness, in case of necessity, to fight, not only in Lombardy, but also in Naples.² Giberti was not less active in other ways as well. He told the Pope, in the most emphatic language, that, if he let this opportunity go by, he would bitterly repent it, and sink into a mere tool of the Emperor's. Still Clement was not to be moved to take any open steps, and Giberti, in desperation, threatened that he would quit Rome.³

Canossa did not commit himself as long as the Pope and Venice refused to declare themselves openly against Charles. On the 25th of June he explained to the Regent that both the Pope and Venice were afraid lest France, thinking exclusively of her own interests, should sacrifice Italy; ⁴ even Giberti had his misgivings of France in this respect.⁵ It was certainly strange that the agents of France had never yet received full powers to conclude an alliance.

¹ Lett. d. princ., II., 83.

² *Ibid.*, II., 81.

³ SANUTO, XXXIX., 174, 176.

⁴ *Canossa a Madama la regina di Francia, dated Venice, June 25, 1525 (Communal Library, Verona).

⁵ Cf. his letter to Canossa, July 8, 1525, in Lett. d. princ., II., 85.

Consequently, at Rome as well as at Venice, matters were taken in hand with the greatest caution and reticence. Under cover of the closest secrecy, Giberti employed Sigismondo Sanzio, one of Carpi's secretaries, to treat with the Regent, and Gregorio Casale to treat with Henry VIII. One object was to ascertain the truth of a report emanating from Spain, that the Emperor would probably visit Italy in person; at the same time, clear information was to be procured as to the help which "poor Italy" might expect to receive. Sanzio and Casale left Rome almost simultaneously (9th and 10th of July).¹ In spite of all precautions, Sessa was informed of these movements. But Clement VII. managed, by the ambiguity of his language, entirely to deceive the Spanish diplomatist.²

The shrewd Venetians proceeded with similar secrecy. They also put no trust in France.³ Already, on the 10th of July, Canossa had described to his friend Giberti the hesitation of the Signoria, who awaited the decision of the Pope.⁴ On the 18th he was able to report that Venice was prepared to enter into a league with France on the conditions put forward by the Pope through Sigismondo Sanzio. For the present, however, this determination was to be kept absolutely secret. The conditions were: Francesco Sforza to keep Milan and marry a French Princess; the Pope to receive Naples and Sicily, and France to pay monthly 50,000 ducats and supply 6600 land forces and 10 galleys; the Italians in return to make an alliance,

¹ Lett. d. princ., II., 85, 86; GRETHEN, 76 *seq.*; PROFESSIONE, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 35; JACQUETON, 211 *seq.*

² GRETHEN, 78 *seqq.*

³ **Canossa a Madama la regina di Francia, dated Venice, July 7, 1525 (Communal Library, Verona).

⁴ **Canossa al datario, Venice, July 10, 1525 (Communal Library, Verona).

offensive and defensive, with France, and to raise an army of 13,000 men for the liberation of the King.¹

By the month of August the negotiations were at a standstill. Giberti's and the Pope's distrust of France had revived with increased strength. The attitude of the Regent was, in fact, so suspicious that the fear that she might treacherously surrender Italy to the Emperor was forced on men's minds. She prolonged the negotiations in such a way that it became more and more clear that she was only making use of Italy in order to obtain the release of Francis on more favourable terms. Not merely in Rome but also in Venice, where Canossa was long kept waiting without any tidings from France being received, the worst suspicions were aroused.² Moreover, there came the news that Sigismondo Sanzio had been murdered in the neighbourhood of Brescia, and all his correspondence stolen.³ Among the papers of this Ambassador were some highly compromising documents relating to a plot to deprive the Emperor of his ablest general.

The iron hand of the haughty Spaniard lay with all its

¹ **Canossa a mons. datario, and, a Madama la regina di Francia, two letters, dated Venice, July 18, 1525 (Communal Library, Verona).

² BREWER, IV., I, n. 1563, 1589; GRETHEN, 80. Canossa wrote on August 5, 1525, from Venice to the Queen Regent: *Quà et a Roma per quanto mi è scritto aspettano con gran desiderio di havere qualche risoluta risposta di V. M. circa quello che Sigismondo li ha portato, et senza la dita risposta non sono per passare più avanti per cosa che se li possa dire. In a *letter of August 18, 1525, Canossa puts plainly before the Regent the Venetian distrust of France. He returns to the subject again on August 22. Cf. also Canossa's letters to Robertet, **August 11, 18, and 22 (Communal Library, Verona). For the Pope's anxiety and depression cf. SANUTO, XXXIX., 341, 377, 425, 459.

³ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 3; SANUTO, XXXIX., 282, 326, 341, 342, 343; PROFESSIONE, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 37.

might on young Francesco Sforza. The Duchy of Milan had been reconquered in his name, but he now saw himself given over to the arbitrary rule of the Imperial governor and treated with the most offensive insolence by the very men to whom, in their extreme danger, he had been a firm support. Milan was under greater oppression than had ever been known under French domination. The complete subjection of Sforza and the incorporation of the Duchy into the Spanish Monarchy seemed now only a question of time. To free his native land from the foreigner, the Duke's Chancellor, Girolamo Morone, devised a plan as clever as it was daring.¹ Pescara, the Emperor's ablest general, felt himself ill-used and pushed into the background by his master. Morone thus hoped to secure him. In deep secrecy, after the most cautious overtures, he disclosed to Pescara his plan for delivering Italy from the Imperial sway, and, in the event of success, promised him nothing less than the kingdom of Naples, which the Pope would confer upon him. Although Pescara did not commit himself to any definite assent, Morone was under the impression that the Emperor's general would yield to these brilliant promises. The impetuous Italian believed that the game was in his hands, and put himself into communication with Venice, Rome, and France. Soon all who were initiated into the adventure were filled with the most overweening hopes. "I see the world transformed," wrote Giberti, "and Italy arising from the depths of misery

¹ For Morone and his conspiracy see DANDOLO, *Ricordi inediti* d. G. Morone, Milano, 1855; G. MÜLLER, *Docum. p. la vita di G. Morone*, in *Miscell. d. stor. Ital.*, III., Torino, 1865; DE LEVA, II., 281 *seqq.*; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 449 *seqq.*; CIPOLLA, 891 *seqq.*; REUMONT, V. Colonna, 75 *seq.*; GIODA, G. Morone e i suoi tempi, Milano, 1887; JACQUETON, 215; *cf.* SALTINI, G. Morone, Firenze, 1868.

to the summit of prosperity,"¹ Clement VII., who, at this time, saw everything through the eyes of his present adviser, was of the same mind.² But Pescara was at heart a thorough Spaniard; he despised the Italians, and only wished to become privy to their plots and to delay the crisis of the conspiracy. In secret he betrayed all to the Emperor and promised to send him money and troops so as to enable him with all possible speed to make peace with France. For never had the danger been greater. Not only the Pope, Venice, and Milan, but also Genoa and Ferrara were united in one common hatred of the Spaniard and fear of the Imperial supremacy.³

Pescara, being in possession of conclusive evidence, threw off the mask. On the 14th of October 1525 Morone, who had been lulled into security, was suddenly seized, and all important places in the Duchy put under military occupation. Against Francesco Sforza, who had taken refuge in the citadel of Milan, a charge of felony was laid; the Milanese authorities were bidden henceforward to execute their functions in the Emperor's name.⁴

The news of these proceedings reached Rome on the 18th of October. They caused as much perplexity, terror, and despondency as the victory of Pavia had done, especially among those who were implicated in the intrigues.⁵ The Spaniards and their partisans at once

¹ Lettera a Ghinucci, in, *Lettere di principi* (ed. princeps), I., 170. RANKE, *Deutsche Gesch.*, II., 2nd ed., 343.

² Report of Fr. de Quiñones, Rome, August 26, 1525. GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 188; *cf.* n. 221.

³ BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 455.

⁴ ROMANIN, V., 415. On November 14 orders were given to pay in all the revenues of the State to the Abbot of Najera. MÜLLER, *Docum.*, n. 243.

⁵ GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 224, 240; SANUTO, XL., 133, 137 *seq.*; *despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, October 19, 1525 (State Archives, Florence).

took up an aggressive attitude. To Cardinal Colonna, who had left Rome a few days earlier, the remark was attributed that "with 100,000 ducats he would pledge himself to drive the Pope from his capital."¹ By the 20th of October Mendoza had come upon the scene commissioned by Pescara to explain the reasons for Morone's arrest and the necessity, arising therefrom, of occupying the Duchy. Clement was unable, at first, to conceal his embarrassment; but afterwards he controlled himself, and tried to justify his recent conduct: the restitution of Reggio and Rubbiera had not taken place, but had been indefinitely deferred; in like manner the article concerning the salt monopoly had not been complied with; further, the Imperial forces continued to occupy the Papal States, to the ruin of the population. To crown all came the removal of the French King into Spain and the suspicious visit of the Duke of Ferrara to the Emperor. In view of the generally received opinion that Charles intended to come to terms with his prisoner to the detriment of the Papacy and of the whole of Italy, Clement had been filled with the greatest distrust, and had taken a share in the movements against the Emperor, so as not to be left in total isolation. Since the occupation of Milan by the Emperor's troops he was fully under the impression that Charles was aiming at the complete conquest and subjugation of Italy. Mendoza and Sessa laboured in vain, during the following days, to convince the Pope that such apprehensions were groundless.² Clement was emphatic in declaring that every-

¹ SANUTO, XL., 138.

² GAYANGOS, III., n. 224, 235, 239, 240. *Despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, October 21, 1525: "Il Signor Lopez Hurtado arrivò hier sera, et questa matina è stato lungamente con N. S."; there follows a summary of the substance of the conversation. According to a *despatch of the same envoy on October 25, Mendoza wished to leave

thing hung on the possession of Milan, and that he should never reconcile himself to Lombardy being ruled by Charles or Ferdinand. This possession of Milan clashed with the conditions of the investiture of the kingdom of Naples; it gave the Emperor unlimited power in Italy, and rather than yield on this point, he would prefer to share the downfall of all the princes of Italy. The Pope made no concealment of his determination to act on the defensive with Venice, France, and England.¹

The extent of Clement's alarm at this moment is shown from the fact that he at once gave orders to provide Parma and Piacenza with troops, and that he saw to the fortification of Rome and to the enlistment of additional troops.²

There were real grounds for the fears of Clement and the Italians. "The only remedy," wrote Mendoza to Charles on the 5th of November, "lies in this: to make peace with France, to take possession of Milan, and—to wrest both Parma and Piacenza from our Holy Mother the Church."³ Thus wrote the man who had just been impart-

on the following day (State Archives, Florence). The Pope viewed the journey of Alfonso from Ferrara with displeasure but, owing to the occupation of the territory of the Church, maintained the suspension of relations for six months. Alfonso, however, never reached the Emperor, for, in understanding with Clement, he was not allowed to pass through France. Cf. SANUTO, XXXIX., 430, 450, 481; XL., 201-202, 245. The *Brief of Suspension here referred to, dated Rome, September 23, 1525, was found by me in the original, in the State Archives, Modena. The discussion in Consistory upon this circumstance took place on September 15. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 253, 256, 258; SANUTO, XL., 174; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 494.

² SANUTO, XL., 220; GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 253, 271.

³ GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 253. Cf. also the letter of Leyva, in MÜLLER, Docum., n. 244, and DE LEVA, II., 301 *seq.*

ing to the Pope the most pacifying assurances. Can Clement and the other Italian powers be blamed if they sought to make their own position secure? "Intrigues are more rife than ever," Caracciolo reported to the Emperor on the 10th of November from Venice. "All depends on separating Venice and the Pope: it would be a very easy thing to win the latter."¹ Charles V. seems also to have taken this view; hence the distinguished reception given, at the beginning of October, to Cardinal Salviati at Toledo. The Emperor spoke so convincingly of his peaceful intentions, of his plans against Turks and heretics, of his filial reverence for the Holy Father, that not the least doubt of his sincerity occurred to Salviati. The Emperor also gave tranquillizing assurances with respect to Milan, Reggio, and Rubbiera; in reality he meant very differently.² But for the moment his one object was, while keeping his hold on Clement and winning him over by fair words and promises, to crush the dangerous movement towards freedom in Italy. For this purpose he sent a special envoy to Rome in the person of Miguel de Herrera.

In the meantime the opposite party pressed their suit on Clement not less zealously. The Spanish envoys saw with special anxiety the strenuous efforts of the Venetians to bring the Pope to a final decision. Their fears increased as the couriers came and went incessantly between Rome and Venice.³ Clement was as far as ever from any fixed determination. The alarm caused by the arrest of Morone influenced him powerfully. This procrastination caused dissatisfaction not only to the anti-Imperialists but to the

¹ GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 256.

² MOLINI, I., 191 *seqq.*; GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 246; SANUTO, XL., 296; DE LEVA, II., 302 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 88 *seq.*; PROFESSIONE, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 57 *seq.*

³ GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 260, 271.

Roman public,¹ who attributed all their misfortunes to the Pope's indecision and stinginess.² Just at this time a powerful impulse was given to the hopes and spirits of the Italians; Pescara, the special object of their hatred and the Emperor's ablest general, was removed by death in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of December, while France had made fresh promises. Incessant pressure was now put on the Pope to give his adhesion to the League for good and all.³

The position in the meantime was such that armed intervention in support of Italy by France and England could not be expected with any certainty. To strike single-handed would have been foolhardiness.⁴ Under such circumstances even a man of strong determination would have hesitated; much more Clement VII., whose leading characteristics were timidity and indecision. No one has described his strange character so strikingly as Guicciardini.⁵ Always slow in forming his plans as well as in their execution, Clement was easily frightened by the smallest difficulty. Hardly had he come, by good luck, to a decision, than the reasons which had led him fell entirely into the background, and it seemed to him that he had not sufficiently weighed those on the other side. He often gave way to

¹ *Canossa al conte Alberto di Carpi, dated Venice, November 15, 1525: "Mi spaventa alquanto la troppo circumspezzione di N. S^{re}." The Venetians "benissimo disposti," but as yet have given no definite answer. To the same from Venice, November 25: Venice is ready to join the League, when the Pope does so. "Dapoi io hebbi la lettera di V. S. per la quale mi scrive che a Roma si trovano de la difficultà" (Communal Library, Verona).

² GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 279.

³ Cf. Canossa's * letters to Giberti, November 25 and December 2, 1525 (Capitular Library, Verona).

⁴ GRETHEN, 90. Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 495.

⁵ GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5.

the representations of his advisers without being thoroughly convinced by them. If only his ministers had been at least of one mind! But Giberti had always been a strong adherent of France, and Schönberg an equally strong Imperialist; this made the confusion complete. The Pope's attitude depended on which of these two alternating counsellors was in the ascendant.

Giberti's influence was now once more to be thwarted. If we may believe Guicciardini, the day for the conclusion of the League against Charles V. had been already fixed when the news was brought that Herrera had landed at Genoa. This was enough to reopen the whole question from the beginning. The Pope announced that he must first hear the proposals which Herrera was bringing from the Emperor.¹

Herrera reached Rome at last on the 6th of December, bringing with him very friendly letters from Charles and drafts of a treaty which had been discussed with Salviati; Schönberg was now at once in the ascendant. Giberti, who, on the 5th, still had strong hopes of securing the Pope's adhesion on the following day, was now in such despair that he threatened to leave Rome.² Perhaps, as the opponents of Charles feared, an alliance between the Pope and Emperor might then have been made, if Herrera's offers had been satisfactory. This, however, was not the case, and the

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 5, whose account is confirmed by the Venetian reports in SANUTO, XI., 307, 344 *seq.*, 365, 410-11, 431-432. *Cf.* also GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 284, 286. G. de' Medici states on December 3, 1525: *Quà non manchano di continuare le pratiche da Francia et Inghilterra et Venetiani per tirar N. S. dicono alla defensione della libertà d' Italia. S. Sta pare resoluta aspectare l' huomo viene et vedere quello porta et secondo porterà governarsi et se necessità non la stringiera non vede che S. Sta sia per mectersi in periculo et spesa senza suo proficto per bonificare et assicurare quelli d' altri (State Archives, Florence).

² SANUTO, XL., 433, 473 *seq.*

negotiations took shape with difficulty. The Pope was determined that with respect to Reggio and Rubbiera something more concrete and tangible than mere promises should be forthcoming. Over the Milanese question, the turning-point of all, agreement was impossible. Matters having reached this point, Sessa and Herrera proposed that the negotiations should be suspended for two months, with the secret intention of gaining time in which to make fresh preparations for war and arouse suspicion among Clement's previous friends. Schönberg and Salviati managed to raise Clement's distrust of the French and other anti-Imperialists to such a pitch that he accepted the Spanish proposal.¹ The Pope, however, expressly declared at the time that if the Emperor did not surrender Milan within the appointed term of adjournment he would enter the League with France and Venice.²

The opponents of Charles in Rome, Giberti, Carpi, and Foscari, as well as the ministers of the Queen Regent, were highly exasperated³ by this decision; not less so Guicciardini⁴ and Canossa.⁵ In this respect their com-

¹ For the mission of Herrera *cf.* GAYANGOS, III., n. 1, 299, 300; VILLA, Italia, 107 *seqq.*; SANUTO, XL., 506 *seq.*; BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 196 *seqq.*; DE LEVA, II., 305 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 92 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 495 *seq.*; JACQUETON, 234 *seq.*; HELLWIG, 18 *seq.*, 22; CREIGHTON, V., 267, and PROFESSIONE'S rare monograph, in which use has been made of unpublished material, La politica di Carlo V. nelle due legazioni del Caracciolo e dell' Herrera a Venezia e a Roma, Asti, 1889. The statement that Schönberg and Salviati brought about the Pope's decision is in SANUTO, XL., 624.

² SANUTO, XL., 507; *cf.* 624, and RAYNALDUS, 1525, n. 90.

³ GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 299; *cf.* BREWER, IV., i., n. 1814, 1902; BROWN, III., n. 1191, 1201; SANUTO, XL., 507, 532 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 93-94; HELLWIG, 12.

⁴ Lett. d. princ., II., 102; *cf.* GUICCIARDINI, Op. ined., VIII., 363 *seq.*

⁵ "Per il tacere suo," wrote Canossa on December 15, 1525, to Giberti, "et per altra via ne ho inteso quanto basta a farmi stare mal contento et

plaints of the Pope were hardly justified. The time gained by the adjournment was certainly of advantage to the Emperor, but also to the Pope. Clement might well hope that in two months' time the state of things, especially the attitude of France and England, would have become so much clearer that he might more easily make the decision charged with such weighty issues.¹

Before the two months were out, on the 14th of January 1526, the Peace of Madrid was settled between Charles and Francis. By this agreement the captive King of France consented to almost all the demands of the victor. He surrendered the Duchy of Burgundy, the countship of Charolais, and the suzerainty over Flanders and Artois; Bourbon and the other rebels were amnestied; all claims to Naples, Milan, Genoa, and Asti were renounced; and lastly, he promised to supply forces on land and sea to accompany Charles on his expedition to Rome, or in warfare against the Turk.² After inexplicable delays the

quasi a desperare in tutto la salute d' Italia parèndomi assai più ragionevole il credere." The following is given in *PROFESSIONE*, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 61. On December 22, 1525, Canossa * wrote to Robertet: "Vista la irresoluzione del papa et non sperando che S. S.^{ma} intri in questa liga se non vede forze tale in Italia che lo possi securare del timore che ha de lo imperatore mi son sforzato di persuadere a questa Signoria che essa si voglia risolvere senza il papa." Cf. also the * letter to Louisa of Savoy, December 22, 1525 (Communal Library, Verona).

¹ BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 497.

² DUMONT, IV., I, 399 *seqq.* Capino da Capo, who came to Rome on February 20, 1526, brought a draft of the treaty; see SALVIOLI, XVI., 278. On March 5, Cardinal Cibo, in Consistory, read a letter from Charles announcing the conclusion of peace, and on the 10th Clement VII. congratulated the Emperor, and informed him of the peace celebrations in Rome (*Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor, Consistorial Archives; BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 223 *seq.*). These celebrations are also described by CORNELIUS DE FINE in his *Diary (National Library, Paris).

Emperor ratified the treaty at last on the 11th of February. On the 17th of March Francis was exchanged for his two sons, who were to remain with Charles as hostages. With the cry: "Me voici roi derechef,"—"Now I am once again a King!"—he set foot on French soil.¹

The Treaty of Madrid was perhaps the gravest political mistake which Charles V. had made. Not without reason did his Chancellor Gattinara refuse to declare his agreement with demands which he knew to be excessive and impracticable. The treaty in fact laid upon the vanquished obligations of such vast extent that their fulfilment from a man like Francis I. could never be expected. Still less was it to be supposed that such a nation as France would degrade itself to become a power of the second rank and own vassalage to the Emperor. Public opinion on the whole, so far as such a thing could then be spoken of, was now steadily inclining towards Francis. In view of the almost brutal way in which Charles was seizing the spoils of victory, hardly anyone believed that the King would observe the peace. In Italy especially this opinion had wide acceptance.

Although no one had any inkling of the secret protest made by Francis before the conclusion of the treaty, he was counselled on all sides to break the oath he had just sworn.² Even Clement VII., the practical politician,³ was

¹ BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 474 *seq.*, 484 *seq.*; MIGNET, II., 198 *seq.*

² GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 6; GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 358; PROFESSIONE, Dalla battaglia di Pavia, 68. Cf. the ** letters of Canossa to Giberti on February 3, to the Regent on February 5 and March 1, to Carpi on February 19, and to Robertet on February 21, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

³ According to the report sent to Wolsey by the Bishop of Worcester, Clement VII., on seeing the draft of the Treaty of Madrid, said he thought it good, provided that Francis, on regaining his liberty, did not observe its conditions. RAUMER, Briefe I., 247.

in this instance no exception ;¹ he considered that treaty and oath, if extorted, were not binding.² The Pope wished in the first place to obtain clear information of the intentions of Francis. He therefore sent, as Venice had done, an embassy to the King, ostensibly to congratulate him on his release from captivity, but really to discover his true intention and, in the event of his not keeping the treaty with Charles, to form an alliance with him. On the 22nd of February 1526 Paolo Vettori was entrusted on the part of the Pope with this mission. Vettori having fallen ill on the journey, Capino da Capo, who was in the confidence of Francis, was ordered to go to France on the 1st of March 1526.³ Yet a further appointment was made on the 20th

¹ See SANUTO, XL., 849 *seqq.*

² Francis I. broke his word on the advice of an assembly of notables of the three estates ; see Rev. d. quest. hist., 1903, I., 114 *seq.* That Clement VII. dispensed Francis formally from his oath, as Sandoval and Sepulveda assert, appears doubtful, and rightly so, to GRETHEN, 98. The fact that Charles V., in his vehement letter of complaint against Clement VII., introduces the subject only with an "it is said," is deserving of notice. This, certainly, is not conclusive proof, but the formal dispensation still remains open to grave doubt, all the more so as Francis I. never appealed to it in his own defence (*cf.* MARTIN, 73). Still less satisfactory is the evidence afforded by remarks of Clement, made, according to reports of Mais, in 1529, under very different circumstances, to another agent of the Emperor's (BAUMGARTEN, II., 519). I have sought in vain in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, and in the National Archives in Paris, for a document containing the absolution from the oath. It is impossible to draw any certain conclusion from this, as the mass of Roman documents is great and they have not all come down to us in a perfect state. *Cf.* also EHSES, Concil. IV., XXIV., note 2, and FRAIKIN, XLI.

³ *Cf.* SANUTO, XL., 873 *seqq.* ; GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 6 ; JACQUETON, 262 *seq.* ; FRAIKIN, 7 ; RAYNALDUS, 1526, n. 27 ; BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 220-222. The original of the Pope's letter to the French Chancellor in the National Archives, Paris, L 357. Fr. Gonzaga speaks of the Pope's grief at the death of Vettori in a *despatch,

of April, when the Florentine Roberto Acciaiuoli was nominated Nuncio-in-ordinary at the French court.¹

Capino could hardly travel quick enough to please the Pope; for safety his letters were addressed to a merchant in Rome.² By the end of March he arrived at the French court, where at the same time Andrea Rosso, the representative of Venice, made his appearance. The King received Capino most graciously, and assured him that he would willingly do all in his power to prevent Charles from putting his yoke on Italy; he would give a full and definite answer as soon as the solemnities of Easter were over.³ On Easter Monday, the 2nd of April, the formal negotiations began.⁴ By the 8th Capino was able to announce that France was won for the League; Venice and the Pope had only now to send the full powers to conclude the alliance.⁵ The news that Francis was prepared to support the work of "the liberation of Italy" and to come to the help of Francesco Sforza, still beleaguered by the Spaniards in the citadel of Milan, caused the greatest excitement in all who were privy to the scheme.

The great coalition against the Emperor was now only a question of time. If it did not become an accomplished fact until the 22nd of May, this was on account of the gravity

March 9, 1526. He also reported on April 19 that the Pope had received letters from Capino during the night; Capino reports on Francis' friendly disposition, but nothing special (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

¹ Cf. PIEPER, *Nuntiaturen*, 82 *seq.*, and FRAIKIN, 12 *seq.*

² SANUTO, XLI., 68, 133, 157, 178.

³ Capino's report in FRAIKIN, 7 *seq.* It differs from the original draft (Lett. del. 1526 al 27) in the Ricci Archives in Rome, dated March 29, 1526.

⁴ SANUTO, XLI., 190 *seqq.*; cf. JACQUETON, 269.

⁵ Report of Capino's, April 8, 1526, in Fraikin, 8 *seq.*

of the transaction and the mutual distrust of the contracting parties.¹ However great was the desire of all the Emperor's enemies that he should be vanquished, no one wished to take the first and principal part in his overthrow. The Italians were still, not without reason, filled with jealousy of France; they wished, therefore, that England should enter the League in order to secure them from any defection on the part of Francis I. Henry VIII., however, wished the League to be ratified in England, a proceeding which would have meant the loss of much precious time. But bold action was called for under any circumstances, for just at that particular moment the Emperor's forces were in a critical state owing to the want of money and provisions. Since Henry held firm to his demand, the accession of England to the League had to be renounced.²

In Venice decisive measures were pushed on. At a very early date movements of troops began, the object of which admitted of no doubt.³ Even the Pope now stood firm, although his Spanish Nuncio, Castiglione, repeatedly besought him in eloquent language to withdraw from an undertaking certain to bring ruin in its train.⁴ "These clever persons," wrote Canossa on the 19th of February to Giberti from Venice, "who would persuade his Holiness that the league with France involves his own ruin and that of Italy, and that no one is bound to sacrifice himself in order to give freedom to others, ought simply

¹ Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 500: PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 12.

² HELLWIG, 14-15; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 482.

³ PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 11.

⁴ Cf. the letter to Schönberg, and especially the long and candid letter to the Pope himself from Toledo, December 28, 1525, both in SERASSI, II., 11 *seq.*, 19 *seq.*

to tell us what ruin can ensue greater than that which we have to fear at this present time."¹ The direct sovereignty of the Emperor over Milan, in the opinion of a Sienese diplomatist, meant for the Pope and Venice the total loss of independence.²

Thus Castiglione's warnings were unheeded. However favourably he and Salviati might represent the Emperor's intentions, facts in Italy told another story. The whole country cried out for deliverance from the galling yoke of the Spaniards, whose soldiery were driving the people of Lombardy to despair. "Hunt down these wild beasts who have only the faces and voices of men," exclaimed Macchiavelli. "Alas! poor Italy," sighed a poet, "whither hast thou fallen? Thy glory, thy fame, thy strength have perished."³ Guicciardini expressed the opinion of all patriotic men when he spoke of the war of deliverance as a holy and necessary national event.⁴ Clement concurred all the more willingly in the general voice since, duped by the Imperialists, he saw the most important stipulations of the April treaty still left unfulfilled. Parma and Piacenza were still overrun by the troops of Charles and their inhabitants subjected to the heaviest exactions. If this was a cause of resentment to the Pope, not less so were the Emperor's encroachments, not only in

¹ * Vorrei che quelli tanti savi che hanno persuaso a N. S., che l'unirsi con Franza fosse la rovina di S. Sta e d' Italia e che non era da mettere in preda se per liberare altrui, mi dicessero quale rovina potea sequire maggiore di quella che ora si puo e si deve temere. Canossa to Giberti, Venice, February 19, 1526 (Capitular Library, Verona).

² Report of Carolus Massainus, March 26, 1526 (State Archives, Siena), in PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 5. Cf. also SALVIOLI, XVI., 276, and GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 1.

³ Cf. DE LEVA, II., 329; FOSSATI-FALLETTI, Clemente VII., 9-10; REUMONT, III., 2, 172 seq.; SALVIOLI, XVI., 284.

⁴ Opere inedite, I., 393.

Naples but also in Spain, on the Papal prerogatives regarding presentation to ecclesiastical posts. What turned the scale, however, was Charles's unmistakable endeavour to secure for himself the sovereignty of Milan and, with it, of all Italy.¹ The idea of European dominion was more and more inseparably bound up with the possession of this noble land. "Let the Emperor," said a Roman diplomatist, "rule Italy, and he will rule the world. *Vae miserae Italiae et nobis viventibus!*"²

Thus on the 22nd of May 1526 was brought about between Clement VII., Francis I., Venice and Sforza, the so-called Holy League of Cognac. By this compact, which was for the greater part the work of Giberti,³ it was settled that the Duchy of Milan belonged to Francesco Sforza, who, thenceforward, was to pay 50,000 ducats yearly to France; all Italian states were to receive back the possessions which they held before the war; Asti and the suzerainty of Genoa were to fall to France; Venice and the Pope were to decide on the number of the retinue of the Emperor on his journey to Rome for the coronation, and the sons of Francis I. were to be ransomed for a reasonable sum. If these terms were refused by the Emperor, the members of the League were to declare war against him and also wrest from him the kingdom of Naples, to be bestowed by the Pope on an Italian prince, who should then pay to the King of France a yearly tribute of 75,000 ducats. In the event of the hoped-for inclusion of England taking place, further special stipulations were

¹ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVI., 6, XVII. 7; SANUTO, XLI., 286; GRETHEN, 95 *seq.* For the Pope's protests against the Emperor's encroachments on the ecclesiastical sphere in Naples, see GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 484.

² R. Acciaiuoli in DESJARDINS, II., 861.

³ Cf. Giberti's testimony in FIGHI, Giberti, 23, and App. VIII.

agreed upon. Two secret clauses were added by which Florence was also to enjoy the protection of the League, and Clement, in the event of the Emperor complying and retaining the Neapolitan kingdom, was to receive from the revenues of that crown a yearly tribute of 40,000 ducats.¹ "We have succeeded," Capino reported on the 24th of May to Umberto da Gambara; "the treaty was concluded the day before yesterday; for God's sake keep all as secret as possible."²

¹ DUMONT, IV., 1, 451 *seq.*; SANUTO, XLI., 348 *seqq.*, 383 *seqq.*, 392 *seqq.*, 400 *seqq.*, 440 *seqq.*, 451 *seqq.*; Libri commem., VI., 183 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 99 *seq.*; HELWIG, 15 *seq.* Cf. also Capino's report in FRAIKIN, 16 *seqq.*

² Capino to Gambara, Cognac, May 24, 1526 (Ricci Archives, Rome), now published in FRAIKIN, 26 *seq.* See also the fuller despatches of Capino and R. Acciaiuoli from copies in the Vatican. A better transcript in the Ricci Archives, in Rome, which I was allowed to see through the kindness of the late Marchese Giovanni Ricci in 1891, was not known to Fraikin, as these archives are no longer accessible.

CHAPTER IX.

CLEMENT VII. AND ITALY AT WAR WITH CHARLES V.

—THE RAID OF THE COLONNA.

THE exorbitant demands made by the victor of Pavia were followed by a natural reaction; this took the shape of the great coalition known as the League of Cognac. To the Italians, in whom thoughts of nationality were stirring, the long-wished-for moment seemed to have come to grasp their freedom and independence. In the opinion of Giberti the war was not undertaken on behalf of affronted honour, nor for revenge, nor to establish the supremacy of this or that city—the stake was the freedom or the perpetual slavery of Italy; never had a more favourable opportunity been given than now to clip the wings of the ever-threatening eagle.¹

The Pope's confidant had deceived himself in a matter of the gravest consequence. In the first place, the stipulations agreed to at Cognac were of such a character that, even in case of success, far more influence would accrue to France in the affairs of Italy than would be compatible with the real independence of that sorely tried country. Still more prejudicial was the diversity of personal aims among the members of the League. The Italians hoped, with the help of France, to shake off the Spanish yoke, while Francis I. really only wished to make use of the

¹ Lettere de' principi, II., 110, 113.

Italians in order to set at naught the Peace of Madrid.¹ Lastly, as regards Francesco Sforza, hard pressed by the Spaniards and in extreme danger in the citadel of Milan, the conclusion of the League was premature, since the forces necessary for his relief were anything but ready;² in Rome these circumstances were completely overlooked. As soon as it was known for a certainty that the League was settled there was an outburst of strong warlike feeling throughout the city.³

Orders were given without delay that the Papal troops should concentrate at Piacenza, and everything was done to hasten the advance of the Venetians and Swiss against Lombardy. Arrangements were made as if war against Charles had already been declared. In the first week of June, Guido Rangoni, Vittello Vitelli, and Giovanni de' Medici were enlisted in the service of Florence and of the Pope. Francesco Guicciardini, who had distinguished himself, under very difficult circumstances, as Governor of the ever-restless Romagna, undertook the post of Commissary-General with almost unlimited powers over the army.⁴ In Papal circles the most comprehensive plans were proposed for the expulsion of the Imperialists from Italy. The first necessity was to guarantee the safety of Rome and the Papal States; prisoners were to be confined in the city itself; it was

¹ Cf. GRETHEN, 101; BROSCHE, I., 91.

² GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 1.

³ "Tutta Roma grida guerra," reports G. Cesano to Giov. de' Medici, June 2, 1526; Arch. stor. Ital., N. S., IX., 2, 132. Cf. VILLA, Italia, 125 *seq.*, and GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 440, 447.

⁴ See GUICCIARDINI, Storia, XVII., 2, and Op. ined., IV., 26 *seq.* Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 204, and CIPOLLA, 901. About Guicciardini as Governor of the Romagna and the disorder there prevailing, see the reports in Vol. VIII., Op. ined.; also BROSCHE, I., 77 *seq.*, and GIODA, Guicciardini, Bologna, 1880, 232.

forbidden to carry arms; the Spaniards were closely watched; no one could travel through the Papal States or Florentine territory without special permission; no one was allowed to raise troops for the enemy. As a safeguard against the Colonna there was a scheme for seizing Paliano and cutting it off from Naples by the help of the Conti and Gaetani. It was taken for granted that actual war would begin with the capture of the citadel of Milan by Papal and Venetian troops; this having been successful, the Milanese territory would be occupied as thoroughly as possible, and there the arrival of the French and Swiss would be awaited. But at the same time combined attack was to be made on the Imperialists from many other quarters: in Genoa by Andrea Doria; in Siena with the help of the exiles; in Naples by co-operation with the Orsini, and in Apulia by means of a Venetian fleet. There were further projects of obtaining aid from Savoy and the enemies of Charles in Germany. Moreover, to the Venetians was given the task of blockading the passes of the Alps so as to prevent the Imperialists being reinforced from Germany.¹ By these united efforts it was hoped to break down the Emperor's power, and to replace Italy in the position which she held prior to 1494.

The Pope, who on other occasions was so extraordinarily

¹ Cf. ***Provisioni per la guerra che disegnò papa Clemente VII. contra l'imperatore Carlo V.* in *Inf. polit.*, XII., 473-480, of the Royal Library, Berlin (cf. RANKE, *Deutsche Gesch.*, II., 2nd ed., 357), in *Cod. CXXIII.* (National Library, Florence), and in *Cod. Ottob.*, 2514, f. 96-102 (Vatican Library). A. Doria reached Rome on May 21, 1526; see *Arch. stor. Ital.*, N. S., IX., 2, 130. *N. Raince reported on June 12, 1526, that the Pope had prepared a Bull forbidding all vassals of the Church to form confederacies among themselves. *Fonds franç.*, 2984, f. 6^b (National Library, Paris). For Clement's compact with Bavaria see SUGENHEIM, 9-10.

nervous and apprehensive, shared Giberti's warlike spirit and his certainty of victory.¹ Both, however, were gravely in error concerning friends and foes alike. They rated the strength of the former too high and that of the latter too low; neither of them weighed the fact that the last thing for which the Papal finances were adequate was the cost of a war; both believed too easily that their hopes would be realized, and allowed themselves to be drawn into an undertaking the execution of which would have taxed to the utmost even the capacities of a Julius II.²

As soon as Charles V. became aware of the danger threatening him he determined to break through the enemy's circle. Ugo de Moncada, already distinguished in the Spanish service by his craft and boldness, and hated for his cruelty towards his foes, was appointed to carry out the enterprise. The choice seemed unfortunate even to so sympathetic an Imperialist as Castiglione, for Moncada belonged to the "Exaltados," whose policy aimed at the subjection of all Italy to Spanish military despotism.³

Moncada first turned to Francesco Sforza in order to induce him to desert the League.⁴ On the failure of this mission he betook himself to Rome, which he reached on the 16th of June. He came, "with a barrel-

¹ Cf. the letter of N. Raince, June 9, 1526, in the *Rev. d. deux Mondes*, LXII. (1866), 17, n. 1, and SANUTO, XLI., 466, 483. Macchiavelli's statement, that Clement hoped to bring the war to an end in two weeks, sounds incredible. On the contrary, the Pope informed the Duke of Bavaria that the allies hoped to be victors in Italy within a year; SUGENHEIM, 10, n. 14.

² Cf. the opinion of GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 3, and VETTORI, 363, 365, as well as GRETHEN, 105.

³ SERASSI, II., 37.

⁴ HELLWIG, 32 *seq.*

ful of promises,"¹ too late, for three days before, the College of Cardinals had approved the League of Cognac.²

Charles had instructed Moncada to try to bring the Pope to terms in a friendly way, or else, following the suggestion of Cardinal Colonna, to compel him by raising insurrection in Rome, Siena, and Florence, and driving him from the city. The Imperial instruction, dated the 11th of June 1526, closed with the words: "If you are unsuccessful in gaining Clement, speak secretly to Cardinal Colonna, so that he may set in hand, as if on his own initiative, the matter recommended by his agents, and give him privily every support."³ The representations and offers of Moncada and Sessa were quite ineffectual, as might have been foreseen from the explicit declaration made to the latter by Clement on the 9th of June.⁴ The Pope, prompted by Giberti, insisted on his treaty obligations. Without the consent of his allies, he could not come to terms with the Emperor. The proud Spaniards had not believed this to be possible, and, enraged at the blunt rejection of the ample inducements offered by them, they left the Vatican.

¹ Expression of the Secretary of the French Embassy, N. Rance. See GRETHEN, 110, and *Bullet. Ital.*, Bordeaux, 1901, I., 225.

² See *Acta Consist.* in FRAIKIN, LIV., n. 3, and the report, already made use of by GRETHEN, 114-115, of N. Rance to Francis I., dated Rome, June 17, 1526 (*National Library, Paris, Fonds franç.*, 2984, f. 41). In Rome the first news of the League became current on June 6. On the 7th (1526) Fr. Gonzaga wrote: *Per Roma si è sparso da heri in qua essere fatta la liga fra il papa, Venetiani et Francia et parlasi molto affermativamente. Tuttavia N. S. non la afferma. (But he was already acquainted with the fact on June 5; see GRETHEN, 115.) Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.

³ Charles V. to Moncada, dated Granada, June 11, 1526. LANZ, *Correspondenz*, I., 216.

⁴ Cf. the report of N. Rance in GRETHEN, 108.

On this occasion Sessa mounted a buffoon behind him whose grimaces gave expression to the Ambassador's feelings.¹ In accordance with the Emperor's instructions, the Spanish envoys began at once to lay the train for a revolution in Rome.

The circumstances were exceptionally favourable to such a scheme. The Romans were exceedingly incensed by the many taxes necessitated by the preparations for war.² When, in the last week of June, the butchers were laid under a fresh impost, they refused to pay and—a sufficiently significant circumstance—took refuge from the threatened arrests with the Imperial Ambassador. Sessa, in fact, forced the Papal police to withdraw without having attained their object. Meanwhile Rome was full of excitement, and two hundred Spaniards gathered round Sessa's palace. The Government, in consequence, was weak enough to remove the tax, but the levy of troops for the protection of Rome

¹ For the mission of Moncada *cf.* Lettere di principi, II., 129^b *seq.*, 130^b *seq.*, 135 *seq.*, 136 *seq.*, 137, 138; BREWER, IV., I, n. 2262, 2273, 2274; SANUTO, XLI., 664 *seqq.*; Carpi's letter in MOLINI, I., 204 *seq.*; the reports of Raince in GRETHEN, 108 *seq.*, and *Bullet. Ital.*, *loc. cit.*; letter of G. du Bellay in BAUMGARTEN, Charles V., II., 710 *seq.* *Cf.* also MIGNET, II., 234 *seq.*; BUCHOLTZ, III., 31 *seq.*; HELLWIG, 38 *seqq.*; BOURRILLY, 25. The following *despatch of Fr. Gonzaga is in favour of Hellwig's view that the rupture of negotiations took place on June 20. . . . Questi dui dì passati il s^r don Ugo e il s^r duca di Sessa sono stati al longo con S. S^{ta} la qual per partiti grandi che habbino proposto non ha voluto attendere a cosa alcuna, essendose risoluta de non potere ne volere fare altro senza la participatione et buona satisfatione de li suoi confederati, et sempre che essi hanno havuto parlamento cum lei ha mandato per li oratori de essi confederati, et halli comunicato tutti li ragionamenti che li hanno fatto esso don Ugo et duca, come si conviene alla adherentia et unione che hanno insieme. Credo che d. Ugo partirà de qui in breve. . . . Roma alli 21 di giugno MDXXVI. (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.)

² *Cf.* the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

continued.¹ The Pope also called to his assistance the house of the Orsini,² for he had not only the Roman populace to fear but the great Imperialist family of Colonna. To all appearances the latter had hitherto behaved peaceably;³ but the ashes were smouldering, and it only needed a puff of wind to rekindle them into flame. Cardinal Colonna, Clement's old enemy, could not forget that the latter had taken from him the tiara. Although this ambitious man had received the Vice-Chancellorship and numerous marks of favour from Clement,⁴ yet he thought himself insufficiently rewarded and, indeed, even placed in the background. Since the autumn of 1525 the breach between him and the Pope had become notorious. The Cardinal, in wrath and muttering threats of vengeance, had withdrawn to the strongholds of his family and there remained in spite of a Papal monition. The anti-Imperial policy of the Pope had raised his anger to the uttermost, and he repeatedly proposed to the Ambassadors of Charles to let loose a revolution against Clement in Rome, Siena, and Florence.⁵ The Emperor had yielded,⁶ and his representatives, Moncada and Sessa, protected by the right of nations, were now proceeding to enter more closely into the arrangements. On the 27th of June Moncada went to Gennezzano; Sessa,

¹ This episode is fully described in CORNELIUS DE FINE, *Diary (National Library, Paris).

² Report of N. Raince, June 11, 1526, in GRETHEN, 121. Cf. SANUTO, XLII., 26; SALVIOLI, XVI., 288, and CIPOLLA, 901.

³ *Li Colonesi non fanno per anchora dismostrazione alcuna anchora che si dica di motte zancie. G. de' Medici, Rome, June 28, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ Cf. *Regest. Vatic., 1238, f. 98 *seq.*, 1240, f. 35 *seq.*, 1242, f. 239 *seq.*, 1269, f. 162, 1275, f. 138 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁵ Cf. SANUTO, XL., 98, 346, 366, 431; GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 221, 253, 333, 363, 364.

⁶ See *supra*, p. 310.

who had already, on the feast of SS. Peter and Paul, presented the palfrey, but without the usual tribute, went immediately afterwards to Naples to collect money and troops; both travelled with Papal passports.¹

While the Imperialists were thus acting secretly against the Pope, the latter had entered openly on his contest with Charles. His Brief of the 23rd of June 1526 brought this about.² This document contained a complete account of the relations which had existed between the Emperor and Clement since the election of the latter. While endeavour-

¹ Lett. d. princ., II., 150, 151^b *seq.*, 153; SANUTO, XLII., 27; VILLA, Italia, 136; *despatch of G. de' Medici, July 2, 1526 (State Archives, Florence); MOLINI, I., 205 *seq.*; GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 475, 476; *letter of N. Raince, July 5, 1526 (National Library, Paris, Fonds français, 2984, f. 10^b); SALVIOLI, XVI., 289; *cf.* 291 for the rejection, on SS. Peter and Paul's day, of the tribute of the Duke of Ferrara; the latter still persisted in his negotiations with the Pope, as the issue of events could not be foreseen. On July 12, 1526, G. de' Medici reports thus: *Egli è comparso iersera nova inbassata del ducha di Ferrara e porta tali conditioni a N. S. che per quello ne ritragho sarà facile cosa che si accordi e unisca con S. S^{ta}; and on July 16: *La pratica di Ferrara si tira avanti (State Archives, Florence).

² *A* The text of this Brief, beginning "Non opus esse credimus," was first published by Charles V. himself in the Libri apologetici duo 9-17, and copied from them by LE PLAT, II., 240-246. It is to be found also in Miscell. ex MS. Colleg. Romani, Romae, 1754, 475 *seqq.*, and in SADOLETI, Epist., IV., Romae, 1759, 161 *seqq.* Many say that the original draft was much sharper in expression; see SERASSI, II., 90. There is yet another copy of the Brief in BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 364-371, from Arm., 63, n. 88, in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, but it is very inaccurate (see Hist.-polit. Bl., XCV., 297, and EHSES, Concil. IV., XXIV., n. 3). The version given by RAYNALDUS, 1526, n. 11 *seq.*, from Sabellicus, and by LANZ, I., 222-223, from a MS. in the Brussels Library (the text here differs in particulars, and the conjectural date October 1526 is wrong), is not authentic. The Brief "Quam multa et magna," etc., dated Romae, A° 1525, printed in the Fascicul. rer. expetend., II., London, 1690, 683, is a forgery.

ing to justify his own policy he submitted the conduct of the Emperor to a criticism which was not only severe but perhaps immoderate. From the beginning of his pontificate he had made every reasonable attempt not only to maintain the general peace of Christendom, but especially to preserve friendly relations with Charles; but since these overtures had not been reciprocated, and had even been repelled, and the Emperor, either at the instigation of his advisers or from personal inclination and ambition, had determined to diminish and overpower the states of Italy and the Holy See, the Pope had been forced, after long delay and the final pressure of necessity, to declare a war of self-defence. In order to substantiate this position, Clement produced a long array of facts. While Cardinal he had been loyal to the Emperor, and had shirked no sacrifice on his account; likewise, after his elevation to the Papacy, although bound by his office to observe a strict neutrality, he had supported to the best of his power the Imperial interests in Italy, so far as was compatible with the due exercise of his functions as universal Father of Christians and with the interests of the Church.

The alliance with Francis had become a necessity owing to the pressure of circumstances and the strong persuasion of many persons. It had also been represented to him that by entering into the League he would secure great advantages. When the victory of Charles seemed to put an end to the war, he had at once concluded a treaty with him, assuring himself that thereby the greatest blessings would accrue to Italy and the whole of Christendom, and had given 100,000 ducats for the Imperial army, on condition of repayment in case the treaty should in any way be received with suspicion. Although the treaty had never been fully ratified, and the Emperor had thus left the Pope in the lurch, the latter had nevertheless, when informed of

the secret intrigues concerning Pescara, apprised and warned Charles, thereby giving him evidence of his unchanging friendship. Again, when, to his sorrow and that of all Italy, Sforza lay besieged in Milan, and the Pope was pressed on all sides to take steps against Charles, the mission of Herrera had at once aroused the wish to come to a good understanding with the Emperor and caused all other counsels to be brushed aside. Herrera's proposals he had accepted almost without alteration; and in a letter to Charles, written in his own hand, he had adjured him to disprove the charge of immoderate ambition by giving guarantees of peace to Italy, pardon to Sforza in the case of his surrender, and to afford protection to Clement himself.

In return, however, for all these and countless other marks of goodwill, the Pope received at the hands of the Imperialists only the most discourteous treatment. Clement VII. could point to the calumnies and insults of the Imperial agents in Italy, in whose words Charles puts more trust than in his; the violence offered to his adherents in Siena, against which he had in vain called to the Emperor for aid; the non-fulfilment of the treaty with Lannoy, of which all the articles favourable to Charles had been complied with while those of advantage to the Pope had been discarded; the delay in repaying the 100,000 ducats; the quartering of Imperial troops on Papal territory contrary to the treaty stipulations and accompanied by brutal oppression on the part of the soldiery; the want of consideration shown in concealing from him the conditions of the negotiations with Francis I.; the unjust treatment of Sforza, who had been condemned without any preliminary inquiry; the attacks on the ecclesiastical rights of the Holy See; the concealment from the Papal agents of Lannoy's dealings with Francis; the long sojourn of Moncada in France; the attempt to snatch

Parma from the Pope, and so forth. All these circumstances had, of necessity, filled Clement with deep distrust of the Emperor and induced him to transfer his friendship from the latter to other monarchs better disposed towards him. Therefore, when Moncada, late and after long delay, came to him with fresh proposals, their acceptance was no longer possible, and nothing was left for the Pope to do but to take up arms perforce, not as a personal attack on the Emperor, but to beat off a threatening servitude and to restore a general peace. Once more he adjured the Emperor not to force him into this hard necessity, and no longer to be led by the lust of power, but to give back rest and peace to Christendom, and so gain for himself praise as the most virtuous of princes.

The Pope at once felt that in this despatch he had gone too far. On the 25th of June, before the Cardinals gathered in Consistory, he produced the draft of a short letter to the Emperor, couched in gentler terms, in which he announced that his Nuncio, Baldassare Castiglione, would explain the reasons compelling him to protect by force of arms the freedom of Italy and the Apostolic See.¹ The Cardinals gave their approval to this document,² and, in a Consistory

¹ LE PLAT, II., 246-247, and BALAN, *Mon. saec.*, XVI., 233-234. HELLWIG'S uncertainty (42, n. 6) whether the date here given (25th) or that of the 24th, as stated in other sources, is correct may be removed by a reference to the *Acta Consist. quoted in the next note. The Brief was drawn up on the 24th, and sent off on the 25th.

² *Die lunae 25 Junii 1526: Card^{is} de Cesis legit litteras apostolicas in forma brevis mittendas ad ser. Carolum Romanorum regem in imperatorem electum significantes justificationes belli a S. D. N. suscepti contra exercitum Hispanum in Lombardia degentem, et conclusum est, quod scribantur etiam literae rev. dom. legato [Salviati] et nuntio [B. Castiglione] ibidem existentibus, ut possuit S. M^{ti} narrare hujusmodi justificationes. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

on the 4th of July they resolved that on the following Sunday, the 8th, the League should be formally made public. After solemn ratification by the Pope on the 5th¹ the publication took place amid such pomp and ceremony that Carpi reported that he had never in his life seen such a festival held in Rome.²

In the meantime the war in upper Italy had begun.

At first the position of the Imperialists was one of great danger. The Imperial generals, almost wholly without money, found themselves opposed to the superior forces of their enemies in the midst of a population driven to the extremities of hatred and downright despair by the cruelties of the Spanish tyranny. Everything turned on the use that the Leaguers made of this fortunate moment for seizing the citadel of Milan by a sudden assault. No one saw this more clearly than the Commissary-General of the Papal troops, Francesco Guicciardini. His plan was to move the troops swiftly and simultaneously on Milan, and to fall without delay on the Imperialists, even if the

¹ **Giberti's letter to Gambara, Rome, July 8, 1526 (Giovedì passato, che furono celli 5, N. S. in presentia de tutte li ambasciatori confirmò la lega come il Christ^{mo} adimandava). Lett. d. Segret. di stato, 1526-1527 (Ricci Archives, Rome).

² Die mercurii 4 Julii 1526: S. D. N. fecit verbum de foedere inito cum rege christianissimo . . . et fuit conclusum, quod hoc foedus publicetur die dominica in capella palatii et rev. dom. card^{lis} Tranensis [de Cupis] prior prybyterorum celebret et Laurentius Grana faciat sermonem et publicetur per tibicines in locis consuetis urbis et fiant luminaria consueta. Further, measures were decided upon to raise money for arms; Acta Consist., *loc. cit.* Cf. FRAIKIN, LVIII., n. 6; BLASIUS DE MARTINELLIS, *Diarium in Cod. Barb., lat. 2799, Vatican Library; SANUTO, XLII., 33, 45, 103; GAYANGOS, III., n. 478; the *letter of Carpi, July 8, 1526, and *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE, both in National Library, Paris. For the financial arrangements see also *despatch of G. de' Medici, July 9, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

arrival of the Swiss and French did not take place; for to remain inactive would ruin all.¹ Giberti was also of the same opinion, having already begun to feel anxious at the non-appearance of French help.²

The Commander-in-Chief of the Venetians, Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino, took an entirely different view; he found Guicciardini's plan much too bold, and would do nothing without the Swiss. In consequence of this division days were lost when every hour was precious. On the 21st of June Canossa wrote: "Our victory was assured, but is now so uncertain that I, for my part, have lost hope."³

While the allies were making excuses for their inaction,⁴ the Imperialists were able to repress a rising in Milan and to take measures for defence; but their position was still very precarious, especially now that Pescara was gone, and they had not more than ten or eleven thousand men to set against the strong force of three-and-twenty thousand opposing them.⁵ On the 24th of June the Imperialists lost the town of Lodi through treachery.⁶ The passage of the Adda was now secured to the allies, and the conjunction of the

¹ GUICCIARDINI, *Op. ined.*, IV., 65 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 506.

² For Giberti's letter see GRETHEN, 115, n. 3. That Giberti's anxiety was justified, is shown in the *report of the French Nuncio to Gambara. *Cf.* especially the letter of Acciaiuoli from Angoulême, June 29, 1526, to Gambara (Ricci Archives, Rome). *Cf.* also FRAIKIN, 58.

³ See *letter to Giberti, June 21, 1526, in PIGHI, App. XXXIX.

⁴ *Cf.* *Canossa's letter to Giberti, June 25, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

⁵ GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 2; BURIGOZZO in *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, I Series, III., 453 *seq.*; Giberti to Michele de Silva, *Lett. d. princ.*, II., 117.

⁶ *GRUMELLO, Cronaca, ed. Müller, Milano, 1856, 406. *Cf.* MARCUCCI, 126.

Papal and Venetian troops might have taken place by the end of June. Giberti rejoiced; he saw in spirit the country of his birth freed from the Spaniard.¹ As a matter of fact, no obstacle lay between the army of the League and the walls of Milan, where the people awaited them, in the anguish of suspense, as deliverers from the inhumanity of the Spaniards; the hapless Sforza still held out in the citadel. But the Duke of Urbino obstinately refused to give battle before the arrival of the Swiss, therefore his advance was very slow. His procrastination gave the Constable de Bourbon time to send money and fifteen hundred Spaniards to the help of the Imperialists.² On the 7th of July the Duke of Urbino at last ventured on an attack; because he was not at once successful, he gave orders to fall back in spite of all Guicciardini's counter-representations. His retreat was very like a flight. To such a leader might be applied in an altered form the saying of Cæsar: "He came, saw, and fled."³ After the arrival of five thousand Swiss the Duke made a fresh advance, but with extreme slowness. On the 22nd of July he took up a strong position before Milan; on the 24th he was still considering his plan of action when the news came that the garrison of the citadel, reduced to starvation, had surrendered to the Spaniards, who had begun to think of leaving the city. The strange conduct of the Duke of Urbino gave rise at the time to the suspicion that

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 2; Lett. d. princ., II., 151 *seqq.*

² See the *report of Carlo Massaini, Milan, July 18, 1526 (State Archives, Siena). Cf. the rare work of FOSSATI-FALLATI, Clemente VII., 10-11.

³ GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 2. Cf. Guicciardini's letters in BERNARDI, L' Assedio di Milano nel 1526, dappresso la corrispondenza inedita di Fr. Guicciardini (Secret Archives of the Vatican); Arch. Stor. Lomb., XXIII., 281 *seq.*

he wished to revenge himself on Clement VII. for what he had undergone at the hands of Leo X.¹

Simultaneously with these occurrences an unfavourable turn occurred on the scene of war in central Italy. The possession of Siena was at stake, a city of peculiar importance owing to its situation between Rome, Florence, and Lombardy.² There, after the battle of Pavia, the party friendly to the Pope, after having obtained a position of mastery with the help of the Duke of Albany, was overthrown and driven out. The new Ghibelline government was entirely on the Emperor's side, who claimed the city as his own.³ On the advice of Salviati,⁴ Clement made an attempt to recover this important position, and at the beginning of July a simultaneous attack from five quarters was made on the Sienese territory. The Count of Pitigliano advanced from the Maremma, Virginio Orsini through the Val d' Orcia, the troops of Perugia and the Florentines through the Val d' Arbia; the remainder of the Florentines through the Val dell' Elsa; the seaports being attacked

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 3; SANUTO, XLII., 308; CIPOLLA, 903. REUMONT (III., 2, 223 *seq.*) is opposed to the view that the Duke of Urbino was really a traitor, a view once more enforced by BALAN, Clemente VII., 64. "He was," is the verdict of the historian of Rome, "a tactician but a very poor commander, wanting altogether in decision." That the Duke, in any case, had "no inclination to risk anything on Clement's account," REUMONT maintains; he rejects (III., 2, 847) the attempts of Ugolini (II., 237 *seqq.*) and others to rehabilitate the Duke. MARCUCCI (134 *seq.*), tries to explain the Duke's conduct on tactical grounds, but carries his defence much too far.

² The importance of Siena was entirely overlooked by Canossa; *cf.* GRETHEN, 118. *Cf.* his *letter to Giberti, Venice, August 1, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

³ GRETHEN, 118.

⁴ See *Tommasi, Storia di Siena (City Library, Siena, A, IV., 3-4, f. 203). *Cf.* FOSSATTI-FALLETTI, Clemente VII., II, 16.

by Andrea Doria, who succeeded in at once taking Talamone and Porto Ercole. On land also everything at first went well; but afterwards Ugo de Moncada had the good luck to delay the march on Siena by introducing negotiations for peace. In the meantime, the leaders of the expedition fell out among themselves, each one having a different object in view. But the fatal error was the General's want of forethought in neglecting to make his camp sufficiently secure. On the 25th of July the Sienese made a sortie, took thirteen cannon and routed the besiegers.¹

The news of the failure of the attack on Siena reached Rome at the same time as that of the surrender of the citadel of Milan. The consternation was great, and Clement VII.'s grief at these misfortunes in the field was proportionate to his previous confidence. He complained bitterly of the Duke of Urbino, the Venetians, and Francis I.; he had been deserted, he declared, by those for whom he had placed himself in danger. Among the Emperor's friends hopes arose that the Pope might be led to abandon the League.²

The Pope's complaints were only too well justified. The help promised from France had, at this time, not yet arrived. The time of year favourable to military operations had gone by, and the Italians waited in vain for the succour of their French allies. This made a deep impression everywhere; even so blind a partisan

¹ Besides the "*Bellum Italianum*" published by Polidori in the *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, 1 Series, VIII., App., 257-342, *cf.* GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 3 and 4; ALFANI in *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, 1 Series, XVI., 2, 307; VETTORI, 365 *seq.*, and especially FOSSATTI-FALLETTI, Clemente VII., 11-18, a work of great importance on account of its wealth of unpublished documents.

² See GAYANGOS, III., 7, n. 504; *cf.* 524.
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of France as Canossa began to have a glimmering notion that his country was being betrayed, by Francis I. His position in Venice became intolerable; by the middle of July he was urgently asking for his recall.¹ Clement VII. thought that one more attempt must yet be made; on the 19th of July he sent Sanga, a confidant of Giberti's, to the French King to remind him, by earnest representations, of his obligations, and if possible to move him to give more supplies of money, and especially to undertake an expedition against Naples.² All was in vain; the fickle King seemed to have repented of all his martial zeal and was squandering his time and his revenues on the chase, gambling, and women.³ England, moreover, held coldly aloof;⁴ the Italians and the Pope were isolated.

The Duke of Urbino had in the meantime begun the

¹ Besides the anonymous writer in *Lettere di principi*, II., 157-158, the letters of Canossa of July 22 and 23, given under his name in *Lettere di XIII huomini*, 20 *seq.*, see above all his *letter of July 14, 1526. On August 19 Canossa wrote to F. Robertet that the Italians' distrust of Francis was reacting on himself; he begged to be removed from his post; he wished under any circumstances, even at the risk of the royal disfavour, to return to his diocese. This *letter is also in the Communal Library, Verona.

² The Colonna would thus be drawn away from Rome; see SANUTO, XLII., 149, 178, 179, 201-202. For Sanga's mission see the Brief of July 19, 1526 (National Archives, Paris). Sanga's mission was practically useless. Cf. besides the reports in FRAIKIN, LXII., 127 *seq.*, 134 *seq.*, 137 *seq.*; the *report in cipher from Landriano, Rome, October 18, 1526 (State Archives, Milan).

³ See Sanga's full and important report from Amboise, August 3, 1526, in *Lettere di principi*, II., 160^b *seq.*; cf. the reports of Acciaiuoli in FRAIKIN, 81 *seq.*, 90, 100, 105, 113, 124 *seq.*, 129, 137 *seq.* The copies in the Ricci Archives in Rome, which I made use of in 1891 and were not accessible to Fraikin, are better than those in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, on which his edition is grounded.

⁴ See Gambarà's letter in CREIGHTON, V., 330 *seqq.*

siege of Cremona, but conducted it with his usual timidity and dilatoriness. On the 3rd of September the Marquis of Saluzzo at last arrived, bringing with him only four thousand five hundred Frenchmen. Guicciardini was now urgently calling on the Duke to raise the siege of Cremona in order that he might devote himself to the capture of Genoa, in Giberti's opinion an object of the first importance. Before the city a fleet of Papal, Venetian, and French ships had assembled and the siege had begun; but capture was out of the question without the co-operation of land forces.¹ The distress within the city had reached the highest pitch, and the appearance of the Duke's army before the walls would certainly have led to the surrender of this stronghold, but he seemed only to seek for pretexts to avoid action. When Cremona at last capitulated, on the 25th of September, the League gained little thereby.² In Rome, meanwhile, the certainty of victory had given place to fears of defeat; Giberti himself had well-nigh lost all heart.³ The war dragged on while the allies, and especially the Pope, were finding the want of money almost insupportable. On the 1st of August the secretary of the French Embassy, Raince, described the condition of Clement VII.:—"I was with his Holiness yesterday, and do not think that I ever before saw a man so distracted, depressed, and careworn as he was. He is half ill with disappointment, and said to me several times that he had never thought he could have been treated in such a way. You have no

¹ Cf. Doria's letter in BALAN, *Mon. saec.*, XVI., 375.

² GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 4; SISMONDI, XV., 247 *seq.*; CIPOLLA, 904 *seq.* Canossa hoped that the capitulation of Cremona, then imminent, would counterbalance the misfortune of the Colonna raid. *Letter to F. Robertet, dated Venice, September 24, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

³ Cf. his letter to Canossa, August 1, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

idea what things are said about us by persons of high standing in the Curia, on account of our delays and our behaviour hitherto. The language is so frightful that I dare not write it. The ministers of his Holiness are more dead than alive. You can picture to yourself that the enemy will make use of the situation."¹

To Moncada, who had never left the Colonna, the moment appeared to have come to carry out the Emperor's advice, and to take vengeance on the Pope. The way in which he set to work betrayed the politician trained in the school of the Borgia. His plan was to lull Clement into security by means of a reconciliation with the Colonna, to bring about the disarmament of his troops, and then to fall upon the defenceless Pope.²

The enterprise succeeded beyond all expectation. The first step of importance was to discover exactly the Pope's feelings and position and to deceive him as regards the intentions of the Colonna. The sojourn of Moncada in the castles of this family was likely to arouse strong suspicion, therefore throughout July the Colonna maintained an appearance of perfect quiet.³ That he might keep in

¹ GRETHEN, 119, gives a German translation of the interesting letter, corroborated by SANUTO, XLII., 437, and VILLA, Asalto, 20. It may be permitted to give here the original text of the principal passage : *Et ne pense pas avoir jamais veu homme plus troublé, plus fasché ne plus ennuyé que luy et tant mal content qu'il en estoit a demy malade et me dict franchement qu'il n'eust jamais pensé qu'on l'eust traité de ceste sorte . . . et sont les dits bons ministres de Sa Sté en tel deplaisir qu'ils sont plus morts que vifs (Fonds franç., 2984, f. 25, National Library, Paris).

² Moncada informed the Emperor of his views with perfect frankness on September 14, 1526. GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 545. Cf. VILLA, Asalto, 24 *seq.*

³ *Li Colonesi si stanno senza fare demonstratione e qui si sta pacifico. G. de' Medici, Rome, July 12, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

touch with affairs in Rome, Sessa, who had fallen ill at Marino, asked the Pope's leave to return in order to have medical treatment. Clement VII., himself a sufferer at the time, gave his permission.¹ In the Eternal City, where the plague was raging, Sessa's illness soon took a fatal turn; but he still had time to show gratitude for the favour granted to him by letting the Colonna and Moncada know in what straits the Pope found himself, especially in his finances.² The Colonna had been busily increasing their forces,³ but to outward appearance had kept perfectly quiet. On the 12th of August the Florentine envoy reported: "No anxiety is felt from the quarter of the Colonna nor from Naples. They are much more frightened for themselves on account of the Venetian fleet expected at Civita Vecchia."⁴ On the 18th of August Sessa died.⁵ Shortly before, a fresh Ambassador from Francis had presented himself before Clement, the historian, Guillaume du Bellay, Sire de Langey. It was soon understood that he only brought general assurances of his master's goodwill.

¹ Clement VII. was suffering from a cough, and an "indispositione di schiena." *Report of F. Gonzaga, August 5, 1526. The latter states that there was an improvement on August 14 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² VETTORI, 367. Cf. *report of G. de' Medici, Rome, August 5, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

³ *Il sig. duca di Sessa, don Ugo et questi Colonesi sono pur a Grottaferrata . . . et ogni dì augmentano la gente che vene dal regno. F. Gonzaga, Rome, August 2, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

⁴ *Delle gente de Colonesi e del regno si sta senza paura e loro sono in grandissimi suspecti per la venuta delle galere. G. de' Medici, Rome, August 12, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

⁵ *F. Gonzaga reports on August 14, 1526, Sessa's serious illness and his death on the 21st. *G. de' Medici more precisely reports on August 17, 1526, that he had the *terzana*, and on August 18: "Il ducha di Sessa hoggi s' è morto" (State Archives, Florence).

The Florentine envoy who reports this adds: "Here all is quiet, and no suspicions are aroused."¹ Instead of bringing the expected help, the French agent produced fresh claims on behalf of Francis; he demanded a tenth of the Church revenues of France for his sovereign and a Cardinal's hat for the Chancellor Du Prat. This must have put the Pope in great ill humour.²

Moncada now held that the moment was propitious for entering into negotiations with Clement. At the same time the Colonna were suddenly to assume a threatening attitude and take possession of Anagni. Moncada asked Clement to give him a free hand in the settlement of the affairs of Italy, but afterwards backed out of the transaction, leaving it to the Colonna alone to draw the Pope into the trap laid for him, since by a settlement of their quarrel Clement would not formally violate his pledges to the League.³ Vespasiano Colonna, son of Prospero, played the part of mediator.⁴ In him, from an early period, Clement VII. had placed special confidence; hard pressed by want of money, he listened to the proposals of reconciliation made by Vespasiano in the name of his whole house. In spite of Giberti's warnings a treaty with the Colonna, to which Moncada was a party,⁵ was signed on the 20th of August

¹ *L' uomo del re christianissimo, che era a Venetia, è venuto qui. Jeri fu da N. S. insieme col s. Alberto [Carpi]. Confirma il medesimo ditto per altre a V. S. del buono animo et volontà del re verso le cose de Italia. Così conferma Ruberto per sue lettere et che presto se ne vederà la experientia. . . . Qui la terra si sta quieta et senza suspecto. G. de' Medici, Rome, August 17, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

² Cf. GRETHEN, 122, and specially BOURRILLY, 26 *seq.*

³ GRETHEN, 122. The report of N. Raince here cited (August 20) is now published in *Bullet. Ital.*, I., 226 *seq.*

⁴ *A Brief of July 13, 1526, called Vespasiano Colonna to Rome. *Arm.*, 39, vol. 46, n. 209 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁵ *Io don Hugo de Muncada fo fede per la presente sottoscritta de

1526; they undertook to evacuate Anagni and withdraw their troops into the kingdom of Naples. The Pope pardoned all past injuries, removed the monition against Cardinal Colonna, and guaranteed to the whole house the possession of their properties.¹ On the 26th of August the secretary of the Spanish Embassy, Perez, wrote in triumph from Rome that the Pope, since his treaty with the Colonna, felt himself perfectly safe; he was in great want of money, and dissatisfaction in Rome was increasing.²

Relying on the treaty, Clement, whose first object was to reduce expenditure, notwithstanding warnings of all sorts from those around him,³ cut down the garrison of Rome to five hundred men,⁴ and resumed his negotiations with

mia propria mano come lo accordo tractato et concluso da questi s^{ri} Colonesi con la S^{ta} di N. S. a li XX d' Agosto è stato con mia saputa et volontà parendomi ben facto per alcune cose concernente el servitio de la Ces. M^{ta} (Dat.) Mareni XX. Ag. 1526. (Signed) D. Ugo de Moncada. (Colonna Archives, Rome, II., A 18, n. 10.)

¹ SANUTO, XLII., 481 *seq.*; GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 5; JOVIUS, Pomp. Columna, 156; GRETHEN, 123. *The Brief of Absolution for the Colonna (a poena rebellionis et crimine laesae majest. propter non observatam prohibitionem congregandi milites et occupat. civit. Anagninae), dated August 24, 1526, Arm., 39, vol. 46, n. 252-253 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). *Die veneris ultima Augusti 1526: S. D. N. fecit verbum de induciis factis cum dom. de Columna et mandavit ut de cetero non portentur arma per urbem. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor in the Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.

² GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 521; *cf.* n. 504, 519, 521, 526, 536.

³ *Cf.* the *Vita di Clemente VII., in Arm., XI., vol. 116, f. 5^b of the Secret Archives of the Vatican.

⁴ According to CORNELIUS DE FINE'S *diary, Clement VII. had only two hundred soldiers in his service besides the customary guard (National Library, Paris). This statement is probably correct, bearing in view Clement's unfortunate parsimony (JOVIUS, Columna, 156). *Cf.* also the despatch of Casella in SALVIOLI, XVII., 1. Acciaiuoli, in a *letter to Gambara from Blois, September 17, 1526, thus expresses himself on the agreement with the Colonna: *Tale accordo non par

the Ambassador of France. With a reference to the untrustworthy accounts given by Sanga, he complained bitterly that French support was slow in coming, and in order to stimulate Francis to some enthusiasm for the war, he proposed that the latter should have Milan as his share of the booty, thereby totally surrendering all thought of Italian independence.¹

While these discussions were taking place came the disastrous news of the total destruction of the Hungarian army by the Turks at Mohacs. Clement was profoundly shaken, and in a Consistory on the 19th of September 1526, spoke of going to Barcelona to treat of peace in person. Yet he was still anxious, first of all, to break the excessive power of the Emperor, who at that very moment was equipping his fleet with all energy² and, according to reports current in Rome, was threatening to pass over into Italy and to renounce his obedience.³

Clement had not yet recovered from the alarm caused by the Turkish victory when he was prostrated by the announcement that the Colonna, with more than five thousand men, had appeared at Anagni with the avowed intention of marching upon Rome.⁴ The Pope,

molto onorevole per S. Sta, nondimeno viene a posare le spese per la guardia di Roma che non erano poche et assicurarsi delle insulte loro (Ricci Archives, Rome).

¹ Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 513 *seq.*, 709 *seq.*, and BOURRILLY, 27 *seq.* See also the *despatch of G. de' Medici, August 25, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

² Cf. the *despatches of G. de' Medici, September 6 and 16, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Cf. the *despatch of G. de' Medici, August 25, 1526, in Florentine State Archives. See also VILLA, Asalto, 20 *seq.*, and BAUMGARTEN, II., 514. For the Consistory of September 19, 1526, see Appendix, No. 35.

⁴ SANUTO, XLII., 681, 700, 724, 727. For the raid of the Colonna, the prelude of the sack of 1527, cf. also the *letters of Giberti to

who had hitherto refused to believe in the treachery of Vespasiano,¹ gave orders that the gates of the city should be closed and that troops should be raised on the following morning. But it was already too late; the enemy, led by Vespasiano and Ascanio Colonna, as well as by Cardinal Pompeo, had marched with such furious speed — they must have covered sixty miles in four-and-twenty hours² — that in the early morning of the 20th of September, they were already before the walls of the defenceless city. By a stratagem they got possession of the Porta S. Giovanni and two other gates and made their way, without meeting any hindrance, through the city as far as the SS. Apostoli. Their rendezvous was the Colonna palace, where they rested for three hours and refreshed themselves

Sanga and Gambara, September 20, 1526 (Bibl. Pia, 123, 9 *seq.*, Secret Archives of the Vatican); the *reports of Albercati, September 21, 22, and 25, 1526 (State Archives, Bologna); the *letters of F. Gonzaga, September 21 and 23, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua; see App. 36 and 37); Casella's report in SALVIOLI, XVII., 2; the letter of Landriano, Rome, September 21, 1526 (State Archives, Milan); a passage in DE LEVA, II., 376 *seq.*; the report in BUDER, Sammlung ungedruckter Schriften, 561 *seq.*; Negri's letter (see *infra*, p. 332 *seq.*); du Bellay's account in BAUMGARTEN, II., 713 *seq.*; the letters in VILLA, Asalto, 27 *seq.*, 30 *seq.*, and GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 571, 573; the *letter of Francesco Bandini to his brother Marco, Rome, September 24, 1526, in Tizio, Cod. G, II., 40, f. 251 (Chigi Library, Rome); Migliore Cresci, Storia d'Italia (Cod. Ashburnh., 633, Laurentian Library, Florence); two letters of Acciaiuoli to Gambara of October 1 and 5, 1526 (Ricci Archives, Rome); ALBERINI, 330 *seq.*; Attilius in BALUZE, Miscell., IV., 517; Blasius de Caesena in CREIGHTON, V., 327; LANCELLOTTI, III., 112 *seq.*, 115, 122; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 5; JOVIUS, Columna, 157 *seq.*; Vettori, 368 *seq.*; SEPULVEDA, I., VI., c. 40. Also a number of interesting points in the Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris.

¹ JOVIUS, Columna, 156.

² VETTORI, 368.

with food and drink. On hearing of the raid, the Pope, who was in deadly terror, sent two Cardinals to the Colonna, and two others to the Capitol to call upon the Romans for protection. These messengers effected nothing; the people, bitterly incensed by the recent taxation, attributing every hardship and irregularity of government to Clement himself, and hating him besides for his excessive parsimony, showed themselves much less inclined to take up arms than to allow the Colonna to proclaim themselves their masters. The latter had done no one any harm; it was much more likely that they had come to free Rome from Papal tyranny. This feeling, indeed, was so widespread that the cry for freedom found many echoes, and the Colonna were hailed with joy.¹ Thus it was that the Romans quietly watched the inroad of these marauders as if it were a spectacle; they showed the same inaction when, towards mid-day, the wild hordes again set themselves in motion and advanced further into the city with shouts of "Empire, Colonna, Freedom!"² They took possession of the Ponte Sisto, moved quickly along the Lungara, stormed the Porta S. Spirito, stoutly defended by Stefano Colonna, who adhered to the Pope's service, and spread themselves in plundering parties over the Vatican quarter.

¹ *S. Pontifex nullum praesidium habuit a Romanis; fecit edictum, ut sumerent arma et renuerunt sumere arma, quia Colonenses venerant ad eos magnis persuasionibus, quod venissent ad urbis liberationem, quia multum angariebantur a s. pontefice quotidianis insuetis exactionibus, et ideo Romani potius gavisii sunt quam contristati in tali praedatione et vilipendio s. pontificis. *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE, National Library, Paris.

² F. Gonzaga in his *despatch, September 20, 1526: *In Roma non è stato fatto pur un minimo disordine [in GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 468] alcuno, et questi Signori dicono non volere che si faccia dispiacere a persone della città, e gridasi Imperio, Colonna e libertà (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

The Pope, who had at first intended, like Boniface VIII., to await his enemies seated on his throne, had, by mid-day, yielded to the persuasions of those around him and taken flight, by the covered way, to the castle of St. Angelo. The few Swiss who remained in the Vatican offered no serious resistance. Soon the Vatican, St. Peter's, and a great portion of the Borgo were in the hands of the marauders, plundering and destroying unchecked. They shrank from no infamy or sacrilege. Relics, crosses, sacred vessels, and vestments were stolen, and even the altar of St. Peter was stripped of its costly ornaments and profaned. Soldiers were seen wearing the white garments and red cap of the Pope, and giving in mockery the solemn Papal blessing.¹ "Such deeds of shame," wrote a German, then dwelling in Rome, in his diary, "have not been heard of for centuries, and are an abhorrence to all Christian men."² A Venetian recalled a prediction that the altar of St. Peter would be plundered, and compared the ravages of the Colonna with those of the Turks.³

The costliest loot was found in the Vatican, where

¹ *Et chi se montato in una mula adidosso con le veste di raso bianco del papa et la sua berettina rossa foderata di armellini et va dicendo la benedizione gridando a Fiorenza, a Fiorenza. Bandini in the *letter quoted *supra*, 328, n. 4 (Chigi Library, Rome).

² *Res a saeculo inaudita, stupenda, inopinata, nunquam ab aliquo praemeditata res et non considerata in dedecus s. pontificis et sedis apostolicae et totius religionis christianae . . . Et illi nebulones non veriti sunt induere indumenta s. pontificis in derisum illius. Illi qui conducebant tormenta curulia erant induti purpureis vestibus s. pontificis, alii dabant benedictionem habentes pileum s. pontificis in capite in contemptu ejusdem, res a saeculo non audita, nefanda et omnibus christianis verecunda. *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris.

³ Cf. the reports in SANUTO, XLII., 690, 697, 700-702, 723 *seq.*, 725, 727 *seq.*

Raphael's tapestries and the Papal tiara fell into the plunderers' hands. Girolamo Negri, Secretary of Cardinal Cornaro, has described in detail and as a spectator the havoc wrought in the Vatican and its precincts in the late afternoon of that horrible 20th of September 1526. "The Papal palace," so recounts this eye-witness, "was almost completely stripped even to the bedroom and wardrobe of the Pope. The great and the private sacristy of St. Peter's, that of the palace, the apartments of prelates and members of the household, even the horse-stalls were emptied, their doors and windows shattered; chalices, crosses, pastoral staffs, ornaments of great value, all that fell into their hands, was carried off as plunder by this rabble; persons of distinction were taken prisoners. The dwelling and stable of Monsignor Sadoletto were plundered; he himself had taken refuge in St. Angelo. Almost all the apartments on the corridors were treated in like manner except those of Campeggio, which were defended by some Spaniards. Ridolfi lost everything; Giberti had removed some of his articles of value, but lost not a few. Among other damage, his porcelain, worth 600 ducats, was broken in pieces. Messer Paolo Giovio, in his History, will be able to recall misfortunes like those of Thucydides, although he, with a presentiment of harm, had concealed in the city, some days before, the best of his belongings. Members of the Emperor's party, such as Vianesio Albergati and Francesco Chierigati, found that circumstance availed them nothing as regarded the safety of their persons or their property. Berni was plundered out and out; they searched for his correspondence with Giberti, which he had carried on as Sanga's substitute, but had to desist owing to an alarm. The coffers of all the clerical offices, those of the *Piombi*, of the Secretariat, and so forth,

were cleared out. Very little, in short, was left uninjured. A good round sum for drink money saved the library." While all the houses in the Borgo Vecchio were plundered, their inhabitants ill-treated and carried off as captives, the plunderers did not venture to molest the Borgo Nuovo. That was swept by the heavy artillery of the fortress, and everything that showed itself there or along the walls of the approach to St. Angelo was within range of fire. "At last," says Negri in conclusion, "whether the enemy were tired out, or had had enough of pillage, or were afraid that the Romans might, after all, come to the rescue of the Pope, they withdrew in such disorder that a very small body of troops could have routed them and taken their booty from them. A few lingered behind the others as far as the Ponte Sisto, but afterwards betook themselves back to the haunts of the Colonna faction." The total damage was estimated at 300,000 ducats.¹

The Pope had thought, for a moment, of acting on the defensive;² but since the castle of St. Angelo, owing to the carelessness of the castellan, Guido de' Medici, and the greed of the treasurer, Cardinal Armellini,³ was not sufficiently provided with either victuals or soldiers, he was forced that very evening to confer, through the Portuguese Ambassador, with Moncada. The latter, much to the disgust of Colonna, who had thought of besieging the Pope in St. Angelo, visited the Pontiff, handed back to him his

¹ Lett. d. princ., I., 104 *seq.*; *cf.* REUMONT, III., 2, 179. V. Alberghi estimated the damage at 200,000 ducats. *Letter of September 22, 1526 (State Archives, Bologna).

² Reported by N. Raince; see GRETHEN, 127. A *Brief to Perugia, September 20, 1526, called for aid in defence of Rome (Communal Library, Perugia).

³ VARCHI, I., 58.

silver staff and the tiara which had been stolen, and assured him that Charles had never sought the supremacy over Italy. Nevertheless, their negotiations had no result. On the following morning Moncada returned and had a long interview with the Pope, while the Cardinals waited in an adjoining room.¹ The treaty which Clement, on the 21st of September, in spite of the counter-representations of Carpi and the Venetian envoys, considered himself forced to accept, was very unfavourable. The terms were: an armistice for four months; the Pope to withdraw his troops and fleet; full pardon for the Colonna and their dependents; their troops to accompany Moncada to Naples; as sureties Filippo Strozzi, the husband of Clarice de' Medici, and a son of Jacopo Salviati to be given as hostages to Moncada.²

On the 22nd of September the Colonna, in great confusion and laden with precious spoils, withdrew to Grottaferrata. Their leaders, especially the Cardinal, were extremely dissatisfied; they had hoped to have become complete masters of Rome and to have deposed and perhaps killed the Pope. Moncada, on the other hand, who had sent the Emperor a triumphant account of the success of the raid, considered that his object, the disruption of the League, had been accomplished. He deceived himself; neither the Colonna nor the Pope intended to keep their treaty. The former protested, as they thought that Moncada had overreached

¹ Cf. in App. No. 36 the *report of F. Gonzaga, September 21, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Cf. SANUTO, XLII., 701, 722 *seq.*, 728; JOVIUS, Columna, 158 *seq.*; RAYNALDUS, 1526, n. 21; PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 39 *seq.*; BOURRILLY, 30. The text of the treaty is in MOLINI, I., 229-231; cf. LANCELOTTI, III., 116 *seq.*; JOVIUS, Columna, 159, goes the length of saying that the restitution of the stolen Church property was agreed to. There is not a word of this in the text of the treaty.

them, while the latter could not get over the humiliation inflicted on him by his own vassals, and thought it his duty to vindicate his reputation by the punishment of the guilty on the first opportunity.¹ Clement felt specially grieved at the ingratitude and disloyalty of Vespasiano Colonna, whom he had treated like a favoured son; nor was he less distressed by the behaviour of the Romans; he even spoke of leaving Rome for a length of time in order that the inhabitants might know what Rome was without the Pope. The Cardinals, too, were highly indignant at the unheard-of acts of violence and sacrilege that had been committed, and called for summary punishment.²

In such a state of feeling special representations, such as were now made to the Pope by the Venetian envoy, were hardly necessary. Domenico Venier pointed out in spirited terms that in the matter of cunning Moncada was no better than the Colonna; that preparations for war must be made, since the Emperor, on the first possible opportunity, would lead his army into Italy, now that he saw how easy it was to take possession of the city and bring the head of the Church into subjection.³ In Rome it was said that if the

¹ Cf. SALVIOLI, XVII., 4; VETTORI, 369; GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 572; JOVIUS, Columna, 158 *seq.*; HELLWIG, 58; SISMONDI, XV., 253; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 714. For Cardinal Colonna's views see in Appendix, No. 37, the *despatch of F. Gonzaga, September 23, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Clement VII., in his *Bull against the Colonna, says himself that the raid had been made with the avowed intention of taking the person of the Pope alive or dead; Cardinal Pompeo intended to be elected Pope by force. *Bull: *Sacro-sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae*, dat. Romae, 1526 (st. fl.), X. Cal. Mart., A° 4°, Regest., 1441, f. 50^a (Secret Archives of the Vatican). Cf. Appendix, No. 45.

² JOVIUS, Columna, 158; SANUTO, XLII., 728; VILLA, Asalto, 28.

³ SANUTO, XLII., 730.

Pope submitted tamely to the unprecedented insult offered to him he might as well lay down the triple crown and withdraw from the world as a solitary. Guicciardini, the Commander-in-Chief of the Papal troops, was, on the contrary, most urgent in his counsels that he should adhere to this disgraceful treaty that had been extorted from him. Clement, as a matter of fact, soon showed that he had no inclination to do so. It was not his intention either to leave the Colonna unpunished or to withdraw from the League. He certainly ordered Guicciardini to withdraw across the Po, but he gave him secret instructions to leave as many troops as possible with Giovanni de' Medici, who, as he was in the French service, was still a member of the League.¹

In order to get help from France and England, Clement sent, by the 24th of September, Paolo d' Arezzo to Francis I. and Girolamo Ghinucci to Henry VIII.² At the same time he addressed personally to the French King, who had hitherto confined himself to empty promises, a long letter containing a harrowing account of the inroad of the

¹ GUICCIARDINI, *Op. ined.*, IV., 393 *seqq.*, 423 *seqq.*; VETTORI, 371. *Cf.* DE LEVA, 378.

² *In questi insulti, li quali sono stati grandissimi e vituperosissimi perho che hanno saccheggiato S. Petro, la quale cosa mai fo fatta, il papa ha mandato ambasciatori al Imperatore, al Christianissimo et al re d' Inghilterra. Paolo Fiessi, Rome, September 26, 1526 (State Archives, Modena). Paolo d' Arezzo also went to Spain to see the Emperor; see PIEPER, *Nuntiaturen*, 70. The letter of credence from Francis I. to Clement VII., dated St. Germain [1527], February 13, refers to his return; *Lettere d. princ.*, IX., f. 223 and 225 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). In addition to the letter of credence of Paolo d' Arezzo published in MOLINI, I., 235 *seq.*, there is another from Clement VII. to Antonius Archiepiscop. Senon. mag. Franciae cancell., dated Rome, September 24, 1526. Original in National Archives, Paris, L 357.

Colonna, accompanied by the most pressing appeals for help.¹ On the 26th of September a monition was published against participation in the raid.² Two days later the Pope assembled the Cardinals in Consistory to discuss his own situation as well as that of Hungary. He declared himself ready for extremities; his own wish was to take part in the Turkish war or to proceed to Nice to arrange a peace between Francis and Charles. The majority, especially the older Cardinals, recommended that he should take his departure soon and go on board the galleys lying ready at Civita Vecchia, "with what ulterior thought in their heads, God knows!" remarked the French Ambassador's secretary. Farnese, on the contrary, who was considered the cleverest and most experienced of the Cardinals, raised objections which gave Clement so much ground for reflection that he again gave up his schemes of travel.³ The news from upper Italy also influenced him in this decision.⁴

The determination of the Pope to remain in Rome necessitated measures to prevent another onset of the Colonna; this appeared to be all the more necessary as in the beginning of October they were again arming,⁵ and

¹ See the text in FRAIKIN, 128 *seq.*; *cf.* Mélang. d'Archéol., XVI., 386.

² *Cf.* LANCELOTTI, III., 119 *seq.*

³ Besides ** the report of N. Raince, September 30, 1526 (National Library, Paris), *cf.* GRETHEN, 129 *seq.*; GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 574; and * Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor of September 28, 1526 (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican). *Cf.* also * the letter of Canossa's to Alberto di Carpi of October 6, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona). In the solemn *Bull against the Colonna quoted *supra*, p. 335, n. 1, Clement VII. says his plans of travel were frustrated by the raid of the Colonna.

⁴ *Cf. supra*, page 323, and GRETHEN, 129.

⁵ SANUTO, XLIII., 55.

their friends were plundering boldly in the Campagna.¹ But the task was a difficult one in view of the enormous expenses already caused by the war.² A sale of seats in the Sacred College was proposed; Clement, however, who on this point felt much more strongly than his contemporaries, gave a decided refusal.³ A committee of Cardinals now made other proposals for raising the money required; the Roman and Tuscan clergy were to contribute;⁴ in that way the city would be fortified and garrisoned most expeditiously. By the 13th of October seven thousand men had been collected in Rome.⁵ In the presence of these preparations Moncada gave way to

¹ See Casella's *report (State Archives, Modena), quoted by SALVIOLI, XVII., 6.

² Cf. DE LEVA, II., 367.

³ Cf. the despatch of Landriano, October 11, 1526 (State Archives, Milan), partly given by DE LEVA, II., 368.

⁴ Die veneris 28 Sept. 1526; [S. D. N.] deputavit quinque rev^{mos} Cardinales ad cogitandum et inveniendum modum pecuniarum pro conservatione status et dominii S. R. E. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican). A result of the conference is to be seen in the *Bull for the *erectio* of a *mons fidei* (cf. COPPI, 3 *seq.*; RANKE, I., 8th ed., 266 *seq.*), dated 1526 XIV. Kal. Nov. [19 Oct.], Clem. VII., Secreta, 1440, f. 274_a f., in Secret Archives of the Vatican. Cf. FRAIKIN, LXVII., note 2. CORNELIUS DE FINE in his *Diary (National Library, Paris) reports on the subsidies given by the Cardinals, and the burdens imposed on the Roman and Tuscan clergy in October 1526.

⁵ Cf. SANUTO, XLIII., 32, 55; VILLA, Asalto, 29, 35; SALVIOLI, XVII., 7; Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris), and the *despatch of F. Gonzaga, Rome, October 13, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). On October 23 Clement VII. appointed Io. Ant. Pulleo, baro Burgii as Commissary-General for all the troops in Rome and its neighbourhood raised to prevent another raid of the Colonna. *Min. brev., 1526, II., vol. 12, n. 535 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). Casella reports on October 8, 1526: *N. S^{re} continua pur fare fortezze e bastioni (State Archives, Florence).

open threats¹ which only strengthened the Pope in his determination to take measures of precaution. One night the whole garrison of Rome was given the alarm in order to prove with what rapidity the male population could assemble in the event of a second raid.²

By the end of October Clement thought himself strong enough to undertake the chastisement of the Colonna.³ New and far-reaching promises of the French King, who had expressed his definite intention of entering Italy at the head of his forces to protect the Apostolic See, had filled him with confidence and courage.⁴ On the 7th of November the Cardinals, assembled in Consistory, determined to issue citations upon Pompeo Colonna and the other members of his house who had taken part in the raid. The Apostolic Chamber opened in due form the process against the collective participators in the raid. The proceedings against the Cardinal were held before

¹ *Report of N. Raince, October 9, 1526: "Il vient d'heure en heure nouvelles des braves parolles de Don Hugues qui menasse plus que jamais N. S. Père et Rome" (Fonds franç., 2984, f. 81, National Library, Paris).

² Cf. besides SANUTO, XLIII., also VILLA, Asalto, 37 *seq.*, and the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris), and the **despatches of Casella, October 4, 1526 (State Archives, Modena).

³ Casella *reports, October 29, 1526: "Qui si fanno preparation alla guerra. Tutto l' giorno giongono fanti novi e l' artiglieria" (State Archives, Modena). See also the *report of Perez to Charles V., Rome, October 22, 1526, in the Biblioteca de la Acad. de la Hist. in Madrid, Col. Salazar, A 39, f. 50.

⁴ Acta Consist. in FRAIKIN, LXVI., note 3. As soon as Francis I. received a written account of the raid of the Colonna he sent at once on October 5, 1526, a *letter to Clement VII. in which he expressed his indignation and announced the dismissal of the S' de Langey. Lett. d. princ., IX., f. 267 and 274 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). Cf. FRAIKIN, 142.

the Consistory.¹ As Pompeo, who was at Naples, disregarded the citation, but appealed² to a Council, proceedings against him were begun on the 16th of November, ending, on the 21st, with sentence of deprivation of all his dignities.³

¹ Die mercurii 7 Novembris 1526: Referente S. Dt N. decrevit monitorium de consilio reverendissimorum dominor. Cardinalium contra dom. Cardinalem de Columna et alios dominos de Columna in monitorio exprimendos [The Monitoria against Pompeo and others of his house, published as pamphlets on the 7th and 10th of November, are in TIZIO, *Hist. Senen., Cod. G, II., 40, f. 266 and 270 (Chigi Library, Rome)] ut infra 9 dies compareant. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor in the Consistorial Archives of the Vatican. Cf. a *despatch of F. Gonzaga, Rome, November 12, 1526: "il monitorio del Card. Colonna fù publicato venerdì sera . . . è stato attaccato in palazzo et in qualche altro luogo di Roma" (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). See also LEBEV, 368, the *despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, November 8, 1526 (State Archives, Florence), and the recapitulation of the whole proceeding (declaration of the invalidity of the extorted treaty, citation and trial) in the solemn *Bull against the Colonna, dated 1526 (st. fl.), X. Cal. Mart. A° 4°, in Regest., 1441, f. 47-64 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 5. I found in the Cod. 41 (Appendix) of the Library of Leyden *the Convocatio concilio generalis super privatione Clementis VII., per Pomp. Card. Columnam, dated November 13, 1526, and, as far as I know, not yet published. Counter to this appeal was drawn up the document entitled *Ad sanct. D. N. Clementem VII. P. M. Petri Albiniani Tretii j.u.d. Consultatio de concilio generali. Copy of the dedication in Cod. Vatic., 3664, Vatican Library.

³ *Die veneris 16 Novembris 1526 dom. Marius de Peruschis procurator fiscalis unacum dom. Hippol. de Cesis, camerae apost. not. accusavit contumaciam rev. dom. Pompei cardinalis de Columna S. E. R. vicecanc., et S. D. N. admisit contumaciam et conclusit in causa. Die mercurii 21 Nov. 1526: Cardinalis de Columna privatus fuit galero et dignitate card. necnon omnibus officiis et beneficiis suis. *Acta Consist. (Consistorial Archives of the Vatican). Cf. the report of Perez in GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 620, the *despatch of F. Gonzaga, November 20, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and the *despatch

The campaign against the Colonna had, meanwhile, begun before the expiration of the four months' armistice agreed upon in the treaty of the 21st of September. Vitello Vitelli commanded the Papal troops, which advanced victoriously amidst frightful devastation: Marino, Montefortino, Galliciano, Zagarolo, and other places were taken and partly destroyed. Only Paliano and Rocca di Papa withstood all attacks.¹

The proceedings at the scene of war in Lombardy occupied the attention of the Pope no less than the fighting in the Campagna; there the allies, in spite of the withdrawal of the Papal forces, were still stronger than

of G. de' Medici, November 21, 1526: "Questa matina in consistorio è suto privato il card. Colonna ne s' è anchora preso deliberatione della cancellaria et altri beneficii teneva." In the following week steps were to be taken against the Conti di Sarni for his share in the *sacco de' Colonnese* (State Archives, Florence). See also the Milanese report in Oesterr. Notizenblatt, 1858, 227; Arch. Stor. Ital., 5 Series, XIV., 50; KALKOFF, Forschungen, 32, note, and the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris). See also the Bull of January 1 in SAGGIATORE, I., 307 *seq.*, which belongs, however, to 1527 and not to 1526.

¹ For the war against the Colonna *cf.*, with GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 5, and JOVIUS, Columna: Lettere de' principi, I., 105^b, II., 191^b; SANUTO, XLIII., 236, 244 *seq.*; GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 615; VILLA, Asalto, 47; SALVIOLI, XVII., 11; the letter of F. Gonzaga in Arch. Stor. Ital., App. II., 293-294; the *despatch of Capino da Capo, employed in the Papal service (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua) (and partly made use of by GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 480); the *reports of Landriano of November 24 and December 8 and 16, 1526 (State Archives, Milan), and the following *despatches of G. de' Medici, Rome, November 11, 13 (the battle of Paliano), 27th (Pompeo Colonna very ill. "Il campo di N. S. si unirà a Valmontone et non forzerà Palliano nè Rocca di Papa"), December 4 (the Pope had had the artillery brought back, as most of the Colonna strongholds had been taken), in State Archives, Florence. Lastly, there is an interesting description in CORNELIUS DE FINE'S *Diary (National Library, Paris).

the Imperialists; yet the Duke of Urbino did nothing decisive, and the Marquis of Saluzzo maintained a like inactivity; thus time was given to Charles V. to prepare himself. Important aid came to him from Germany through George von Frundsberg. The famous leader of the landsknechts pawned his towns and possessions in the Tyrol, even his beloved castle of Mindelheim, the cradle of his race, together with the personal ornaments of his wife. By this means he was able, it is true, to raise only 38,000 gulden; but none the less, when his trumpet sounded the rally, there streamed to him from all sides young men fit to carry arms, especially those of the new creed. "Many enemies, much honour," said George; he was determined with God's help to come to the rescue of the Emperor and his people, since it was clear as day that the Pope was oppressing Charles, his noble army, and the house of Colonna. He held to it that it would be pleasing to God and mankind that the Pope, the instigator of the war, the Emperor's greatest enemy, should be punished and hanged, should he have to do it with his own hand. Within three weeks more than ten thousand lusty soldiers, eager for plunder, had been gathered in the Southern Tyrol, each provided with the fee of a golden gulden. Stout and valorous captains such as Schertlin von Burtenbach and Conrad von Bemelberg likewise joined him.

The passes between the Lago di Garda and the Adige were held by the troops of the Duke of Urbino. But Frundsberg's brother-in-law¹ pointed out to the wild bands of landsknechts a way over the mountains between the lakes of Idro and Garda, a breakneck path where the men had to clamber like the chamois. By this passage they, on the 19th of November, reached the territory of Brescia without mishap, and thence, with little molestation from

¹ The Count of Lodron.

the enemy, into the confines—the so-called Serraglio—of Mantua. Here, enclosed on the west by ditches and a wall, on the south by the Po, and on the east by the Mincio, the landsknechts ought, according to the plans of the Marquis of Mantua, to have been entrapped and taken.

When Frundsberg, on the 23rd of November, reached Borgoforte, he found that the ships promised him by the Marquis were not there. As he saw that he had been deceived, he took care to secure the bridge of Governolo, the only egress from the Serraglio. Into what danger they had fallen the Germans found out for themselves when, on the following morning, the allies, commanded by the Duke of Urbino and Giovanni de' Medici, appeared at Borgoforte and tried to drive off Frundsberg's troops from the narrow causeway leading to Governolo; "but the landsknechts, armed with their hand guns, stood like a wall, turned at once to face the enemy, and when the latter drew near, made them retreat and drove them back." Thus they reached Governolo in safety, where money, provisions, and some artillery belonging to Ferrara fell into their hands. Duke Alfonso, who had been treating, for a long time, with both parties,¹ went over finally to the side of the Emperor. At the very beginning of the fight the bold Giovanni de' Medici, the leader of the "Black Band," was wounded, and on the 30th of November the man on whom the League and the Pope had placed all their hopes died of his wounds. Frundsberg, who had previously, on the 28th of November, effected his passage across the Po, now advanced on Guastalla; from this point he threatened the Papal forces encamped at Parma and Piacenza.²

¹ Cf. CIPOLLA, 902.

² Cf. the reports in GASSLER, 50 *seq.*, 56 *seq.* (letter of Frundsberg's), and Canossa's *letter to Francis I., dated Venice, November 28, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona). See also REISSNER, *Historie der Frunds-*

The news of the advance of the landsknechts, the accession of the Duke of Ferrara to the Imperialist side, and the fatal injuries of Giovanni de' Medici, reached Rome in the last days of November,¹ when the city was in dangerous agitation owing to taxation, plague, and famine.² Almost at the same time yet another alarming piece of intelligence arrived; Charles de Lannoy, with the Imperial fleet, was approaching the coasts of Italy.³ Clement now saw himself threatened from the sea, just as on the north he was exposed to the landsknechts bent on plunder and filled with hatred of the Pope. His fear was greater than ever, and he knew not whither to turn.

berge, 81 *seq.*; BARTHOLD, 377 *seq.*, 385-392; Österr. Revue, VIII. (1864), 132 *seq.*; GAUTHIEZ, Jean des Bandes Noires, Paris, 1901, 315 *seq.* For the hopes placed on Giovanni de' Medici see BENOIST, Guicciardini, Paris, 1862, 44.

¹ The news of the muster of the landsknechts in Bozen reached Rome on November 6 in 1526; see F. Gonzaga's report in Arch. Stor. Ital., App. II., 293. Guicciardini's letters gave information of the forward on-rush of the terrified inhabitants; see the *despatch of Galeotto de' Medici, November 30, 1526 (State Archives, Florence). For the alarm of the Pope, see the report of N. Raince, November 30, 1526, in GRETHEN, 131, n. 1. For the death of Giov. de' Medici, see GUICCIARDINI, XVII., 5; VETTORI, 372, and especially the letter of P. Aretino in Arch. Stor. Ital., N. S., IX., 2, 136; at the end he says: "E. Firenze e Roma (Dio voglia che io menta) tosto saprà ciò che sia il suo non esserci; e già odo i gridi del Papa che si crede haver guadagnato nel perderlo." This last assertion is a calumny, as shown by the Briefs published by GUSTI from the Secret Archives of the Vatican in the Arch. Stor. Ital., 5 Series, II., 200 *seq.*, from which it is proved that the news of Medici being wounded reached Rome on November 30, and the announcement of his death on December 4. Cf. also Arch. Stor. Ital., App. II., 295, and GAUTHIEZ, Jean des Bandes Noires, 315 *seq.*

² Cf. SALVIOLI, XVII., 12.

³ Cf. the *despatches of G. de' Medici, dated Rome, November 17, 19, 28, and 30, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

According to the report of the Milanese envoy Landriano on the 28th of November, Clement was most deeply affected by the desertion of the Duke of Ferrara to the Emperor. "The Pope," wrote Landriano, "seemed struck dead. All the attempts of the Ambassadors of France, England, and Venice to restore him were in vain. Unless something unexpected takes place he will make a peace or some day take flight. He looks to me like a sick man whom the doctors have given up. From France nothing is heard, and this drives everyone to desperation."¹ A few days later the same envoy wrote in bitter derision that neither gold nor troops come from France, nor any news other than that the King is amusing himself well with dancing, "and we are more dead than alive. Here, in Bologna and Modena, we are arming in frantic haste, but it will avail nothing. The extreme necessity of the hour will force us to an agreement with the enemy."² The situation was such that even the Secretary of the French Embassy, Raince, admitted frankly that without speedy help from Francis I., the Pope could make no further resistance or stay longer in Rome. Clement himself had done all that was possible; foreign help, in all probability, would now come much too late.³

¹ See in Appendix, No. 39, the *despatch, in cipher, of Landriano, November 28, 1526 (State Archives, Milan).

² See in Appendix, No. 41, the *despatch, in cipher, of Landriano, December 2, 1526 (State Archives, Milan).

³ See the *letters of N. Raince, Rome, November 26 and 27, 1526 (Appendix, No. 38): "Sire Sa S^m se trouve de plus en plus encouragé et déplaisant et tant estonné et esbay quil ne scayt de quel coté se tourner." Fonds franç., 2984, f. 109, 113 (National Library, Paris). Cf. the passages in Carpi's letter, November 29, 1526, in GRETHEN, 137, note 2; and SANUTO, XLIII., 349 *seq.*, 356 *seq.* See also VETTORI, 373, and a cipher *report of Landriano, November 28, 1526 (State Archives, Milan).

On the 30th of November the Cardinals consulted what was to be done. Three courses were proposed: pardon, flight, or an armistice. The opinions were divided; pardon was seen to be impossible, flight was ignominious and full of danger; it was determined as the best expedient to open negotiations. Quiñones, the General of the Franciscans, who was much beloved by the Emperor, was entrusted with the difficult mission,¹ and by the 2nd of December he had started to meet Lannoy.² The Pope waited with indescribable anxiety for further reports. All thought of flight from Rome seemed closed to him, for he knew that Cardinal Colonna would either summon him before a Council or procure his own election as antipope. Schönberg and his friends never ceased to work upon the harassed Pope by representing to him these dangers, while Carpi, Cardinal Trivulzio, Giberti, and the rest of the French party exerted themselves in the opposite direction. The fate of Florence lay nearest to Clement's heart, for there disturbances had broken out and the advance of the landsknechts had caused many to flee, taking with them their wives, children, and goods.

In Rome also a panic of the same kind had arisen on the arrival of Lannoy in the harbour of San Stefano, from whence he could also march either on Florence or Rome.

¹ Cf. in Appendix, No. 40, the *despatch of G. de' Medici, November 30, 1526 (State Archives, Florence), and *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor in the Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.

² See the **despatch of G. de' Medici, December 2, 1526 (State Archives, Florence): *Die lunae December 3, 1526; "S. D. N. fecit verbum de adventu viceregis in Italiam cum classe Caesaris." The Pope, at the same time, announced the mission of Peñaloza, who delivered a letter from Charles V. in which the latter tried to clear himself in the matter of the excesses committed by the Colonna. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor in the Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.

On the evening of the 29th of November Lannoy again set sail, and on the 1st of December he reached Gaeta. The galleys of the League which had been intended to hinder his approach reached San Stefano two days too late. "It really seems," wrote the Secretary of the French Embassy, Raince, to Montmorency, "that all reasonable calculations are miscarrying, and that things could not turn out better than they are doing for the Imperialists."¹

By a special Nuncio the Pope, on the 6th of December 1526, let Francis know what the dangers were into which he had fallen.² All, except Giberti, were then advising the Pope to come to terms with the Emperor's party.³ That even this partisan of France took the worst view of the situation is clear from his correspondence. "We are," Giberti wrote on the 7th of December to the English Nuncio Gambara, "on the brink of ruin; fate has let loose upon us every kind of evil, so that it is impossible to add to our misery. It seems to me as if sentence of death had been passed upon us, and that we are only awaiting its execution, which cannot be long delayed."⁴ But with the arrival of more favourable news concerning the help to be expected from France, Giberti at once changed his mind.

Clement, a prey to anxiety and impatience, had in the meantime sent Schönberg also to Naples to treat with Lannoy as to terms. The Pope himself was wavering: on the 11th of December he told the Florentine envoy that his heart was no longer in the war, since the allies were so tardy in their support and the conflict only increased the

¹ See the *report of N. Raince to Anne de Montmorency, December 4, 1526, in the National Library, Paris, MS. franç., 2984, f. 117.

² Cf. FRAIKIN, 178 *seq.*

³ Despatch of Landriano, December 4, 1526 (State Archives, Milan); partly in DE LEVA, II., 404.

⁴ Lett. d. princ., I., 82; cf. II., 177^b.

Emperor's power.¹ The conditions offered by Lannoy, which Quiñones brought back on the evening of the 12th of December, seemed to Giberti very hard and only acceptable in the last extremity.² Lannoy demanded a six months' truce, besides a war indemnity to be agreed upon later on, Ostia and Civita Vecchia or Parma and Piacenza being in the meantime held as preliminary guarantees; at the same time he seemed inclined to force on this exceptional peace by armed force. Still stronger pressure was used by Perez, the Secretary of the Spanish Embassy, acting probably on an understanding with Lannoy, who on the same day, the 12th of December, presented to the Pope with all official formality a series of documents setting forth with unprecedented harshness all the Emperor's complaints of the Papal policy, and threatening Clement with a Council.

¹ *Despatch of G. de' Medici, Rome, December 11, 1526 (State Archives, Florence). For the Pope's irresolution, see especially GRETHEN, 141. Canossa was strongly opposed to any agreement between the Pope and the Emperor. Cf. Arch. d. Soc. Rom., XXIII., 285 *seq.*

² Cf. Lett. d. princ., II., 182. G. de' Medici reported on December 12, 1526: *Questa sera è arrivato il generale et ha parlato a lungo con N. S. Porta di far una suspensione d' arme per sei mesi con li cautioni de l' observantia da l' una banda et da l' altra, et di più chiedono una contributione di denari durante la suspensione. S. S^{ta} spaccia questa nocte al rev. di Capua (State Archives, Florence).

CHAPTER X.

THE ANTI-PAPAL POLICY OF THE EMPEROR.—ADVANCE OF THE IMPERIAL ARMY ON ROME.

IN order to form a just estimate of Charles V. in his opposition to Clement VII., we must represent to ourselves the part played by the Emperor in connection with the raid of the Colonna. Before Charles had been more fully informed of the Pope's hostile intentions he had already, on the 11th of June 1526, instructed his Ambassador in Rome that if Clement did not show himself compliant he should be driven out by means of the Colonna and a revolutionary movement set up in the States of the Church.¹ While the Emperor, in this way, signified his approval of the treacherous and piratical manœuvre so unworthy of him,² which Moncada carried out by means of the Colonna on the 20th of September, he was giving the Papal Nuncio Castiglione assurances of his filial submission to the Holy See.³ As soon as the raid had successfully taken place, Moncada advised the Emperor to express to the Nuncio and Clement his great grief at the acts of violence done

¹ *Cf. supra*, p. 310 *seq.* Already, on May 10, 1526, Sessa had advised that either concessions should be made, to secure the friendship of the Papal party, or that "their wings should be so plucked that they could no longer fly." GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 419; HELLWIG, 28.

² Opinion of GREGOROVIVS in the Beilage zur Allg. Zeitung, 1876, No. 205.

³ *Cf.* SERASSI, II., 53-54.

by the Colonna and to make known to the princes of Christendom how repugnant such occurrences had been to his views and wishes.¹ Before the Emperor, then staying in Granada, could give effect to this advice,² he had already taken a fresh step against the Pope. On the 13th of August he announced publicly, for communication to the Christian world, that the aggression of the French, the Pope, and other Italians forced him to take up arms. Moncada was fully empowered to confirm the Duke of Ferrara in the possession of all his fiefs held from the Empire.³

In pursuing his contest with the Pope, Charles had recourse also to the advice of learned canonists. The latter were to expound to him in particular how far and under what circumstances an Emperor owed obedience to the Pope, and whether the former would be justified in refusing payment of half the annates and in declaring war against the supreme Pontiff, if he were called upon to do so. Castiglione, who reported upon these consultations, said the views differed, yet all had aimed at pleasing Charles. In a report in cipher he also observed that most secret consultations had been held as to the way in which the Emperor could proceed against the Pope, and whether he

¹ MIGNET, *Rivalité*, II., 244.

² Charles V. followed this advice scrupulously and even wrote to Perez as if he had been in ignorance of the plan (*cf.* GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 611-613; GRETHEN, 136). The autograph letter of apology to the Pope, which was delivered by Cesare Fieramosca, is in LANZ, I., 296-298, but is post-dated incorrectly April 1529. The words "Je me excuse du sac qui a este fait du saint siège en sacquant l'église de S. Pierre et vôtres s. palais" show plainly that the *sacco* by the Colonna is meant, and not that of 1527. MARTINATI, 50, aptly calls Charles's protestations to Castiglione "una vile commedia" (see SERASSI, II., 98).

³ GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 510, 511; GRETHEN, 132.

was bound to subject himself to excommunication and censures and a thousand other evils.¹

Such was the state of opinion when the severely worded Brief of the 23rd of June was handed to Charles. The presentation of this all-important document was made on the 20th of August by Castiglione, who had not yet received the second and milder communication with the order to withhold the first. The Brief caused Charles deep resentment, especially as there were about him those who knew how to fan his justifiable agitation into extreme anger; Gattinara,² who was sore at not receiving the Cardinalate, was active in this direction. Charles concealed his inward displeasure; he spoke, it is true, of a council before which he would vindicate himself from the Pope's charges, but, on the whole, he remained outwardly calm, and used, as he had done previously to Castiglione, the most fervent expressions of devotion to the Holy See.³ Meanwhile a bulky state-paper was drawn up which exceeded in its language even that of the Brief, and opposed to the one-sided statement of the Pope another not less one-sided on the part of the Emperor.⁴

¹ SERASSI, II., 61, 62. *Cf.* also VILLA, *Asalto*, 20-21. The judgment of M. Cano on Charles V., quoted by CANOVAS DEL CASTILLO, *Asalto*, 35, cannot belong to this time, since Cano was still a student in 1527; he was not ordained priest until 1531.

² SANUTO, XLIII., 96. It was even believed among the party of the League that Gattinara aimed at becoming Pope himself in the event of Clement's deposition by a council; see *letter of Canossa's to Francis I., dated Venice, December 16, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

³ *Cf.* SERASSI, II., 68, 70, 73, 77, 79; BAUMGARTEN, Charles V., II., 521.

⁴ The state-paper was printed at the instance of the Imperial Chancellor (see SERASSI, II., 145-146), in the spring of 1527, at Alcalá (*cf.* SANDOVAL, I., xv., c. 18; see also WEISS, *Pap. d'État*, I., 279 *seq.*).

In the opening of this document, dated "Granada, September 17, 1526," prominence was given to the fact that the Brief of the 23rd of June, handed in by the Nuncio on the 20th of August, was couched in language neither becoming in the Chief Shepherd of Christendom nor consonant with the "filial devotion" which Charles had always shown towards the Apostolic See and the Pope. It was necessary to reply in some detail, as the Emperor was not conscious of blame and could not allow his unsullied reputation to be assailed. He had always shown himself to be a great lover of peace, and had aimed only at the peace and freedom of Italy. Let the Pope consider whether his present behaviour was in keeping with his pastoral office; whether he ought to have drawn the sword that Christ had ordered Peter to replace in its sheath; whether he had a right to weaken the forces of Christendom and to strengthen its enemies, the heretics. When his Holiness, at the beginning of his Brief, lays stress on the necessity of pardon, the position is not an intelligible one, since no one has injured the Pope's honour and dignity. In order to make his statements more credible, the Brief describes a "long tragedy," recounts what is in keeping with the Papal conception, but

then in the autumn at Mainz by Joh. Schöffler (*Pro divo Carolo* apologetici libri duo nuper ex Hispania allati, pp. 19-85), and at Antwerp. To this last edition, the mistakes in which are censured by EHSES, Concil., IV., xxiv.-xxv., belong the extracts in Goldast, Raynaldus, and Le Plat. I made use of the Mainz edition, which, although not free from errors, is yet much more correct than that of Antwerp. For more modern writers *cf.* GRETHEN, 132 *seq.*; HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 486 *seq.*, and BAUMGARTEN, II., 518 *seq.* Canossa had very early intelligence of this Imperial state-paper. In a *letter to Giberti from Venice as early as October 27, 1526, he says that he has heard "da una lettera o volume dello Imperatore a N. S^{re} piena di molte querele, sdegni e minaccie e fra le altre di concilio" (Communal Library, Verona).

passes over in silence everything that explains the real course of affairs. To show clearly the real sequence of facts, the state-paper refers back to the position assumed by the Papacy in the question of the Imperial election; the many marks of favour shown by the Emperor to Clement when he was Cardinal are stated with clear precision; the events of the most recent years are set forth very thoroughly. The object of the whole representation is to brand Clement VII. with disloyalty, and to justify Charles in his treatment of disputed Italian questions (Milan, Reggio, Modena). This is done in exceedingly "energetic, compact" language, not without an admixture of sophistry.¹ Many passages are marked by a refinement of sarcasm; as when it is said that it is incredible that the Vicar of Christ on earth should acquire for himself worldly possessions at the cost of a single drop of human blood, since this would be in direct contradiction to the teaching of the Gospel. In another place it is specially pointed out that the Pope would not have lost the praise due to a good shepherd and father if he had kept himself aloof from plots and alliances against the Emperor. In other respects also severe charges are brought against Clement. His conduct has not tended to protect the safety of Italy and Christendom, nor even that of the Holy See, which—seeing that no one was coming forward to attack it—stood in no need of weapons and troops. In consequence of this the Pope has destroyed the means of protecting the Holy See, has squandered the treasure of the Church, and acted in opposition to Christ Himself and to the hurt of Christendom. The Pope cannot justify his deeds before God or men. It is evident—if such language may be used—that he has only occasioned scandal and destruction to the Christian commonwealth. Clement VII. might remember that the Curia draws greater

¹ Cf. GRETHEN, 133, and HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 491.
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revenues from the Emperor's dominions than from any other countries. If the Pope is as anxious for peace as is the Emperor, let him lay down his arms, and it would then be easy to combat the errors of the Lutherans and other heretics. If, on the contrary, his Holiness disregards the Emperor's defence, insists on maintaining war and opposing himself to the general peace—in which case he is acting not as a father but as a party leader, not as a shepherd but as a hireling—the Emperor will then be forced, seeing that no other higher judge can be appealed to, to turn to a Holy General Council of collective Christendom, in whose hands it shall be left to decide on all questions in dispute. At the end of his indictment Charles solemnly appeals to the judgment of this Council, which the Pope shall summon in some safe and fitting place within limits of time to be definitely settled.

Since the days of Frederick the Second and Louis of Bavaria no ruler of Germany had addressed such language to Rome. There were many passages in which Charles used language "of which no follower of Luther need have been ashamed."¹ It was at one with the notions of the draftsman of the paper, Alfonso de Valdés, who was steeped in the spirit of Erasmus the humanist.²

On the 18th of September 1526 the document was officially handed over to Castiglione, the Papal Nuncio, who entered a protest against such an uncivil reply, and then

¹ RANKE's opinion, *Deutsche Gesch.*, II., 2nd ed., 389. *Cf. supra*, p. 353, the passage (line 17) where the *evangelica doctrina* is mentioned. EHSES (*Politik Clemens VII.*, 581) says: "The Imperial state-paper is perhaps the most violent document addressed in that century by a Catholic sovereign to the Pope."

² BOEHMER, *Bibl. Wiffeniana*, I., 84 *seq.*; BAUMGARTEN, *Charles V.*, II., 520, note 1, and 632 *seq.*; *cf.* HOMENAJE Á MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, I., 388.

went on to point out that it was only in consequence of belated instructions that the Brief of the 23rd of June had been presented,¹ and that he was most painfully surprised. Hitherto Charles, in his conversations with him, had always evinced a most conciliatory temper; even as regards the Brief of the 23rd of June he had shown diplomatic self-restraint; the second and more temperate Brief of the 25th had, Castiglione felt certain, restored the Emperor to perfect composure.² Charles, indeed, had solemnly assured him that his answer, even if he appealed to a council, would be so gentle that the Pope would have no cause to complain of it.³ And now there came this official paper! In great anger Castiglione complained to Gattinara and to Charles that he had been deceived, and felt it an affront that he should have been expected to transmit such a violent and insulting reply.⁴ It was of really little use that the Imperial Chancery, on this very 18th of September, drew up an answer, in corresponding terms, to the more moderately expressed Brief.⁵ The conciliatory and friendly words which the Emperor continued to address freely to Castiglione⁶ and others had quite as little meaning. He adhered inflexibly to the standpoint of his paper of the 17th of September.⁷ Indeed, in the letter addressed to the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 351.

² SERASSI, II., 86 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, II., 88.

⁴ See Castiglione's report from Granada, September 20, 1526, in SERASSI, II., 90-93.

⁵ Pro divo Carolo apologetici libri duo, 90-92. RAYNALDUS, 1526, n. 44.

⁶ SERASSI, II., 98 *seqq.*

⁷ Cf. GRETHEN, 134. According to this author, it was Quiñones to whom the Emperor caused to be conveyed, on September 26, a reassuring answer concerning the Council (*cf. infra*, p. 356, n. 1). But HELLWIG (56, note 3) has now shown that Quiñones had again left the Imperial

Cardinals on the 6th of October, he went still further and endeavoured to stir up an anti-Papal schism. If his Holiness, he wrote, will not summon a council, then the Cardinals, "in conformity with legal right," must do so.¹

In thorough keeping with the Emperor's embittered feeling was the insulting manner in which Perez, the Secretary of the Embassy, communicated to the Pope his master's message. Perez had received the document on the 9th of December. He kept its existence a close secret until the 12th, when a Consistory was held. On that day he appeared unexpectedly with a Spanish notary and Spanish witnesses before the Cardinals surrounding the Pope and handed to Clement the state-paper, and to the Cardinals the letter of the 6th of October. Immediately after leaving the hall he had an act to notify their delivery drawn up by his notary. Consequently the news of the Emperor's demand for a council was at once spread through Rome.²

Court on September 8. Charles's declaration cannot, therefore, have been made to him. The correctness of Hellwig's assumption that Quiñones' departure had taken place much sooner than GRETHEN (124, note) supposes, is made clear not only from Farnese's instructions (WEISS, *Pap. d'État*, I., 298 *seq.*), but also from GUICCIARDINI, XVII. 6. Cf. also PIEPER, *Nuntiaturen*, 70, note 4. From a *Brief of June 7, 1526 (Secret Archives of the Vatican, Arm., 40, vol. II, n. 317), it is further evident that Quiñones was then still in Rome, and that there was no intention of sending him to Spain.

¹ The best copy of the letter is in, *Pro divo Carolo apologetici libri duo*, 93-99. For the contents cf. EHSES, *Concil.*, IV., xxv. In a letter of September 26, 1526, Charles took a more proper view, with regard to the Council, in insisting that it belonged to the Pope and to no other to summon the Council. BUCHOLTZ, III., 47, note.

² Perez to the Emperor, December 15, 1526. GAYANGOS, III., I, n. 633; cf. *Pro divo Carolo apologetici libri duo*, 100 *seq.*, and SANUTO, XLIII., 494, 580. The accounts of the proceedings in Consistory after Perez' departure are contradictory. In SANUTO, XLIII., 494, it is said expressly, in an extract from the report of the Venetian Ambassador of

Two days later Perez had an audience of Clement VII. in order to communicate to him a letter which the Emperor had written to Cesare Fieramosca. "Why," asked the Pope irritably, "have you not brought a notary with you on this occasion as well, so that the delivery of this letter might also be certified?" Perez, according to his own account, had the audacity to deny altogether the notarial act of the 12th of December. "But," so he

December 19: "in concistorio ha fatto lezer il protesto li ha mandato Cesare, che non si facendo l' accordo, chiamerà un Concilio general contra il Papa." Landriano reports to the same effect in a *despatch, found by me in the State Archives, Milan, dated December 12 (see Appendix, No. 42). The Emperor's letter of complaint was read in Consistory on December 12, but not the "letter to the Pope and Cardinals" (that is, the letter of October 6). But in contradiction to this we have the express statement of Perez, in his report to the Emperor of December 15 (see *supra*, p. 356, n. 2), that he had exerted himself to have the letters delivered by him to the Consistory also read in that assembly. He was aware that this had not been done, but that the Cardinals were acquainted with the contents of the letters. In agreement with this the *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor, in the Consistorial Archives of the Vatican, have, on December 12, only the entry shown below (see *infra*, p. 359, n. 4); on the other hand, the entries for Dec. 19 (App. No. 43) state expressly that Cardinal Cesi read a letter of twenty-five pages from the Emperor to the Pope, dated Granada, September (the day is not given) 1526, and a letter from Charles to the Sacred College. Perez, in a report of December 24 (GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 642), says that the Imperial letter of October 6 was read in a Consistory held on December 21; he then relates that a dispute arose amongst the Cardinals whether the Emperor had a right to summon a council, and it was decided that an answer should be sent to Charles by a commission of Cardinals. This commission met in the beginning of 1527. Perez reported on January 10, that it was said that the commission was unanimous on all points except the question of the Council; GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 3. On January 26 Perez reported again on the great difference of opinion among the Cardinals as to the Emperor's rights over the Council. The Cardinals were displeased with the sharp terms of the Emperor's missive; *ibid.*, n. 9.

himself relates, "when I perceived that the Pope had observed the whole proceeding and had seen the notary, whom he knew quite well by sight, and the witnesses, I was obliged to admit that I was acting by the express command of your Majesty." "In that case," answered the Pope, "if you had given me notice beforehand, I should not have prevented the letter being read in Consistory." Further excuses from Perez he cut short by bringing the audience to a close; but to the Portuguese Ambassador he remarked that he would, in case of necessity, make use of the Emperor's letter in self-defence.¹

That the Imperialists were determined on going to extremities is shown by the fact that Lannoy, step by step, increased his demands and ordered his troops to advance on Frosinone.² The acceptance of his conditions, which, in their final form, called upon the Pope to give up, as guarantees of peace, Parma, Piacenza, Ostia, and Civita Vecchia, and demanded the surrender by the Florentines of Pisa and Leghorn, would have meant the practical abolition of the temporal possessions of the Holy See.³ In great agitation the Pope declared that, since they were determined to rob him of everything, it should

¹ Perez to the Emperor on December 15, 1526, in GAYANGOS, III., 1, n. 633. The passages from the Acta Consist. of December 19, 1526, in Appendix, No. 43.

² Cf. GRETHEN, 141 *seqq.*

³ See the *letter of Canossa to Giberti, dated Venice, December 16, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona). Cf. DE LEVA, II., 406; GREGOROVIVS, 3rd ed., 482, and PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 46 *seq.* Carpi and other French agents were afraid, in spite of the open breach between the Pope and Emperor, that the latter should come to an understanding, and did their best to prevent one; see the report of G. de' Medici, dated Rome, December 15, 1526 (State Archives, Florence).

be done only by force and not under the guise of fair play.¹

The recruiting of troops for the Papal army was pushed on in haste. In Rome, where the inhabitants, with a view to taking their share in the defence, were employing the best means for the security of the city, the famous engineer Sangallo, in whom the Pope placed special confidence,² was active. On the 10th of December the warlike Legate Trivulzio joined the troops intended to oppose Lannoy.³ Soon afterwards a monition was issued against all invaders of the Papal territories.⁴ In closest alliance with Lannoy were the Colonna, still breathing vengeance, who always found strong support among the Imperialists in Naples. Perez had already, on the 4th and 5th of December, informed the Emperor that, sooner or later, the Colonna, with the help of the Viceroy and Moncada, would once more make war on the Pope and try to drive him out of Rome.⁵

Still greater than the danger threatening in the south was the peril slowly drawing nearer from the north.

It was of the utmost importance for the development

¹ GRETHEN, 143.

² Cf. the *despatches of G. de' Medici from Rome, December 2, 4, 28, and 30, 1526 (State Archives, Florence); see also Perez' report of December 15 in VILLA, Asalto, 49 *seq.*

³ *Die veneris in festo S. Ambrosii, 7 Decembris 1526: Referente S. D. N. creavit rev. Aug. de Tivultio S. Theodori diac. Card. legatum de latere ad exercitum S. R. E. Die dominica, 9 Decembris: rev. d. Aug. Card. de Tivultio fuit publicatus legatus ad exercitum . . . et die sequenti profectus est ad castra. *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor in the Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.

⁴ Die merc. 12 Decembris 1526: fuit decretum monitorium contra invadentes terras et subditos S. R. E. eisque dantes auxilium et favorem. *Acta Consist., *loc. cit.*

⁵ GAYANGOS, III., 7, n. 628, 629.

of events in upper Italy that the Pope, in spite of all negotiations, was unsuccessful in coming to an agreement with the Duke of Ferrara.¹ It was only with Alfonso's support that Frundsberg was able, at the end of November 1526, to make the difficult passage of the Po and to carry the ravages of war into the states of Parma and Piacenza. Guicciardini, who was stationed here with Papal troops, implored the Duke of Urbino, but in vain, to come to his aid. The Duke remained on the other side of the Po to cover the territory of Venice. "The Emperor's luck," said Guicciardini, "is boundless; but the limit has been reached, inasmuch as his enemies have neither the wits nor the will to make use of the forces at their disposal."²

Frundsberg did not seize any of the fortified towns on his route, but encamped in the territory of Piacenza, to await the arrival of the Constable de Bourbon and his army. The latter had the greatest difficulties to surmount with his mutinous and savage troops, who were clamouring with threats for their arrears of pay. On the 1st of February 1527 he had been able at last to satisfy at least the army in Milan after, so he wrote to the Emperor, he had drained the city of its blood. De Leyva remained behind in Milan

¹ GUICCIARDINI (Op. ined., V., 145) considered this one of the chief mistakes in Clement's policy. Cf. GRETHEN, 138; SALVIOLI, XVI., 279 *seqq.*, 284 *seqq.*, 293 *seqq.*, XVII., 4 *seqq.* Canossa also had always thought that it was of capital importance to win over Ferrara. Cf. especially his *letter to Giberti of August 4, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona). At the end of November Alfonso had informed the Pope that he had joined the Imperialists (HELLWIG, 62). Nevertheless, Cardinal Cibo, as late as December 21, 1526, was trying to allay the strife with Ferrara. (See the *brief of the above date to Cardinal Cibo; the original is in the State Archives, Modena.) All attempts at a reconciliation were useless. See SALVIOLI, XVII., 14 *seqq.*

² GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 485; CIPOLLA, 910.

with twelve thousand men; the remainder went south with Bourbon. In the days between the 7th and 12th of February the conjunction of Bourbon's army with that of Frundsberg took place not far from Piacenza. The host of nearly twenty-two thousand men¹ took, on the 22nd of February, the ancient Emilian Way; the advance was slow owing to bad weather and the painful scarcity of provisions. If the Duke of Ferrara had not sent frequent supplies of money and victuals, the highly dissatisfied and to some extent mutinous horde would undoubtedly have broken up. Never was there such a good opportunity of attacking the Imperial forces; nevertheless, the Duke of Urbino lay idle. Thus the former were able, although amid the greatest hardships, to march through Parma and Modena and to cross the Panaro, the old river boundary of the States of the Church. On the 8th of March they encamped at San Giovanni, hardly a day's journey from Bologna.²

¹ The data for the strength of the Imperial army are very weak. No trust can be placed in Ulloa's figures, reproduced by GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 516 (20,000 Germans, 6000 Spaniards, 14,000 Italians). SALVIOLI'S calculation, XVII., 17 (30,000), and that of the writer in the *Oesterr. Revue*, VIII. (1864), 138 (32,000), are pitched too high. Ammirato and Reissner are nearest to the truth; they count on about 14,000 landsknechts, 5000 Spaniards, 2000 Italians, 500 *hommes d'armes*, and 1000 light horse (see SISMONDI, XV., 272). This agrees with the important statement, hitherto unnoticed, in SANUTO, XLV., 74 and 218, where the army is computed at about 22,000. In addition there were numerous camp followers. VETTORI also says (380) that the Imperial troops who entered Rome were not more than 20,000 strong. M. CRESCI (**Storia d'Italia*, in the Laurentian Library; see *supra*, p. 328, note 4), enumerates: "15,000 lanzi, 400 Spagnoli, 5000 Italiani." Acciaiuoli, in a *letter to Gambara, gives the strength of the landsknechts thus: "17,000 fanti, 800 cavalli," and 12 cannon (Ricci Archives, Rome).

² Cf. BARTHOLD, Frundsberg, 398 *seqq.*, 404 *seq.*; SISMONDI, XV., 270 *seqq.*; CIPOLLA, 914 *seq.*

In the meantime there had been constant alternations in Rome of fear and hope, military preparations and negotiations for peace. During the first days of the year of misfortune 1527 Clement had addressed to Lannoy and the Colonna a solemn admonition to lay down their arms under pain of excommunication and, at the same time, had released Orazio Baglioni from his three years' imprisonment in St. Angelo and taken him into his pay.¹ On the 4th of January Lannoy's ultimatum was presented to the Pope.² Four days later the long-expected envoy of Francis I., Renzo da Ceri, arrived, but without soldiers and without money.³ "It would not have been so bad," thought even a friend of the French, Canossa, "if he had not come at all."⁴ Instead of the necessary help Renzo brought fresh demands from his self-seeking sovereign: the cession of Naples to France.⁵ The dissatisfaction and alarm of Clement were still more increased at this time by the growing scarcity of money⁶ and the incessant

¹ SANUTO, XLIII., 579, 614, 615; VILLA, Asalto, 52 *seq.*; BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 397 *seqq.*; TESEO ALFANI, 309; GRETHEN, 144. For the Consistory of December 27, 1526, see FRAIKIN, 424 *seqq.*

² GRETHEN, 145.

³ GRETHEN (146) is right in maintaining that Renzo came to Rome only on January 8, and not previously in December; for the day mentioned is that given by SANUTO, XLIII., 632, *N. Raince, Rome, January 9, 1527 ("Le Seigneur Renze arriva hyer soir et fu devers S. St^e," National Library, Paris), and *Casella, Rome, January 8, 1527 ("Il S. Renzo hoggi è entrato in Roma," State Archives, Modena). Giberti wrote to Gambara on January 24: "Renzo è venuto senza un carlino" (Ricci Archives, Rome).

⁴ PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 48.

⁵ Cf. GRETHEN, 146, who here describes well the character of the policy of Francis I.

⁶ See SANUTO, XLIII., 633 *seq.*, and *Min. brev., 1527, I., vol. 14, n. 13-15 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

appeals of the Florentines to come quickly to terms with the Imperialists. His fellow-countrymen depicted in the blackest colours the infernal horrors which might be let loose on Florence at any moment by Spaniards and landsknechts. Schönberg made similar representations; moreover, Clement was daily besought, with tears, by Clarice de' Medici, to deliver her husband, held fast in Naples as a hostage; so that, as the Mantuan envoy remarked, the poor Pope, assailed thus on every side, was to be compared to a ship tossed hither and thither on the high seas by conflicting winds.¹

Cardinal Farnese advised flight from Rome. "Things cannot go on thus," said the Venetian Ambassador; "the Pope has not a soldo left." Clement openly confessed his despair. He even declared that he would like to withdraw entirely from politics and confine himself exclusively to his ecclesiastical functions.²

The Pope's cares were made still heavier by the representations of a member of the Sacred College, who urged him to raise the necessary funds by a nomination of Cardinals and to anticipate the Emperor by summoning a council. The sale of Cardinals' hats had, at an earlier date, been decisively rejected³ by Clement; and even now he would hear nothing of it "from an honourable conscientiousness."⁴ The thought of bringing these important

¹ See the *report of F. Gonzaga of January 10, 1527, in Appendix, No. 44 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). "L' Arcivescovo," Landriano stated in a cipher report of December 25, 1526, "pinge l' inferno al papa se non si accorda. Non so quello farà S. S^{ta}, sin qui mostra bon animo" (State Archives, Milan).

² SANUTO, XLIII., 633, 670, 701.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 338.

⁴ GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 488; cf. the report of Landriano, dat. Rome, January 10, 1527 (State Archives, Milan), used by DE LEVA, II., 405.

affairs into his own hands by means of a council was one which in itself pleased him; yet he held back through the fear that his hands would be completely tied in respect of the nomination of Cardinals. So nothing definite was settled, and the plan came to nothing. But the situation was one which imperatively demanded that he should make himself safe in Rome. On the 14th of January 1527 Renzo visited the Papal forces encamped to the south of Rome and afterwards returned to the city, where the citizens were armed and organized on a war footing with all possible haste.¹ Lannoy's answer consisted in the reopening of hostilities by the siege of Frosinone, although the limits of the armistice² had not expired. Thereupon Clement, on the 23rd of January, called upon all the Neapolitan fief-holders to take up arms for the States of the Church.³ At the same time he entered into closer communication with the Voivode of Siebenbürgen, Joannes

¹ Cf. SANUTO, XLIII., 700, 715; VILLA, Asalto, 58; SCHULZ, 84-85; the **reports of F. Gonzaga of January 21 and 29, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and the *despatches of Casella, dated Rome, January 14, 1527: "El Signor Renzi heri si transferì all' exercito di N. S^{re}"; January 16: "L'artegliaria di N. S., quale è in castel S. Angelo, si mette in ordine per cavarla fuori di ditto castello"; January 21: Defensive preparations in Rome; January 25: "Qui si fanno fanti a furia et così come li fanno li mandano in campo" (State Archives, Modena). Copious disbursements for the military preparations are entered in the *Mandata divers. Clementis VII.*, 1527 (State Archives, Rome).

² Of September 1536 (see *supra*, p. 334).

³ *Die mercurii 23 Januarii 1527: Discussion as to "publicatio litterarum apostolicarum contra Columnenses et viceregem, quibus hortantur omnes barones et feudatarii regni Neapolitani, ut arma capiant pro defensione personae suae [sc. papae] et terrarum S. R. E. prout fieri deberet, quia jam moniti non destiterunt, et fuit conclusum ut publicarentur." *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor in the Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican.

Zapolya, who was contesting the crown of Hungary against the Emperor's brother.¹ While these warlike measures were in progress the negotiations of that strange time went steadily on. On the evening of the 25th of January, Cesare Fieramosca, accompanied by Schönberg and Quiñones, arrived in Rome with proposals for an armistice from Charles. They at once went to see Clement in the Belvedere.²

Fieramosca brought from the Emperor, who also continued to employ very friendly language with regard to Castiglione,³ the best assurances of his good-will towards the Holy See, but very hard conditions for the conclusion of a three years' peace: the restoration of the Colonna; the payment of 200,000 ducats by the Pope and Florence, and, as security, the surrender of Parma, Piacenza, and Civita Vecchia into the hands of a third party. In spite of the opposition of the Cardinals, Clement VII., in his necessity, entered into the agreement on the 28th of January,⁴ but the ratification of the treaty was postponed in order to allow of Venice being asked to give her adhesion; an eight days' armistice was to be observed provisionally.⁵

¹ GRETHEN, 147-148; HUBER, III., 551 *seq.*

² See **the despatches of G. de' Medici of January 25, 1527 (State Archives, Florence).

³ Giberti *wrote on January 24, 1527, to Gambara: "Il Conte Baldassar scrive di Spagna con commissioni amplissime d' accordar con N. S. promettendo voler S. S^{ta} per padre et tante buone parole che se havesse in animo osservarne la meta saremo felici" (Ricci Archives, Rome).

⁴ For this *cf.* *Giberti to Gambara, on January 24 and February 2, 1527 (Ricci Archives, Rome).

⁵ *Cf.* SANUTO, XLIII., 758 *seq.*, XLIV., 15 *seq.*, *cf.* 101; VILLA, Asalto, 59 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 149 *seq.*; PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 50. G. de' Medici reports fully on the negotiations in his *despatches of January 26, 1527, and following days (State Archives, Florence).

Before the latter had run its course the state of affairs had undergone a fresh change. The ink of the treaty was hardly dry before the news arrived that René, Count de Vaudemont, the champion of the claims of the house of Anjou on Naples, had come from France with 30,000 ducats, and that the envoy of Henry VIII., Sir John Russell, with a like amount, was on his way to Rome. This was enough to rekindle Clement's warlike spirit—who very rightly placed no trust in Lannoy¹—to such an extent that Giberti, on the 29th of January, disregarding the armistice, gave orders to Cardinal Trivulzio to make an offensive movement.² On the 1st of February came Vaudemont,³ and on the 2nd the Rector of the University of Rome mustered the students, fifteen hundred fine well-armed youths eager for service.⁴ On the evening of the 4th, beacons on the hills of Tivoli announced the defeat of Lannoy, "the greatest enemy of the Holy See,"⁵ at Frosinone.⁶ After so many misfortunes, Giberti and the Pope rejoiced at this gleam of sunshine. On the 7th of February Andrea Doria arrived, and it was resolved to

¹ Cf. the interesting *report of G. de' Medici of January 1, 1527 (State Archives, Florence).

² GUALTERIO, *Corrispondenza*, 67; GRETHEN, 152; BROSCHE, I., 98.

³ SANUTO, XLIV., 33; GUALTERIO, 77; *G. de' Medici, dat. Rome, February 1, 1527 (State Archives, Florence); *Giberti to Gambara on February 2, 1527 (Ricci Archives, Rome). The *letter of Francis I. to Clement VII., in which he asks that a favourable reception may be given to Vaudemont, is dated St.-Germain (1526), December 2. Lett. d. princ., IX., f. 292-293 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). Cf. FRAIKIN, LXXVIII.

⁴ G. de' Medici on February 2: * "Hoggi ha fatto la mostra il retthor dello studio con più di mille cinque cento istudianti bene armati et bella gioventù" (State Archives, Florence). Cf. Casella's **letter of February 2, 1527, in State Archives, Modena.

⁵ SANUTO, XLIV., 34.

⁶ *G. de' Medici on February 4, 1527 (State Archives, Florence).

turn the victory to account by attacking Naples;¹ and yet a conspiracy had first been discovered at Rome which ought to have been a warning to use extreme caution!

In order to create disturbances on the rear of the Papal army, Lannoy and the Colonna had joined themselves with the chief of the Orsini, Napoleone, Abbot of Farfa. This turbulent man was offered pay in the Imperial service and the daughter of Vespasiano Colonna with a dowry of 30,000 ducats. In return Napoleone bound himself to give free passage through his domains to the troops of Charles V., commanded by Ascanio Colonna, and to procure, by means of an adherent in Rome, the opening of one of the city gates. At the same time Orsini was to assemble all his troops and to appear with them in the Leonine city under pretext of protecting the Pope; in reality, in order to murder him together with eight Cardinals. The attempt had all the more prospect of success as Orsini, the traitor, enjoyed the full confidence of the Pope. Luckily, however, Clement was told of the danger threatening him by the Count of Anguillara, whom Orsini had asked to participate in the plot. The Abbot was therefore arrested at Bracciano on the 1st of February, and brought to the castle of St. Angelo, where, after a struggle, he made a full confession.²

The miscarriage of this plot, the defeat at Frosinone, and, lastly, the Papal advance on Naples, made such an

¹ SANUTO, XLIV., 68, 98 *seqq.* *G. de' Medici on February 7, 1527: "M. Andrea Doria è venuto qui" (State Archives, Florence). *Casella reported on February 14, 1527: "Qui ogni dì giungon fanti novi." On February 24: The troops have marched; "heri notte" Paolo d'Arezzo returned (State Archives, Modena). A letter of Salviati's to Gambara, dat. Poissy, February 18, 1527, in FRAIKIN, 262, shows how much the Papal party had overestimated the worth of the victory at Frosinone.

² For the conspiracy of N. Orsini *cf.*, along with the short notices in SANUTO, XLIV., 38, 46, and GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 1, the full **reports of Casella of February 2 (State Archives, Modena), and

impression on Lannoy that he renounced all his previous demands for money payments, the surrender of strongholds, and the restoration of the Colonna. Although the envoys of France and Venice were even now still averse to an armistice, the arrangements for one might very likely have been carried out had not the English representative insisted that the opinion of Venice must first be heard. For this they had to wait,¹ and in the meantime first one and then another messenger of disaster reached Clement.

The King of France had not fulfilled one of all his glittering promises. His auxiliaries arrived late and in insufficient numbers; for the monthly payments of the war subsidy the Roman treasury waited in vain; although a tenth of the ecclesiastical revenues of the whole of France had been granted him, Francis only sent the ridiculous sum of 9000 ducats. Also, the support intended for the expedition against Naples was so insignificant in men and money that the whole enterprise, started with such hopes, came to nothing. This frivolous Prince was so absorbed in hunting and other pleasures that no time was left to him for things of serious importance. To the Italians Francis was as prodigal as ever of fair words, but he did nothing, and his indifference threw the Papal Ambassador, Acciaiuoli, into sheer desperation.² This

**those of F. Gonzaga of February 6 and 10, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). See also Acciaiuoli's *letter to Gambara of February 18, 1527 (Ricci Archives, Rome).

¹ Cf. GRETHEN, 153 *seqq.* The report of Raince, given by GRETHEN, 154, n. 1, is dated in the original, Rome, February 21, 1527; see FRAIKIN, LXXIX., n. 2. Cf. also the *despatch of G. de' Medici, February 21, 1527 (State Archives, Florence). On February 20, 1527, Clement VII. issued a fresh *Bull against the Colonna; see Appendix, No. 45 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² See Acciaiuoli's reports in DESJARDINS, II., 859, 862 *seqq.*, 868 *seq.*, 870 *seqq.*, 890 *seq.*, 892 *seqq.*; cf. also FRAIKIN, 181 *seqq.*

indifference did not grow less as affairs in Italy turned more and more in favour of the Imperialists; even so true a partisan of France as Canossa had to admit that Francis let the Pope's business go to rack and ruin.¹ The behaviour of the Venetians was not much better; they certainly did all they could to prevent an agreement between the Pope and the Emperor, but showed no sign of procuring for the former means to prosecute the war. "Venice," as Canossa had written to Giberti on the 28th of November 1526, "cares for nothing but her own interests: help from that quarter is to be expected as little as from France."²

Meanwhile the danger from the north was drawing ever nearer; Florence and the Romagna were seriously

Characteristic also of the conduct of the French Government was the manner and way in which they treated L. de Canossa, one of their most devoted friends and agents. For a long time he was entirely forgotten. This is shown in Canossa's *letters to F. Robertet. On May 1, 1526, he says: I know not what I shall do. On May 17: I am without news. On June 8: I have been treated very badly by the French Government. On June 13: I have no news from France. On June 14: The promised money has not come. On September 18: I have no information as to the King's intentions. January 10, 1527: For two months past I have had no news from the French Court, which causes astonishment to the Venetians. All these *letters are in the Communal Library, Verona.

¹ *Voglio anche dirvi che per le ultime lettere che io ho di Francia io comprendo apertamente che aveano le cose di Roma per disperate e però non è da maravigliarsi se sono anche più neglienti nelle provisioni di quello che la natura loro porta. Canossa to Giberti, dated Venice, February 11, 1527 (Communal Library, Verona). Canossa was not too severe; for on February 1, 1527, Acciaiuoli summed up to Gambara his complaints of the French dilatoriness in the following *words: "Sono tarde queste loro esecutioni così di denari come delle altre cose, che farrieno crepar l' anima di Giob" (Ricci Archives, Rome).

² **Canossa to Giberti, dated Venice, November 28, 1526 (Communal Library, Verona).

threatened, while Venice and the Duke of Urbino only thought of themselves.¹ In the south the advantages gained against Naples could not be followed up owing to the ever-increasing poverty of the Pope, now left in straits by his allies. In consequence the Papal troops were not only left without pay, but without that bare necessity of life—bread. The half-famished soldiers deserted by the score; the remainder had at last to make their way back to Piperno. At Terracina a plot was discovered to deliver the town to Pompeo Colonna.²

In these difficulties Clement, on the 6th of March, forwarded a safe-conduct to Cesare Fieramosca,³ and five days later this agent of the Emperor entered Rome. Du Bellay also arrived on the same day; he brought many fine promises but not the longed-for 20,000 ducats.⁴

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 1; *cf.* SANUTO, XLIV., 204, 233, 300.

*Letter of N. Raince, dated Rome, February 24, 1527 (N. S. Père ne se peut faire que trop mal contenter du mauvais deportement du Duc de Ferrare et du refus qu'il a fait de ces beaux partis a luy offerts), in the National Library, Paris, *loc. cit.*, f. 148. See also DE LEVA, II., 410, and Canossa's letter in PROFESSIONE, Dal trattato di Madrid, 53 *seq.*, 148, 164.

² For the poverty of the Papal army: Lettere d. princ., II., 213^b; RAUMER, Briefe, I., 253; SANUTO, XLIV., 148, 233, 340; DE LEVA, II., 409; GRETHEN, 156; *letters of F. Gonzaga of March 2 and 11 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), of *Casella of March 13 (State Archives, Modena), and of *G. de' Medici of March 14, 1527 (State Archives, Florence). For Terracina see Sanuto, XLIV., 213.

³ *A Cesare Fieramosca è suto mandato salvo condotto se vorrà venire a resolver l' accordo per virtù del mandato mandò il Vicerè per Giovanni della Stupha. G. de' Medici, dated Rome, March 6, 1527 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ Besides Giberti's letter of March 12 (Lett. d. princ., II., 218), see the *despatch of G. de' Medici of March 11, 1527: "Mons. de Langes è arrivato questa mattina," etc., etc. (State Archives, Florence). *Cf.* Casella's *despatch of March 11, 1527 (State Archives, Modena);

According to his wont Clement hesitated for some days; but at last, driven to extremity, nothing remained for him to do but to accept the conditions offered by Fieramosca and Serenon as Lannoy's plenipotentiaries. In the night between the 15th and 16th of March an eight months' armistice began, the terms of which were that each party should give up their conquests, although the territory wrested from the Colonna remained in the Pope's possession during the truce. On the other hand, Clement promised to absolve the whole house from the censures passed upon them, to reinstate Cardinal Pompeo, and to pay, as ransom for the hostages Strozzi and Salviati, 60,000 ducats to the Imperialist army, who were, in return, to evacuate the Papal States. Lannoy was to come to Rome in person to ratify the treaty; the Pope saw in that a guarantee that Bourbon also would respect the agreement.¹

Lannoy came to Rome on the 25th of March. The Pope received him with great honour and assigned him rooms in the Vatican.² Charles V.'s opponents tried at the last hour
SANUTO, XLIV., 277, 300; DESJARDINS, II., 899; VILLA, Asalto, 72; GRETHEN, 157; BOURRILLY, 40 *seq.*

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 1; SANUTO, XLIV., 310 *seq.*, 313 *seq.*, 328, 339, 424-431, 448, 452; Lett. d. princ., II., 220^b *seq.*; BUCHOLTZ, III., 604 *seqq.*; GRETHEN, 160; BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 532; DE LEVA, II., 413; FRAIKIN, 435 *seq.*, and the two **despatches of G. de' Medici of March 16, 1527 (State Archives, Florence). How implicitly trustful the Pope was is shown by the release of Nap. Orsini from his imprisonment; *cf.* the **letters of F. Gonzaga of March 23 and 25, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Besides SANUTO, XLIV., 358, 406-407, 419, and VILLA, Asalto, 87 *seq.*, see the *reports of Casella of March 25, 1527 (State Archives, Modena), of G. de' Medici of March 25 (State Archives, Florence), of *F. Gonzaga of March 25 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and the *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor: "Die lunae 25 Martii: Carolus prorex Neapolitanus Romam venit compositurus inducias cum S. D. N. Clemente

to change Clement's mind ; they represented to him how dangerous it was to sacrifice himself for the good-will of the Imperialists. The whole convention, thought John Russell, was only a trick to separate Clement from his allies. But Clement, after Lannoy's arrival, held that the execution of the treaty would be quite safe ; he repeatedly said in tones of decision to the Ambassadors when they warned him, "*Quod scripsi scripsi.*"¹ On the 27th of March, in a secret consistory, he addressed the Cardinals on the state of affairs ;² on the 28th he excused himself to the Doge,³ referring to the failure of all his means of help ; on the 29th followed the ratification of the treaty.⁴

Trusting to the loyalty of Lannoy,⁵ Clement VII. carried out his treaty obligations at once in the most conscientious manner. There can be no doubt that his pacific intentions were serious.⁶ In order to put an end finally to all questions in dispute, the mission of Giberti to England and France was taken into consideration.⁷ Although Clement had the

VII., *et in palatio hospitatus est in ea parte palatii, quam Innocentius VIII. aedificavit et in capella datus est locus apud pontificem ad dextram*" (Consistorial Archives and Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ SANUTO, XLIV., 338.

² *Acta Consist. of the Vice-Chancellor ; see FRAIKIN, LXXXI., note 1.*

³ **Duci Venetiarum*, dated Rome, March 28, 1527. Arm., 44, T. 9, f. 336 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁴ *SANUTO, XLIV., 419, 432.

⁵ *Cf. the *reports of G. de' Medici*, dated Rome, March 28, 29, 31, 1527 (State Archives, Florence).

⁶ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 1 ; GRETHEN, 161.

⁷ *Cf. the *despatches of F. Gonzaga of April 1, 1527* (in part in GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 498), in Gonzaga Archives, Mantua ; of Casella of April 13 (Giberti's departure was close at hand) in State Archives, Modena ; SANUTO, XLIV., 520 *seq.* ; and the *letter of G. de' Medici of April 15 (Mons. de Verona partirà domane o altro) in State Archives, Florence. On April 16 the credentials were drawn

advantage in the Neapolitan war, he withdrew his troops both by land and sea. He even went so far, in order to save money, as to reduce the total of his forces to a hundred light horsemen and two hundred foot soldiers of the so-called "Black Band."¹ All these measures show how certainly he counted on Bourbon also accepting the treaty. In order to settle this Fieramosca had already, on the 15th of March, arrived at the Imperialist camp fully empowered to take all the necessary steps. It is certain that both the Pope and Giberti had not the least presentiment that the danger threatening them from the Imperial army was not yet fully removed. When the news first reached Rome that Bourbon's army refused to accept the treaty concluded with Lannoy, Giberti saw only a daring attempt to extort more money.²

Of all the illusions under which Clement VII. and his adviser laboured, none was more momentous than their attributing to the Imperial generals an influence over the army which, for a long time past, had got entirely out of control.

On the very first rumour of Lannoy's negotiations with the Pope, the German and Spanish soldiers, who had bivouacked at San Giovanni, near Bologna, since the 8th

up; FRAIKIN, 338. In consequence, however, of the bad news from the north, Giberti's journey, against which Canossa had explicitly declared himself from the first, was given up altogether; see PROFESIONE, *Dal trattato di Madrid*, 54 *seq.*

¹ See SANUTO, XLIV., 453; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 7; and the *reports of Casella, dated Rome, March 27. 1527 (*Per quanto intendo N. S. fa distribuir tutti li soi cavalli alle stanze, cassa quasi tutta la fanteria*), and March 31 in the State Archives, Modena. For the return of Cardinal Trivulzio see *Acta Consist. of April 10, 1527, in the Secret Archives of the Vatican, and the despatch of F. Gonzaga of April 11, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

² Lett. d. princ., II., 228.

of March, were thrown into great excitement. The troops were in a wretched condition; they had endured up till then four months of poverty, hunger, and cold, and no end to their hardships was in sight. Heavy downfalls of snow and rain had turned the ground almost into a swamp, where in damp, miserable clothing the soldiers were encamped, many without shoes to their feet, all without pay and a sufficiency of food.¹ The prospect of booty, the riches of Florence, the greater riches of Rome, had alone kept them together and given them courage amid their misery. It can easily be imagined what an impression was made on them by the news that they were to be "thrust out of Italy like beggars" and the prizes of victory snatched from them. As the increasing hurricane lashes the sea into greater and greater agitation until the conflicting tumult of the waves resembles chaos, so the rumour of a disastrous peace, passing from mouth to mouth through the Imperialist host, produced a scene of unparalleled excitement and passion. The Spaniards, to whom the Emperor owed eight months' pay, were the first to mutiny. They flung themselves in fury on Bourbon's tent, demanding payment in full with wild uproar. Bourbon had to hide himself in a horse-stall; one of his gentlemen was murdered; his tent was plundered. The Germans, stirred up by the tumult, quickly assembled; they also shouted "Pay, pay," refusing to march a step further unless they had their money. "All the men were in a kindling temper which burned like fire. They were ready to kill the captains and leaders."

An attempt to get sufficient money from the Duke of Ferrara failed. Thereupon "Father Frundsberg," on the 16th of March, gathered the Germans together and gave them an address "so earnest" in its tone that he "must

¹ See BARTHOLD, Frundsberg, 411.

have moved a stone." But all the representations of the man who, for a generation, by the power of his presence, of his will, of his word, and of his successes, had held the landsknechts together, were unavailing. "Pay, pay," shouted the frenzied soldiers. They even turned their pikes against their captains. Then Frundsberg's giant constitution suddenly gave way; overcome by grief and anger, he fell speechless on a drum. He had been struck down by apoplexy.¹

The party of Clement VII. saw in the unexpected fate of Frundsberg the judgment of God on one who had presumptuously declared his willingness to lay hands on the Pope's person. But if they hoped that the landsknechts, deprived of their leader, would disband, they soon found themselves bitterly undeceived. The Germans only wished to escape as quickly as possible from the scene of misfortune. The whole army was of one mind that, under any circumstances, an advance must be made on districts that still lay open to plunder and offered a prospect of provision and booty. Bourbon had given each soldier a ducat and promised him unlimited pillage—"the law of Mohammed."²

Such was the situation when, on the 20th of March, Fieramosca produced the treaty of the 15th and 30,000 ducats, but this sum could not satisfy the soldiers; it was only like a drop of water on a hot stone. The reception given to the messenger of peace was in keeping with the soldiers' mood; "they were like raging lions," Fieramosca reported to the

¹ Cf. with RESSNER, 81 *seq.*; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 2; BARTHOLD, 411 *seq.*, and DE LEVA, II., 413; also the report in SANUTO, XLIV., 327, 329, as well as GASSLER, 77 *seq.*; BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 410 *seqq.*; VILLA, Asalto, 75 *seqq.*, and LEBEY, 408 *seq.*

² JOVIUS, Alfonsus, 189; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 2; Fieramosca's report in LANZ, I., 231; BARTHOLD, 415 *seq.*

Emperor, and he only saved his life by taking flight to Ferrara.¹ Bourbon had lost all power over his army. He stood helpless before the chaos, in which the only element of unity was the desire to be let loose. Forward at any cost, forward to Florence, forward to Rome! On the 29th of March Bourbon sent a message to Lannoy that he was forced of necessity to advance; at the same time he informed the Pope of this decision, by which the armistice was broken. Soon afterwards he raised his demands to 150,000 ducats.² "Three things," wrote Guicciardini on the 29th of March to Giberti, "remain open to you; to accede to everything by a new treaty, to take flight, or to defend yourselves to the death."³

After provisions and munitions had come from Ferrara the Imperialist army set forward on the 30th of March. Many thought that the fierce horde would throw itself immediately on Florence. But the Apennines were still covered with snow, and well protected by troops. They therefore went by way of Bologna, plundering and burning slowly on the ancient Emilian Way as they drew nearer to the Romagna.⁴ Guicciardini had, in the meantime, succeeded in getting the Duke of Urbino—who, hitherto solely occupied in guarding Venetian territory, had remained near the Po—to follow up the enemy, although at a considerable distance. This induced Bourbon to turn to the Apennines. He chose the road leading over

¹ SANUTO, XLIV., 347, 353, 362, 371, 381, 395, 436 *seq.*, 440; LANZ, *loc. cit.*, and SALVIOLI, 20.

² SCHULZ, 92 *seq.*, 94, 173-174.

³ Op. ined., V., n. 152; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 499. With the reports of F. Gonzaga of April 7 here cited, *cf.* the **despatch of G. de' Medici of April 6, 1527 (State Archives, Florence).

⁴ SANUTO, XLIV., 382, 394, 409, 450, 451, 453 *seq.*, 462, 467, 499 *seq.*, 518 *seq.*; BARTHOLD, 418 *seq.*

Meldola into the upper valley of the Arno. The rain fell in torrents; but on went the army, up into the mountains, having to leave behind all their baggage waggons. The hope of the "glorious plunder of Florence" gave wings to the steps of the soldiers, who on the 16th of April reached Santa Sofia, that belonged to Florentine territory.¹

On the entreaty of Clement VII., Lannoy, with 60,000 ducats from the Pope and 20,000 raised from his own resources, had left Rome for the Romagna on the 3rd of April to try and persuade the Imperialist forces to return. Letters from Bourbon caused him to alter his course and to go direct to Florence. Here he succeeded in arranging with Bourbon's agents that the Florentines should pay the Imperialist army 150,000 ducats; on receipt of the first half the army was to begin its return march.² Clement VII., meanwhile, had continued to dismiss his soldiers. He had hardly had news of the Florentine arrangement when, from misdirected economy and disgust at their insubordination, he parted with the last of his forces, the men of the Black Band.³ Vaudemont, with his contingent at Civita Vecchia, sailed for Marseilles just as if peace had been securely concluded;⁴ all warnings had been in vain.

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 2; BARTHOLD, 420 *seqq.*

² GRETHEN, 163 *seq.*; CIPOLLA, 916; D. MARZI, *Il viaggio del Vicerè di Napoli al campo Cesareo per l'accordo del Duca di Borbone col Papa e coi Fiorentini e l'aggressione a Santa Sofia*, 19 d'Aprile 1527, Dicomano, 1900 (published as a manuscript).

³ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 2, and the **reports of G. de' Medici of April 6, 8, 12, and 13, 1527, in State Archives, Florence.

⁴ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 2, and the *despatch of G. de' Medici, dated Rome, April 15, 1527: "Mons. di Vadamon partì questa mattina per andare a Civitavecchia per imbarcar se e sue gente sopra una galea di N. S. e una di Venetiani per andare a Marsilia" (State Archives, Florence).

"The imprudence and carelessness," wrote Francesco Gonzaga on the 11th of April, "is too great; before the armistice has taken effect the Pope has entirely disarmed himself. All this has been done only to save a little money. Everyone is astonished at such proceedings. But without doubt God's will has so ordered this, that the Church and its leaders may be destroyed."¹

A feeling of uneasiness, such as almost always precedes great catastrophes, prevailed in Rome. Old predictions of overwhelming judgments on the seat and centre of the Church's government² revived again with increased force. Extraordinary accidents, regarded as portents, a flash of lightning which occurred as Lannoy arrived at the Vatican, caused disturbance in anxious minds; such things were looked upon as a premonition that the wrath of Heaven was about to strike the sinful city.³

A still more powerful, if momentary, impression was made on the Romans by one of those fanatical preachers of repentance who even then were constantly trying to add to the excitement of the Italian people, terrified already by prophecies,⁴ and sorely visited by war, plague,⁵

¹ Cf. the **letter of F. Gonzaga of April 11, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). Cf. also Lett. d. princ., I., 106^b.

² Cf. DÖLLINGER in *Histor. Taschenb.*, 1871, 288 *seq.*; GRAUERT in *Histor. Jahrb.*, XIX., 282 *seq.*

³ JOVIUS, *Columna*, 356. Cf. the report in VILLA, *Asalto*, 140-141; see also L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 178 *seq.*

⁴ For the previous predictions of astrologers for the year 1524 see the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris. Cf. also *Atti. d. Romagna*, 3 Series, II., 432 *seqq.*; *Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.*, LXXXII., 375; ROSCOE, IX., 332; *Arch. stor. Lomb.*, 3 Series, XXIX., 35.

⁵ For the plague see *supra*, p. 344. In January 1526 Rome suffered also from an inundation of the Tiber; see *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris, and the *report of the Mantuan envoy of January 21, 1526 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

and other calamities. On Holy Thursday (18th April 1527), when Clement VII., after the reading of the Bull *In Cæna Domini*, was giving the pontifical blessing to a devout multitude of ten thousand persons, a man with the demeanour of a maniac, almost entirely naked, save only for a leathern apron, clambered on to the statue of St. Paul in front of St. Peter's and shouted to the Pope: "Thou bastard of Sodom, for thy sins Rome shall be destroyed. Repent, and turn thee! If thou wilt not believe me, in fourteen days thou shalt see it."¹

A prophet of this sort was nothing new to the Romans; as far back as the summer of 1525 a hermit had declared to them his strange visions.² The prophecies of this new herald of misfortune, who was known by the name of Brandano, surpassed, however, in many respects anything of the kind known before. The appearance of this enthusiast was a highly characteristic episode of this agitated time. Bartolomeo Carosi, called Brandano,³ was

¹ See the Spanish report on the *sacco* in VILLA, Asalto, 141.

² Cf. the **report of G. de' Medici of July 29, 1525 (State Archives, Florence). REUMONT, III., 2, 192, is wrong in identifying the first prophet with Brandano; the composer of the "*Neuwe zeyttung*" (for whose credibility see SCHULZ, 44) makes a clear distinction between the two prophets; so also does SANTORO, 7. Canossa also speaks of the first prophet in a *letter of August 5, 1525, in which he sends to the Queen of France "*una profetia de uno romita che sta a Roma, il quale ha predite molte cose che sono state vere et maxime in le cose del re*" (Communal Library, Verona).

³ G. B. PECCI (Notizie s. vita di Bartol. da Petrojo chiamato Brandano, 2nd ed., Lucca, 1763) relies, among others, on A. Bardi, Storia di Siena (MS.). The conversion of the city is here (5) assigned to 1526, which entirely precludes the identification with the prophet of 1525. Pecci shows that the statement that the Archbishop of Siena, in 1614, had permitted the veneration of Brandano, is an invention. This assertion is found, among other fabulous material, in the **Vita* of Brandano, current under the name of C. Turi as author; Casanatense

a native of Petrojo near Siena. After leading for a long time an evil life in the world, he was suddenly converted and gave himself up, as a hermit, to severe acts of penance. Later on he quitted his solitude and passed through the towns of his native district holding up before the inhabitants their sinful manner of life. The wrath of God would burst upon them, war, plague, and other visitations would follow on the general iniquity. This was on the whole the substance of his penitential preaching. Sometimes in his fiery zeal he gave utterance to more concise discourse.¹ Perhaps his outward appearance produced more effect than his preachings and prophesying. Clothed only so far as decency demanded, barefooted and with long red hair hanging dishevelled to his shoulders, the prophet went his rounds. His frame was muscular, but emaciated by fasting; his face wan and deeply furrowed, the greenish-yellow eyes hollowed by tears and nightly vigils; his movements were abrupt and uncouth. When preaching he held a crucifix in his right hand, in his left a skull.² Some thought him a crazy fool, others a prophet and saint. The common folk had many a tale to tell of his severe exercises of penance, his frequent pilgrimages to Santiago in Spain, even of miracles he had worked.³ In Siena he had preached in the cathedral; now, with cries of woe, he was announcing in the streets of the Eternal City

Library, Rome, Cod. 3212. Cf. *ibid.*, Cod. 1205 and 2627. This *Vita*, in a fragment, is also found in Cod. Palat., 680, of the National Library, Florence; the author is a fervent admirer of his hero, whom he regards as a saint and a true prophet. The author of the document produced by MORENI, I., 111, takes the extreme opposite standpoint. ORANO, I., 247, note, mentions further literary notices of Brandano.

¹ CRESCIMBENI, Comment. intorno alla volg. poesia, II., 195; TIRABOSCHI, VII., 3, 215; RUTH, Poesie, II. 491.

² L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 177.

³ Vita, *loc. cit.*

the certain downfall of its priests and inhabitants and the renewal of the Church.¹

On Easter Eve 1527 Brandano went from the Campo di Fiore to St. Angelo, and, like a second Jonas, cried with a loud voice, "Rome, do penance! They shall deal with thee as God dealt with Sodom and Gomorrha." Then he said quietly, as if to himself: "He has robbed the Mother of God to adorn his harlot, or rather his friend." On hearing of this scandalous speech the Pope put an end to his doings by ordering Brandano to be placed in confinement.² He was soon afterwards set at liberty and started afresh on a career which brought upon him renewed imprisonment.³

The destruction foretold by this prophet of evil was drawing nearer and nearer with the certainty of fate. Notwithstanding the arrangement with the Florentines, Bourbon's army continued to march on Rome. After extraordinary exertions the crest of the Apennines was surmounted; the eight field-pieces, attached to ropes, had to be dragged along by hand.⁴ On the 18th of April the half-starved troops reached S. Maria in Bagno, on the south side of the mountains, and on the 20th Bourbon encamped at Pieve di S. Stefano in the upper valley of the Tiber. Here Lannoy met him. The latter had left Florence on the 15th of April, and on the 19th had been attacked by the inhabitants of Santa Sofia and forced

¹ L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 178; *cf.* 330, and BERNINO, IV., 368.

² This is reported on the hearsay testimony of Lanceolinus; see *infra*, p. 396, n. 2; see SCHULZ, 66; *cf.* 44, 47, 51, 54, 69. See also L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 178, and CAVE, 391.

³ GUICCIARDINI, *loc. cit.*; DÖLLINGER in *Histor. Taschenb.*, 1871, 291. A prophecy then posted up in Rome, which Reissner produces, may be attributed, as GREGOROVIVS (VIII., 3rd ed., 512), surmises, to the prophet of Siena.

⁴ *Cf.* the letter of R. Schwegler in HORMAYR, *Archiv*, 1812, 448.

to take refuge in the abbey of the Camaldoli, S. Maria in Cosmedin. Two days later he suddenly appeared in the Imperialist camp. It was soon discovered that he and Bourbon were trying to deceive the Florentines, who thereupon made energetic preparations for the defence of their city.¹

When Bourbon now raised his demand for money to 240,000 ducats,² this, it was evident, was because he knew his enemy was unprepared. His army was in such a condition that necessity forced him to go forward. Only the hope of plundering Florence held his men together.³ Bourbon advanced all the more joyfully as he knew that he was thus meeting the Emperor's wishes, whose first object was to get hold of money to pay his troops and to wring from the Pope the most favourable treaty possible.⁴

Clement VII. was highly indignant at the non-observance of the armistice. "To produce 240,000 ducats," Giberti exclaimed, "was as impossible as to join heaven and earth together." Bourbon replied by raising his demand to 300,000 ducats.⁵ In the meanwhile the Papal and Venetian troops, under the Duke of Urbino, the Marquis of Saluzzo, and Guicciardini, had come to the relief of Florence, already strongly fortified, so that Bourbon,

¹ According to Marzi's investigations into the special MS. quoted *supra*, p. 377, n. 2. Clement VII. was still unaware, on April 27, 1527, that Lannoy was only trying to deceive him; for on that day he sent a * Brief to Lannoy in which he deplored the great danger in which the latter was placed, and announced the despatch of an envoy. *Min. brev., 1527, IV., vol. 17, n. 182 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² GRETHEN, 164; SCHULZ, 96.

³ Cf. the remarkable letter (in cipher) of Bourbon to de Leyva, dated S. Pietro in Bagno, April 19, 1527, in SANUTO, XLIV., 570-571.

⁴ See BUCHOLTZ, III., 58 *seq.*, 66 *seq.*; BARTHOLD, 410 *seq.*; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 504; DE LEVA, II., 419 *seq.*

⁵ GRETHEN, 165.

having regard for the condition of his necessitous and wearied soldiers, felt compelled to renounce his purpose of attack. With rapid decision he recalled his troops, who were already making inroads in the valley of the Arno, disencumbered himself of his last pieces of artillery, and on the 26th of April struck the road to Rome.¹

Not only necessity and the conviction that at Rome he would meet with less opposition, but his ambition to become Viceroy of the whole of Italy² urged Bourbon forward on the city. His soldiers, anticipating the plunder of Florence, at first showed signs of mutiny, but he succeeded in quieting them with visions of Rome, where he would "make all of them rich." In hot haste they came to Montepulciano and Montefiascone. Neither the slow operations of the army of the League, nor the unwonted rain-storms, nor the gnawing want of provisions, could keep back the Imperialists, who were joined on the way by many adventurers eager to have a share in the spoils. On the 2nd of May they had reached Viterbo.³

Clement, who up till now had almost intentionally shut his eyes and refused to see his danger, perceived at last that Bourbon had tricked him and that nothing could save him except a desperate struggle. On the 25th of April he rejoined the League.⁴ The Duke of Urbino was implored

¹ Cf. BARTHOLD, 421 *seq.*; SCHULZ, 98. On April 26 a republican rising against the dominion of the Medici had been suppressed. The city then joined the League for one month; see PITTI, I., 135 *seq.*; SEGNI, *Storie fiorent.*, 4; CIPOLLA, 916 *seq.*; PERRENS, III., 125 *seqq.*

² See the letter of Otto di Pratica to R. Acciaiuoli of April 25, 1527, in the *Riv. storica*, 1893, 612, note. Cf. VETTORI, 375; SCHULZ, 92 *seq.*

³ SANUTO, XLV., 231 *seq.*; BARTHOLD, 425; SCHULZ, 99 *seq.*

⁴ SANUTO, XLIV., 551 *seq.*, 573 *seq.*; GRETHEN, 167; DE LEVA, II., 422; LEBEY, 417.

to render help;¹ Giovanni Antonio Orsini was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the newly organized Papal cavalry,² while to Renzo da Ceri was entrusted the defence of Rome. But for this the one thing necessary was lacking—money. In vain the Pope called upon the well-to-do citizens to give voluntary contributions. Greed and infatuation were so great, that Domenico Massimi himself, the richest man in Rome, only offered to lend the sum of 100 ducats!³

The Pope was besought on every side to raise money for the defence of Rome by the sale of Cardinals' hats. But Clement, even at this moment incapable of decision, refused his assent. But when, on the 3rd of May, he was informed that Bourbon had already advanced beyond Viterbo, he was driven to take the step so repugnant to him. But it was already too late to obtain the payments⁴ from his nominees; these were Benedetto Accolti, Niccolò

¹ Cf. the *Briefs to the Duke of Urbino, dated Rome, April 22 and 30, 1527, in State Archives, Florence, Urb. eccl.

² *Brief to the same of April 30, 1527, Min. brev., 1527, IV., vol. 17, n. 183, in the Secret Archives of the Vatican.

³ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3.

⁴ For the creation of Cardinals on May 3, 1527, see, besides CIACONIUS, III., 477 *seq.*; NOVAES, IV., 80 *seq.*; EHSES, Dokumente, 249; CATALANUS, Capranica, 303 (instead of Martii read Maii); DE LEVA, II., 427, and GRETHEN, 168–169; also the following *letters: (1) G. de' Medici, April 26, 27, 28, and May 4, State Archives, Florence; (2) F. Gonzaga, April 27, Gonzaga Archives, Mantua. Efforts to procure the Cardinalate for Ercole Gonzaga had begun under Leo X. (cf. Delle esenzioni, 45 *seq.*) and were renewed in the first days of Clement's pontificate. As early as November 19, 1523, *Cardinal Gonzaga had written about it to the Marchioness Isabella. The Marquis of Mantua, in a *letter of January 22, 1524, asks B. Castiglione to further the matter. On February 6 he expresses his pleasure at the Pope's favourable answer, and begs Castiglione to urge on the affair. In a *letter, dated Bologna, February 12, 1524, Ercole thanks the Marquis of Mantua for his exertions in trying to obtain for him,

Gaddi, Agostino Spinola, Ercole Gonzaga, Marino Grimani, and the French Chancellor Du Prat. The Pope could not make up his mind to fly to Civita Vecchia. Quite in contradiction to his usual character, he now displayed an extraordinary confidence.¹ On the 3rd of May he rode through the city, encouraging the citizens, who were determined to defend Rome to the uttermost, and on the 4th he placed Bourbon under the ban of the greater excommunication.²

If Clement entirely underrated his danger, the principal blame must be laid on his blind confidence in Renzo da Ceri. The latter, with the utmost assurance, set all fears at naught,³ and declared that the four thousand men he had raised were ample protection, for so great a city as Rome, against the undisciplined and famished hordes of Bourbon; he went so far as to boast that the city itself could hold out, even were the enemy so successful as to possess themselves of the right bank of the Tiber; he therefore even refused to destroy the bridges. That Renzo placed the greatest confidence in his hastily organized bands, recruited from stablemen, mechanics, and all sorts of persons inexperienced in the ways of war, is shown from the fact that on the 4th of May he sent a message through Giberti to Guido Rangoni, who had brought more than eight thousand men from the army of the League, that Rome was so perfectly

through the mediation of Castiglione, the Cardinal's hat. On the same day the Marquis writes to the latter and bids him thank the Pope for his "certa promessa" to give Ercole the first nomination. Copies of all these *letters in the Library, Mantua. In 1526 Capino was urging Ercole's nomination; Lett. d. princ., II., 103^b.

¹ "Spogliatosi della natura sua," says GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3.

² See CAVE, 407 *seqq.*; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 506, and BARTHOLD, 430.

³ How great these fears were is clear from the *letter of V. Albergati of April 29, 1527 (State Archives, Bologna).

secure that from six to eight hundred men, armed with guns, would be a sufficient reinforcement; he advised Rangoni to return to the League with the remainder of his forces, as he would there be of much greater use than at Rome!¹

A herald of Bourbon, coming to demand the 300,000 ducats from the Pope, received no answer. From the Vatican Clement VII. could see the enemy advance across the Neronian fields; but even then he saw no serious danger, especially as they were not supported by artillery. Besides, there was the hourly expectation of the arrival of the army of the League.²

Clement VII. was confirmed in his mistaken conception of the state of things by the defeat of a troop of lands-knechts at the Ponte Molle by Orazio Baglioni. The Mantuan envoy, who reported this on the 5th of May, added, "The Pope is in the best spirits."³ Yet on the 4th of May such a panic had broken out in the city that it seemed as if the enemy were already within the

¹ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; *cf.* SANUTO, XLV., 144. For the armed rabble prepared for the defence of Rome, *cf.*, along with the authorities made use of by GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 509 *seq.*; CAVE, 392, 394; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 173 *seqq.*; M. Cresci, *Storia d'Italia (Laurentian Library, Florence, Cod. Ashburnh., 633), and the *despatches of G. de' Medici of April 26 and 27 and May 4, 1527 (State Archives, Florence), as well as the *reports of F. Gonzaga of April 25 and 28, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). According to a report of Canossa's to Francis I., dated Venice, May 16, 1527 (published by CIPOLLA, per le nozze Pellegrini - Canossa, Padova, 1880), "no si trovarono (in Roma) più che 3 m. fanti forestieri e quelli assai tristi per essere fatti tumultuariamente." *cf.* the different accounts given by others of the garrison in Cipolla's collection, *loc. cit.*, 21-22.

² SANUTO, XLV., 233. *cf.* the letter to Charles V. in MILANESI, Sacco, 500.

³ See in Appendix, No. 46, the *report in cipher of F. Gonzaga of May 5, 1527 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua).

walls.¹ Thousands tried to find a safe hiding-place for their property. Many, in spite of prohibitions, fled from Rome.²

Meanwhile the Imperialist army had surrounded Rome as far as the Janiculum. The main body encamped in the vineyards behind St. Peter's.³ In the cloisters of S. Onofrio, the headquarters of Bourbon, a council of war had decided that the Leonine city should be stormed on the following morning without further preparation. The state of the army was desperate. Deprived of the necessities of life, in an empty and barren country with an enemy in their rear, they now saw before them their only means of deliverance: this was the capture of Rome by storm, the walls of which were defended, as they knew, by only a handful of brave soldiers.⁴ Victory or death was Bourbon's watchword.⁵ With longing eyes his soldiers, craving for booty, counted up the prize of victory, now, at last, lying before them. The goal to which they had pressed through so many unheard-of hardships was now reached. The rays of that setting sun of the 5th of May lit up for the last time all the magnificence of the Rome of the Renaissance, then the fairest and richest city in all the world.

¹ See the report of **G. de' Medici of May 4, 1527 (State Archives, Florence). Cf. the autobiography of RAFFAELLO DA MONTELUPO, 427.

² Cf. Lett. d. princ., I., 110, and SANUTO, XLV., 73, 131. See also Arch. Stor. Ital., 5 Series, XIV., 57.

³ See Lannoy's report in LANZ, I., 705.

⁴ "Hessendo noi conduti in loco angusto e carestioso et havendo dinanzi un Tevere et una Roma," writes Sigismondo dalla Torre, "et intendendo che drieto ne cavalchava un grosso exercito, si pensò esser necessario tentar la fortuna, al che ci faceva più arditi il saper che in Roma non era gran provisione di buona gente pagata." SANUTO, XLV., 232.

⁵ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SACK OF ROME.—CAPTIVITY OF THE POPE.

ON the morning of the 6th of May, Monday after Misericordia Sunday, a thick fog covered the low, damp levels of the Tiber. In Rome, all through the night, the great bell of the Capitol had rung the tocsin and called the defenders to their posts.¹ They stood along the walls

¹ "In urbe vero tota nox praecedens expendebatur in clamoribus arma, arma, et campana Capitolii tota nocte et die tangebatur ad provocandum Romanos ad arma," are the expressions used by *CORNELIUS DE FINE in his Diary in the National Library, Paris. Besides his account I have also seen the following unpublished sources relating to the sack : (1) a despatch of F. Gonzaga of May 7, 1527, in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua ; (2) two reports of May 7 and 27, from the State Archives, Modena ; (3) the monastic chronicle of Orsola Formicini in the Vatican Library ; (4) an anonymous Italian account in the same collection ; (5) the "relatione di diversi casi" of the Angelica Library, Rome ; (6) a letter from Sanga of June 27 in the Ricci Archives, Rome ; (7) a report of Cardinal Salviati in the Secret Archives of the Vatican. The published documents, reports, pamphlets, and narratives in works of history have been diligently collected by SCHULZ, Sacco, 3-75 (*cf.* Schulz in the *Zeitschr. für Bücherfreunde*, III., 21 *seq.*), and critically examined, without concealing from himself that there are special publications by Italians which must have escaped his notice. Important authorities, overlooked by Schulz, are undoubtedly : a Mantuan report edited by LUZIO in 1883, Corvisieri's *Documenti inediti*, and the records (published by Armellini in 1886) of the Roman notary, Teodoro Gualderonico. It has also escaped Schulz that the letter of A. Gavardo, in the Quiriniana Library at Brescia, is not unpublished, but was produced as far back as 1877 in *Arch. Stor. Lombardo*, IV.,

in fighting order, but tried in vain to discern through the impenetrable vapour the movements in the enemy's camp.¹ Yet, distinctly audible, there rose from the sea of mist a wild tumult of sounds mingled with signals of war. The Imperialist army was getting ready for the assault.

Sciarra Colonna, with light cavalry and Italian infantry, advanced against the fortifications of the Milvian Bridge, while Melchior Frundsberg made an attack on the Trastevere at S. Pancrazio. The chief attacking party, meanwhile, moved on the Leonine city.² The north and

628 *seq.* Cf. also GUERRINI, Docum. Bresciani rig. il Sacco di Roma, in Riv. d. scien. stor. di Pavia, I., 8, 1904. Since the appearance of Schulz's valuable work, the sources of our information have been remarkably enriched. In the first place, mention must be made of the copious contemporary accounts in the forty-fifth volume of Sanuto; secondly, the French narratives in the Mél. d'Archéol., XVI., and the Ricordi of M. Alberini, written about 1547, and given in the Arch. d. Soc. Rom, XVIII. (1895). D. ORANO's work, planned on a great scale, on the Sacco di Roma, has not yet gone beyond the first volume (Rome, 1901), but it contains, with numerous explanations, the Ricordi of Alberini. As the second volume of Orano is to deal with the "Sacco nella letteratura," I refrain from a more detailed account of my own researches in this direction. Vol. vi. of Orano's work will contain a description of Rome in the year 1527, from the artistic point of view, by Lanciani and Venturi.

¹ The thick mist is dwelt upon by almost all the original authorities (*cf.* ORANO, I., 247 *seq.*), expressly by CAVE, 396; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 186; GROLIERIUS, 65; SANUTO, XLVI., 130; LANCELLOTTI, III., 237; VETTORI, 379; CORNELIUS DE FINE, quoted *infra*, p. 392, n. 1, and the "lettera da un ufficiale dell' esercito di Borbone" in MILANESI, 499 (that this was written by Gian Bartolomeo Gattinara has been shown by CORRADI, Gian Bart. Gattinara ed il Sacco di Roma (Torino, 1892), and SCHULZ, 5 *seq.*). Gattinara is expressly named as the author in Cod. Regin., 350, f. 119, of the Vatican Library, and in Cod. 92 of the Campello Archives, Spoleto.

² For the then condition of the fortifications of Rome, which, especially on the right side of the Tiber, were conspicuously weaker and different

west sides, where the Belvedere and the Porta Pertusa lay, were attacked at the same time as the south side ; there the Spaniards advanced and, on their right, against the Porta S. Spirito, the landsknechts did the same. The attack on the Belvedere and the Porta Pertusa, where Prince Philibert of Orange commanded, was, however, only a feint intended to deceive the defenders and turn their attention from the south side. Here, at the Porta Torrione (now Cavalleggeri) and the Porta S. Spirito, the weakest points of the fortifications, the attack was heaviest, undertaken without artillery, only with spears, pistols, and ladders hastily constructed out of garden palings and bound together with withes.¹ It was a rash enterprise, but the outcome of counsels of despair.

The first onset was successfully repelled by the defenders, although the latter were firing at random into the fog. The Spaniards as well as the landsknechts were forced to withdraw with heavy losses; a second attack also failed. Bourbon, who saw that everything was at stake,² thereupon placed himself at the head of the assailants. He succeeded in reaching the walls of the Porta Torrione, near the site, in later days, of the Cesi gardens and villa (now the Collegio di S. Monica³). Here there was a very badly secured position, easily exposed to attack.⁴ One of the

from those of a later date, *cf.* RAVIOLI in Arch. d. Soc. Rom., VI., 337 *seqq.*, 345 *seqq.* CANOVAS DEL CASTILLO, *Del asalto y saco de Roma* (Madrid, 1858), gives a map of the assault ; but this, as well as the topographical matter of this author, is not wholly satisfactory. The castellan of St. Angelo during the sack was Guido de' Medici ; see BENIGNI, *Miscell. di Storia*, V. (1906), 55 *seq.* Here also are given details of the works carried out in the castle under Clement VI.

¹ *Cf.* R. Schwegler's letter in HORMAYR'S Archiv, 1812, 448.

² *Cf.* the report of the Abbot of Najera in VILLA, *Asalto*, 123.

³ Present entrance Via S. Uffizio, 1.

⁴ According to D. Venier (SANUTO, XLV., 214) there was even a

first of the storming party to fall was Bourbon himself, who had pressed forward with headlong rashness. A bullet struck him down; although mortally wounded, he yet had the presence of mind to ask those around him to cover his body with a cloak.¹ In spite of this precaution, the fall of the Commander-in-Chief became known immediately to the Imperialist army. It caused such consternation and alarm that the fighting was for a while suspended. But the enemy, now breathing vengeance, soon resumed their attack on the walls, from which a deadly fire was pouring. This time the hazard was successful, being favoured by the

breach in the wall at this point. In any case the defences here were quite inadequate. Cf. Vettori in MILANESI, 433, and L. GUICCIARDINI, *ibid.*, 183 *seq.*, 190.

¹ The exact circumstances of Bourbon's death were variously related, from the first, by very well-informed contemporaries. Cf. Naselli's report of May 14, 1527, in HORMAYR'S Archiv, 1812, 437. Most authorities say that the fatal ball penetrated the abdomen (ORANO, I., 251). I find, however, other statements, that, for instance, of CORNELIUS DE FINE (*Diary, National Library, Paris), who says expressly: "ictu unius bombardae percussus in capite inter palpebras diem suum clausit." The French narrative (published by DROYSEN, *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 2) says he was struck on the forehead; as also does the *letter of Salviali (see App., No. 49, Secret Archives of the Vatican). That Bourbon fell, struck by a cannon ball, and not by a musket ball, as many say, is also the account given in SANUTO, XLV., 145; the latter says: "li portò via la costa sinistra et tutti li intestini." The different statements as to the locality of the wound can be reconciled, for an eye-witness affirms that he saw three wounds on Bourbon's body; see SANUTO, XLV., 87. It is certain that B. Cellini was not justified in claiming the credit, also attributed to others, of this fatal shot; cf. CANCELLIERI, Mercato, 242 *seq.*, and the works quoted by ORANO, I., 252; see also LEBEY, 428 *seq.* No difference of opinion can prevail as to where Bourbon fell (see GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 521, n.). The church where he was carried, and where he died, has been variously assigned; but it was certainly the Sistina; see BARTHOLD, 450, n., and SANUTO, XLV., 418.

fog, now so thick that it was hardly possible for a man to recognize his neighbour; for the same reason the heavy guns on St. Angelo were kept entirely out of action.¹ About 6 A.M.² the Spaniards succeeded in breaking through the walls of the city at the Porta Torrione by making skilful use of a badly guarded position; almost at the same time the landsknechts scaled the walls of S. Spirito.³

Fierce street fighting was carried on in the Borgo, especially near St. Peter's and S. Spirito. The Roman militia, in their desperate resistance, rivalled the loyal Swiss Guards, who had taken up their position near the obelisk, then still standing not far from the German Campo Santo; these troops were nearly annihilated.⁴ A testimony to their

¹ Cf. the reports in VILLA, *Asalto*, 141; SANUTO, XLV., 143 *seq.*, 165, 167, 186; JOVIUS, *Columna*, 165; CELEBRINO, 12 *seq.*, and CORNELIUS DE FINE, who, in his *Diary, says that the mist had become so dense "*ita quod videri vix poterat qui stabat cum alio facie ad faciem et Romani non poterant amplius tormentis bellicis hostes laedere, quia nihil videbant*" (National Library, Paris).

² "Initum fuit certamen," says *Cornelius de Fine, "in aurora ante octavam horam (according to Italian time; according to ours, at 4 A.M.) postquam certatum esset ferme per duas horas, Imperiales habuerunt victoriam et vi ceperunt Burgam S. Petri continue certantes et interficientes Romanos et pontificis satellites, et nulli pepercerunt." *Diary in National Library, Paris.

³ According to the Ferrara report in HORMAYR'S Archiv, 1812, 438 (GASSLER, 81 *seq.*, had already published this document, of which Hormayr says nothing; I quote from Hormayr because his Archiv is much better known than the rare work of Gassler), the Spaniards were the first to enter Rome; others, followed by RANKE (*Deutsche Gesch.*, II., 2nd ed., 410), say the landsknechts. That they both made their way in simultaneously is also the opinion of SCHULZ, 105 n.

⁴ Besides the letters of Buffalini of May 11 (*Lettere di diversi all' ill. Sig. V. Vitelli*, Firenze, 1551, 141, and GROLIERIUS, 66), see the reports in SANUTO, XLV., 123, 167; in HORMAYR'S Archiv, 1812, 438; in VILLA, *Asalto*, 123; the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National

valour may still be read to-day in an inscription near the Church of S. Spirito, which relates that there the Papal goldsmith, Bernardino Passeri, fell fighting for the sacred cause of the city of his fathers, after having slain many of the enemy and captured a standard.¹

The whole Borgo was soon ringing with the cries of victory of the Imperialists, who, as they rushed irresistibly onwards, cut down all who crossed their path, without regard to age or sex. Almost all the sick in the hospital of S. Spirito, even the inmates of the neighbouring orphanage, were murdered. Blood flowed before the altars in St. Peter's.² Already in some places plundering was set on foot, not indeed by soldiers but by the camp rabble; for commands had been given to refrain from plunder until the city was completely taken. These were so strictly carried out that the soldiers were under orders to slaughter all beasts of burden found in the Leonine city in order to prevent the transport of booty, and therewith the disorganization of the bodies of troops.³ The Imperialists were prevented from crossing the bridge of St. Angelo by the hail of cannon balls from the guns of the fortress.

The rush of the enemy into the Leonine city had taken place so suddenly, in the midst of the rolling vapours, that Renzo da Ceri lost his head and fled distractedly to the Vatican. There Clement was praying in his private

Library, Paris); and in Appendix, No. 49, the report of Salviati (Secret Archives of the Vatican). The twelve survivors of the Swiss Guards entered the landsknechts; see *Anz. f. schweiz. Gesch.*, 1886, 37.

¹ CANCELLIERI, *Mercato*, 242; TORRIGIO, *Grotte*, 262; *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, VI., 374 *seqq.*; PIERRET, *Cenno storico di B. Passeri*, Roma, 1885.

² JOVIUS, *Columna*, 165; VILLA, *Asalto*, 134; CAVE, 398; letter of Buffalini, Rome, May 11, 1527, in *Lettere al V. Vitelli*, 148; BUONAROTTI, 1871, 255 *seq.*; and SANUTO, XLV., 133, 167, 186.

³ Naselli's report in *HORMAYR'S Archiv*, 1812, 438.

chapel,¹ when the approaching sound of the cries of battle told him what had happened. The Pope up to this moment had trusted implicitly in Renzo's promises. The latter had pledged his head that the enemy would not make their way into Rome.² Nothing but rapid flight could now save the chief Pastor of the Church. A Spanish account says that if he had lingered as long as the time it takes to say three Credo's, he would have fallen a prisoner.³ With sobs and lamentations he hastened along the covered way leading to St. Angelo; from the small windows of the castle he saw the panic-stricken knots of fugitives cut down in pitiless fury by Spaniards and Germans. The historian Paolo Giovio was of help to Clement in his flight. He flung his violet prelate's mantle over the white clothing of the Pope so that the latter should not be an easy mark for his enemies as he hurried across the open wooden bridge connecting St. Angelo with the covered way.⁴

To the same asylum of refuge fled the non-Imperialist Cardinals, also Giberti, Jacopo Salviati, Schönberg, the Ambassadors of France and England, the officers of the Papal Court, and a throng of men, women, and children. Cardinal Pucci, who, in his flight, had been thrown from his horse and trampled upon, yet managed to reach the castle at the last moment; Cardinal Armellini was drawn up in a basket.⁵ When the drawbridge went up and

¹ Not in St. Peter's as many, including GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 523, assert; *cf.* BARTHOLD, 447, n.

² *Cf.* the report in SANUTO, XLV., 418.

³ Letter of Salazar of May 18, 1527, in VILLA, Asalto, 142.

⁴ JOVIUS, Columna, 165. In Giovio's description of the sack (*Sacco di Roma*, Descriz. di M. P. Giovio, Venezia, 1872, ed. per *nozze*) the circumstance mentioned above is not related. *Cf.* also the somewhat different account in SANUTO, XLVI., 130.

⁵ CELEBRINO, 14; L. Guicciardini, in MILANESI, 193 *seq.*; *cf.* SANUTO, XLVI., 132.

the rusty portcullis fell, three thousand persons were computed to have found shelter in the stronghold. Even then, many others pressed forward, and fell into the moat. "We stood there," narrates the sculptor Raffaello da Montelupo, who, like Benvenuto Cellini, was manning the castle guns, "and looked on at all that passed as if we had been spectators of a festa. It was impossible to fire, for had we done so, we should have killed more of our own people than of the enemy. Between the church of S. Maria Transpontina and the gate of the castle more than from four to five thousand persons were crowded together, pell-mell, and, as far as we could see, hardly fifty landsknechts behind them. Two standard-bearers of the latter forced their way through the turmoil with uplifted banners as far as the great gate of the castle, but were shot down at the head of the bridge."¹

Many inhabitants of the Leonine city sought refuge in flight; so reckless was the rush on the boats that many were swamped and sank; not a few persons flung themselves in despair into the Tiber.² The Imperialists were forced to withdraw from the Leonine city, where the guns of St. Angelo made occupation impossible. The commanders accordingly determined to transfer the attack to the second suburb on the right bank of the Tiber, to Trastevere, from which three bridges (Ponte Sisto, Ponte Quattro Capi, and Ponte S. Maria) led into Rome proper. Since the Imperialists could now make use of the captured artillery, they quickly attained their object, the resistance they encountered being at the same time very much weaker. St. Angelo indeed kept up a repeated fire,

¹ Autobiography of RAFFAELLO DA MONTELUPO, 429-430; *cf.* GROLIERUS, 67. The number of those in the castle was reduced, later on, to 950; see SANUTO, XLVI., 132.

² Blasius de Martinellis in CREIGHTON, V., 328; J. CAVE, 397.

but the guns had not sufficient range to do serious damage to the besiegers and prevent the capture of Trastevere.¹

It was now the chief object of the Imperialists to act with the utmost possible despatch before the army of the League drew near and the Romans recovered from their panic and broke down the bridges. The commanders had difficulty in keeping together their men, eager for plunder, and ordered the separate divisions to advance on Ponte Sisto. It was about seven in the evening² when the first columns arrived there. Although it sounds incredible, it is yet a fact, that the means taken to secure even this most important point were utterly inadequate. The bridge had not been blown up, and the gate-house was only weakly defended. The question may be asked: How was this possible? The Roman Marcello Alberini, who as a young man had lived through the capture of the city, supplies the answer. The defence was organized as badly as possible; from the beginning there was no one central command. Apart from this, the defenders, who were none too numerous, were dispersed along the entire distance of the long line of the city walls and kept watch at points where the least danger threatened. Many deserted

¹ Cf. in Appendix, No. 49, the report of Salviati (Secret Archives of the Vatican), as well as SANUTO, XLV., 233, the letter of Du Bellay in *Mél. d'Archéol.*, XVI., 412, and Autobiography of RAFFAELLO DA MONTELUPO, 430.

² The 23rd hour (Italian time) is given in most accounts as the time of the entrance into Rome proper; see GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; A. LANCEOLINUS, *Capture of Rome*, translated into German by H. von Ependorff (supplement to G. CAPELLA, *Von den Geschichten Italie*, Strassburg, 1536; cf. SCHULZ, 24 *seq.*); ALBERINI, 340; GUMPPENBERG, 240; *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris). The 20th and 21st hours are given in SANUTO, XLV., 145, 219, and CAVE, 399, the 22nd in VETTORI, 380.

their posts because no one brought them their victuals. Others paraded the streets pompously with military airs, and believed, Alberini adds in bitter irony, that they were thus defending their native land. Besides, the Ghibellines and satellites of the Colonna thought that they had nothing to fear if the Imperialists were victorious; many even wished that Rome might come under the rule of Charles V. Then, again, the consequences of Bourbon's death were greatly exaggerated, and some were convinced to a certainty that the enemy's army, having lost its leader, would immediately break up.¹ When, at last, the magnitude of the danger was recognized, attempts were made to open negotiations which, from the nature of the case, could have no result.² But the populace, as if bewildered by fear, ran about the streets, and people of substance tried to conceal their property in the houses of Imperialist persons. Only a few high-minded and spirited men resolved to raise a couple of hundred horsemen to defend the Ponte Sisto. But those brave men were not able to check for long the inroad of the enemy. From the roof of the palace of the Cancelleria, Alberini saw how Pierpaolo Tibaldi, Giulio Vallati, and Giambattista Savelli

¹ ALBERINI, 339; GROLIERIUS, 54, 71; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; Vettori in MILANESI, 435; *cf.* ORANO, I., 241, n. According to Du Bellay, Renzo da Ceri had resolved on the destruction of the bridges, but met with refusal on the part of the Romans; *cf.* Mél. d'Archéol., XVI., 411 *seq.* A report in SANUTO, XLV., 418, says that the Pope wished the bridges to be destroyed; the refusal came from Renzo. L. Guicciardini (in MILANESI, 196 *seqq.*) brings the gravest accusations against Renzo, but says that he was not alone to blame.

² The negotiations were to be in the hands of the Margrave Gumbert of Brandenburg, a resident in Rome; *cf.* GUMPPENBERG'S report, 240 *seq.*; see also BELLERMANN, *Erinnerungen aus Südeuropa*, Berlin, 1851, 39 *seq.*

fell like heroes, whereupon the leaders gave up all for lost and fled.¹

The Imperialists now rushed like a mountain torrent in flood through the streets of the capital. "All were doomed to certain death who were found in the streets of the city; the same fate was meted out to all, young or old, woman or man, priest or monk. Everywhere rang the cry: Empire! Spain! Victory!"²

Nevertheless, the Imperialists did not yet feel secure. At any moment the army of the League might appear before Rome. Even if a few, here and there, had begun to plunder, the generals were still able to keep control over the nucleus of the army in its appointed divisions. The landsknechts held the Campo di Fiore, the Spaniards the Piazza Navona, while Ferrante Gonzaga watched St. Angelo. These measures of precaution proved, however, to be unnecessary. Guido Rangoni had, indeed, appeared in the evening at the Ponte Salaro with five hundred light cavalry and eight hundred musketeers, but on hearing of the fall of Rome had immediately fallen back on Otricoli. When the victorious soldiery saw that no one disputed their quickly won success, their leaders were no longer in a position to hold them together. The first to break away in their hunger for booty were the Spaniards; they were soon followed by the landsknechts. Twenty thousand disorganized soldiers, to whom a rabble of vagabonds and banditti³ had attached themselves, now spread through the

¹ See ALBERINI, 340, the letter of Buffalini, see *supra*, p. 392, n. 4, and CELEBRINO, 14.

² GUMPPENBERG'S Report, 241.

³ According to SANUTO, XLV., 218, the number of these vagabonds amounted to 10,000, certainly a very exaggerated reckoning. The same statement is made by AMASEO, *Diario*, Venezia, 1884, 90-91. For the strength of the Imperial army see *supra*, p. 361. JOVIUS, *Columna*, 165, exaggerates when he says that more than 40,000 of the enemy

streets of the ill-fated capital of the world, to plunder, burn, and kill in accordance with "the rights of war." Carrying lighted wax candles in their hands, these savage bands passed from house to house in the darkness of the night; they took, however, only gold and silver; whoever offered resistance was at once cut down.¹

On the morning of the 7th of May, Rome presented a spectacle that baffled description. It was, in the words of Francesco Gonzaga, a sight that might have moved a stone to compassion.² Everywhere there was the most ruthless devastation, everywhere rapine and murder. The air re-echoed to the wailings of women, the plaintive cries of children, the barking of dogs, the neighing of chargers, the clash of arms, and the crash of timber from the burning houses.³ All accounts, even the Spanish, agree that no age, no sex, no station, no nationality, neither Spaniard nor German, neither church nor hospital, was spared.⁴

The soldiers began by carrying off from the houses and palaces all objects of value; they then set a price of ransom on all those whom they had robbed, on men, women, and children, and even on servants; those who were not able to

invaded Rome. GUALDERONICO, 91, puts the number at only 18,000, CORNELIUS DE FINE at 25,000 (*Diary in National Library, Paris).

¹ **Primi spoliatores erant Hispani et Itali qui tota nocte cum torciis ceræ albae circumibant civitatem a domo ad domum nil accipientes nisi aurum et argentum, si tamen alia preciosa non accipiebant.* *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

² I found the despatch of this envoy, written with a trembling hand, in the Gonzaga Archives, Mantua; see the text in Appendix, No. 47.

³ J. CAVE, 400. Cf. also the report of F. Gonzaga of May 9, 1527, in LUZIO, Maramaldo, 79.

⁴ VILLA, *Asalto*, 124, 135 *seq.*, 143, 164. Cf. MILANESI, 501; SANUTO, XLV., 88, 90; GUALDERONICO, 92. See also **Relazione di diversi casi curiosi successi in Roma nel sacco di Borbone*. R 6, 17, Angelica Library, Rome.

pay were first tortured in the cruellest manner and then murdered. But even the payment of their ransom did not help these wretched victims; this only led to fresh exactions and fresh suffering. Often, when a house was stripped clean of its contents, it was then set on fire. "Hell," said a Venetian report of the 10th of May 1527,¹ "has nothing to compare with the present state of Rome." In many places the streets were covered with dead bodies; beneath them lay many a child under ten years of age who had been flung out of the windows by the soldiers.²

Still more terrible was the fate of defenceless women and maidens. Neither tender youth nor venerable age nor noble birth shielded the unhappy victims from brutal ill-usage and dishonour. Many were violated and murdered before the eyes of their husbands and fathers; even the daughter of the wealthy Domenico Massimi, whose sons had been slain and his palace burned, fell a victim. More than one contemporary declared that the deeds of the Vandals, Goths, and Turks were outdone. Many young girls, driven to despair by the dishonour wreaked upon them, flung themselves into the Tiber; others were put to death by their own fathers to save them from the extremity of shame.³ Spaniards, Germans, and Italians rivalled one another in cruelty towards the unhappy inhabitants; but all accounts coincide in giving to the Spaniards, among whom were many Jews and "Marani,"⁴ the palm for ingenuity in

¹ SANUTO, XLV., 219. F. Gonzaga writes in the same way on May 9; see LUZIO, Maramaldo, 81.

² SANUTO, XLV., 123, 165.

³ SANUTO, XLV., 133, 145, 164, 165, 187, 203. F. Gonzaga in LUZIO, Maramaldo, 81; J. CAVE, 400 *seq.*; *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 24, 26; see also ORANO, I., 272, n. Cf. Sanga's letter in Appendix, No. 50. For D. Massimi see SANUTO, XLV., 122, 145, 187, 233.

⁴ L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 229; CELEBRINO, 15; and GRO-LIERIUS, 24. VOGELSTEIN, II., 50, doubts the above facts without grounds.

unearthing treasure and contriving tortures, although the Italians, and especially the Neapolitans, were, on the whole, scarcely second to them.¹

A letter of the Venetian, Giovan Barozzi, written to his brother on the 12th of May 1527, describes with appalling truth and directness the unspeakable misery of the Romans. "I am," he says, "a prisoner of the Spaniards. They have fixed my ransom at 1000 ducats on the pretext that I am an official. They have, besides, tortured me twice, and finished by lighting a fire under the soles of my feet. For six days I had only a little bread and water. Dear brother, do not let me perish thus miserably. Get the ransom money together by begging. For God's sake do not abandon me. If I do not pay the ransom, now amounting to 140 ducats, in twenty-six days they will hack me in pieces. For the love of God and of the Blessed Virgin help me. All the Romans are prisoners, and if a man does not pay his ransom he is killed. The sack of Genoa and of Rhodes was child's play to this. Help me, dear Antonio; help me for God's sake, and that as quickly as possible."² The sufferings here spoken of were by no means the most severe; the French physician, Jean Cave, in his account of the sack, remarks that no method of torture was left untried; he gives some examples, in illustration, which the pen shrinks from

¹ Italian despatch-writers state this expressly; see SANUTO, XLV., 221; JOVIUS, Columna, 166, and ALBERINI, 342. Cf. ORANO, I., 199, n., and 275, n. According to Blasius de Martinellis (CREIGHTON, V., 328) and SANUTO, XLV., 234, Romans themselves took a part in the plunder. In the **Literae priorum Castri Plebis* to Siena, dated "ex terra Castri Plebis desolata," May 13, 1527, we read: "Non igitur mirandum est quid fecerint Germani et Hispani hostes urbi Romae, cum seiora patrauerint amici milites." TIZIO, **Hist. Senen.*, Cod. G. II., 40 (Chigi Library, Rome).

² The letter is in SANUTO, XLV., 237-238.

transcribing. Luigi Guicciardini relates things of, if possible, even greater atrocity. A form of torture which seems to have been especially in favour with the Spaniards was to bind their prisoners fast and leave them to die of slow starvation.¹

The excesses of German landsknechts were not marked by such inventive cruelty. They gave way rather to a stupid and brutal vandalism. Sots and gamblers, knowing nothing of Italy and its language, they were systematically overreached by the shrewd Spaniards, who knew how to single out for themselves the richest houses. The Germans also, in their simplicity, were satisfied for the most part with much smaller ransoms.² In disorderly companies

¹ J. CAVE, 403. Cf. *Histor. Jahrbuch*, XII., 752; VILLA, *Asalto*, 136, 164 *seq.*; GUALDERONICO, 92; GAVARDO in *Arch. Stor. Lomb.*, IV., 630; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 224 *seqq.*; Cardinal Trivulzio, *ibid.*, 486; SANUTO, XLVI., 140 *seq.* *Nullum genus tormentorum praetermiserunt in eos, alii per testicul[os] pendebantur, alii igne sub pedibus torquebantur, alii varia supplicia passi sunt donec solverent ea quae non haberent, et quod plus est: postquam liberati essent e manibus unius, incidebant in alios nequiores latrones. *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris.

² See JOVIUS, Columna, 106. GREGOROVIVS, in the *Allgem. Zeitung*, 1876, Beil. No. 205, has justly taken exception to VILLA's assertion (*Asalto*, 205 *seq.*), that the greatest cruelties were committed, not by Spaniards, but by Germans. Not only Jovius, but also L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 231, and the Frenchmen, GROLIERIVS, 92 *seq.*, and J. CAVE, 404, testify to the conduct of the Germans in a very different way, without denying that they committed excesses. That they too did many cruel things, and slew in anger those who did not at once meet their demands for money, is proved (see SANUTO, XLV., 166, 168, 188, 262); but it is certain that they were not, on the whole, the worst and the most cruel. M. CRESCI (**Storia d'Italia*, Laurentian Library, Cod. Ashburnh., 633) says the Italians were quite as cruel as the Spaniards and the landsknechts. Fabius Arcas of Narni says truly: "In that destruction of Rome the Germans showed themselves bad enough, the Italians were worse, but the worst of all were the Spaniards," K. LEIB, *Annales*, 512.

they passed through the streets of the city,¹ not sparing even their own countrymen,² dressed up in a ridiculous manner in magnificently embroidered silk raiment, with gold chains round their necks and precious stones twisted through their beards, while their faces were begrimed with powder and smoke.

Since the landsknechts were for the most part Lutheran, they did not neglect this opportunity of heaping scorn and ridicule on the Papacy. With the red hats of Cardinals on their heads and the long robes of the Princes of the Church flung round them, they paraded the streets mounted on asses and indulged in every conceivable mummery. A Bavarian captain, Wilhelm von Sandizell, even dressed up as the Pope and bade his comrades, masquerading as Cardinals, kiss his hands and feet. He gave his blessing with a glass of wine, a salutation which his companions acknowledged by drinking to him in return. The whole gang then made their way to the Leonine city, to the sounds of trumpets and fifes, and there proclaimed Luther as Pope in such a way that the inmates of St. Angelo became aware of their doings. A landsknecht called Grünwald was said to have shouted up to the fortress that he wished he could devour a bit of the Pope's body, because he was a hinderer of the Word of God. Another carried about a crucifix fastened on the point of his pike before finally breaking it in pieces.³

¹ J. CAVE, 400; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 238.

² See GESCHEID's account in *Histor. Jahrbuch*, XII., 752; SCHULTE, I., 238; SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 274; DE WAAL, *Der Campo Santo*, 87 *seq.*

³ J. CAVE, 402; Nova in SCHARDIUS, II., 612; SANUTO, XLV., 210; *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 27 *seq.*, 44 *seq.*; GIOVO's *Descrizione*, 17, quoted *supra*, p. 394, n. 4; LANCELOTTI, III., 251, 263; RANKE (*Deutsche Gesch.*, II., 2nd ed., 414) sees in the proceeding of the landsknechts described above "the sportive (!) expression of their evangelical opinions." BARTHOLD, 453, 462 *seq.*

It is almost impossible to describe the destruction and sacrilege wrought by the landsknechts in the churches; yet the Spaniards and Italians did not fall far short of them. Every church, even the national churches of the Spaniards and the Germans,¹ was plundered. What the generosity and piety of centuries had amassed in costly vestments, vessels, and works of art, was, in the space of a few days, carried off by this rude soldiery, flung away on play or wine or sold to the Jews. The precious settings of relics were torn off; in many instances even tombs were broken open and ransacked in the search for treasures. Hands were laid on the Blessed Sacrament of the altar itself; the consecrated species were flung on the ground and desecrated in all manner of ways. "Unbelievers," says a Spanish account, "could not have behaved worse."² It was reported that some soldiers clothed an ass in bishop's vestments, led him into a church, and tried to force a priest to incense the beast solemnly, and even to offer him the Sacred Host. The priest, on refusing, was cut in pieces.³

¹ Cf. SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 273 *seq.*, 278 *seq.*

² See the Spanish reports in VILLA, 135 and 136, and the Italian in SANUTO, XLV., 133, 166, 203, 221-222; XLVI., 142 *seq.* Cf. also GUALDERONICO, 93; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 204, 241; GROLIERUS, 74; SURIUS, *Comment.*, 202; TIZIO, *Hist. Senen. in Cod. G, II., 40, f. 313 and 314 (Chigi Library, Rome). For the robbery of relics see FONTANA, *Renata*, I., 430, and in Appendix, No. 50, Sanga's *letter (Ricci Archives, Rome), and the letter of Salvati, *ibid.*, n. 49.

³ *Un povero sacerdote ma generoso christiano perchè non volse incensare e comunicare un' asino, che vestito in habito di vescovo havevano con mitra condotto in chiesa, restò crudelmente trucidato. *Relatione del Sacco dato a Roma li 6 Maggio 1527 cavata da alcuni Mss. di persone trovatesi. Cod. Vatic., 7933 (Vatican Library). The *Relatione of the Angelica Library, Rome, cited *supra*, p. 399, n. 4, says the same with more detail. Cf. L. Guicciardini in MILANESI,

The desecration of churches was carried to such a pitch that they were turned into stables; even St. Peter's did not escape this fate, for there also tombs were violated, among others that of Julius II. The head of St. Andrew was thrown on the ground, the napkin of St. Veronica, a relic deeply venerated during the Middle Ages, was stolen and offered for sale in Roman hostelries. A famous crucifix belonging to one of the seven principal altars of St. Peter's was hidden away in the clothes of a landsknecht; countless relics and costly objects were at this time purloined; the Holy Lance was fastened by a German soldier to his pike, and carried in derision through the Borgo. Although the resting-place of the Princes of the Apostles was desecrated, yet the actual tomb of St. Peter was left uninjured. The chapel Sancta Sanctorum, declared in an inscription to be the most sacred spot on earth,¹ was plundered; happily the special treasure of the chapel remained undisturbed in its huge enclosure of iron.²

The fury of the captors wreaked itself with special cruelty on all persons of ecclesiastical status. A large proportion of the priests and monks who fell into the hands of the landsknechts were murdered. Many were sold publicly

229; SANUTO, XLV., 218; the letter of Cardinal Trivulzio in MILANESI, 484; LANCELLOTTI, III., 263, and the narrative of S. Perelli in SAGGIATORE, I., 313.

¹ Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 133, 166, 168, 192, 435 *seq.*; VILLA, 146; Arch. stor. Lomb., IV., 635; GESCHEID in Hist. Jahrbuch, XII., 752; Nova in SCHARDIUS, II., 612; MILANESI, 484 *seq.*, 503; SANDOVAL, I., 718 *seq.*; SANTORO, 11; GRISAR in the Civ. Catt., 1906, II., 725 *seq.*; Sanga's letter (Ricci Archives, Rome), in Appendix, No. 50; TORRIGIO, Grotte, 255 *seq.* For the dispersion of relics see ORANO, I., 271 *seq.*, n., and 333, n. GESCHEID'S account of the tomb of St. Peter (Hist. Jahrb., *loc. cit.*) is an exaggeration due to excitement; cf. GRISAR, Tombe apostol. di Roma, 29; see also LANCIANI, I., 238.

² Cf. GRISAR in the Civ. Catt., *loc. cit.*

as captives of war; others were made to put on women's clothing and exposed to shocking ribaldry. The Spaniards made it their main business to extort money from the clergy. The landsknechts declared that they had promised to God to murder all priests, and they acted accordingly; Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops, Protonotaries, Abbots were ill-treated, fined, and murdered. Venerable priests well stricken in years were treated with violence. The Bishop of Potenza, eighty years of age, being unable to pay his ransom, was at once put to death. The Bishop of Terracina, in his ninetyeth year, failing to give the 30,000 ducats demanded of him, was publicly put up for sale, with a truss of straw on his head, like a beast in the cattle market.¹ Other ecclesiastics had their noses and ears cut off, and were forced to perform the lowest services.²

Still more terrible were the sufferings endured by the nuns. Some succeeded at the last hour in securing safe places of concealment. More than a hundred and sixty who had taken refuge in a convent near S. Lorenzo in Paneperna were, on payment of money, protected by a company of landsknechts from their own comrades. One of the nuns of S. Cosimato in Trastevere, all of whom had fled there in a body, describes the deadly agony which she and her companions, mostly women of noble birth, went through. The same chronicle gives a vivid description of the spoliation of the rich church of S. Cosimato, where an image of the Infant Christ Himself,

¹ These details are given in the Spanish reports in VILLA, 137, 154. Cf. also SANUTO, XLV., 122, 145, 166 *seq.*, 186, XLVI., 139 *seq.*; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; DROYSEN, *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 43 (*cf.* SCHULZ, 50, 54 *seq.*); Sanga's letter in Appendix, No. 50, and the **Relatione* in Cod. Vatic., 7933.

² L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 239. Cf. LANCELOTTI, III., 224, 237.

carved in wood, was shattered in pieces.¹ But what was all this compared with the fate of those religious houses of women whose inmates had no hope of escape, as, for example, the nuns of S. Maria in Campo Marzo, S. Rufina, and others!² It can easily be understood that the atrocities committed were indescribable. The victims of this bestial rapine were to be counted happy who, after being robbed of all, were slain; the majority of those who survived were reserved for a fate harder than death. Half-naked, or huddled up, in mockery, in Cardinals' robes, they were

¹ See Galetti's *extracts from the *Cronica di S. Cosimato in Mica aurea in Cod. Vatic., 7933, f. 55 *seq.*, of the Vatican Library. The Suor Orsola Formicini here gives a simple and vivid description of the flight of the sisters in the night, of their agony of mind, and their marvellous rescue under cover of S. Lorenzo in Paneperna, and of the destruction of the church and monastery of S. Cosimato. *Lassarono dunque le pavidè ancille del Signore il loro monastero pieno di ogni bene: la madonna della Chiesa parata et con que' vezzi de' perle grossissime di quelle antiche baronesse et un parato di velluto cremesiuo nell' altare maggiore, et era la prima volta che fù mossa. Tutta la sacrestia richa et nobile poichè quelle illustrissime signore quando si facevan monache tutte le loro cose belle et bone et di prezzo mettevano in sacrestia . . . ; mi dissero come vi era una croce d' oro fino et piena di perle et gioie finissime qual' era di gran valuta; il tutto lassarono senza salvar niente. In her account of the destruction of the monastery the writer says: "Ogni cosa fù persa, ma perchè no fù perso l' onore si puo dire che non persero nulla."

² According to the *Relatione, quoted *supra*, p. 404, n. 3, these two monasteries suffered the worst outrages; Cod. Vatic., 7933, of the Vatican Library. The same account is found in the *Relatione of the Angelica Library (see *supra*, p. 399, n. 4). Above this section is written: *Sacco dato al rione di Campo Marzo e morte di alcune signore e parimente sacheggiano il monastero di Campo Marzo e stuprano le monache et tolgono l' onore a molte matrone Romane che si credevano salve in detto Monastero. Cf. the further section: *Cio che fecero alli monasteri e conventi di monache et religiosi. See also the minute in SAGGIATORE, I., 314, and ORANO, I., 273, n.

dragged through the streets to the houses of ill-fame, or sold singly in the markets for two ducats, or even less, apiece.¹ Here again the Spaniards committed the worst abominations. The German landsknechts, at first, were content for the most part with extorting ransoms and securing precious belongings; and sometimes they even protected persecuted innocence from their own comrades;² but later on they followed the example of the others, and, in not a few cases, tried, indeed, to outvie them in their excesses.³

The landsknechts, among whom were many Lutherans, had shown no pity, from the first, for the clergy and the Cardinals, who, moreover, had been handled badly enough by the ruthless Spaniards. Even the Cardinals with Imperialist sympathies did not escape wholesale robbery, savage ill-usage, and cruel mockery. For eight days the palaces of Cardinals Piccolomini, Valle, Enkevoint, and Cesarini, situated in the Rione S. Eustachio, were spared, their owners having secured the protection of Spanish officers, who declared that they would take nothing from the Cardinals themselves, but demanded large sums from the numerous fugitives who found asylum in those palaces. At first they asked for 100,000 ducats from each palace; but afterwards were satisfied on receiving 45,000 from Cesarini, 40,000 from Enkevoint, and 35,000 from Valle and Piccolomini each. These sums had to be paid in

¹ With VILLA, 138, 146, *cf.* specially SANUTO, 166, 167, 203, 218, 435. See also GUALDERONICO, 93; Arch. stor. Lomb., IV., 635; and in Appendix, No. 50, Sanga's letter (Ricci Archives, Rome).

² *Fu osservato però in qualche caso che li Luterani tedeschi si mostravano più miti, anzi si fecero custodi della pudicitia di alcune bastando loro di ottenere robba o denaro, mostrandosi molto più pregiudizievole alla città li Spagnoli per le inaudite inventioni di tormenti praticati con alcuni per farli confessare ripostini e per cavarne denari. *Relatione, etc., in Cod. Vatic., 7933, Vatican Library.

³ L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 232 *seq.*

ducats to the full amount ; all other coins and also precious stones were rejected. But the landsknechts were now also anxious to visit these palaces, and finally the Spaniards announced that they could not guarantee any further protection. The landsknechts fell first on the palace of Cardinal Piccolomini, who thought himself perfectly safe, as he and his family were, from old times, friends of the Emperor and the Germans. After a four hours' fight the palace was taken and plundered. The Cardinal, who had to disburse 5000 ducats, was dragged, with his head uncovered, amid blows and kicks, to the Borgo. In consequence Cardinals Cesarini, Valle, and Enkevourt also felt no longer safe, and fled to the Palazzo Colonna. They had hardly left their residences before looting and destruction began. Not content with the huge booty they found there, the landsknechts laid a heavy ransom on every Roman who had taken refuge in these palaces.¹ In addition to this the three hundred and ninety persons in the Palazzo Valle had been fined already, on the 8th of May, by Fabrizio Maramaldo, a captain in the Imperialist army. The Cardinal and his household on this occasion had been mulcted in 7000 ducats ; the other fugitives had been rated individually according to their means. The total sum raised in this one palace alone—of an Imperialist Cardinal—amounted to 34,455 ducats.²

¹ Lettera del Card. di Como of March 24, 1527, in MILANESI, 477 *seq.* Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 168, 187 ; VILLA, 145 ; SAGGIATORE, I., 338 *seq.* ; SCHMIDLIN, 274 *seq.* ; ORANO, I., 289 *seq.*, and the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris).

² The notarial instrument by which the refugees undertook to repay to Cardinal Valle the sums levied on them has been published incorrectly by L. BONAPARTE, *Sac de Rome*, Florence, 1830, 81 *seq.*, and correctly by CORVISIERI, *Documenti*, 21-31, who also gives (33-34) the rates at which each person was taxed ; among the latter were eight Jews who were valued at 400 ducats. Cf. also VOGELSTEIN, II., 47 *seq.*

Cardinals Cajetan and Ponzetti were also dragged through the streets, fettered, and subjected to ill-usage and ridicule. Ponzetti, who was also an Imperialist, had to pay a ransom of 20,000 ducats; he died in consequence of the injuries he had received. The Franciscan Cardinal Numai, then suffering from serious illness, was carried on a bier through the streets by Lutheran landsknechts singing dirges. They then took him to a church, where a mock funeral service was gone through, and threatened to fling him into a grave if he did not pay a ransom. He was afterwards carried to some friends who were bound over to be his sureties.¹ Cristoforo Marcello, Archbishop of Corfù, was called upon to pay 6000 ducats; not having the money, he was flung into imprisonment at Gaeta under threats of death.²

A heavy ransom was demanded even from the Portuguese Ambassador, who was very nearly related to Charles V., and on his refusing to pay, his palace was plundered. As several bankers had transferred their property thither for safety, the soldiers came into possession of an exceedingly rich haul. The Florentine banker, Bernardo Bracci, was taken by Spanish soldiers to the Bank of the Foreigners, where he had to pay down his ransom of 8206 ducats. On the Ponte Sisto he met the captain, La Motte, who had been appointed governor of the city, who threatened to fling Bracci into the Tiber unless he laid down an additional 600 ducats; Bracci paid and so saved his life.³ Even Perez, the Secretary of the Imperial Embassy, was in danger of his life at the

¹ Cf. the *Relatione in Cod. Vat., 7933, Vatican Library; SANUTO, XLV., 100, 145; VILLA, 137; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 228; GROLIERIUS, 75 *seq.*

² See SANUTO, XLV., 493-495; *cf.* 655.

³ See the reports in MILANESI, 228 *seq.*, 380, 472 *seq.*; VILLA, 138, 145, 165; SANUTO, XLV., 133; Studi e doc., V., 224 *seq.*

hands of savage landsknechts, and suffered heavy losses in money and property.¹ The Emperor's procurator, George Sauermann, was so completely despoiled that he was reduced to beggary, and died in the street from hunger and exhaustion.² No place afforded safety; the very hospitals, among them even that of the Germans, were not spared.³

The Venetian Ambassador, Domenico Venier, and the envoys of Mantua, Ferrara, and Urbino, had fled to the great palace of Isabella, Marchioness of Mantua, at SS. Apostoli. This high-minded Princess had also given asylum in her fortress-palace to a multitude of men and women of noble birth. While it was still night her son, Ferrante Gonzaga, came in haste to protect her; he was unable, however, to prevent the sum of 60,000 ducats being levied as ransom on those to whom his mother had given shelter. Although a watch of Spaniards and landsknechts now guarded the house, it was repeatedly threatened by turbulent bands of the captors. The Marchioness was in deadly fear. On the 13th of May she fled to Civita Vecchia; with her escaped the Venetian Ambassador, disguised as a porter. In the letter in which Venier announced his safety to the Doge, he remarks, "The destruction of Jerusalem could not have been worse than that of Rome."⁴

Pompeo Colonna appeared in Rome on the 10th of

¹ See VILLA, 157, 163, and SCHULZ, 9 *seq.* Cf. also CANOVAS DEL CASTILLO, Asalto, 18-19.

² Cf. BAUCH in *Zeitschr. für schles. Gesch.*, XIX., 179 *seq.*

³ Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 99; *Salviati's letter in Appendix, No. 49; DROYSSEN, *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 23; BARTHOLD, 455. The hospitals of S. Giovanni and S. Giacomo were spared as by a miracle, says GUALDERONICO, 92.

⁴ Venier's letter of May 20, in SANUTO, XLV., 214 *seq.*; cf. 168, 191, 208 *seq.*, 217, 220 *seq.* As to the fate of Isabella, see Lanceolinus's account, *supra*, p. 396, n. 2; the Chronicle of Daino in *Arch. Stor.*

May. He found his palace sacked, and the streets covered with dead bodies; the scene of cruel desolation moved even this hard man to tears. Giovio states that Colonna took urgent steps to mitigate the misery and gave protection to several fugitives; but with him some thousand peasants from the environs had made their way into Rome, ready to seize on what had been left over from the pillage of the soldiery. Not only the iron railings, but even the very nails were wrenched by them from the walls of the houses. The Pope's villa on Monte Mario was now given to the flames.¹

The Frenchman Grolier, who betook himself for safety to the house of a Spanish Bishop, has described, in striking words, the scene that met his eye as he looked, from the terrace of his place of refuge, over the city now given up to fire and sword: "From every side came cries, the clash of arms, the shrieks of women and children, the crackling of flames, the crash of falling roofs. We stood motionless with fear and listened, as if fate had singled us out alone to be the spectators of the ruin of our homes."² There was hardly a house in Rome at last

Ital., App. II., 236, and the letter in LUZIO, Maramaldo, 81 *seq.*, and Mantova e Urbino, 279. Cf. also in Appendices, Nos. 47, 48, 50, the letters, discovered by me, of three persons who had taken refuge in the palace of the Marchioness, namely: Casella's *report of May 7 (State Archives, Modena), the *despatch of F. Gonzaga of May 7 (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua), and Sanga's *letter of June 27 (Ricci Archives, Rome).

¹ Cf. JOVIUS, Columna, 166 *seq.*; GUALDERONICO, 92; J. CAVE, 406; GROLIERIUS, 80; SANUTO, XLV., 122, 134, 164, 165, 167. There are different versions of the day of Colonna's arrival (*cf.* ORANO, I., 284 note). May 10 is given in VILLA, 128, 163, in the *Nova* in SCHARDIUS, II., 611, and in the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE (National Library, Paris), who says: "Horum adventus maxima urbis destructio fuit."

² GROLIERIUS, 87; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 541 *seq.*

which was not injured. Even the wretched huts of the water-carriers and porters were not spared.¹ "In the whole city," ran one account, "there was not a soul above three years of age who had not to purchase his safety."² Several paid ransoms twice or even three times over; many were in such bodily suffering that they preferred an immediate death to further torture.³

It is hardly possible to compute the number of deaths with certainty. In the Borgo and Trastevere alone, two thousand corpses were cast into the Tiber, nine thousand eight hundred were buried.⁴ The booty of the soldiers was incalculable. At the lowest estimate it must have amounted in money and objects of value to more than one million ducats, in payments of ransom to three or four millions. Clement VII. estimated the total damage at ten millions in gold. Many soldiers had plundered coin in such quantity that they were not able even to drag their booty away; each vagabond camp-follower had as many ducats as he could fill his cap with.⁵

With a pitiless coolness which makes one shudder, the

¹ See the reports in MILANESI, 474, 486.

² DROYSEN, *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 39; cf. ALBERINI, 345.

³ L. Guicciardini gives examples in MILANESI, 226 *seq.*; cf. SANUTO, XLV., 192; GUMPPENBERG, 236, says many were fined ten times and then murdered after that.

⁴ SANUTO, XLV., 210; GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3, puts the dead only at 4000. This is too little; others (ORANO, I., 275) evidently exaggerate. When VOGELSTEIN (II., 47), for the three months after the sacco, reckons, after Reissner, 100,000 dead, his statement is wholly incredible, as before the capture Rome had not more than 55,035 inhabitants; see *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XVII., 376 *seq.*

⁵ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; SANUTO, XLV., 146, 203, 218, 436; VILLA, 147. Cf. REUMONT, III., 2, 204. The statements in SANUTO, XLVI., 382, concerning Clement's ransom are confirmed by the account in VILLA, 138. The higher sums mentioned by others (ORANO, I., 274, n.) are exaggerated.

Protestant hero Sebastian Schertlin von Burtenbach relates in his autobiography the misery of the Romans whereby their victors were enriched: "In the year 1527, on the 6th of May, we took Rome by storm, put over 6000 men to the sword, plundered the whole city, seized all that we could find in all the churches and anywhere, burned down a great part of the city, and seldom spared, tearing and destroying all copyists' work, registers, letters, and state documents."¹

The last clause touches on an aspect of the sack of Rome which moves the historian to grief: the destruction, namely, of historical documents and literary treasures.² The library of the monastery of S. Sabina, the precious private collections and manuscripts of many learned scholars, were scattered or burnt. Six books of Giovio's history perished. Cardinal Accolti lost his whole library. The remarkable gaps in the private and monastic archives of Rome; the poverty, above all, of the Capitoline records, are certainly a consequence of the destruction wrought at this time. In many despatches of this period it is expressly stated that original Papal documents and valuable manuscripts were lying about the streets, or were used as litter for the horses. Cardinal Trivulzio mentions in particular the destruction of the Apostolic Camera, where many volumes of registers were torn up and the leaden seals of Bulls melted down for bullets. Clement VII. himself mentions that all the deeds of the Secret

¹ Life of Schertlin von Burtenbach, 7; *cf.* GROLIERIUS, 85.

² See MILANESI, 487; VILLA, 150; SCHARDIUS, II., 611; DROYSSEN, *Zeitgenössische Berichte*, 23, 28, 29; SANUTO, XLVI., 137; GAYANGOS, IV., 1, n. 672. *Cf.* *Mél. d'archéol.*, XVI., 367, where further evidence is given; see also GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 534 *seq*; JANSSEN-PASTOR, III., 18th ed., 141; VALENTINELLI, *Bibl.*, I., 94, n. 3; *Arch. d. Soc. Rom.*, XI., 691, XXIV., 399.

Chancery fell into the soldiers' hands.¹ The Vatican Library, containing the most precious collection of manuscripts in the world, barely escaped destruction; this was saved only owing to the circumstance that Philibert of Orange had his headquarters in the palace; nevertheless, it sustained serious losses.

Orange occupied the Papal apartments. He caused his charger to be stabled close to him lest the animal should be stolen; the most beautiful chambers in the Vatican, even the Sixtine Chapel, were turned into horse-stalls. There is also no doubt that works of art, especially marble statues, were destroyed or taken away. Such famous antiques, in the Vatican, as the bronzes of the Capitol, the masterpieces of Raphael, Michael Angelo, and other artists of the Renaissance, luckily suffered no serious damage. This can be quite well explained by the fact that the soldiery only laid hands, for the most part, on those works of art which attracted them by their adornments of gold, silver, and precious stones. Thus the sack caused irremediable loss among the numerous specimens of the goldsmith's and jeweller's craft. The gold cross of Constantine, the golden rose presented by Martin V. to the Church of St. Peter, and the tiara of Nicholas V. were stolen.²

¹ "Essendo venuti in mano di questi soldati tutte le scritture," etc., is the expression in the Instruction for Cardinal Farnese mentioned *infra*, p. 433. A great deal was afterwards restored. Volume 872, for instance, of the Vatican Regests containing *Alex. VI., Secret. lib., VI. The volume is torn in two, many pages are missing; in fol. 65 is written: Die 26 Aprili, 1532, iste liber fuit reportatus sic lac[eratus] (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² For the loss incurred by art and learning, besides the references *supra*, p. 414, n. 1, see also MÜNTZ, Grimaldi, in the *Bibl. des écol. Franç. d'Ath. et de Rome*, I. (1877), 263 *seq.*, *Bibl. du Vatican*, 7, and *Les Arts*, III., 233; *Arch. Stor. d'Arte*, I., 17 *seq.*; WILKEN, *Heidelb. Bibl.*, 252;

For eight days, according to the lowest reckoning, the work of robbery and murder¹ went on unchecked. An order, issued on the third day, that plundering was to cease, was totally disregarded. The want of discipline among the pillaging soldiery was such that if the army of the League had arrived suddenly, it would have hardly met with serious resistance; the gates of the city were never once guarded.² Philibert of Orange was nominally the Commander-in-Chief; La Motte was Governor of the city. If the latter extorted money under threats of death,³ it can easily be supposed that his

DE ROSSI in the *Studi e doc.*, V., 357 *seq.*; BARTHOLD, 458; HABERL, *Musikkatalog.*, 66; *Rev. d. Bibl.*, IV., 86; LUZIO, *Maramaldo*, 26 *seq.*; LANCIANI, I., 237 *seq.* For the removal of antiquities, see specially GUALDERONICO, 92; L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 236, and GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 6; *cf.* also INTRA, *Il Museo statuario e la bibl. di Mantova*, Mantova, 1881, and *Repert. für Kunstwissenschaft.*, XIV., 310. The deportation of marble statues from Rome is mentioned by Clement VII. himself in the *Brief of Dispensation for Paulus. Card. S. Eustachii, dated December 4, 1527, *Arm.* 39, vol. 47, n. 867, of the Secret Archives of the Vatican. Of importance also is a *report of Sigismondo Ferrarese, dated Rome, June 5, 1527, who relates that he had himself taken some "testi di marmo" out of the Papal palace (State Archives, Modena). For the condition of the Vatican see especially the Ferrarese report in HORMAYR'S *Archiv*, 1812, 438. For Raphael's tapestries see our information in Vol. VIII. of this work, p. 298; DE WAAL, *Roma Sacra*, Vienna, 1906, 438.

¹ SANUTO, XLV., 215, 221, 234; the Ferrarese report in HORMAYR'S *Archiv*, 1812, 439; GUALDERONICO (92) says the confinement of the inhabitants lasted 11 days; *cf.* also SANUTO, XLV., 192. Cardinal Trivulzio says 12 days (MILANESI, 471), GUMPENBERG (216, 225) 13, LANCELLOTTI (III., 263), even 15. Trivulzio is in agreement with CORNELIUS DE FINE, who *says: "duravere haec spolia et capturae duodecim diebus sine intermissione" (National Library, Paris).

² SANUTO, XLV., 90, 92, 122, 166.

³ *Cf. supra*, p. 410. For La Motte see *Bull. de l'Acad. de Bruxelles*, 1843, X., 2, 481.

subordinates would also exact ransom from their captives. This form of torture was unending; many must have redeemed themselves six times over.¹ The thirst for blood had been quenched, the thirst for money remained; the very sewers were searched, and yet many a hidden treasure escaped the robbers.²

While dogs were gnawing the corpses around them, the soldiers gave themselves up to dice and wine.³ At the Ponte Sisto, in the Borgo, and on the Campo di Fiore, relates a Roman notary, gold-embroidered garments of silk and satin, woollen and linen cloths, rings, pearls, and other costly articles in a confused medley, proceeds of the sack, were sold. German women had whole sacks of such things, which they traded in at stiff prices; but, once sold, all was soon stolen again. "Children and beggars were rich; the rich were poor." "I," says this narrator in conclusion, "was taken prisoner together with my wife by the Spaniards, and had to pay 100 ducats. After losing all my property, I fled first to Tivoli and then to Palestrina."⁴ The same fate befell thousands; the unhappy victims of the sack left Rome half naked, and sought in the surrounding districts the means wherewith to appease their hunger.⁵ Among them were citizens who, a short time before, had stalled ten horses in their stables.

Many soldiers made off with their booty at once and went to Naples; others soon gambled it all away, and, as

¹ SANUTO, XLV., 203.

² L. Guicciardini in MILANESI, 233 *seq.*; GROLIERIUS, 81; MORONI, LIX., 19; GRISAR in the Civ. Catt., 1906, Giugno, 2.

³ J. CAVE, 404 *seq.*

⁴ GUALDERONICO, 93.

⁵ Cf. *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE in the National Library, Paris; J. CAVE, 406; Vettori in MILANESI, 439.

Brandano, the prophet of Siena, now set at liberty by the Imperialists, had once foretold, "the gains of priests, and the plunder of war, quickly come and quickly go." With menaces they demanded their pay. Moreover, on the 17th of May, some cases of plague had begun to appear. As all provisions had been destroyed in the most wanton manner, a food famine threatened to break out; eatables were worth their weight in gold; an egg cost a giulio, a loaf two ducats. Bloody quarrels, also, were of daily occurrence between the Spaniards and landsknechts.¹ Scattered over the whole city, the army was on the verge of total disruption. In a case of alarm the officers had to go from house to house and seek out their men one by one.²

All these conditions must have made Philibert heartily anxious to come to terms of peace with the Pope. Clement VII., who found his position in the castle of St. Angelo a desperate one,³ had already, on the 7th of May, entered into communication with the Imperialists. Bartolomeo Gattinara came to the castle, where the Pope, with tears in his eyes, told him that he flung himself on the Emperor's magnanimity. On the 9th of May a treaty was proposed, in accordance with which the fortress of St. Angelo, Ostia,

¹ See SANUTO, XLV., 113, 133, 166, 185, 228, 235; F. Gonzaga in LUZIO, Maramaldo, 81; ALBERINI, 347 *seq.*; VILLA, 138-139, 153.

² GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; GROLIERIUS, 98, 101 *seq.*; *cf.* SCHULZ, 109.

³ *Cf.* Lett. al Aretino, I., 11 *seq.* The Pope was certainly not cut off from all communication with the outer world, but entrenchments were begun very soon, and when finished the castle was completely invested. *Cf.* the despatch of G. de' Medici, dated, "in Dyruta," May 11, 1527: *Spagnoli hanno comenzato le trinciere intorno al Castello sichè questi signori ne fanno cattivo concepto in secreto, perchè dentro del Castello sono 3^m persone (State Archives, Florence). For the state of things in the castle *cf.* the letter, dated thence, May 12, in SANUTO, XLV., 163-164.

Civita Vecchia, Modena, Parma, and Piacenza were to be surrendered, 150,000 gold scudi paid to the Imperialists, 200,000 ducats levied on the States of the Church, and the Colonna family reinstated; the Pope and the Cardinals were to be conveyed to Naples.¹ But the Germans now made difficulties; they announced that they would not leave Rome until their arrears of pay, amounting to 300,000 ducats, were paid. Gattinara was at his wits' end; the army of the League might appear at any moment, and the whole question would be reopened.²

On the night of the 12th of May two leaders of the League party made an attempt to rescue the Pope; this bold enterprise was balked only by an accident. New negotiations now ensued, but Clement was, as always, undecided. Du Bellay described the Pope's attitude in the phrase, "To-day peace, to-morrow war; to-day action, to-morrow rest."³ Meanwhile, in the hard-pressed castle of St. Angelo, the position grew more difficult day by day. The arrival of the forces of the League, with whom communication had been opened by means of beacon signals, was hoped for in vain.

Clement VII. would have liked best to treat with Lannoy, who was lying in Siena; on the 18th of May he asked the Duke of Urbino to give the Viceroy a free-conduct to Rome.⁴ On the 19th, Gattinara, the Abbot of Najera, and

¹ The draft of the treaty was published by HORMAYR in his *Archiv*, 1812, 439 *seq.*, but without mentioning that it was already to be found in GASSLER, 92 *seq.* Cf. also SUDENDORF, *Registrum*, III., 169.

² See Gattinara's report (*supra*, p. 389, n. 1) in MILANESI, 507 *seq.*; cf. SCHULZ, 112 *seq.*

³ *Mél. d'Archéol.*, XVI., 413.

⁴ *Brief dated on this day in State Archives, Florence, Urb. eccl.; cf. SCHULZ, 114, 122 *seq.* The *Brief to Lannoy, with the request that he should come, is likewise of the date of May 18, 1527; *Min. brev.*, 1527, I., vol. 14, n. 52 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). The "Salvus

Vespasiano Colonna came again to St. Angelo, where the Pope, after long consultation with the Cardinals, decided to surrender. Nothing was wanting to the new terms of capitulation, which had undergone alteration in some particulars, save the signatures, when the news was brought that the army of the League was drawing near. Thereupon the French party succeeded in bringing the Pope to a change of mind. During the night the Imperial council of war had determined to begin the actual siege of the castle. Entrenchments were at once thrown up, reinforcements ordered from Naples, and every disposition taken to repel any attempt at relief on the part of the Leaguers.¹ The latter, with a force 15,000 strong, had at length, on the 22nd of May, reached Isola, nine miles from Rome, where Cardinal Egidio Canisio also joined them with auxiliary troops.² But notwithstanding the eloquent representations of Guicciardini and the appeals for help from St. Angelo, the council of war decided not to make any attempt at relief. The soldiers, many of whom had already gone over to the enemy, were not to be trusted, and on the 2nd of June the camp was broken up and the retreat on Viterbo begun.³

The departure of the army of the League, without striking conductus" of Clement VII. for Dinteville, who was to go, in charge of Orange, to Charles V., dated May 14, 1527, is published in Bolet. de la Acad. de Madrid, XXXI., 81 *seq.*

¹ See MILANESI, 510 *seq.*; SCHULZ, 115 *seq.*; ROBERT, 115 *seq.*

² Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 177, 219. G. M. della Porta wrote *on May 27, 1527, from Isola to the Duchess of Urbino: "Il card. Egidio è stato hoggi quà havendo condotta una banda de fanti pagati da la Marca pensando che si havesse d'andar a combatter et diceva voler esser nella prima fila, ma veduto le cose pigliar altro camino se ne retira dimani a Nepi, dove è signore l'Unico" (State Archives, Florence.)

³ Cf. GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 552 *seq.*; SCHULZ, 120 *seq.*; ORANO, I., 264 n.; MARCUCCI, 179 *seq.*; ROBERT, 118 *seq.*

ing a blow, has been branded by Ariosto in scathing words:¹

“Vedete gli omicidii e le rapine
In ogni parte far Roma dolente;
E con incendi e stupri le divine
E le profane cose ire ugualmente.
Il campo de la lega le ruine
Mira d' appresso, e 'l pianto e 'l grido sente,
E dove ir dovria inanzi, torna in dietro,
E prender lascia il successor di Pietro.”

The Pope's enemies, burning for a fight,² planted their cannon on Monte Mario and laid mines in order that they might, in the last extremity, blow up the Pope and all about him.³

Such was the situation when, on the 1st of June, Schönberg left the castle and approached the Imperialists; at the same time Pompeo Colonna was invited to have audience with Clement VII. The two enemies soon stood face to face with tears in their eyes. Colonna did all in his power to facilitate an understanding.⁴ On the 5th of June an agreement was

¹ Orlando Furioso, C. XXXIII., S. 55. Cf. REUMONT, Vittoria Colonna, 90; where also is the fine letter in which G. Guiddiccioni urged the Duke of Urbino to bring succour.

² See the letter of K. Schwegler of May 27, 1527, in HORMAYR, Archiv, 1812, 445 *seq.* I found a Latin translation of this letter in the State Archives, Modena.

³ See GUMPPENBERG'S account, 217.

⁴ JOVIUS, Columna, 167-168; cf. TIRABOSCHI (Röm. Ausg.), IX., 276. Clement VII. showed his gratitude by giving the Cardinal and his family many privileges and graces. He confirmed these on December 6, 1527, in a *special deed of appointment in which he says: “Sane cum nuper dum nos in arce s. Angeli de urbe detineremur et tu omnia possibilia pro liberatione nostra effecisses.” On the same day he conferred on Cardinal Colonna the Legation of the March of Ancona. *Deed of appointment, dated “Romae in arce s. Angeli, 1527, VIII.,

reached; the conditions were: the surrender of the castle, of the strongholds of Ostia, Civita Vecchia, Civita Castellana, as well as of the cities of Piacenza, Parma, and Modena; the payment of 400,000 ducats—100,000 at once, 50,000 within twenty days; the remainder to be collected by means of a levy on the States of the Church. The Pope, with the thirteen Cardinals who were with him, was still to remain, for the time being, a prisoner in St. Angelo. As soon as the 100,000 ducats were paid, the surrender of the strong places carried out, and plenipotentiaries appointed for the surrender of the cities, he would be allowed to withdraw to Naples. As security for the money payments, the following were made hostages: Giovanni Maria del Monte, Archbishop of Manfredonia, Onofrio Bartolini, Archbishop of Pisa, Antonio Pucci, Bishop of Pistoja, Giberti, Jacopo Salviati, the father of the Cardinal, Lorenzo Ridolfi, and Simone Ricasoli. Further, the Pope was to restore to the Colonna all their possessions, to reinstate Cardinal Pompeo in all his dignities, and to remove all censures from the Imperialists.¹

On the 7th of June the Papal garrison left the castle of St. Angelo, whereupon four companies of Spanish and German troops marched in.² The Pope was entrusted

Id. Decemb." A. 5°, Regest., 1297, f. 125 and 172 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). The deed reinstating Pompeo in the Cardinalate I have sought for in vain in the Secret Archives of the Vatican.

¹ GROLIERIUS, 167-178; BUCHOLTZ, III., 609-613; SANUTO, XLV., 245-249 (with incorrect date); *cf.* ORANO, I., 313, n. The removal of censures from the Prince of Orange took place on June 8; see FONTANA, Renata, I., 427 *seq.* When the Prince was wounded, Clement VII., on June 2, had permitted him to see a confessor; see ROBERT, 119, and Lett. et doc., 82 *seq.*

² "Li Spagnoli stavano alto al loco chiamato el Maschio a la guardia et il lanzichenecchi abasso"; see the account in Arch. stor. Lombard., IV., 635; *cf.* GIOVIO, Descrizione, 17-18.

to the custody of Alarcon, who had once been also the jailer of Francis I. Among the Germans who occupied St. Angelo was Schertlin von Burtenbach, who describes with ruthless brutality the sad plight in which he found the Pope and Cardinals "in a narrow chamber." "They were making a great lamentation and weeping bitterly ; as for us, we all became rich."¹

¹ Life of Schertlin von Burtenbach, 7 ; *cf.* also SCHULTE, I., 237. The Spaniard Salazar reported on June 11, 1527, to Gattinara that he was so moved to compassion on seeing the Pope and Cardinals, that he could not restrain his tears, adding that, "even if we are forced to say that they have brought this misfortune on themselves, it is still heart-rending to see the chief ruler of the Christian Church in such distress and humiliation." GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 87. On June 11, Clement VII. begged the Archduke Ferdinand to use his influence with the Emperor and the army to bring these calamities to an end. The bearer of the letter, P. Salamanca, would enter into details. *Original in the Secret Court and State Archives, Vienna.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ANARCHIC CONDITION OF THE PAPAL STATES.—THE EFFORTS OF HENRY VIII. AND FRANCIS I. TO DELIVER THE POPE.—THE ATTITUDE OF CHARLES V.—THE FLIGHT OF CLEMENT VII. TO ORVIETO.

"THE Pope," wrote Guicciardini on the 21st of June 1527, "is treated as an actual prisoner. Only with the greatest difficulty can entrance into the castle or egress from it be obtained, so that it is almost impossible to have speech with him. They have not left him ten scudi worth of property. He is beset daily with fresh demands, and not the slightest attention is shown to his wishes regarding those of his servants who remain in the city."¹

There was no limit to the rapacity of the Imperialists. A Ferrarese agent reports that Bartolomeo Gattinara went the length of taking from the Pope's finger a diamond ring worth 150,000 ducats and of forcing him to sign a paper containing a promise of the Cardinalate.² Clement himself told Roberto Boschetti that "the Spaniards had robbed him before his eyes of the chalice he used at

¹ GUICCIARDINI, *Op. ined.*, IX., n. 28. Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 415; GIOVIO, *Descrizione*, 18, and a German *account of June 5, 1527, in the *Reichstagsakten*, XLIII., f. 23 (City Archives, Frankfurt a. M.). See also LANCIANI, I., 243 *seq.*

² Lannoy compelled Gattinara to return the ring and the deed. *Report of Lod. Cati to the Duke of Ferrara, of August 6, 1527 (State Archives, Modena); cf. BALAN, *Storia*, VI., 132.

Mass."¹ Clement could only regain his freedom by consenting to the hard conditions of the treaty. But in respect of these very conditions the most serious difficulties at once arose. In the first place, the Spaniards only held Ostia. In the upper parts of the Papal States not the slightest concern was shown for the commands of the captive Pope. Civita Castellana was held by the troops of the League; Andrea Doria held Civita Vecchia and refused to surrender the town until the 14,000 ducats he was called upon to raise were paid. Parma and Piacenza refused flatly to open their gates to the Imperial plenipotentiaries, and by the beginning of June Modena was in the hands of the Duke of Ferrara.² The Venetians, "the allied associates" of the unfortunate Pope, in their desire to acquire territory, had taken advantage of the situation to lay hands on Ravenna and Cervia. Sigismondo Malatesta, favoured by Duke Alfonso, had made himself master of Rimini, while Imola had fallen to the lot of Giovanni da Sassatello, and Perugia to the sons of Giampaolo Baglioni.³ Not less painful to Clement than these losses in the States was the rebellion of his native Florence.

Drawn into the anti-Imperial alliance by the Pope, the Florentines had had to make the heaviest pecuniary sacrifices. Cardinal Silvio Passerini, who had resided in Florence since 1524, a man as inconsiderate as he was

¹ See Boschetti's remarkable report in BALAN, Boschetti, Appendix, p. 42.

² This important town was so badly protected that Canossa feared that it would fall as soon as Alfonso's advance was reported. *Canossa to Francis I., June 3, 1527 (Communal Library, Verona).

³ Cf. BALAN, Clemente VII., 68 *seqq.*, 76, 78, and SALVIOLI, XVII., 29 *seqq.* Clement's *order to Barth. Ferrantinus (Galliae nostrae cispad. vicelegat.), dated June 6, 1527, to hand over Piacenza to A. de Leyva, in Min. brev., 1527, III., vol. 14, n. 98 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

selfish and avaricious, was not fitted to quell the rising discontent. His hardness and lack of understanding embittered the spirits of all.¹ To the news of the storming of Rome the Florentines replied by an insurrection against Medicean rule, and on the 17th of May Cardinal Passerini was obliged to leave the city, taking with him his wards, Ippolito and Alessandro,² the cousins of Clement VII. This was followed by the restoration of the republican government as it existed prior to 1512. Niccolò Capponi was chosen Gonfaloniere. He repressed the more serious forms of disorder, but was unable to prevent the Florentine youth, whose heads were turned by their newly acquired freedom, from destroying all the armorial escutcheons of the Medici and even the wax effigies of Leo X. and Clement VII. in the Church of the Annunziata.³

At this time Bologna also was very nearly lost to the Pope.⁴ The situation grew worse from day to day. The provinces, in Guicciardini's opinion, were virtually without government. "Our distress," wrote Giberti to Gambara on the 27th of June, "passes all imagination."⁵ Nowhere was this more felt than at Rome.

The outlook in the Eternal City, a month after the sack, is described by a Spaniard in the following words:—

¹ WALTZ in the *Histor. Zeitschrift*, LXXII., 210. Here it is shown conclusively, as against Ranke, that Guicciardini gave his assistance loyally towards the suppression of the first Florentine revolt of April 26, 1527.

² Ippolito was a son of Giuliano; Alessandro was a putative son of Lorenzo. Cf. *supra*, p. 248, n. 1.

³ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 3; PERRENS, III., 136 *seqq.*

⁴ Cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 4.

⁵ "Le calamità et miserie nostre superano tutto quello che altri si possi imaginare." *Giberti to Gambara, dated "Castel S. Agnolo," June 27, 1527 (Casale was charged with this pressing effort to obtain help), Ricci Archives, Rome.

on everything they find. No one can imagine the cruelties that are committed every day. Without respect of rank, age, and nationality, people are ill-used, tortured, and slain daily. If a man cannot pay he is sold—be he an Italian or a German—in open market as a slave, and if he does not fetch a purchaser, they cast dice for him. The soldiers are absolute masters of the city. They obey no man.”¹ The landsknechts suffered most in consequence of their mad manner of living. “Many of our men die here of plague,” wrote Kaspar Schwegler on the 11th of June. “Many drink heavily, become delirious, and so die; the wine here is very strong.”²

The warm season of the year and the effluvia from the many bodies of men and animals, to which the hastiest burial had been given, turned Rome into a “stinking slaughter-pit.” By the 22nd of July two thousand five hundred Germans had died of the plague, and the streets were covered with dead and dying.³ The pestilence made its way into the castle of St. Angelo and exacted fresh victims among the servants of the Pope.⁴

Clement, in the meantime, was making strenuous efforts to collect the promised sums of money with which to recover his freedom. The Papal tiaras—only that of Julius II. was spared,—after their precious jewels had been

¹ GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 87.

² Letter of K. Schwegler, *loc. cit.*

³ See the reports in BUCHOLTZ, III., 78, and SANUTO, XLV., 434, 464, 504; XLVII., 132. *Cf.* also the account in *Histor. Jahrbuch*, XII., 752; GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 93; *Bolet. de la Acad. de Madrid*, XXXIX., 85, and ORANO, I., 253 *seq.*, note.

⁴ GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 4; SANUTO, XLV., 505. The foul drinking water certainly conduced to an outbreak of plague. The soldiery had destroyed the aqueducts systematically. *Cf.* *Repertorium f. Kunst-wissensch.*, XIV., 132. Inscriptions on the graves of Spaniards who died in 1527 in FORCELLA, III., 295 *seq.*

taken out and concealed, had already been melted down by Benvenuto Cellini in a wind furnace hastily constructed on the top of the castle near the statue of the angel. Now all the rest of the gold and silver plate, even chalices and images of the saints, found its way into the melting-pot.¹ In this way 70,000 ducats were forthcoming in the second half of June. But the troops, now completely out of hand, demanded with menaces further sums. To obtain them, Clement, on the 3rd of July 1527, turned to all the Bishops of the kingdom of Naples with prayers for help. He bitterly bewailed his necessities. He was bound by the treaty to pay 400,000 ducats, but since the assets in gold and metals in St. Angelo could only produce 80,000, he was compelled to appeal to the benevolence of others.² Meanwhile no time was left to await the success of these requests. On the 6th of July Clement was forced, under extremely burdensome conditions, to borrow from the Genoese banker Ansaldo Grimaldi and the Catalonian merchant Michael Girolamo Sanchez. The loan amounted to 195,000 gold scudi. It was characteristic of the Pope's position that the lenders at once deducted from this sum the enormous accommodation charge of 45,000 scudi. Clement had, besides this, to pledge as securities the town of Benevento, the quit-rents and the church tithes of the kingdom of Naples, as well as valuables worth 30,000

¹ CELLINI, I., 7; SANUTO, XLVI., 135; LANCELOTTI, III., 270; MÜNTZ, Hist., III., 232; MÜNTZ, Tiare, 77. For the compulsory coinage minted during the period of the "sacco" *cf.* SCHULTE, I., 212 *seq.*, 220 *seq.*

² Min. brev., 1527, I., vol. 14, n. 120; *cf.* Arm., 39, vol. 47, n. 114 (Forma XXX. brevium ad episc. regni Neapolit.). See *ibid.* the *full powers, dated June 5, 1527, granted to "Jo. Cusent. regis Neapolit. capell. majori et Nicol. Capuan. prael. dom. archiepisc.," to sell the town of Benevento, as money had to be raised by all possible means (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

scudi.¹ To pay still further sums immediately was, in spite of the Pope's good-will,² impossible, which drew from the landsknechts fearful threats.

Meanwhile hunger and pestilence had reached such a pitch in Rome that the city became uninhabitable. Those who could not fight for their daily bread at the point of the sword had to die of hunger. Men dropped down dead in the street like flies. A Venetian report put the cases of death on several days at five hundred, on others at seven hundred, and even, in some instances, at a thousand. The burial of the dead could not be thought of.³

Under such circumstances the Spanish and Italian troops left the city about the middle of June and made for the more distant neighbourhood. The landsknechts remained and threatened to murder all their officers and reduce Rome to ashes.⁴ Orange and Bemelberg were in a very difficult position, but at last, on the 10th of July, they succeeded in inducing their utterly disorganized troops to cross to the further side of the Tiber and there encamp on ground free from plague and wait for the

¹ CORVISIERI, Documenti, 9-19, gives the text of the Act. For the collection of tithes in Naples see MEISTER, Die Nuntiatur von Neapel in Histor. Jahrbuch, XIV., 73 *seq.*, of which, however, GALEOTA, Dei Nunzii apost. di Napoli, 23 *seq.*, has not made use; the Nuntiatore of Fabio Arcella is here treated of in special detail.

² Cf. the *full powers given by Clement VII. to Martinus a Portugallia to levy money on the Portuguese clergy for support of the Pope; the Archbishops and Bishops to contribute two whole tenths, and the other clergy according to their taxability and the assessment of Martinus. D. Romae in arce, 1527, IV., Id. Julii (= 12 July) A° 4°. Regest., 1437, f. 387-389 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ See the graphic description in SANUTO, XLVI., 141, and in GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 109.

⁴ Naselli in BALAN, Mon. saec., XVI., 441-442.

Pope's remittances. Only the garrison of St. Angelo remained in Rome.¹

Orange, with a hundred and fifty horsemen, went to Siena. Bemelberg and Schertlin von Burtenbach, with the landsknechts, marched on Umbria. The generals were quite powerless to cope with their tumultuous soldiery; by the time they reached Orte there was mutiny in the distrustful ranks and the general's tent was destroyed. It was only upon the threat of laying down his command that Bemelberg brought the mutineers to their senses.² The inhabitants of the small town of Narni refused to admit the wild horde and made a desperate resistance. They were cruelly chastised (17th July). "With two thousand landsknechts we made the assault without firing a shot, took the town and castle by God's grace, and then put upwards of one thousand persons to death; women and men."³

Besides the General of the Franciscans, Francesco Quinoñes,⁴ who had been appointed previous to the great catastrophe, the Pope, under the pressure of his intolerable situation, had, by the middle of May,⁵ matured his plan of sending Cardinal Farnese to Charles V., in company with the Portuguese envoy, Don Martin, in order to urge on his

¹ The *safe-conduct for the departing Imperialists is dated July 8, 1527, Arm., 39, vol. 47, n. 140 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). For Bemelberg *cf.* the monograph of SOLGER, Nördlingen, 1870.

² BARTHOLD, Frundsberg, 477; ROBERT, 129.

³ SCHERTLINS, *Leben*, 5; ALBERINI, 355; EROLI, *Il Sacco de' Borboni*, in the *Miscell. stor. Narn.*, I., Narni, 1858, 16 *seq.*; BALAN, *Storia*, VI., 140. See in Appendix, No. 51, the *Brief of July 23, 1527 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

⁴ *Cf.* WADDING, XVI., 2nd ed., 240 *seqq.*, and SANUTO, XLV., 503.

⁵ *Cf.* the *Brief for "August. Card. Perusin (Trivulzio)," dated May 20, 1527. Min. brev., 1527, I., vol. 14, n. 53 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

liberation.¹ Farnese received comprehensive instructions drawn up in justification² of the Papal policy towards Charles. After hearing, on the 24th of June, of the birth of Prince Philip, afterwards King, Clement wrote a letter of congratulation to the Emperor; he did not omit to

¹ On June 20 Clement VII. announced the mission of Farnese to the Perugians (see the Brief in Cod. Vat., 7955, Vatican Library); cf. GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 93, 94; GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 564. On June 26 Clement VII. addressed a *Brief to Quiñones in which he asked the latter to intercede with Charles V., and informed him of Farnese's mission. "Hortamur te, fili in Deo, ut fidem ei plenam in omnibus habere tuaque opera et consilio assistere et ubicumque poteris adesse velis." Min. brev., 1527, I., vol. 14, n. 106. In order to produce a favourable impression on the King of Portugal, the right was conceded to him of nomination to the abbacies of that kingdom, on June 23, 1527; Corp. dipl. Port., II., 284 *seq.* For the reward given to Dom Martin, whose mission is referred to in the Brief to Charles V. in Archiv für Ref.-Gesch., II., 284 *seq.*, see, besides SANUTO, XLV., 414, also the *letter of Canossa of June 30 to Francis I. (Communal Library, Verona).

² The "Instrutione al card. di Farnese," on account of the many important political data contained in them, were repeatedly copied before the end of the sixteenth century. This is shown by the numerous transcripts in Italian libraries. Besides the MS. in the Corsini Library made use of by Ranke may be mentioned: Vatican Library, Cod. Ottob., 2510⁷ and 2514, Urb., 865, Vat., 8335; CAPPONI, 148, II.; National Library, Florence, Cod. Magliabech. and Capponi, 1254; Court Library, Vienna, Cod., 6621, pp. 47-77 *seq.*; Escorial Library and Secret Archives of the Vatican, Var. Polit., X., 313 *seq.* PALLAVICINI, II., 13, first made use of a MS. in the Borghese Library; RANKE printed it in the first edition of his History of the Popes (III., Appendix, No. 15, p. 241 *seq.*, of the first edition), but afterwards omitted it, while WEISS, Pap. de Granvelle, I., 280-310, published it. Ranke supposed that the first part, in which the Pope is spoken of in the third person, was composed by Giberti or some other confidential servant of Clement; the second, beginning with the words "Per non intrare in le cause," and so forth, by the Pope himself. The copy in Weiss is, moreover, very faulty.

include some references to his distress, and besought Charles to show his gratitude to God by giving freedom to the Vicar of Christ.¹

The mission of Farnese was displeasing to the Emperor's commanders; they would have liked better that Schönberg and Moncada should have gone to Spain. But Clement had not sufficient confidence in Schönberg, whose devotion to Charles was notorious, to entrust him with such a charge;² therefore, on the 11th and 12th of July, the letters of safe-conduct were prepared for Don Martin and Cardinal Farnese.³ The Cardinal started on his journey but remained in upper Italy.⁴ Cardinal Salviati also, who was still resident in France, made pretexts for evading the embassy to the Emperor for which the Pope had intended him, and threw the burden on Giacompo Girolami.⁵ His instructions for the latter, dated the 10th of July 1527, are preserved in the Papal secret archives, but they do not exactly give evidence of Salviati's diplomatic talent. In reading them it is especially strange to note how, among other things, the Cardinal is at pains to show that Clement and Charles had never really been enemies, but rather had worked reciprocally for each other's interests. Among the negative services for which Salviati, quite seriously, gave his master credit, is the fact that Clement had never done the Emperor all the harm which it was in his power to do. In conclusion,

¹ BUCHOLTZ, III., 80-81.

² DESJARDINS, II., 974.

³ The safe-conduct for Dom Martin of July 11, in VILLA, 247 and 249, that of the 12th for Farnese in Min. brev., 1527, III., vol. 17, n. 230 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). To this period also belongs the

* Brief to the King of Portugal in Corp. dipl. Port., II., 298 *seq.*

⁴ See PIEPER, Nuntiaturen, 74; *cf.* SANUTO, XLVI., 231.

⁵ Girolami started for Spain on July 11; see DESJARDINS, II., 974. HERGENRÖTHER, Konziliengesch., IX., 539, is wrong in supposing that Salviati went also.

Salviati appealed to the magnanimity of Charles, and pointed out to him that the liberation of the Pope would be to his own advantage, since thereby the Imperial army in Rome would be set free and be able to oppose the French forces then advancing into Lombardy.¹

Francis I. was not the only sovereign then threatening Charles V. Henry VIII. also seemed determined to do all that was possible to restore Clement to freedom. The alliance between the French and English sovereigns, which had already found expression in the treaty of Westminster² concluded in April 1527, had become still closer under the pressure of events in Italy. The English King promised, on the 29th of May, to pay a monthly subsidy of 32,000 crowns to the French army, and gave Cardinal Wolsey full powers to treat with Francis regarding the further steps to be taken towards the Pope's release. "The affairs of the Holy See," Henry declared, "are the common concern of all princes. The unheard-of outrages that See has undergone must be avenged."³

Henry's concern for the Holy See was in no way disinterested; for he was afraid that the Pope's captivity might impede his contemplated divorce from Catherine of Aragon, the Emperor's aunt. Wolsey also had his own objects to serve in intervening in favour of the Pope. On the 3rd of July he left London with a great retinue on his journey to France.⁴ In Canterbury he celebrated Mass at the altar of St. Thomas, the martyr of ecclesiastical freedom, and published, as Papal Legate and representative of the King, an edict ordering fasts and processions during

¹ *Nunziatura di Francia I., f. 14-19 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² Cf. BOURRILLY DE VAISSIÈRE, *Ambass. de Jean du Bellay*, XII.

³ RYMER, *Foedera* VI., II., 80; cf. CIACONIUS, III., 467 *seq.*, and BOURRILLY DE VAISSIÈRE, *loc. cit.*, XIII.

⁴ SANUTO, XLV., 553.

the Pope's captivity. A copy of this ordinance was sent to Salviati for promulgation in France, and the same was done in Venice. It was hoped that this course of action would make a great impression even in Spain, and that in this way the Emperor, under the pressure of a popular movement, would set the chief ruler of the Church at liberty.¹

Wolsey was welcomed at Calais by Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, who conducted him to Amiens to meet Francis I. The interview between the French King and the English Cardinal took place in that city on the 4th of August, with exceptional marks of respect on the part of Francis.² This meeting was looked forward to all the more hopefully because Francis, who hitherto, in spite of all warnings,³ had maintained his light-hearted indifference, had, after the sack of Rome, appeared to have become a changed man. At the first moment the King had been completely dazed; afterwards he determined to act. His chief inducement, however, was certainly less the liberation of the Head of the Church, than his alarm at the supremacy of the Emperor and his hope of recovering his sons, still kept as hostages. Steps were taken, on a large

¹ Cf. the **letter which one of Wolsey's suite addressed from Calais, on July 16, 1527, to the Cardinals Cibo, Passerini, and Ridolfi (Ricci Archives, Rome).

² SANUTO, XLV., 632 *seq.*, XLVI., 34; DECRUE, Anne de Montmorency, 94; CAVENDISH, Wolsey, 86-103. Cf. also Cardinal Salviati's *letter, dated Amiens, August 16, 1527; Nunziatura di Francia I., f. 34 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ Canossa, as early as November 28, 1526, had expressed his fear that the Imperialists would march straight on Rome in a *letter addressed directly to Francis I. On January 9, 1527, he wrote with reference to Lannoy's enormous demands: "If your Majesty does not help the Pope he must either fly from Rome or go into captivity."

*Copies of these letters are in the Communal Library, Verona.

scale, to recruit the army. Orders were issued to the French fleet in the Mediterranean to prevent, in every way, the removal of the Pope to Spain, and Andrea Doria was taken into the French service, in command of eight galleys. Lautrec was given full powers to carry on the war in Italy; he had already, on the 30th of June, left the French Court in order to join the army then assembling in the neighbourhood of Asti.¹ "After all," wrote Salviati to Castiglione, who was living as Nuncio at the Court of Charles V., "this victory, or rather this massacre of Rome, has not been of much use to the Emperor. On the contrary, it has roused the princes to greater activity, and," he adds in a tone of vexation, "for all this poor Italy must pay the bill."²

At Amiens Wolsey discussed matters thoroughly with Francis I., Salviati, the English nuncio Gambara, and the Florentine envoy Acciaiuoli. "Although," remarked the latter, "the Cardinal displays publicly a somewhat exaggerated and ostentatious pomp and state, yet his talk, bearing, and manner of transacting affairs show a truly large and enterprising mind. He is a man of attractive character, full of noble and lofty thoughts. I do not remember since the days of Alexander VI. to have seen anyone who filled his position so majestically; but, in contrast to that Pope, it must be stated that the Cardinal's life is without blame."³

¹ Cf. DESJARDINS, II., 950 *seqq.*, 955 *seq.*, 965, 974; DECRUE, Anne de Montmorency, 91-92. Cardinal Salviati *reported on the French military preparations and Lautrec's departure, to Jacopo Salviati on June 17, 1527, and to Castiglione on July 3, 1527; Nunziatura di Francia I., f. 6-7 and 9 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² *Cardinal Salviati to the nuncio at the Imperial Court, June 8, 1527 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). See Appendix, No. 49.

³ DESJARDINS, II., 981-982. For the majestic bearing of Alexander VI. see our remarks, Vol. V. of this work, p. 387 *seq.*

Wolsey explained the aim of his mission to be the liberation of the Pope, the maintenance of the Italian States in their independence and integrity, and the overthrow of the Emperor's supremacy. He brought with him 300,000 scudi for the war and made extensive proposals in regard to it.¹ Casale was to go into Italy to watch carefully that the monthly subsidies promised by Henry VIII. were applied to the right uses, and that Vaudemont, with ten thousand landsknechts, took part in the campaign. From Francis I. Wolsey obtained a promise that he would make no treaty for the surrender of his sons so long as the Pope remained a prisoner. On the 18th of August was concluded the alliance between France and England which was to wring by force from the Emperor the liberation of Clement VII. In this treaty of Amiens the allied sovereigns bound themselves to refuse their assent to any summons of a council as long as the Pope was not free, and to offer a common resistance to any attempt to make the Papal power subservient to the advantage and interest of Charles.²

While he was still at Amiens, Francis I. issued strict orders that no Frenchman should proceed to Rome on business relating to Church benefices, and that no money from France should be sent there before the Pope recovered his entire freedom.³ Wolsey made one more special proposal; that all the Cardinals who were at liberty should assemble at Avignon and, while the Pope's

¹ Cf. DESJARDINS, II., 983 *seqq.*, 985 *seqq.*

² DUMONT, IV., i., 494-495.

³ See Mél. d'Archéol., XVI., 416, note 2; cf. Cat. des actes de François I., I., 517, VI., 83. The Archbishop of Cologne, Hermann von Wied, took advantage of the Pope's imprisonment to appoint to benefices fallen vacant during the months assigned to Papal patronage; see VARRENTAPP, Hermann von Wied, Leipzig, 1878, 50 *seq.*

captivity lasted, assume the reins of government. "The assembly of the Cardinals," such was the opinion of Acciaiuoli, "had two aims in view. On the one hand, the Emperor would be brought to see that if he transported the Pope to Spain or Naples, or kept him a prisoner, the government of the Church and the ordering of ecclesiastical affairs in France and England would be cared for by the Cardinals; on the other hand, in the eventuality of Clement's death, the Cardinals who were in the Emperor's power would be prevented from electing a new Pope, since, in such a case, France and England would set up an antipope."¹ Clearly, it would be proved to the Emperor that, although he held the Pope, he did not hold the Church in his grasp, and that Clement as a prisoner was a useless prize.

"Wolsey," declared one of his confidential servants to Cardinals Cibo, Passerini, and Ridolfi, "is acting more in the interests of the Church and Italy than of his King, for he is mindful of his dignity and his obligations to the Holy See and the house of Medici."² As a matter of fact the intentions of the English Cardinal were not so disinterested. This did not escape even Cardinal Salviati; in the official correspondence, in which he invited Cardinals Cibo, Passerini, Ridolfi, Egidio Canisio, Trivulzio, Numai, and Cupis to assemble at Avignon, he only set forth in general terms the advantages of such a plan.³ But in his confidential letters to Castiglione and Guicciardini he did not hold back his real opinion: "The pretext is not a bad one, but the thing itself I dislike. I fear a schism or some

¹ DESJARDINS, II., 984.

² **Letter, dated Calais, July 16, 1527 (Ricci Archives, Rome).

³ All these *letters are dated August 6, 1527; Nunziat. di Francia I., f. 22-26 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

other incurable misfortune.”¹ “Wolsey, during the Pope’s captivity, might become his substitute for the whole of Christendom, or at least for England and France.”² This shows that the English schism was already casting its shadow before. The ambitious Cardinal aimed at nothing less than becoming, at least for England, the acting Pope; as such he would gratify the will of his monarch by declaring his marriage invalid.

Wolsey’s well-known ambition gave rise in many minds to the worst suspicions. Sanchez thought that Wolsey was certainly aiming at the tiara, in the event of Clement’s death.³ Canossa expressed his serious doubts to Francis I. whether the assemblage at Avignon was for the good of France, as a schism might easily spring from it; Wolsey sought the Papacy, and if the King were unfavourable to this scheme, he would incur his enmity; if the scheme succeeded there would be a Pope far more ill-disposed than Clement.⁴

Wolsey’s ambitious designs encountered at once the greatest obstacles. Although the Kings of England and France sent most pressing solicitations to the Italian Cardinals to meet Wolsey, and promised them every conceivable security and even compensation for their travelling expenses,⁵ yet they were opposed to meeting in

¹ *Cardinal Salviati to B. Castiglione, August 14, 1527; Nunziat. di Francia I., f. 32 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² Cardinal Salviati to Guicciardini, September 14, 1527, in EHSES, Dokumente, 249.

³ GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 196.

⁴ **Canossa to Francis I., dated Venice, August 26, 1527. Canossa, in a *letter to Francis I. of August 9, 1527, had already spoken of Wolsey’s efforts to obtain the Papacy (Communal Library, Verona).

⁵ Lettere di principi, II., 232 *seqq.*; EHSES, Dokumente, 1 *seq.*, 4 *seq.*; DESJARDINS, II., 984. Canossa conveyed the letter of Francis I. to the Cardinals at liberty; see his *letter to the King, dated Venice,

France. The Cardinals who were at large had first assembled in Piacenza, and determined on a congress at Bologna, Ancona, or Parma to discuss measures for the Pope's liberation. On the 10th of August Cardinal Cibo informed Henry VIII. of this determination; in the beginning of September the free Italian Cardinals met at Parma.¹ Clement VII. exhorted them to be firm in their opposition to the removal of the conference to France, but warned them, at the same time, to go to work with caution.²

Wolsey in the meantime had carried his plans yet further. He was, indeed, so incapable of putting a check on his ambition that he had already usurped the coveted functions of a Papal Vicar-General before they had been conferred upon him. Together with Cardinals Bourbon and de Lorraine and the Papal Legate Salviati he came to Compiègne and did not hesitate at once to assume Papal privileges, since, in spite of Salviati's remonstrances, he handed the insignia of the Cardinalate³ to the Chancellor Du Prat, who had been nominated in a Consistory held before the sack of Rome. Thus he had at his disposal

August 26, 1527. On August 30 Canossa told the King that the English envoy, Casale, had gone to Padua in order to get the consent of Cardinal Egidio Canisio to the assembly at Avignon; Casale was to approach the Cardinals at Mantua with the same object. *Both letters are in the Communal Library at Verona. For Casale's journey to Mantua see also GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 196.

¹ Cf. Arch. d. Soc. Rom., VI., 408 *seqq.*; STAFFETTI, Card. Cybo, 78 *seqq.* Gattinara called on the Emperor to protest against the assembly of the Cardinals in Parma and to oppose to them, with the help of Colonna, a counter-assembly of Cardinals; BUCHOLTZ, III., 96.

² Cf. the interesting notice in SANUTO (XLVI., 208) on the mission of the Augustinian, Felice.

³ EHSES, Dokumente, 251.

four of the Sacred College, in whose name he addressed, on the 16th of September 1527, a protest to the Pope, which was at once entrusted for delivery to the Prototary Uberto Gambarà.¹ This document set forth, in language full of unction, that the signatories, following the example of the first Christians during the imprisonment of St. Peter, had assembled themselves in the power of the Holy Ghost at Compiègne in order to take preventive measures against the manifold evils which might accrue from the bondage of the head of the Church. Since the Emperor held the Pope in his power and every man was mortal, they were bound to make solemn protest against any alienation of the Church's rights or property, and against any nomination to the College of Cardinals during the captivity of Clement VII. They declared further that, in the event of the Pope's death, they would, without regard for the Cardinals now in imprisonment or for any new Cardinals appointed by the Pope while deprived of freedom, repair to some safe place to choose his successor, and would refuse obedience to any Pope who might be elected during the present captivity. In conclusion, Clement VII. was called upon to delegate his authority during his imprisonment in order that the free government of the Church might be firmly maintained.²

It must be matter for surprise that Salviati should have

¹ Cf. PIEPER, *Nuntiaturen*, 83, note 4, as well as EHSES, *Die Päpstl. Dekretale*, 222 *seq.*, and *Dokumente*, 249. See also SANUTO, XLVI., 171.

² This important document was published first by GROLIERIUS, 156 *seqq.*, and then by LE GRAND, *Divorce*, III., 4-13. EHSES (*Dokumente*, 7) gives emendations of this version from the original in the Secret Archives of the Vatican. Le Grand certainly made use of the copy in the National Library, Paris, MS. de Brienne, V., n. 1.

consented to sign this protest of a minority of the free Cardinals suggesting to the Pope a temporary abdication and containing within it the germ of schism. On the 28th of September he wrote to Gambara asking him to make excuses on his behalf to Clement VII. for his participation in Wolsey's action. All had arisen only from his good intention of compassing, as soon as possible, the liberation of the Pope; if he had refused his signature, great ill-feeling would have been caused and Wolsey's zeal for the Pope's deliverance would probably have been chilled or altogether extinguished.¹ A private letter addressed to Castiglione on the 18th of September shows how little Salviati was deceived by Wolsey's schemes. In this he describes the protest of the 16th as a dangerous move preliminary to enfranchisement from obedience to the Church; he had concurred only to avoid greater evils and to gain time. If he had opposed, then undoubtedly an English and French Patriarchate with Papal authority would have been set up, and thereby, perhaps, the unity of the Church for ever rent asunder. His action had at least averted this. Before the Pope's answer arrived, a long time would elapse, during which Clement might be set at liberty. "By this, you see," Salviati continues, "I was compelled to agree in order to prevent a much greater evil. You know Wolsey's ambition and the bold assurance with which he asks Clement to appoint him his vicegerent. The French agree because he is useful to them. If the Pope refuses, Wolsey will find means to attain his object through his Bishops, a step bound to bring after it the greatest conceivable confusion in the Church. But I have hopes that in the meantime Quiñones will have returned to Rome and

¹ *Cardinal Salviati to Gambara, dated *Compendii*, September 28, 1527; *Nunziatura di Francia I.*, f. 62-65 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

Clement been set free. This is the only cure for all these evils.”¹

At that moment, then, all the efforts² of Castiglione, Salviati, and the other Papal diplomatists were directed to securing the Pope's freedom. What was the attitude of the Emperor towards this question?

Charles V. first received news of the capture of Rome in the latter half of the month of June.³ His joy at this great and unexpected success must have been lessened by the accounts, at first inexact, of the unbridled excesses of the troops. The unheard-of ferocity with which the soldiery had laid waste the city was antagonistic to his interests, since it covered his name with shame and reproach. He certainly had wished to punish the Pope and to render his enmity innocuous; but destruction such as that wreaked by his army on the time-honoured capital of Christendom he had not intended. He therefore, in the beginning of August, protested to the Christian princes against the

¹ EHSES, *Dokumente*, 250–251. The assembly at Avignon did not take place; even the French Cardinal Castelnau de Clermont declared himself against it; see SANUTO, XLVI., 451.

² For Castiglione's efforts see SERASSI, II., 149 *seqq.*; for Salviati see *supra*, p. 434, and Guicciardini's **letter to Gambara, dated July 15, 1527, Florence (Ricci Archives, Rome), as well as the *letters of Salviati to Castiglione, dated October 8, November 6, 19, December 8, 1527, to Girol. Ghinucci, November 19, 1527, and to Cardinal Ridolfi, dated December 8 and 21, 1527. *Nunziat. di Francia I.*, f. 65 *seqq.*, 76 *seqq.*, 92 *seqq.*, 96 *seqq.*, 99 *seqq.*, 107 *seqq.*, 122 *seqq.* (Secret Archives of the Vatican). Cardinal Cupis, in a letter to Clement VII., dated Venice, October 29, 1527, gives an account of his exertions to obtain the Pope's freedom in Venice and France. *Lettere di principi*, IV., 218, 222; *cf. ibid.*, 178, 187, the recognition of these exertions in *a letter from Francis I. to Clement VII., dated St-Germain, February 4, 1528 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ *Cf.* SCHULZ, Sacco, 131, 143. See also BUCHOLTZ, III., 97; GASSLER, 121 *seq.*; and HORMAYR, *Archiv*, 1812, 380.

burden of responsibility for these outrages being laid upon him.¹ But this declaration did not do away with the fact that Charles had allowed his army to fall into a state of insubordination from which, if continued, the very worst was to be expected. He had also expressed himself so ambiguously that it might well be supposed that he would see without displeasure his troops requiting themselves with the plunder of Rome; nor must it be forgotten that for many a long day the enemies of Italy had acted on the principle that "war supports itself."² Charles had now to pay in person for his own shortcomings. The spirit of mutiny took hold of the victorious soldiers after the sack of the city to such a degree that the Emperor could no longer call his army his own. Rome was taken, the Pope was a prisoner, but the Imperial army was threatened from within with complete disruption.³

It soon became evident that the crimes committed in Rome were in the highest degree prejudicial to the Emperor's cause, for they gave to all his enemies an opportune handle for serious accusations which, at the first glance, seemed justified. The spectacle of the army of the secular head of Christendom, the protector of the Church, carrying murder, fire, and outrage into the city of its spiritual head, was turned to account to the fullest extent. Even in the heart of Charles's empire, in Spain, a by no means inconsiderable

¹ *Lettere di principi*, II., 234 *seqq.* Cf. Melancthon's opinion in JANSSEN-PASTOR, III., 18th ed., 141 *seq.*

² Cf. JESENKO, *Geschah die Erstrümmung Roms mit oder ohne Vorwissen Karls V.?* Programm des Gymnasiums zu Görz, 1864, 37. See also HEFELE-HERGENRÖTHER, IX., 527; ORANO, I., 318 n.; and BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 543. The greater culpability of Charles V. is upheld by DOREZ in *Mél. d'Archéol.*, XVI., 363 *seq.*, with whom LEBEY, 418 *seq.*, associates himself. Cf. also BURCHARDT, *Kultur*, I., 7th ed., 133 *seq.*

³ See *supra*, pp. 427, 431.

opposition was raised to a policy which had ended at last in turning him into the jailer of the Pope.¹

The full recognition of the extremely difficult situation brought about by the sack of Rome, and the Catholic conscience of the Emperor, were the motives which restrained him from taking advantage of his victory to the uttermost. That he would have done so was the expectation of many,² and exhortations even were not wanting directing him on this course. Already, on the 25th of May 1527, Lope de Soria had written to the Emperor from Genoa to try and convince him that it would be a meritorious and not a sinful action to reform the Church, in such a way that the power of the Pope should be exclusively limited to his own spiritual sphere, and secular affairs placed under the sole jurisdiction of the Emperor, since "the things of God belong to God, and the things of Cæsar to Cæsar."³

Many wished to go further. A letter of Bartolomeo da Gattinara shows clearly that among the Imperialists the question was seriously discussed whether Charles should allow the seat of the Papal government to remain any longer in Rome. Gattinara and others found that any experiment of this sort would be too dangerous, since England, France, and other countries would then choose Popes of their own; but they advised the Emperor to weaken the Roman See to such an extent that it should always be subservient to the Imperial Majesty.⁴

Lannoy on his side pressed the Emperor with earnest

¹ Cf. BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 667, and *infra*, p. 448 *seq.*

² "Già si diceva infino da plebei uomini che, non istando bene il pastorale e la spada, il papa dovesse tornare in S. Giovanni Laterano a cantar la messa." Varchi, I., 197.

³ GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 26; VILLA, Asalto, 166.

⁴ VILLA, 193 *seq.*, and MILANESI, Sacco, 517; cf. SCHULZ, 7. For the then prevalent feeling among the Germans in Rome there is

representations. It was necessary "that his undertakings should be directed towards something else than the ruin of an institution belonging both to the divine and human order ; the army must not win everything and the Emperor lose all ; no more violence must be done to the Pope, with the probable result of a schism ; the confusion of the spiritual with the temporal power must not continue, and the temporal must no longer obstruct the spiritual by pragmatic sanctions and in other ways ; Rome must no longer be an occasion of scandal to the whole world, and heresies and sects must be removed ; in a word, what is God's must be given to God, and what is Cæsar's to Cæsar." Charles should retain possession of the States of the Church only until such time as his affairs with the Pope were put straight and he could put trust in his Holiness ; only the towns belonging to Milan and Ferrara must be claimed as fiefs of the Empire. For the rest, the settlement of these points was to be left to a general council or to a congress such as that held at Mantua under Julius II., and the same tribunal was to decide in detail on points connected with the heresies in Germany.¹

Ferdinand I. also recommended a council in a letter of the 31st of May 1527, in which he urged, at the same time, that the Pope should not be set free before order and security were restored : "For if he were out of your hands, I fear that he might behave as he always has behaved, and as the

remarkable evidence in the *Testament of Arrigus Theutonicus Cameracens. dioc. coltellarius in urbe in regione S. Angeli (Actum Romae in regione S. Angeli ante apothecam ipsius testoris), in which the date is no longer reckoned from the year of the pontificate ; the preamble runs thus : "In nomini, etc., A. 1527 regnante serenissima Carolo [indict.] decima quinta mensis Junii die 29." * Lib., I., scriptur archiconfrat. b. Mariae [Campi Sancti] (Archives of the Campo Santo in Rome). J. Zeigler in a polemical writing of 1527 claims Rome as a German city ; see REIZLER, VI., 521.

¹ BUCHOLTZ, III., 87-88.

King of France has behaved, only still worse, for he avoids and shuns the council. Apart from this and your presence here, I see no possibility of finding means to oppose the Lutheran sect and the accursed heresies."¹

Amid the various influences brought to bear upon him, the Emperor was long in coming to any fixed decision. At first his inactivity was such that it was supposed to arise from some strong physical reaction;² this extended to all his Italian affairs. After Bourbon's death the first necessity was obviously the appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief. Charles's council was insistent on this point, since the Prince of Orange was too young and inexperienced for the post. Charles handed over the chief command to the Duke of Ferrara, although the latter had already declined the honour in the autumn of 1526. As might have been foreseen, the Duke, on this occasion also, refused to place himself at the head of a "gang of mutineers." The consequence was that the army, if such it could be called, remained through the greater part of the year 1527 without a generalissimo, and shrank in numbers more and more from sickness and desertions.

The Imperial army in Milan was also in the worst condition. The faithful Leyva reported "that there was not a farthing's worth of pay for the troops." The army was more like a swarm of adventurers than a force in Imperial service. The commanders were powerless, the soldiers did what they liked.³ No wonder that the Imperial troops had to give way on all sides, when Lautrec appeared with his army.

¹ GEVAY, *Urkunden und Aktenstücke: Gesandtschaft an Sultan Suleiman, 1527, Vienna, 1840, 84.* Cf. BUCHOLTZ, III., 90.

² Cf. BAUMGARTEN, *Karl V., II.*, 597 and 634, who calls attention to a remark of Castiglione's.

³ LANZ, I., 237 *seq.*

Nor did less embarrassment await the Emperor on account of the imprisoned Pope, for whom the most active sympathy was being shown, not only in France and England, but in Spain itself. The deep Catholic feeling inherent in the Spanish people had long since expressed a growing repugnance to the policy of Charles towards the Pope. "All ranks, high and low," wrote Castiglione from Granada in November 1526, "are indignant at the raid of the Colonna." In his later letters he returns repeatedly to the loyal attachment of the Spanish people to the Pope. "If he were to come to Spain, he would be worshipped," writes Castiglione on hearing rumours concerning the movements of Clement VII. In March 1527 it was reported that the prelates and grandees had openly announced that no more money could be voted, since such grants would be spent on waging war against the head of the Church. The Chancellor made vain attempts to establish the Emperor's innocence by means of printed publications, but the opposition to the war against the successor of St. Peter increased; the grandees and bishops earnestly urged that peace should be made with Clement. "The loyal dependence of the nation on the See of Peter," Castiglione reported from Valladolid on the 24th of March, "is more apparent than ever."¹

What must have been the impression now made by the news of the Pope's imprisonment and the sack of Rome! Not only the great ecclesiastics but the grandees of Spain as well made known their indignation. Strong reproaches were addressed to the Emperor by the Archbishop of Toledo and the Duke of Alba.² Charles threw all the blame on the undisciplined army. "But," reported the Venetian envoy on the 16th of July 1527 from Valladolid,

¹ Cf. Castiglione's statements in SERASSI, II., 100, 125, 145, 147.

² "Le nuove d' Italia che l' esercito Cesareo sia entrato in Roma et
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"these excuses produce no effect here; the prelates and grandees are daily interceding for the Pope with the Emperor. There is a great conflict of opinions. Some say that Charles must show his abhorrence by setting the Pope at liberty; others that the Pope must come to Spain; others again, such as Loaysa, the Emperor's confessor, maintain that Charles cannot yet trust Clement and must hold him prisoner." In the meantime the Emperor gave the Nuncio nothing but fair speeches; but he came to no decision.¹ It was credibly reported that Spanish opinion was in favour of the suspension of divine worship in all the churches of the kingdom so long as the Pope's captivity lasted, and also that the bishops in a body, clad in mourning, intended to present themselves before the Emperor and beseech him to set Clement free. Through the influence of the Court these reports were suppressed,² but the general agitation was not abated.³

habbi usato la crudelità che si dice et che il pontefice stia assediato in castel S. Angelo non si havendo rispetto alcuno alla tregua fatta dal sig. vicerè han parso de qui molto strane et han dispiaciuto sommamente a tutti questi signori si ecclesiastici come altri et i principal di loro, come è l' arcivescovo di Toledo et duca d' Alba et altri simili son stati a parlare a S. M^{ta} circa cio pregandolo che vi faccia qualche provisione et tali di questi hanno parlato si liberamente et usato tal parole che a molti ha parso che habbino più presto detto di più che di meno di quel che bisognava." *Report of Navagero from Valladolid, June 17, 1527, in Cod. Vat., f. 265^b, of the Vatican Library.

¹ Cod.* 6753, f. 265^b (Vatican Library).

² Cf. Castiglione's letters of July 22 and December 10, 1527, the former in GUALTERIO, *Correspond. di Giberti*, 247 *seq.*, the latter in SERASSI, II., 150. Like the Archbishop of Toledo (see *infra*, p. 462, n. 5), the Bishop of Cordova also wrote a sympathetic *letter to Clement VII., dated ex Caesaris aula [1527] July 20. * Lett. d. princ., V., f. 208 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ * The grandees and prelates of Spain, reports Cardinal Salviati to Jacopo Salviati on August 16, 1527, "si sono doluti et dolgono mirabil-

Some decided step became more necessary day by day ; even Lannoy was pressing on this point. On the 6th of July he wrote to the Emperor : " The present situation cannot go on much longer. The more victories God sends you the more embarrassments you have, the domains of your kingdoms grow less and the ill-will of your enemies grows greater. Some envy your greatness, others hate you for the ill-treatment they have received from your soldiers, who have plundered Genoa and Milan, laid waste the country, and at the present hour brought destruction on Rome."¹

Quiñones, who had reached Valladolid in the last weeks of July,² after having been held up by pirates, told Charles to his face that if he did not fulfil his duty to the Pope he could no longer claim to be called Emperor ; he must rather be regarded as the agent of Luther, since, in his name and under his banner, the Lutherans had committed all their infamies in Rome.³ Quiñones believed it to be his duty to speak thus strongly as he knew that Charles was determined to get as much advantage as possible from the Pope's imprisonment, and to secure for himself a position which would make the independence of the Church a nullity.

mente di queste calamità et come buoni christiani che sono non restono sollecitar lo Imperatore et instar perche liberi S. S^{ta} come ha promesso et promette in modo che da quelle bande si ha ogni cosa favorevole et pero è da sperare bene et star di buona voglia." Nunziatura di Francia I., f. 34 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ BUCHOLTZ, III., 87.

² Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 503, and the * letter of Navagero, dated Valladolid, July 27, 1527, in Cod. Vat., 6753, Vatican Library.

³ "Tra l'altre cose che gli ha havuto animo di dire che non facendo quel che deve a lui non par che si possi chiamar Imperatore, ma capitano di Luthero." * Letter of Navagero, July 27, in Cod. Vat., 6753. Cf. R. BROWN, IV., n. 142.

The Papal Nuncio Castiglione, on whom Cardinal Salviati set all his hopes,¹ supported the efforts of Girolami with all his energy; nevertheless, the latter failed to get from Charles any definite decision with regard to Clement's liberation.² The envoys of England were also unsuccessful in their endeavours at the Imperial Court, although they could not have shown more zeal if they had been the Pope's representatives.³ The representations of Quiñones made more impression on Charles, but even he made little way at first. At the end of July Charles wrote to the Roman Senate and people,⁴ to the Legate Salviati,⁵ to the Cardinals and Roman nobility,⁶ lastly, to all the Christian princes, disclaiming all responsibility for the sack of Rome, to which he was not accessory, and laying the whole blame on Clement VII. At the same time he used

¹ "In te uno praecipere spes nostra est." *Cardinal Salviati to Castiglione, dated Paris, July 10, 1527. *Nunziatura di Francia I.*, f. 21 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² Cf. the *letter of Cardinal Salviati to Castiglione of August 14, 1527. *Nunziatura di Francia I.*, f. 29-32 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ Thus Cardinal Salviati reported to Jacopo Salviati in a lengthy *despatch dated Amiens, August 16, 1527; *Nunziatura di Francia I.*, f. 34 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). Cf. the *letter of Navagero, dated Valladolid, July 30, 1527 (Cod. Vat., 6753, Vatican Library).

⁴ On July 26; see GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 567, note. There was violent opposition in the Senate. HOFFMANN gives the speeches, *Nova Coll.*, I., 550.

⁵ Salviati, on hearing of Girolami's mission, had written to Charles V., on July 10, 1527, in a tone of subjection, that all his hopes rested on the Emperor's goodness (*this letter is in the *Nunziatura di Francia I.*, f. 21, Secret Archives of the Vatican). Charles's answer of July 28, wrongly addressed "to Cardinal Cibo," in the National Library, Paris (Ital. 1357), in SANUTO, with correct address, XLVI., 32-33; cf. also *Arch. Stor. Ital.*, 3 Series, XII., I, 1-7.

⁶ On July 31; see SCHULZ, Sacco, 145.

strong expressions of sorrow and regret for the injuries inflicted on the Holy See, and declared that he would rather not have won the victory than be the victor under such conditions.¹

About this time Charles was informed of Henry VIII.'s schemes of divorce ; on the 31st of July he instructed Lannoy to speak to the Pope on this business, but with caution, lest greater complications should arise if the Pope were to hold out a bait to King Henry in the matter or enter into any mischievous practical understanding with him. Charles wished Clement to make any further advance in the business of the divorce impossible by the issue of Briefs to Henry VIII. and Wolsey.² This private affair of the Emperor, calling for the full support of the Pope's spiritual power, warned the former to act with great caution towards Clement, as did also, in no less degree, the threatening attitude of France and England, now joining in close alliance.³

Thus influenced, Charles, who, from motives of self-regard had long hesitated before taking any decisive step,⁴ wrote from Valladolid on the 3rd of August 1527 two autograph letters to the Pope.⁵ In the first of these remarkable communications he laid great stress on his efforts to secure the general peace of Christendom, to reform the Church, and abolish heresy and unbelief. In the attainment of these objects all private interests must

¹ *Cf. supra*, p. 444 *seq.*

² BUCHOLTZ, III., 94-95, note.

³ *Cf. supra*, p. 438.

⁴ * Navagero's letter, dated Valladolid, August 1, 1527 (Cod. Vat., 6753, Vatican Library).

⁵ Both letters are in the State Archives, Florence (Innanzi il Princ. Miscell.), and have been recently published for private circulation by CASANOVA (*Lettere di Carlo V.*, 13-16).

be put aside and a unanimous course of action pursued. On these grounds the Pope would be justified in summoning a council for the extirpation of heresy, the destruction of unbelievers, and the exaltation of Holy Church. Charles, in conclusion, pledged his royal word to his prisoner that he would not suffer the council to undertake in any way the deposition or suspension of the Pope; any attempts in that direction, whether they came from a secular or ecclesiastical quarter, he would oppose, while protecting Clement in every way.

In his second letter, of which Quiñones was to be the bearer, Charles reminded Clement of the summons of a council. He besought the Pope in the most urgent way to undertake the promised visit to Spain; such a step would strike terror into the heretics and at least advance the prospects of peace between the Emperor and France. The Emperor's projects for a council were without result, for before his letters reached Rome, France and England had agreed to refuse their consent so long as the Pope was a prisoner.¹

Over the demand for Clement's liberation Charles hesitated still longer. To the Nuncio Castiglione he spoke in such a friendly way that the latter was filled with sanguine hopes.² But the instructions received at last on the 18th of August 1527, by Pierre de Veyre, who awaited them with Quiñones at Barcelona,³ did not correspond

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 438.

² SCHULZ, Sacco, 146 *seq.*, 175 *seq.* Here is published for the first time, from the Secret Archives of the Vatican, Castiglione's report to Clement VII. of August 12, 1527.

³ Quiñones and P. de Veyre went on August 15 to Barcelona; cf. Navagero's *letter, dated Valladolid, August 17, 1527 (Cod. Vat., 6753, Vatican Library), and that of *Cardinal Salviati to F. Guicciardini, dated Compiègne, September 14, 1527 (Nunziatura di Francia I., f. 50, Secret Archives of the Vatican). They left Barcelona on September 5

with these assurances. They were certainly not wanting in regrets for the misfortunes that had befallen the Pope in Rome or in wishes for the peace of Christendom, the reformation of the Church, and the uprooting of Lutheran errors; but with regard to the Pope's restoration to freedom, it was stated in the most definite terms that under this head nothing was to be understood beyond his liberty in the exercise of spiritual functions. Moreover, as a preliminary, the instructions of the envoys emphatically declared that Lannoy must receive securities, as certain as any human securities could be, against the possibility of Papal treachery or Papal vengeance. Lannoy was left to specify the conditions. But Charles indicated what he believed himself entitled to demand in this respect, namely, Ostia, Civita Vecchia, Parma, Piacenza, Bologna, Ravenna and, in exchange for the castle of St. Angelo, Civita Castellana. The Emperor demanded besides, in return for the restoration of the Pope's spiritual jurisdiction, nothing less than the surrender of several of the more important towns of the Papal States. But he insisted, at the same time, that he was not making these demands for his own personal advantage, but in order to hold guarantees until such time as general peace should be attained, a council summoned, and the reform of Christendom set on foot.¹

Clement, meanwhile, had passed through a terrible time.

(* Navagero's letter, dated Paredes, September 27, 1527, in Cod. Vat., 6763) and reached Rome in the beginning of October. Cf. SANUTO, XLVI., 150, 152, 181, 203, 205, 210, 223, 225.

¹ BUCHOLTZ, III., 97 *seqq.*, gives the instructions in epitome; he places them three weeks after June 30, about July 21. Veyre's instructions were kept back by the Emperor until August 18; see Navagero's *report, dated Valladolid, August 19, 1527, in the Vatican Library. Cf. R. BROWN, IV., n. 152.

Within the narrow confines of the castle,¹ kept under closest watch by a fierce soldiery, he spent his days as in a "living tomb." He sought comfort in prayer,² trusted to the Emperor's magnanimity,³ then again looked for the help held out by Francis I.,⁴ yet through all preserved his calmness of mind. This is shown by the Bull prepared on the 15th of July 1527, in which the regulations for the Papal election in Rome, or elsewhere in Italy, or even in some foreign country, were drawn up, in the case of his death during imprisonment. The Bull shows that Clement took all these contingencies into account; the object of this document was to secure freedom of election and to prevent a schism. The Cardinals were empowered to meet in conclave elsewhere than in Rome and enjoined to wait during a certain time for those of their colleagues who should be absent.⁵

The life of Clement VII. was, in fact, at this time seriously threatened. It is clear from the reports of Perez that the Spaniards and Germans were continually hankering after the possession of Clement and the Cardinals; the lands-knechts did not wish the prisoner to be taken to Spain, but were anxious to carry him off themselves.⁶

¹ He was living with the Cardinals in the so-called *maschio* of the castle; see GREGOROVIVS, VIII., 3rd ed., 564. The Pope's bed-chamber was guarded by Spanish soldiers; see GIOVIO, Descrizione, 18.

² Cf. SANUTO, XLVI., 132.

³ *Ibid.*, XLV., 415.

⁴ See Francis I.'s letter to Clement VII., written from Amiens in August, in Mél. d'Archéol., XVI., 414-416. The Latin translation in GROLIÉRIUS, 131 *seq.*, is dated from Compiègne, September 14.

⁵ CIACONIUS, III., 454-455; GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 184 and 196; see SÄGMÜLLER, Papstwahlen, 11-12.

⁶ *See the reports in VILLA, Asalto, 234 *seq.*, and GUMPPENBERG'S account, 208 *seq.* See also GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 155 (Perez to the Emperor on August 18). To this time also belongs a *Brief of

Rome was now in the full heat of summer, and the plague at its height. Pestilence and famine made havoc among the inhabitants; churches and streets were soon filled with dead bodies.¹ Frightful malaria arose from these "shambles"; if the wind blew from the city, relates one of the captives, it was impossible to remain on the walls of the castle.²

The plague had made its way into the fortress long before and helped, together with the sufferings and agitations of captivity, to thin the ranks of the prisoners. Cardinal Rangoni died in August; he was followed in October by Francesco Armellini, broken-hearted at the loss of his riches.³ The situation of the captive Pope became more and more unbearable. He waited in vain for the envoys of the Emperor as well as for the return of the army of the League to deliver him, and his dread lest the Spaniards or Germans should carry him away increased every day. When Alarcon and Muscettola insisted on his giving adequate security for the payment of the promised 250,000 ducats, he exclaimed with tears in his eyes, "For the love of God do not exact from me promises which must be known to all the world and become engraven on the memories of men for ever! So great is my misfortune and my poverty, that the three Franciscans who are with me would be in want

Clement VII. to Camillo Gaetani, Lord of Sermoneta, dated July 11, 1527, bidding him make everything ready for the Pope's sojourn in Sermoneta, as the Imperialists intended to carry him thither. *Min. brev.*, 1527, IV., vol. 17, n. 224 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ See GAVARDO'S account in *Arch. Stor. Lomb.*, IV., 631.

² SANUTO, XLV., 595, 655; XLVI., 141. Cf. the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE, in which it is stated that dead bodies lay unburied for fourteen days, and that many Imperialists and Romans died of plague (National Library, Paris).

³ Cf. SANUTO, XLV., 701; XLVI., 144, 279-280, 299.

of their daily bread if they were not able to borrow money from some compassionate souls. I leave it to you and your consciences to say whether such conduct is worthy of an Emperor."¹

In the first days of September it was reported that Clement in despair had ordered a Bull to be drawn up exhorting the Church to pray for her imprisoned head and bidding the Bishops publish the canonical censures against her persecutors. The draft, couched in language of extreme severity, is preserved in the State Archives of Florence. This Bull, however, was never put into official shape and published. In the hands of the masterful Popes of the Middle Ages such a transaction would undoubtedly have been completed, but Clement VII. had not the requisite courage.² According to one account it was Alfonso del Vasto who held the Pope back from this extreme step.³

When Veyre at last landed at Naples on the 19th of September 1527, Lannoy lay ill of the plague which he had contracted in Rome. His death (September 23rd)⁴ brought

¹ This Perez reported to the Emperor on September 2, 1527. GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 184.

² VARCHI calls attention to this, I., 178.

³ The Bull "Considerantes" was published by GUASTI in Arch. Stor. Ital., 4 Series, XV., 7 *seqq.* Guasti was not acquainted with the statement about Vasto in SANUTO, XLVI., 54, of which use has been made above, and his supposition that the Bull was drawn up in the first days of the captivity is opposed not merely by SANUTO, *loc. cit.*, but also by GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 184, both of whom support the September date; *cf.* VILLA, Italia, 235 *seqq.* On the other hand, GUASTI, *loc. cit.*, 5 *seq.*, is right in maintaining that the Bull was not published, in spite of a statement to the contrary in SANUTO, XLVI., 209. Then, as before, the Pope was incapable of making up his mind.

⁴ *Cf.* the *Brief to H. de Moncada, Viceroy of Naples, of September 26, 1527 (condolet de morte Caroli viceregis et congratulatur de eius adventu), Arm., 39, vol. 47, n. 499 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

everything to a standstill, as fresh instructions had now to be received from the Emperor. This was all the more necessary since the situation, in other respects, had entirely changed from what Charles supposed it to be at the moment of Veyre's departure. The latter reported to Spain that the Pope had paid only 100,000 ducats of the 400,000 owed by him, while the Florentines had not yet paid anything of their 300,000. Alarcon, from scruples of conscience, had renounced his plan of bringing the Pope to Gaeta. The commanders of the Imperial army had been forced to fly, and their mutinous soldiers, instead of being on the march to meet the French in Lombardy, were again on the road to Rome, where they intended to extort their pay by force.¹ They got there on the 25th of September, and subjected the unhappy city to a second pillage. The same horrors which had accompanied their first onslaught were now repeated, and in some ways increased.² The soldiers, according to a German account, did everything they could think of, burning, extorting, robbing, thieving, and doing violence. The money raised by Clement by the sacrifice of his own silver vessels and those of the prelates was insufficient to appease the demands of the furious horde; they threatened Rome with utter destruction and the Pope and Cardinals with death if they were not paid.

Clement had now to make up his mind to give up to the Germans the hostages³ named in the treaty of June. Gumpfenberg has described, as an eye-witness, the surrender of these unfortunate men. The Pope ex-

¹ Veyre's report of September 30, 1527, in LANZ, I., 248 *seqq.*; *cf.* BUCHOLTZ, III., 108 *seq.*; ALBERINI, 357; GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 201.

² *Cf.* SANUTO, XLVI., 178, 186, 210; SCHERTLINS *Leben*, 8; ALBERINI, 355.

³ See their names *supra*, p. 422.

claimed with tears, "There they stand, take them with you. I will accompany them."¹

The account-book of Paolo Montanaro, expeditor of Clement VII.,² now preserved in the Roman State Archives, enables us to realize directly the fearful plight to which the Pope had been brought. This account-book, which comprises the quarter from October to the 31st of December, shows clearly how scarce and dear provisions were. Since the treaty of June the Spaniards, who had at first determined to starve out the inmates of St. Angelo, had allowed communications to be renewed. It is a peculiar testimony to the economical bent of Clement VII. that the regular account of expenditure begins again as early as the 1st of October. With the most conscientious exactitude Montanaro notes down the smallest sum spent on the table of the imprisoned Pope, and, in like manner, the Master of the Household, Girolamo da Schio, Bishop of Vaison, submits each office³ to a searching examination.

While the soldiers were robbing in every nook and corner of Rome, Veyre and Quiñones, in the beginning of October, approached the Pope.⁴ Like Alarcon and Morone, they negotiated with a delegation of Cardinals, del Monte,

¹ GUMPPENBERG, 247 *seqq.*; *cf.* also the report of Perez, October 12, 1527, in VILLA, Asalto, 289.

² *Registro delle spese sono fatte in Castello de sancto Angelo per uso de N. S. et sua familia per man del r. mons. Vasionen. mastro di casa de S. Sta incominzando dal primo dì de Ottobre 1527. GREGOROVIVS in the *Histor. Zeitschrift*, XXXVI., 163 *seq.*, has given a detailed account of these "most precious and, in some cases, unique relics of the sack of Rome."

³ GREGOROVIVS in the *Histor. Zeitschrift*, XXXVI., 164 *seqq.* For the Master of the Household see MORSOLIN, Girol. da Schio, Vicenza, 1875.

⁴ *Cf. supra*, p. 454, n. 3, and EHSES, Dokumente, 13 and 252.

Campeggio, and Lorenzo Pucci; Pompeo Colonna, whom Clement had won over to his side,¹ did all he could to attain a successful result; but in spite of these endeavours no progress was made. Meanwhile the soldiers became more and more furious. In their rage they dragged the hostages to newly erected gallows on the Campo di Fiore and threatened them with death. At the last moment they changed their mind; they were unwilling to lose the last security remaining to them, and the hostages were taken in chains to the Palazzo Colonna.²

Although in Rome the scarcity of provisions made itself felt increasingly every day,³ and the approach of the French troops under Lautrec was a cause of growing anxiety, the army could not be induced to leave the city, since the soldiers held out for payment of their arrears in full. The final result of the total "paralysis of the Emperor's authority"⁴ was the defection of the Duke of Ferrara and

¹ By the promise of the Legation of the marches of Ancona (see GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 5) and other marks of favour (*cf.* Arm., 39, vol. 47, n. 739: *Legitimation of "Joh. de Columna, Cleric. Rom.," dated November 3, 1527. "Hinc est quod nos te, qui ut accepimus defectum natalium de dil. fil. nostro Pompeio til. s. Laurent. in Dam. presb. Card. S. R. E. vicecanc. tunc in minorib. constituto et soluto et soluta genitus pateris," etc. (Secret Archives of the Vatican). There is no evidence in support of the charges made against Colonna in Veyre's report (in LANZ, I., 248 *seq.*).

² *Cf.* SCHULZ, Sacco, 149 *seq.* To the sources there made use of may be added SANUTO, XLVI., 210, 222, 231, 241; an undated (probably drawn up end of October) German *report in the Reichstagsakten, XLIII., f. 33-34 (City Archives, Frankfurt-on-Maine); GIOVIO, Descrizione, 19 *seq.*, and the *Diary of CORNELIUS DE FINE, who describes the *inaudita mortalitas* still caused by the plague in September: "All who had hitherto escaped sword and famine were now dead" (National Library, Paris).

³ *Cf.* SANUTO, XLV., 299.

⁴ BAUMGARTEN, Karl V., II., 605.

the Marquis of Mantua who, in November, deserted the cause of Charles for that of France.¹

At this time a decided reaction set in at the Imperial Court.² At the end of October the Ambassador of Henry VIII., in the name of his King, "the Defender of the Faith," presented a solemn protest against the Pope's imprisonment.³ In November the Spanish Council discussed the matter; no less a personage than the Chancellor Gattinara there declared that if the Emperor looked upon Clement as the legitimate Pope, he ought no longer to detain him captive. Praet called attention to the danger that the French might set the Pope at liberty; it would be better that the Emperor should do this and, in so doing, set his troops free; on this ground he recommended that Moncada should be ordered to abide, only "as far as was practicable," by the instructions of Veyre. The result of the deliberation was that the Council of State determined that, in any case, the Pope must be given his freedom.⁴

In the meantime the negotiations in Rome had been endlessly protracted. In despair Clement VII., on the 15th of November, deplored his misery⁵ to the Archbishop of

¹ Cf. SUDENDORF, III., 172 *seq.*; DE LEVA, II., 450 *seq.*; BALAN, VI., 145 *seq.*

² Navagero reports in a *letter from Burgos, October 25, 1527, that, in spite of this reaction, there were still many who opposed Clement's release. Cod. Vat., 6753 (Vatican Library).

³ SANUTO, XLVI., 314.

⁴ BUCHOLTZ, III., 119-120.

⁵ RAYNALDUS, 1527, n. 43. The letter here printed is the answer to that of the Archbishop of Toledo to the Pope, dated Valladolid, July 27, 1527. The Archbishop tries to comfort the Pope with allusions to the good dispositions of the Emperor. Now that the Pope had entered on the hazards of war, the Archbishop hopes that Clement has made such thorough provision for all the eventualities of the conflict that he will also be able to meet his present misfortune with

Toledo. Moncada, the new Viceroy of Naples, tried to exact as much as possible from the Pope. Clement hoped, not without grounds, that the approach of the French army under Lautrec would force the Imperialists to make more favourable terms;¹ he also succeeded by promises in bringing Quiñones and Morone entirely round to his side.²

After proposals and counter-proposals³ had been bandied to and fro amid tedious delays, a basis of agreement was reached at last, and on the 26th of November the terms were settled. In the first place, a treaty was concluded between the Pope and the Cardinals on the one hand, and the representatives of the Emperor (Veyre, Moncada, Quiñones) on the other. It was herein stipulated that Clement should be restored to his spiritual and temporal rights on condition that he—while remaining neutral—advanced the peace of Christendom and convoked a general council for the reform of the Church, the uprooting of Lutheran teaching, and the pursuance of the Turkish war. As securities the Emperor was to hold six hostages—Giberti, Jacopo Salviati, Galeotto and Malatesta de' Medici, as well as Cardinals Trivulzio and Pisani⁴—and the towns of Ostia, Civita Vecchia, Civita Castellana, and Forlì. All the remainder of the Papal fortitude and spirit. *Lett. d. princ., IV., f. 202 and 208 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

¹ The services rendered him by Lautrec's appearance were acknowledged by the Pope, after his release, in a special letter of December 14, 1527, in RAYNALDUS, 1527, n. 47.

² Quiñones had a promise of the Cardinalate. Morone's son was to receive the Bishopric of Modena. JOVIUS, Columna, 170; cf. GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 5.

³ Cf. SCHULZ, Sacco, 153 *seq.*

⁴ In place of his nephews, Alessandro and Ippolito de' Medici, who were absent.

States, with the exception of the territories ceded to the Colonna, was, on the other hand, to be restored as before the sack of Rome. The Imperial army would quit Rome and the States of the Church as soon as the troops of the League evacuated the latter.¹

No one was named in this treaty to execute the restoration of the territories severed from the States of the Church. As a matter of fact, the restoration of the temporal possessions, although conceded in theory, lay practically at the good pleasure of the Emperor.² On the other hand, the Pope was free to fix his own time for the convocation of the council.

A second agreement settled in detail the sums payable by the Pope to the Imperialist generals; in the first place, within ten days 73,169 ducats, as the price of the evacuation of the castle of St. Angelo, and immediately after that 35,000 ducats more, on receipt of which the troops would quit Rome. After fourteen days 44,984½ ducats were to be paid, and then in three monthly instalments 150,000, and again finally, at the same rate, 65,000. In order to collect these sums the Pope made new Cardinals and alienated Church property in the kingdom of Naples. On the payment of the 44,984½ ducats the Imperialist forces left the Papal States.³

¹ Text of this treaty in SCHULZ, Sacco, 176-183. Cf. the doubtful letter of Cardinal Pisani, November 27, 1527, in SANUTO, XLVI., 348-349.

² Cf. BROSCHE, I., 109-110.

³ In MOLINI, 273-278, and LANCELOTTI, III., 325 *seq.*, is the Italian, in SCHULZ, 183-188, the Latin, text of this treaty. German translation in REISSNER, 146 *seq.* SCHULZ, 159, first called attention to the Brief (Secret Archives of the Vatican, Brevi di Clemente VII., T. 17, part 4^a, n. 336) in which Clement appointed a commissary to accompany the army to Viterbo and to look after their commissariat and quarters.

Since, in spite of the nomination of Cardinals,¹ sufficient money was not forthcoming,² the landsknechts again threatened the hostages with death and rose in mutiny against their leaders, who took refuge in the Alban hills with the Colonna. At the end of November the hostages managed to make their warders drunk and escaped.³ On hearing this the landsknechts flung down their arms, but order was soon restored.⁴ An arrangement was subsequently made with the Pope that he should pay from the

¹ On November 21, 1527, were nominated, Antonio Sanseverino, Vincenzo Caraffa, A. M. Palmerio, E. Cardona, G. Grimaldi, P. Gonzaga, S. Pappacoda; see CIACONIUS, III., 488 *seq.*, who is mistaken in assigning the nomination of Du Prat and Quiñones to the same date. NOVAES, IV., 90 *seq.*, makes the same mistake with regard to Du Prat. In the *Nomination Brief of V. Caraffa, dated Romae in Arce, November 21, 1527, we read: Clement had created him Cardinal "habita cum ven. fratribus nostris S. R. E. Cardinalibus matura deliberatione de illorum unanimi consilio et consensu cum promissione ratificandi creationem post liberationem ex arce s. Angeli." Brev., vol. 47, n. 814 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). See also SANUTO, XLVI., 389-410. The promulgation of the Cardinals created on November 21 took place along with that of those nominated on May 3, 1527, not, as CRISTOFORI (348), supposes, on April 27, but in the beginning of February 1528 (certainly before the 11th); see SANUTO, XLVI., 580, *cf.* 585, and CATALANUS, 283, 303. See also the *letter of thanks of Cardinal Sanseverino (dated Rome, February 16, 1528), Lett. d. princ., V., 110 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

² It is plain from the *Brief to Schönberg, dated December 6, 1527, that the Neapolitan Cardinals refused to pay down the stipulated sums "nisi mittantur pilei et apportetur assumptio." Therefore Clement gave Schönberg full powers to proceed with the ceremonies of the bestowal of the ring and the imposition of the hat. Brev., vol. 47, n. 880 (Secret Archives of the Vatican).

³ JOVIUS, Columna, 169, and Hist., XXV., 28; SANUTO, XLVI., 361 *seq.*, 389; ALBERINI, 358 *seq.*; GUMPPENBERG'S account, 261 *seq.*; SCHULZ, Sacco, 159; BARTHOLD, 485; BALAN, Clement VII., 85.

⁴ SANUTO, XLVI., 389; *cf.* 362.

1st of December 100,000 ducats to the Germans, with the exception of the leaders and those in receipt of double pay, 35,000 ducats to the Spaniards, and furnish fresh securities.¹ Accordingly, after Cardinals Orsini and Cesi had been handed over to Colonna, and Cardinals Trivulzio, Pisani, and Gaddi to Alarcon as hostages, and further securities given for the above-mentioned sums of money, the Imperialists left the castle of St. Angelo on the 6th of December 1527.²

With this the hard captivity³ of the Pope, which had lasted full seven months, came to an end. Clement wished to leave Rome at once, where Campeggio was to remain as Legate; Alarcon advised him to wait a few more days on account of the insecurity of the roads,⁴ but this delay seemed very dangerous to Clement, who was afraid of the soldiers awaiting their pay in Rome, and, moreover, he did not trust Moncada.⁵ Between the 6th and 7th of December he left St. Angelo suddenly, by night, dressed in the clothes of his majordomo, but certainly not without previous knowledge on the part of the Imperialist commanders. Luigi

¹ SCHULZ, Sacco, 160; *cf.* SANUTO, XLVI., 364 *segg.*

² *Cf.* the Sienese account in FOSSATI-FALLETTI, 24-25.

³ How difficult it was, up to the last, to have communication with the Pope is shown from the reports of W. Knight, sent to Rome by Henry VIII. in the matter of his divorce; see State Papers, Henry VIII., London, 1849, VII., n. 177.

⁴ A. Pisani reported this from Todi on December 11, 1527; SANUTO, XLVI., 375. In a *Brief to the Duke of Urbino and the other generals of the League, dated December 3, 1527, Clement VII. announced his approaching departure for Orvieto, accompanied by an Imperialist guard of soldiers, for whom he asked a safe-conduct; Min. brev., 1527, III., vol. 16, n. 1094 (Secret Archives of the Vatican). In Orvieto Clement's coming was known as far back as the middle of November; see FUMI, Orvieto, 186 *seq.*

⁵ *Cf.* JOVIUS, Columna, 70, and the Pope's own account quoted below in BALAN.

Gonzaga waited for him on the Neronian fields with a troop of arquebusiers, and under this escort he went in haste to Montefiascone, and from there to the stronghold of Orvieto.¹

¹ For Clement's flight see, besides GUICCIARDINI, XVIII., 5, and JOVIUS, Hist., XXV., 29, also SANUTO, XLVI., 375, 378-379, 389-390, and the Pope's own account (made known recently for the first time) in BALAN, Boschetti, II., Appendix, 42. See also GAYANGOS, III., 2, n. 259, 272; DANDOLO, Ricordi ined. di G. Morone, Milano, 1859, 230, and FOSSATI-FALLETTI, 25. Guicciardini, followed by most modern historians, assigns the flight to December 8; but in the accounts in Sanuto, as well as in the despatches of F. Sergardi, C. Massaini, and J. C. Salimbeni (State Archives, Siena), drawn upon by Fossati-Falletti, December 6 is expressly stated; so also Blasius de Martinellis (quoted by EHSES, *Die Dekretale*, 226, note 1) and the Diary in OMONT, *Suites du Sac de Rome*, 18. The statements in BONTEMPI, 325, are also in agreement with the above. To all this evidence must be added that also of the Pope himself in a *Brief of January 12, 1529, in Arm., 39, vol. 49, n. 31 (Secret Archives of the Vatican), first utilized by EHSES, *Dokumente*, XXVIII., note 4. The 6th of December is also proved to have been the day of the flight by *the *Regestro delle spese* in the State Archives, Rome (see *supra*, p. 460, n. 2), where on the 7th of December there are no more entries for provisions; the last entry is made at Galera, a place which the Pope passed through in his flight. GREGOROVIVS (*Histor. Zeitschrift*, XXXVI., 171-172) was not aware of this; his explanation rests on an unnecessary hypothesis. For a coin of Clement VII., the Pontiff's face being bearded, referring to his deliverance, see REUMONT, III., 2, 849. Reumont also has here some critical remarks on FUSCO, *Di una inedita moneta battuta in Roma l'anno 1528 dall' Imperat. Carlo V.*, Napoli, 1848.



APPENDIX
OF
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS
AND
EXTRACTS FROM ARCHIVES.

APPENDIX.

1. G. M. GIBERTI to N. N.¹

1522, Januar. 9, Rom.

Copia de un capitulo di una littera di mes^r Jo. Matthio :

R^{mo} s^r mio. V. S. sarà già stata avisata della s^{ma} electione dil r^{mo} card^{le} Dertusense in summo pontifice, la quale dette piacere a tucti li homeni da bene per le rare et singular virtu sue, e a li amici e s^{ri} del patrone per essere opera e factura sua. Rome VIIII jan. 1522.

[Cop. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

2. ALIENATION OF CHURCH ORNAMENTS FROM THE PAPAL CHAPEL BY THE COLLEGE OF CARDINALS.²

1522, Februar. 6, Rom.

Committitur per collegium rev^{morum} cardinalium rev^o d. camerario, ut det quaedam vasa argentea rev. d. Ant. Puccio episc. Pistorien. in pignus pro duc. 2500 auri capitaneis Helvetiorum (who served under A. Pucci in Lombardy) debitis, and in particular :

Duo candelabra magna argentea smaltata pondⁿ libr. 47 ac valoris duc. 550.

Item duo alia candelabra argentea smaltata ejusdem pondⁿ et valoris.

Item duo candelabra argentea smaltata ad confecterias pondⁿ libr. 66 et valoris duc. 700.

Item unam crucem cum pede magno et armis Eugenii [IV] et Pauli [II] pondⁿ libr. 42^{1/2} val. duc. 450.

¹ See *supra*, p. 24.

² See *supra*, p. 3.

Item duo candelabra argentea aurata cum armis papae Julii [II] pond. libr. 28, val duc. 300.

Item unam coppam cum suo tegmine argenteam deauratam pond. libr. 5 et unciar. 9. val. duc. 60.

Item unum vas aquae benedictae cum sua asperges et armis Pauli papae II pond. libr. 5 et unciar. 10, val. duc. 60.

Et unum aliud vas simile cum suo aspergulo argenti smaltati cum armis, card. Ascanii¹ pond. libr. 3 et unciar. 6, val. duc. 30.

Item unum aliud simile vas sine armis pond. libr. 5 et unciar. 6, val duc. 65.

Item duo turribula, quorum alterum est deauratum, cum navicula et cochleare argenteis pond. libr. 9, val. duc. 90.

Item unum truncum crucis, quae deferitur ante faciem pontificis, argenteum et in tribus partibus divisum pond. libr. 14 et unciar. 2, val. duc. 150, et sic in tota summa summarum praed. val. 3005 duc. auri ponderantia et valentia in sacristia palatii apost. existentia et ad usum altaris pontificii teneri solita in pignus et cautelam eorum assignari curet. . . .

D. Romae in palatio apost. in nostra generali congregat. die 6, febr. 1522. . . .

[Cop. in the *Acta consist. 1492-1513 (formerly Miscell. 3), f. 65, Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

3. EPITOME OF CARDINAL SCHINNER'S PROJECT OF REFORM.²

1522, Mart. 1, Rom.

Sanctissimus in Christo pater et dominus noster dominus Adrianus, divina providentia papa sextus, pontifex maximus optimusque vive vocis oraculo mandavit michi Bernardo de Lauro abbati ac sue beatitudinis familiarium minimo indignoque, ut a quodam memoriali per me coram S^{te} Sua lecto transcriberem hec que sequuntur :

Primum de celeri in Italiam adventu.

Quod B^{do} sua nichil det aut concedat seu dari aut concedi patiat, quod arcium Hostie et s^{te} Marie de Loreta [sic] aut aliarum terrarum custodiam concernat, etiam si super hoc collegium scribat.

Insuper quod S^{tas} Sua quantocius scribat collegio, quatenus

¹ A. Sforza.

² See *supra*, p. 86.

modis omnibus attendat atque efficiat, ne quidquam terrarum et dominiorum, quae tempore fe. re. domini Leonis [X] recuperatum obtentumve [sic] fuerit, aut aliorum pontificum predecessorum, amittatur sive amitti auferri aut abalienari patiatur, sed omnibus modis ac viis conservare defendere et protegere curet, et super hoc tota sit intentio Sue S^{ts} et citius id fiat.

Et nisi presto S^s D^s N^r sit venturus, quod faciat legatum et hoc faciat B^{do} Sua et nullo modo hoc remitat collegio.

Preterea pacem (quae tamen nichil habitura sit insidiarum) inter principes componere curet, et ubi tractabitur caveat de fraudulenta pace.

Et quod se confederet cum Cesare atque regibus Anglie et Portugalie.

Et quod scribat regi Francorum, ut in Italie ab armis absteineat, ne ultra sanguine christiano Italia irrigetur. Et etiam Ecclesie Romane vasallis scribat, quod nulli in armis versanti faveant nec adhereant, presertim illis qui ecclesie confederatos contra [sic] arma ferunt.

Insuper sciat Beatitudo Sua, quod in Italia malo ingenio multa arma costructa sunt, quae et ducatum Urbini et civitatem Perusam tyrannide opprimunt, et, nisi presto obvietur, etiam Bononiam, ut in eam Bentivoli reintrudantur, invadent.

Preterea, quia sedes apostolica ere alieno est gravata et pro occurrentibus necessitatibus sunt habende pecunie, idcirco S^{ta} + Sua poterit ab ill^{mo} Anglorum rege mutuatos accipere ducatos ducentos mille, quos et duplicatos juste habere poterit tum ex marranis tum ex aliquibus pretiis defalcandis ex contractibus illicitis et usurariis cum aliquibus creditoribus initis et etiam ex rebellibus componendis.

Quod excellentissimus dominus dux Mediolani sub alis Sue Beatitudinis se commendat.

Insuper quod ex Turcis habentur timenda nova, ea tamen cum fenore aliquo subministrantur a Gallis et a Venetis ea intentione, ut pax preceps fiat ex qua acrius bellum exeat. Et impossibile est Italiam pace frui, dum in ea aderunt Galli, et ex consequenti nec in reliqua publica re christiana pax esse poterit. Et est notissimum quod, ex quo Galli in Italiam irruerunt, plus quam duocenta milia hominum gladiis occubuerunt. Et dum Galli vires habebunt, nichil boni contra infideles fieri poterit.

- + Et si Beatitudo Sua vult vere dominari, quod nulli cardinalium adhereat, sed omnes equaliter amet et plus merenti plus etiam tribuat. Et super hoc dicetis aliqua que scitis, nam periculosum esset omnia scripto dicere.

Insuper quod Beatitudo Sua non recipiat aliquos in suos oficiales nisi illos jam dudum forsani sibi notos et probatos donec S^{tas} Sua fuerit Rome, ubi sunt aliqui viri digni et incorruptibiles, quos Beatitudini Sue nominabunt cardinalis Sedunensis et Guillermus Hynchenfort.¹ Et inter nominandos est unus nomine Jacobus Bomisius pro secretario aptissimus, et pro subdatario alter qui vocatur Johannes Betchen Coloniensis.

- + Item quod Sanctitas Sua dum erit Rome oficiales et familiares suos habeat ad honestum et redactum [sic] numerum, unde sequatur, quod car^{les} nunc maxima et superflua familiarium comitiva stipati etiam se reformabunt et familiam suam ad honestum numerum reducent.

- + Insuper quia ex officiorum auditoris camere et clericorum de camera et abreviatorum de majori et nonnullorum aliorum venditione paratur materia ut justitia venalis fiat, idcirco dicta officia minime vendantur, sed gratis dentur personis litteratis. Et quod auditor camere et gubernator astringantur ad syndacatum.

- + Quod penitentiarii et referendarii reducantur ad honestum numerum et tam ipsis quam etiam dominis de Rota quotannis assignentur certi redditus, qui absque conscientie lesione et sine patrimonii diminutione poterunt eisdem ac ipsorum unicuique assignari ex redditibus aliquorum abbatiatum magni valoris certis congregationibus nuper unitorum.

- + Et quod domini de Rota sub ofitiorum ipso facto privatione nichil pro propina recipiant nisi tantum quod ad plus valeat duos ducatos auri de camera, et pars plus dans ipso facto perdat jus quod habet in causa et illud accrescat parti alteri. Et hoc idem incurrant dicti penitentiarii. Et si penitentes voluerint gratis dare aliquid, illud reponatur in quadam arcula ad opus fabrice sancti Petri.

- + Et quod scriptores apostolici nihil percipiant quam instituta Nicholai [V] in quadam bulla, et si contra fecerint non absolvantur a censuris in bulla contentis et sic precludetur iter delinquendi.

¹ Enkevoirt.

Et quod gabelle de Ripa diminuantur pro medietate et sic fiet res gratissima Romanis, et nichilominus tantundem utilitatis ex gabella resultabit, quia dum gabella erit diminuta, multo plures quam nunc venditores per flumen Tyberi portabunt victualia, + quae nunc propter gabelle excessum non vehuntur, et quod dicta gabella non arrendetur, sed pro ipsa exigenda ponantur collectores, qui de exactis reddant rationem magistro domus Vestre Beatitudinis; nam dum gabella arrendatur, illi, qui ipsam arrendant, maxime vexant illos, qui victualia vendenda deferunt.

Demum multa imposita a Leone [X] decreta et officia militum scutiferorum et preter solitum numerum cubiculariorum et ofitia de Ripa evanescent et dissolvantur, nam fere totum patrimonium absorbent.

Et quod fiscus non audeat excedere in suo ofitio quod tantum + consistit in denuntiando et instando.

[Endorsed:] Transcripta a quodam memoriali per rev. dom. Matheum card. Sedunens. prima martii Rome ordinato, scripto tamen per me abbatem [B. de] Lauro.

[Orig. Cod. Vatic. 3924, I., f. 204, Vatican Library.¹]

4. POPE ADRIAN VI. TO THE COLLEGE OF CARDINALS.²

1522, Mai 8, Saragossa.

Adrianus papa VI. Vener. fratres nostri, salutem et apost. benedict.

Sexta huius mensis reddidit nobis litteras circumspect. vestrarum dil. filius Ioannes Maria alumnus et nuntius dilecti filii nobilis viri ducis Urbini, quibus circumspectiones vestrae ducem ipsum et egregia eius erga nos et sanctam sedem apostolicam merita diligenter commendant. Non facile dixerimus quantam nobis dictae litterae laeticiam attulerunt non solum propter oblatam nobis ipsius ducis obedientiam et optimam eius ad res ecclesiae iuvandas voluntatem, quod in promptu est videre quanti in hac temporum malicia estimari debeat, sed etiam quod ex hac circumspectionum vestrarum commendatione plane innotescat rectissimus et ardens zelus earundem ad optime prospiciendum rebus

¹ The crosses and lines on the margin are in the original document, and seem to have been made by Adrian VI. himself.

² See *supra*, p. 162.

et statui ecclesiae, quae ex longiuscula nostra ab urbe absentia est in moerore non parvo constituta, cum fortissimos ac fidelissimos vassallos ipsius ecclesiae et ipsi tam benigne tractent et nobis tam ex corde commendent proque viribus omnia procurent, quae ad sedandas ecclesiae tempestates conducere noverint. Sane ducem ipsum propter eum eiusque egregias virtutes et fidem erga nos et sanctam sedem apost. sat commendatum omni eramus favore, ut par est, prosequuturi. At accedente ad hoc sacri chariss^{orum} fratrum nostrorum collegii interventu curae nobis erit, ut cumulus quoque beneficentiae favorisque nostri non contemnendus accedat, quod suo tempore re melius ipsa quam verbis ostendemus. Quod reliquum est hortamur ac rogamus circumspectiones vestras quam maxime possumus ex animo, ut per hoc breve momentum absentiae nostrae paci et unitati primum quidem inter se ipsas, deinde in populis urbis Romae ac totius Italiae summa cum instantia ac vigilantia studeant cogitentque nunquam oblatum iri sibi occasionem, qua excellentes virtutes suas magis quam nunc illustrare possint.

Dat. Caesaragustae sub annulo piscatoris die VIII maii 1522 suscepti a nobis apostolatus officii anno primo.

T. Hezius.

[A tergo:] Address and Chancery endorsement of receipt, 28 June, 1522.

[Orig. Sec. Arch. of the Vatican, Arch. s. Angeli A. V, c. 3, n. 31.]

5. POPE ADRIAN VI. TO THE COLLEGE OF CARDINALS.¹

1522, Juni 3, Saragossa.

Adrianus papa VI. Venerab. fratres nostri, salutem et apost. benedictionem.

Cum diu avide expectassemus responsa circumspect. vestrarum ad eas litteras nostras quas nuper mense martio per dil. fil. Ioannem Borrellum camerarium nostr. secretum cum diversis instructionibus atque mandatis illi commissis duplicatas misimus, tandem ultima maii voti compotes facti sumus binis circumspect. vestrarum litteris, quarum alterae octava, alterae XI maii datae fuerunt, simul acceptis, ex quibus et quam laetis animis instru-

¹ See *supra*, p. 54.

menta acceptationis nostrae exceperint et quo studio de profectionis nostrae adminiculis sategerint magna cum animi nostri exultatione percepimus, quam mox sequenti die, id est kal. iunii, maxime cumulavit iucundissimum novum, quo dil. filium nostrum Alexandrum card. de Caesarinis cum galeone nostro littoribus Catheloniae salvum applicuisse et insuper novem triremes ex Italia, duas nostras et ecclesiae et septem chariss. in Christo filii nostri Caroli in imperat. electi, nec non duas alias naves multo biscocto atque frumento vinoque oneratas propediem expectari cognovimus.

Glad that he is at last able to travel, and thanks the Cardinals. The Emperor and the King of Portugal have already sent their envoys.

Rex Portugalliae classem nobis suis sumptibus talem et taliter instructam mittit, ut ad securitatem navigationis nostrae non parum momenti afferre videatur. Alter vero id est rex Anglie totam classem quae traiectioni nostrae necessaria esset solus exhibere paratus erat et eam exhibuisset, nisi per memoratum electum imperatorem persuasus fuisset nobis hac in re ex Neapoli facilius atque commodius subveniri posse. Sed et char^{mus} in Christo filius noster Francorum rex christianissimus non quidem adhuc per oratorem sed per privatas personas amicum et benivolum erga nos animum ostendit idque ipsum et dil. filii Venetorum respublica litteris et amplis oblationibus (etiam triremium suarum) plane demonstrarunt.

For sake of peace, which is so necessary, has sent envoys to the Emperor, Henry VIII., and also to Francis I., in order that at least a truce may be arranged.

Omnino vero dabimus operam, ut, iam suppetentibus tam navigiis quam com meatibus, citra ullam dilationem nos hinc in portum et inde continuo in Italiam conferamus. . . .

Circa delationem vero armorum et alia gubernationem urbis et Italiae concernentia in vigilantia prudentiaque circumspect. vestrarum quibus eas res tantae curae esse videmus deinceps conquiescemus. Reliqua quae nunc scribenda erant, ne prolixiores simus, circumspect^{es} vestrae ex dil. filiis Wilhelmo de Enkevort notario et procurat. nostro et Melchiore de Bardasinis advocato consist. plenius intelligent. . . .

Dat. in palatio Aliaferiae prope et extra muros Caesaragustae

sub ann. piscat. die 3 iunii 1522 suscepti a nobis apostolatus officii a^o primo. T. Hezius.

[A tergo:] Address and Chancery endorsement of receipt, 18 July 1522.

[Orig. Sec. Arch. of the Vatican, Arch. s. Angeli A. V, c. 3, n. 29.]

6. GALEOTTO DE' MEDICI TO FLORENCE.¹

1522, August 27, Rom.

. . . Per via d' Incheftort² ritrago di commission del papa haver dicto al s. Don Giovanni³ che delle cose delli stati non vuole muover cosa alcuna senza di lui e che vuol che governi il tutto e lo vuole in palazzo apresso di se e haver ordine di consegniarli le stanze, il qual non l' ha volsute acceptar dicendo prima volersi abochar con S. B^{ne}. Dopo il S. Don Giovanni di grande auctorità sarà l' arcivescovo di Cosenza⁴ et Incheftort sarà datario. . . .

[Orig. State Arch. Florence, Lett. agli Otto, n. 25.]

7. GALEOTTO DE' MEDICI TO FLORENCE.⁵

1522, September 1, Rom.

Questa matina è stato consistoro, dove N. S^{te} ha parlato molto sanctemente con dir [che] dopo la fel. rec. di papa Leone ci s' era facto errori assai, il che importava che ogni homo era peccator, ma che le lor signorie rev^{me} erano a tempo ad emendarsi, e così pregava facessino perchè li haveano ad esser spechio a tutto il mondo, che pensassino al honor e salute della Chiesa, soprattutto si operassi che si administrassi ragione e iustitia, e molto li admonì e exhortò vivamente. . . .

[Orig. State Arch., Florence, *loc. cit.*]

8. GIOVANNI MARIA DELLA PORTA TO URBINO.⁶

1522, September 2, Rom.

. . . Ne le cose de beneficii ha me detto il Datario⁷ haver pur hoggi replicata commissione da S. S^{ta} di non dare a persona del

¹ See *supra*, p. 164.

² Enkevoirt.

³ Manuel.

⁴ Ruffo Teodoli.

⁵ See *supra*, p. 93.

⁶ See *supra*, pp. 95, 120.

⁷ Enkevoirt.

mondo solo che un beneficio con cura. Chiedendole con molta istanza il card. Trevultio M. Agostino un vescovato allegando la povertà sua, S. S^{ta} gli adimandò ch' intrata fosse la sua e dicendo di 4^m ducati, replicò con molta admiration ch' essa era vissuto¹ con 3^m et con avanzo de qualche denari che l' haveano aiutata nel venir suo in Italia. Questi termini non piacerono molto alli preti, ma se ha da seguitar Dio gli doni pur longa vita come credo che farà, che si governa ben ne vol magniare in brigata et fa grandissima guardia per il veleno. . . .

[Orig. State Arch., Florence, Urbino Cl. I, Div. G, filza 132.]

9. GIOVANNI MARIA DELLA PORTA TO URBINO.²

1522, September 6, Rom.

. . . Il Papa fù ieri a pigliare il possesso del Castello Santo Angelo, et non vi si fermò quasi niente, non trovandovi altro che gli cassoni vodi; pure non ha mutato ancora il castellano. Sua Santità ha, questa mane, havuta nova l' armata sua esser gionta a Porto Venere et subito ha commesso che non si lascia descendere un fante, et pare che non voglia più farla venire qua, ma dirizarla al soccorso di Rodi, al che mostra di attendere diligentissimamente; et vuole che questi padri reverendissimi concorrano alla spesa, dicendoli parole sopra il reformare de la Chiesa, tanto gagliarde, che restano tutti attoniti; ne l' ultimo concistoro, ragionando di questa materia, adduxe l' esempio de li Hebrei: che, non si volendo correggere, receveano ogni dì nove persecutioni da Dio, come a noi cristiani intervenea da tanto tempo in qua, et la causa di questo disse essere, come narrava S. Bernardo, che alli peccatori intervenea come alli molti pieni tutti di malo odore, che l' uno non sentea il puzzone di l' altro; et perciò bisognava che sue signorie reverendissime comenzassero a levare da sè questo malo odore del peccato, perchè gli dispiacesse il sentire quelle di l' altrui et così venessero a dare bono exemplo, con tanto biasimare il viver di questa corte, che non si può dir più. Così ragiona di remettere la giustitia et già pare che abia ordinato che li auditori di Rota non piglino più propina, come si usava al tempo di Sisto [IV]. Guarda la excellentia vostra quanto ello è rigoroso nella giustitia, che, ad istanza di tutto il collegio, non ha voluto, per

¹ In the original: visse.

² See *supra*, pp. 93, 98.

allegrezza di la sua venuta, liberare le pregioni, dicendo non volere che, per causa sua, si deroghi alla giustitia. . . .

Roma alli 6 settembre 1522.

[Orig. State Arch., Florence, *loc. cit.*]

10. GALEOTTO DE' MEDICI TO FLORENCE.¹

1522, September 8, Rom.

P. S. Intendo N. S^{re} haver facto metter bando che alcuno pelamantello o vero righattier non possa sotto gravissime pene comperare alcune supelectilie di chi morissi e che tutti li preti debbino star alle loro parrochie e visitar qualunque sentissino esser infermo confessandoli e facendo tutte l' altre cose che a loro s' aspectono far in tali lor parrochie, ne manchino di alcuno loro offitio divino sotto pena di privatione delli benefitii e altre pene come parà a S. S^{ia}, il che si pensa sia ordinato per haver facultà d' ingrassare questi Ultramontani venuti qua senza aviamiento.

[Orig. State Arch. Florence, Lett. agli Otto n. 27.]

11. GIOVANNI MARIA DELLA PORTA TO THE DUCHESS OF
URBINO.²

1522, September 23, Rom.

About Winkler, see *supra*, p. 81.

N. S^{re} sta meglio ogni dì ne vogliono gli medici che S. S^{ia} dica messa insin ch' ella non sia ben confermata. L' altro giorno essendo affannata di haver data audienza quasi sforzamente a non so chi voltasi al suo secretario dicono che disse: O Theodorice, quanto esset melius quod nos essemus in nostro archydiaconato Luanie pacifice.

Opinion about Heeze, see *supra*, p. 81.

[Orig. State Arch. Florence, Urbino, filza 265.]

12. L. CATI TO THE DUKE ALFONSO OF FERRARA.³

1522, December 26, Rom.

. . . Heri in la solenitate del Natale in lo intrar de la corte et del papa in capella cadete uno architravo marmoreo giù del uscio de la capella et occise un Suizero de la guardia cum periculo de

¹ See *supra*, pp. 99, 101. ² See *supra*, pp. 101, 125. ³ See *supra*, p. 168.

ucciderne molti più homini da bene et forse il papa se il caso non occorea si presto ; fù reputato per male augurio.

[Orig. State Archives, Modena.]

13. ANGELO GERMANELLO TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS
OF MANTUA.¹

1522, December 29, Rom.

. . . El dì de natale essendo ia preparato de dire la messa papale in capella et ia el papa mosso per andarli, essendo la frequentia de le brigate, che li intravano secundo se sole, cascò lo architrave de marmore che stava sopra la porta de la capella et decte in terra et poi che fo in terra in lo balso che fece colse subito uno scvizaro et subito lu amazò et un altro scvizaro stroppiò, et se stava un pocu più ad cascare seria stato pericolo non havesse colto el papa o cardinali o qualche prelato, fo mancho male succedesse como accascò, et veramente fo gran cosa. . . .

Rome XXIX decemb^{ra} 1522.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

* "Se fosse cascato uno miserere più inanti haveria facto qualche grande scandalo," reports V. Albergati on 25th December 1522. [State Archives, Bologna.]

14. JACOPO CORTESE TO THE MARCHIONESS ISABELLA OF
MANTUA.²

1523, Januar. 12, Rom.

. . . È vi anchora rumore et dicesi non sencia fundamento de non scio che tractato contra et nela persona de N. S. et ragionassi di veneno, per il che sono incarcerati certi speciali quali havevano le botege nel borgo di S. Petro et certi altri, non però persone di conto, è pur giudice il p^{io} s^r capit^o. È anchor incarcerato uno episcopo calavrese creatura dil r^{mo} car. Armelino nomato messer Sixto persona molto nota al r. mes^r Berardo. Potrà esser ma non credo sia notato di questo : e perchè questa è materia tanto ardua, che è magior virtu a non ne parlare, non mi pare poterne scriver sobrio, sol dico che non cade ne la mente mia, che si possi trovar homo tanto profano che habi a imazinar o³ pensare simil cose in

¹ See *supra*, p. 168.

² See *supra*, pp. 98, 121.

Ms. : ho.

uno principe de la qualità che è Sua S^{ta} di sanctimonia, rectitudine, vita exemplare, affabilità, et humanità, et secondo me è impossibile che sotto a tal pastor e governo questa sede apostolica patisca. . . .

In Roma XII jenaro 1523.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

15. ANGELO GERMANELLO TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS
OF MANTUA.¹

1523, Februar. 9, Rom.

. . . Laltro dì andorono dal papa tredici cardinali uniti et con gran reverentia se dolsero con la Sua S^{ta}, che era fama in Roma et in le terre de la chiesa e tra li principi christiani, che la Sua S^{ta} non faceva più casu de card^{li} et che questo epsi lo vedevano cum effectu, perchè la Sua S^{ta} tucte le sue deliberationi le faceva con consulto de lo archiepis^o de Cosensa lo auditor de la camera et el datario, non de fratrum consilio secundo dicono li sacri canoni et li ordini de li altri pontifici, supplicandoli non volesse far tal scisma. Da poi se dolsero che la Sua S^{ta} li derogasse ad loro indulti et che per le regule de cancelleria li havesse molto restrecti. Tertio se dolsero che facesse levar case et robbe ad cortisciani che morivano et che de questo Roma ne pateria assai perchè niscuno vorria edificar più. La Sua S^{ta} li auscultò voluntieri et se excusò che la peste era stata causa del tucto, et che per lo advenir se seria portata talmente che serriano ben satisfacti de la S. S^{ta}, et così li expedecte. Veramente li card^{li} restano molto mal contenti per esser pocu existimati et anchora tucte le altre brigate, perchè non se po cavar dal papa alcuna resolutione et è grand^{ma} fatigha negociar ad questi tempi, non se ha respecto ad alcuno, le facende vanno longissime senza alcuna resolutione como ne intervene del breve de le taxe, el quale el papa più volte ad mia presentia la ha commesso ad lo auditor de la camera et anchora non se è possuto havere, ma spero tra quatro dì haverlo expedito, ne mando una copia ad la V. Ex^{ia} come haverà da stare, se dicto auditor nol guastarà, et per le primi spero mandarlo. . . .

Rome die IX februarii 1523.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

¹ See *supra*, p. 114.

16. CONSISTORY OF THE 11TH OF FEBRUARY, 1523.¹

Romae die merc. 11 februarii 1523. S. N. D. proposuit duo: primum vid. quod infecti peste mitterentur in aliquo loco extra urbem et quod provideretur eis de necessariis ministris et aliis rebus pro curatione et sustentatione eorum. . . . Secondly about Rhodes, which may be given up as lost. Et propterea S. S. cogitaverat de novo scribere brevia ad istos reges super concordia, addendo in illis, quod indicebat treguas triennes seu quadriennes et quod volebat imponere decimam, et commiserat card. Anconitano² ut ordinaret minutam quae postea legi deberet in consistorio et etiam creari deberent legati tam pro regno Ungariae quam pro regibus, et ne fieret difficultas in eorum receptione significare regibus intendebat quomodo S. S.^{tas} eos ad illos destinaret, et fere omnes laudarunt propositum S. B.^{nis}. Three Cardinals (Soderini, Colonna, and Cornaro) deputed for this business.

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

17. GIROLAMO BALBI TO SALAMANCA.³

1523, Februar. 23, Rom.

. . . Quicquid denique D. V. mihi demandaverat vel praesens vel scriptis, id totum a summo pontifice est obtentum, sed nullas litteras vel brevia adhuc exigere potui. Causa est defectus officialium, nam qui sub pontificatu Leonis erant in hoc genere peritiores alii abierunt, alii obierunt, hii vero qui nunc successerunt sunt paucissimi et imperitissimi adeo, ut hic nihil expediatur et vix uno mense absolvi possit et ego cogar per me et meos quae sunt scribenda perficere, habebitque M. V. intra paucissimos dies ea confessionalia, interim libere et intrepide utatur esu carnum utque ita faciat pontifex, cum de tarditate expeditionis conquereretur, annuit et assensit. . . .

[Orig. Court and State Archives, Vienna.]

18. CONSISTORY OF THE 23RD OF FEBRUARY, 1523.⁴

Romae die lune 23 februarii 1523. S. D. N. proposuit quod desiderabat componere pacem inter istos reges et si non posset

¹ See *supra*, pp. 123, 172.

³ See *supra*, p. 114.

² Pietro Accolti.

⁴ See *supra*, p. 172.

concludi pax saltem concluderentur indutiae quinquennales ut interim possit tractari pax et quod scripserat ad istos reges et habuerat responsum a rege christ^{mo}, qui erat paratus inire pacem prout placeret Suae S^{ti}, et quia non habuerat responsum ab imperatore et rege Angliae, cogitaverat pro maiori auctoritate et efficacia, quod collegium scriberet litteras ad ipsos reges hortando eos ad pacem quam Sua S^{tas} eis proposuerat vel saltem ad dictas indutias, ut interim pax ipsa tractari et concludi ac imminenti Turcarum periculo provideri possit.

Item quod cogitaverat deputare legatos primo ad regem Ungariae cum rex ipse Ungariae legatum a S^{te} Sua et hac S. Sede mitti peteret pro consternatione illius regni et ad alios reges non ut de presenti irent, sed habita voluntate regum, si illos recipere vellent, essent parati et irent et omnia que in regnis ipsis pro provisione possent tractare, concludere et expedire. R^{mi} dom. cardinales fere omnes approbarunt et laudarunt sanctas cogitationes Suae S^{tis} et quod videbantur exequendae et executioni demandandae et quod ad S^{tem} Suam spectabat nominare legatos et cum essent nominati tunc vota rev. dom. super eorum nominatione danda erant, illis nominatis exclusis, erit igitur Suae S^{tis} cum sibi placuerit procedere ad ulteriora. . . .

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

19. L. CATI TO ALFONSO, DUKE OF FERRARA.¹

1523, Mart. 21, Rom.

Report in cipher about the Pope's : *Extrema et rapace avaritia, de la qual crida tutta Roma et già se fa iudicio, che habbia imborsato a quest' hora de li ducati più di settanta milia et non ne spende se non pochissimi, anzi esso ha havuto a dir che spendea dieci ducati il giorno per suo uso in casa et che erano troppo, che li volea limitar in meno et benchè Leone fusse una sanguisuga di denari pur li spendeva, ma costui suga et non spende, adeo che tutta Roma sta di malissima voglia ne mai se li ricorda tanta mestitia et judicasi che questo suo habbia ad esser un pessimo pontificato . . . et quel che scrissi a questi dì de pasquillo disceva che accumulava denari per fugirse sel Turco*

¹ See *supra*, pp. 71, 108.

cazasse le cose in quà, sappia V. E. che questa cosa è uscita di pasquillo et andata alle orecchie di S. S^{ta} di modo che pubblicamente si è lamentato in consistorio et ha detto, che non ha sì poco animo como pensano costoro.

[Orig. State Archives, Modena.]

20. CONSISTORY OF THE 23RD OF MARCH, 1523.¹

Romae die lunae 23 martii 1523. S. D. N. proposuit tria circa legatum destinatum ad regem Ungariae: Primum de qualitate subsidii pro defensione contra Turchas danda legato destinato ad illas partes; secundum si erat danda facultas eidem legato alienandi mobilia et vasa pretiosa ecclesiarum, ac quarta[m] parte[m] mobilium urgente necessitate; tertium de deputatione capitanei. Vota super his fuerunt diversa; tandem Sanctitas Sua, quae collegit vota, dixit, quod videbatur sibi, quod plura vota dominorum essent, quod Sanctitas Sua sola non posset ferre onus huiusmodi defensionis contra Turchas et quod deberet examinare, quot pecuniae possent haberi tam ex decimis impositis, quam ex medio ducato imposito super focalibus civitatum et terrarum Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae et ex aliis gemmis et jocalibus et vasis argenteis, et ex officiis vendendis, de quibus poterat disponere, et pecuniarum summam maiorem, quam habere posset, legato destinato consignare. Quoad secundum dare facultates amplas, quae aliis legatis dari consueverunt. Quo vero ad facultatem alienandi mobilia, etiam quartam partem bonorum immobilium ecclesiarum illarum partium ad requisitionem maioris partis capitulorum et personarum ecclesiasticarum aliarum partium posset imminente necessitate illa alienare, prout videretur discretioni et prudentiae ipsius legati expedire, et haec bulla facultatis esset secreta, et illa non uteretur nisi requisitus, et ipse viderit expedire. Quoad tertium de defensione nunc agitur; et non de generali expeditione; et si reducerentur isti reges ad pacem vel concordiam vel treguam, esset discutiendum inter Imperatorem, regem Christianissimum, regem Angliae et regem Poloniae, quis eorum debet esse imperator; pro presenti defensione videretur remittendum Germanis, Ungaris et aliis, qui pronunc debent concurrere ad provisionem huius exercitus, quem ipsi inter se vellent

¹ See *supra*, p. 179.

eligere pro capitaneo et duce, et si non concordarent, dare facultatem legato, ut ipse auctoritate apostolica posset eos reducere ad concordiam vel si sibi videretur unum ex nominatis eligere auctoritate apostolica. Sanctissimus Dominus Noster fecit verbum, quod alias in promotione facta de persona Hieronymi electi Gurcen. quod daretur sibi dilatio ad solvendum jura papae et collegii usque ad festum S. Michaelis de mense septembris, quod ipse libenter nunc solveret medietatem, si sibi fieret gratia de reliqua parte. Aliqui erant contenti, alii vero titubabant. Papa respondit, quod daret refutatorios. . . .

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

21. GIROLAMO BALBI TO SALAMANCA.¹

1523, April. 12, Rom.

. . . Unum me recreat quod iam pontifex fraudes et dolos Gallorum incipit clarius intueri et perinde iam a sua neutralitate deflectere. Sunt eciam interceptae litterae, quas card^{is} Volterrano scripserat regi Galliae, in quibus feda et periculosa coniuratio est patefacta. Vocabatur enim Gallus ad occupandam Siciliam et ducatum Mediolanen. et utroque in loco erant insidiae collocatae, quibus apertis nullus iam locus est relictus apud Pontificem Gallos tuendi. Hanc tamen rem clarius d. Petrus ut puto explicabit, nam industria dom. ducis Suesse eius fratris haec coniuratio in lucem prodiiit. . . .

[Orig. Court and State Archives, Vienna.]

22. ANGELO GERMANELLO TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.²

1523, April. 27, Rom.

. . . Hozì essendo andati ad palazzo el r^{mo} cardinale di Volterra et el r^{mo} cardinale di Medici at el duca di Sessa dapoi l' hora del vespro et stando con el Papa tutti insieme, prima fù pigliato uno messer Heliseo secretario del ditto rev^{mo} di Volterra in la camera del paramento, dove stava ad expettar il patrone, dapoi in banchi fù preso uno mes^r Bernardo da Varazano Florentino et banchieri et molto intimo del ditto r^{mo} di Volterra, et più volte essendo la

¹ See *supra*, p. 186.

² See *supra*, p. 188.

R^{ma} S. V. in Roma la vene ad visitare da parte del ditto r^{mo} di Volterra. Ultimo el Papa ha destenuto el card^{le} di Volterra, et mandatolo in pregione et el conduceva el capitaneo de la guardia con alcuni Spagnoli, et el sottocapitano Svizaro et el cancellero de ditta guardia per ditte camere e fora ad la porta de la sala di pontifici de sotto era tutta la guardia ad expectarlo et così el conduxero per il giardino et dapoi per el corridore in castello, dove subito andò lo auditore de la camera ad esaminarlo. Prima li fossero poste le mano adosso forono el duca di Sessa et el r^{mo} di Medici ed Volterra ad molte discussioni avanti il Papa, et havendole incomplete, el Papa con lo r^{mo} di Medici et duca de Sessa andarono in le stantie de sopra et lassorono Volterra in mano de ditti subcapitano et altri prenominati et el menarono via et passando per l' anticamera alcuni sui prelati li volevano andar dreto, forono tutti expulsi et el ditto card^{le} andava mezo morto senza far alcuna parola. La causa de la captura se existima sia stata per le cose ha confessate quel Siciliano, che fo preso, del quale alli di passati io scrissi et al sig^r marchese et ad V. S. R^{ma}. Dapoi retornando io ad casa ho veduto el barisello che ha preso il palazo del ditto card^{le} di Volterra e pigliano tutte le robbe per il Papa. Fatta ditta captura son partuti de palazo de compagnia el r^{mo} card^{le} di Medici et el duca di Sessa et retornati alle loro habitationi. Questo è quanto fin ad hora è successo, et è stato la sera poco avanti le XXIII hore; secundo succederanno le cose avisarò la R^{ma} S. V. . . .

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

23. CONSISTORY OF THE 28TH OF APRIL, 1523.¹

Romae die martis 28 aprilis 1523. S. D. N. declaravit causam detentionis rev. d. card. Vult. in arce s. Angeli et deputavit r. d. card. S. Crucis, Anconit. et de Cesis commissarios in huiusmodi causa et ordinavit ut d. Vult. detentus haberet commoditatem omnium que sibi usui essent donec et quousque dilueret crimina obiecta.

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

¹ See *supra*, p. 188.

24. CONSISTORY OF THE 27TH OF MAY, 1523.¹

Romae die merc. 27 maii 1523. S. D. N. proposuit necessitatem pecuniarum quam Sua S^{tas} habebat in mittendo legato ad Ungariam et quod videbatur sibi expediens, quod distributio annatarum s. collegii, quae debebat fieri in festo s. Iohannis, retardaretur ad festum omnium sanctorum et quod rev. dom. de Flisco tunc faceret eas restituere collegio, et omnes rev^{mi} fuerunt contenti. . . .

[Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

25. ANGELO GERMANELLO TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.²

1523, Juli. 12, Rom.

Questa nocte passata è abbrusciata tucta quella cuppola de piombo che era in la torre Borgia³ del palazzo del papa, la quale de sobto era foderata de tavole et par che alcuni de quelli Tedeschi li andassero per pigliar li columbi et attaccarono la candela in quelle tavole dentro de la cuppola, donde è causato uno grandiss^o incendio et tucto el piombo se è descolato et liquefacto et la torre è tucta conquassata, et tucta questa nocte se atteso ad extinguere el focu, ma non ce stato ordine finchè tucta la cuppola non se consumata; alcuni han suspecto non sia facto ad posta dicto incendio; el papa questa nocte è stato levato per dubio del focu, perchè era sopra ad le camere dove dorme. . . .

Rome XII Julii 1523.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

26. POPE ADRIAN VI. TO C. DE LANNOY, VICEROY OF NAPLES.⁴

1523, Juli. 18, Rom.

Adrianus papa VI. Dilecte etc. Cum ob certa quaedam ardua negocia in presentiarum occurrentia honori et utilitati

¹ See *supra*, p. 190.

² See *supra*, p. 205.

³ For the cupola of the Torre Borgia see FABRICZY, *Die Handzeichnungen des Giuliano da Sangallo*, Stuttgart, 1902, pp. 96-97.

⁴ See *supra*, p. 203.

char^{mi} in Christo filii nostri electi imperatoris magnopere expediat nos tecum coram ac presentialiter loqui atque conferre, hortamur in dom. nob. tuam teque paterne et enixe requirimus, ut statim acceptis presentibus te per dispositos equos seu postas cum paucissimis comitibus et quam secretissime ad hanc almam urbem nostram conferre festines, in aedibus dil. filii nob. viri ducis Suessani dicti electi imperatoris hic oratoris si tibi videbitur descensurus ac requieturus, donec nos de tuo adventu certiores facti opportunitatem tecum communicandi tibi significari fecerimus, in quo rem facies Ces. M^u plurimum expedientem et nobis quam gratissimam. Dat. Romae apud s. Petrum sub annulo piscat, die 18. julii 1523, p. n. a. 1^o.

[Autograph postscript:] Non procrastines oro venire ad nos. Res enim¹ arduae sunt et quae commodum Imperatoris concernunt et eius honorem ac rei publicae christianae salutem. Adrianus papa VI.

[Orig. Court and State Archives, Vienna.]

27. ALESSANDRO GABBIONETA TO THE MARCHIONESS
ISABELLA OF MANTUA.²

1523, Juli. 28, Rom.

. . . Madama mia, Roma non è più quella che la lassò, tanto è mutata la dignità et splendor di quella; in palazzo, dove solea esser il concorso del mondo, non si vede quasi persona, alle camere del Papa non è più la solita frequentia; l'è vero che la S^{ta} Sua sta più pomposa in le camere cha Pontifice io vidi mai, e forse lo fa per quello ditto de David: Astitit regina a dextris tuis in vestitu deaurato circumdata varietate.³ La effigie sua è mitissima e clemente et più assimigliasi ad una fratescha de quelle delli frati de San Vito cha pontificale; le parole sue son buone, ama la M^{ta} Cesarea tanto quanto l'anima propria, e voria chel fusse victore non solum del re de Franza ma de tutto il mondo; ma per questo se possibile fusse non voria spendere un carlino. . . . Romae 28 julii 1523.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

¹ Orig.: ,n^e. Baumgarten (II., 280) makes this clear by reading ,nam^e.

² See *supra*, p. 120.

³ Psalm 44. 10.

28. CONSISTORY OF THE 29TH OF JULY, 1523.¹

Romae die merc. 29 mensis julii 1523. S. D. N. fecit verbum de federe ineundo inter reges et principes christianos, ostendens, quanto cum periculo versetur universa respublica christiana ob continuas victorias, quas ob negligentiam principum tyrannus Turcharum assecutus est. Rogavitque enixe rev. dominos, ut Suae S^{ti} assistere vellent eumque adjuvare consilio et ope, ut pax inter ipsos reges et principes componi possit, qua confecta expeditionem generalem contra Turchas deliberare et executioni demandare unanimi consensu possit, ut a S^{te} Sua summo opere desiderabatur.²

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

29. POPE ADRIAN VI. TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA AND CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE CHURCH.³

1523, August. 26, Rom.

Adrianus Papa VI. Dilecte etc. Qui aper litteras et nuncios fide dignorum admoniti sumus exercitum Gallorum in Italiam ad ducatum Mediolani occupandum infestis signis ac animis adventare, nos considerantes inde non solum dicto ducatu, sed etiam toti Italiae, immo quod gravius est universae christianitati, nisi opportune provideatur, maximae perturbationis et plurimorum malorum discrimen imminere, ac volentes iuxta federis ac ligae quam nuper una cum certis regibus ac principibus tibi notis pro defensione praefatorum Italiae et christianitatis conclusimus formam atque tenorem ad opus eiusdem defensionis quas possumus et prout ex dicti federis capitulis nobis incumbit ferre suppetias, nobilitatem tuam tenore praesentium in Domino hortamur et expresse serioque requirimus, ut statim acceptis praesentibus omnibus et singulis equitibus tam gravis quam levis armaturae, quos ad stipendia nostra ratione contractus novissime inter nos et te initi tenes ac tenere debes, districte praecipias ac mandes, ut una cum locum-

¹ See *supra*, p. 206.

² DE LEVA (II., 173) gives a different version of Adrian's speech, but without quoting authorities.

³ See *supra*, p. 211.

tenente tuo per te constituendo se ad castra Caesarae Maiestatis in dicto ducatu existentia et ad dilectum filium nobilem virum Prosperum Columnam illis praesidentem illico conferre debeant, facturi ea quae illis ab ipso Prospero iniungentur, donec certius cognoverimus, utrum praefatus Gallorum exercitus iter suum adversus dictum ducatum omnino prosequatur. Quo casu, quem tamen Deus evenire prohibeat, intendimus nobilitatem tuam requirere, ut ipsa personaliter ad dicta castra post dictos equites suos proficiscatur, quo auctoritate consilioque suis ipsorum Gallorum impetus facilius retundi valeat. Interea vero eandem hortamur in Domino et paterne requirimus, quatenus statim his visis providere et ordinare velit, ut commeatus et victualia iusto interveniente precio et solutis solvendis ex marchionatu et ceteris suis dominiis libere extrahi et ad memorata castra ferri et exportari possint, in quo nobilitas tua rem humanitate sua dignam et nobis ac huic sanctae sedi inprimis acceptam faciet.

Datum Romae apud sanctum Petrum sub annulo piscatoris die XXVI augusti MDXXIII^o, pontificatus nostri anno primo.

T. Hezius.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

30. POPE ADRIAN VI. TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS
OF MANTUA, ETC.¹

1523, September 1, Rom.

Adrianus Papa VI. Dilecte etc. . . . Cum itaque quotidie certius intelligamus hostilem exercitum Italiae continue magis ac magis appropinquare regemque chr^{mum} in persona ad partes Italiae contendere ac properare, ut nostra ex parte omnibus remediis adversus pericula ipsi Italiae et ex consequenti toti christianitati imminencia non iam dubia neque exigua, sed certa et magna uti debeamus nec ulla in re quae per nos et confederatorum quemque praestari possit amplius cunctandum videatur, nobilitatem tuam expresse et attente in Domino requirimus, ut ipsa una cum omni equitatu quem sub se habet, videlicet tam nostro et ecclesiastico quam Mediolanensi ac Florentino, absque ullius morae interpositione Padum flumen traicere ac versus civitatem nostram Placentiam proficisci festinet, inde cum praefato Prospero Columna

¹ See *supra*, p. 211.

per litteras ac nuncios consultatura, utrum ne conveniret eam ad tutelam et custodiam civitatis Alexandriae accedere. Cum enim civitas illa (sicut nobilitas tua novit) venientibus Gallis primum obvia futura sit putentque prudentes, vel solam, ubi bene defensa sit, hostiles vires ac impetum citra Padum sustinere posse, maxime elaborandum est, ut aliquis magnae auctoritatis ac nominis vir, cuiusmodi nobilitas tua est, illius custodiae ac defensionis praeficiatur. Et si quidem dicto Prospero omnino videbitur, ut nobilitas tua onus hoc suscipiat, cupimus eam ocysime ad civitatem ipsam accedere una cum toto equitatu praedicto et cum mille peditibus (si videbitur) sclopetariis, quos statim acceptis praesentibus ab ea conduci [sic] ad nostra et praefatorum Florentinorum stipendia, pro quibus solvendis absque mora pecuniae per nos et illos transmittentur, nec non cum duobus vel tribus millibus peditum Hispanorum vel Germanorum prout nobilitas tua elegerit. Hortari autem nobil^{tem} tuam ad fortiter strenueque se hac in re gerendum, superfluum merito videatur, cum et animi eius generositas ac fides multis magnisque in rebus probatissima et rei de qua agitur importantia et periculorum imminantium propinquitas ac magnitudo et denique ingens suus erga communem salutem Italiae zelus eidem ad praemissa satis incitamenti additura sint. Hoc unum dumtaxat in fine dicimus, nobilⁱ tuae tota vita sua non esse expectandam occasionem, qua nos et dictam sedem ac praefatam Caesaream Maiestatem nec non Italiam ac universam christianitatem sibi magis promereri veriolemque laudem sibi apud omnes recte sentientes comparare possit, quam si omnibus ingenii industriaeque suae viribus una cum praefato Prospero ac aliis partium nostrarum concorditer et absque emulatione, quae saepe maximas res et alioqui tutissimas perdere ac deservire solet, Italiae defensionis contra eos qui illam et dictam christianitatem perturbatum veniunt incubuerit.

Datum Romae apud sanctum Petrum sub annulo piscatoris die prima septembris MDXXIII^o pontif. nostri anno secundo.

T. Hezius.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

31. POPE ADRIAN VI. TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS
OF MANTUA, ETC.¹

1523, September 8, Rom.

Dilecte etc. . . . Cum autem tua istinc profectio ob rerum exigentiam ulteriorem moram, prout nobil^{tem} tuam non praeterit, minime patiat,ur, denuo illam enixe in Domino hortandam et quanto possumus studio requirendam duximus, ei nihilominus in virtute sanctae obedientiae iniungentes, ut omni exceptione et excusatione postposita personaliter cum dictorum equitum et peditum manu iuxta dictarum litterarum tenorem quam celerrime vadat. Quod licet rei importantia et perbreve temporis intervallum exigant, erit nobis quam maxime gratum et acceptum.

Datum Romae apud s^{um} Petrum sub annulo piscatoris die VIII^a septembris MDXXIII^o, pontif. nostri anno secundo.

T. Hezius.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

32. POPE CLEMENT VII. DISTRIBUTES HIS BENEFICES.²

1523, December 23, Rom.

Ad fut. rei mem. In qualibet monarchia. . . .

Distribution of the Papal benefices among the 37 Cardinals of the Conclave in accordance with the resolutions passed at the election. These benefices were: Florence; Narbonne; Chiaravalle; St. Victor at Marseilles; St. Joannes de Angeva, dioc. Genoa; Trium fontium Urbis, Monastery and Commendam; office of Vice-Chancellor and the Legation of Bologna.

All of these benefices in respect of their incomes were to be divided into 37 equal portions, each amounting to 1000 ducats, as determined by the Sacred College itself:—Florence 2 portions; Narbonne 8; Chiaravalle 8; Tre Fontane 2; St. Victor and St. John together 2; 1 for the title of Narbonne, Chiaravalle, and Tre Fontane (350 ducats for each of the two first and 300 for Tre Fontane); the Cancellaria 9, and the Legation of Bologna 5 portions.

The titles of Florence, the Cancellaria, and the Legation of Bologna were reserved for the Pope's free disposal.

¹ See *supra*, p. 211.

² See *supra*, p. 245.

The Cardinals cast lots for the portions, which were distributed in accordance with the foregoing apportionment to each individual; besides they had the right to make exchanges with each other or to commute their portion for a pension.

Dat. Romae 1523 X. cal. jan. a^o 1^o.

[Secret Arch. of the Vatican, Regest. Vat. 1440, f. 44^b-46^a.]

33. CONSISTORY OF THE 11TH OF JANUARY, 1524.¹

Romae die lune 11 jan. 1524. . . . S. D. N. fecit verbum de divisione fienda de beneficiis et officiis, quae in persona Suae S^{tis} fuerant ante assumptionem ad pontificatum, et primo petiit a dom. rev^{mis}, quibus in sortem obvenerant portiones super ecclesia Narbonen. an essent concordēs, qui omnes dixerunt se esse concordēs; idem affirmarunt ii quibus super monasterio Trium fontium portiones sorte obvenerant. Idem ii quibus in monasterio Clavallē., idem ii quibus in cancellaria. Idem ii quibus in legatione Bononiensi.

Deinde per S. D. N. deventum est ad expeditionem ecclesiarum, monasteriorum et officiorum.

Ad relationem papae :

Fuit deputatus perpetuus administrator ecclesiae Narbonen. rev. dom. card. de Lotaringia cum retentione beneficiorum suorum. . . .

Deinde provisum est ecclesiae Florentinae de persona rev. de Rodulphis. . . . Deinde monast. Clavallēns: ord. Cisterc. Mediolan. dioc. commendatum est rev. de Cesis. . . . Deinde monast. s. Victoris ord. s. Benedicti Massilien. dioc. commendatum est rev. de Trivultii. . . . Deinde provisum est de prioratu s. Joannis de Angeva dom. rev. Comensi. . . . Deinde monasterium Trium fontium commendatum est rev. de Flisco. . . . Creatus est vice-cancellarius rev. de Columna. . . . Creatus est legatus Bononiae rev. de Cibo. . . . Provisum est ecclesiae Vaurien. de persona rev. Trivultii. . . .

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

¹ See *supra*, p. 245.

34. A. PIPERARIO TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.¹

1524, November 28, Rom.

A questi di intesi che'l *re christianissimo proponeva Ferrara al papa vincta a sue spese se l' voleva farsi Francese*, e questo lo diceva Alberto.² *Questi Imperiali sono mal satisfatti del papa quanto dir se possa.*

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

35. CONSISTORY OF THE 19TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1526.³

Romae die mercurii 19 sept. 1526. Rev. dom. card. de Cesis diaconus legit litteras ill. ducis Venetiarum ad mag^{cum} Dominicum Venereum oratorem suum apud S. D. N. scriptas, quibus significabat se ex multorum litteris percepisse die 29 mensis augusti 1526 magnum conflictum fuisse factum inter Turcarum tyrannum et Ungaros, adeo magnum quod Ungari cum suo rege debellati fuerant in damnum maximum christiane fidei et periculum, quod dii avertant pro eorum misericordia, et dubitabatur de amissione totius regni Ungarie, quod temporibus retroactis fuerat propugnaculum firmissimum pro fide christiana contra hanc immanem gentem, et de morte prefati regis Ungarie dubitabatur. Tum S^{mus} D. N. lectis litteris cepit deplorare conditionem nostrorum temporum dixitque nullum presentaneum remedium his tantis malis fore, quam si fieret pax et concordia inter principes christianos, et propterea Sua S^{tas} decreverat personam suam exponere ut decet optimum pastorem pro grege suo et ire cum nonnullis triremibus Barchinonam versus Ces. M^{tem} non dubitabatque illam M^{tem} omnia facturam esse, que ad honorem dei optimi maximi et totius Christianitatis essent profutura, quum semper cognoverat ipsam M^{tem} summa religione et prudentia predictam esse, et ita de consilio fratrum huiusmodi profectionem decrevit, quam certis de causis impresentiarum publicari prohibuit.

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

¹ See *supra*, p. 269; the passage in italics is in cipher.

² Carpi.

³ See *supra*, p. 328.

36. FRANCESCO GONZAGA TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.¹

1526, September 21, Rom.

Ho significato a V. Ex^{ia} per le mie due de heri quanto era occorso fino alle xxiii hore per la venuta qui in Roma del s^r don Ugo et de s^{ri} Collonesi, ma vi havea da giongere, che a quella medesima hora misero il pallazo a sacho quasi tutto e in spetie le robbe di N. S. che anchor che fusse stato levato lo oro, le gioglie et li argenti insieme cum qualche altra cosa di pretio, pur vi restorono de molte altre robbe, le quale tutte sono andate in mano de queste genti et fra loro fatone divisione; erano alla guardia de ditto pallazo alcuni Svizari, li quali fecero qualche difesa, ma non tale come havevano dovuto et potuto, di modo che intrati una brigata de fanti fecero la preda che volsero si de beni mobili come de cavalli, per forma che ogniuno de li pallatini ne hanno sentito o pocho o assai, ma la maggiore parte sono restati netti dil tutto; misero anche a sacho la casa de mons^r Camerlengo benchè intendo che sono state salvate molte robbe de le sue che prima furno levate; et insieme sachegiorno alcuna altre case li in borgo, ma non tutte però. Fatto questo li soldati si da cavallo come da piedi si retirorno et ritornorono a s^{to} Apostolo, dove sono stati questa notte, et questa mattina per tempo si sono ridutti alle Terme ad fare la ressigna et dare denari, per quanto è stato dicto cum il s^r Vespasiano et s^r Ascanio in compagnia loro. El card^{le} Colona e don Ugo restorno allo alloggiamento. Io mi son apresetato questa mattina a bon hora a castello et intrato ritrovai N. S^{re} in congregatione cum tutti li card^{li}, dove dopuoi longo spacio fù risoluto di mandare per il s^r don Ugo et vedere di pigliare qualche forma de accordo, se possibile era, e accioche havesse ad venire sicuramente, si mandò li dui card Cibo et Rodolphi al r^{mo} Collona per obstagi; se come si fece anche heri sera chel p^{to} don Ugo intrò in castello ad parlare cum S. S^{ta} et exequito questo dopuoi che il papa et li card^{li} hebbero fatto collatione, venuto don Ugo, S. B^{ne} si è ritirata seco in una camera, lassando li card^{li} in un altra, et solo vi è stato lo arcives.^o di Capua² et dopuoi longhi ragionamenti al fine si è venuto a conventioni de accordo in questo modo. . . . Stabiliti li capituli del accordo il papa è uscito de la camera et è venuto ne

¹ See *supra*, pp. 329, 334.² Schönberg.

luoco dove erano li card^{li}, et publicati essi capituli, confirmati et sottoscritti da ciascuna de le parti don Ugo è partito cum promissione de fare partire questa notte tutte le genti. . . .

Da Roma alli XXI di settembre 1526.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

37. FRANCESCO GONZAGA TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.¹

1526, September 23, Rom.

. . . Dico adonqua che non potrei esprimere il dispiacere che sente il Papa, per quel che mi è parso di comprendere per le parole de S. S^{ta}, di questo insolentissimo termino che gliè stato usato da questi Collonesi et in specie dal s^r Vespasiano, il quale oltra chel fusse stato instrumento et data la fede a S. S^{ta} nello accordo fatto li di passati, io so che particolarmente era amato da quella non meno che se gli fusse stato figliolo et ne la pratica di questa parentela della moglie p^{ta} S^{ta} si è afaticata tanto amorevolm^{te} et con tanto studio acciochè succedesse lo effetto, che per me haverei creduto et aspettato una demonstratione tale dogni altro che da lui. Et il Papa non voleva et poteva credere chel fusse in questa compagnia finchè non fù visto con gli occhi, che doppoi S. S^{ta} è stata con altrotanta maraviglia como con displicentia et ella me ha usato tal parole de lui, che, anchor che in questo appuntamento gli habbia perdonato come a li altri, pur non so si mi creda che S. S^{ta} si debba scordar mai questa iniuria, la qual li penetra troppo nel cuore et nel anima. Del card^{le} Collona poi S. S^{ta} me ha ditto in questa sua venuta a Roma ha parlato tanto obrobriosamente di essa quanto dire se possa usando tra l' altre parole queste, che era venuto qui per liberare la sua patria da mani del tiranno, et che non se dovesse dubitare, che, si come lui lo havea fatto Papa, così lo diffaria, et con parole simili ha cercato di fare conoscere con li effetti appresso, quanta poca stima faccia di S. S^{ta}, dove che essendo seguito questo accidente tanto scandaloso et di tanta importantia, poteti pensare se mai più vi sarà ordine di reconciliatione. Ma un altra cosa haveti da sapere, che tutti questi card^{li} sono in la medesima mala satisfactione et io hoggi ne ho parlato con molti, li quali non possono tollerare

¹ See *supra*, pp. 329, 335.

questo atto così deshonesto, di modo che io credo che questa casa Collona non sia per haver credito più mai con la sede apostolica, essendo parso troppo strano, appresso il resto, chel primo salto che habino fatto; come sono stati in Roma, di andarsene al palazzo et metterlo a sacco, non perdonando a cosa che sia, dove hanno potuto mettere le mani sopra, havendo non solamente robato la salvarobba del papa, che non li hanno lassato pur una stringa, che fino alle mitre sono state tolte, ma si è anche tolto le cose de la sacrestia, manti, croci di argento, pastorali, calici et simili cose, di modo che non si sa pensare che di più potessero fare li Turchi. Hor pensati che stomacho facino simili sacrilegii, che certo ne verria pietà alli assassini, ne so come dio sia per tollerarli che non ne faci una manifesta dimostratione di vendetta. Ma tornando al primo proposito, dico che anchora che il papa havesse come determinato di più presto morire che di venire a patto alcuno con loro ne con don Ugo, che S. S^{ta} non volea neanche partissee da le stantie sue da palazo, se non erano li card^{li}, li quali lo persuasero pregando et astringendo a redurse in castello, che fù bona electione, che altramente li seria stato posto le mani adosso et senza dubbio lo haveriano condotto seco, cosa inaudita et spaventevole a chi tene punto di bontà et di religione; non di meno vedendo S. S^{ta} che niuno di questi di Roma, per gratia loro, si sono mossi in fare pur una minima dimostratione in favore di lei et temendo che stando ella in questo assedio, che le terre de la Chiesa, maxime quelle che hanno le parti et che sono factiose, non facessero tumulto, et che li exerciti di Lombardia udiva una nova tale non si mettessero in ruina, maxime che seria stato di necessità tirare subito una parte de le genti in qua per soccorso, li è parso manco male di pigliare lo expediente di questa tregua che fare peggio, tanto più che la dice che per questo li exerciti di Lombardia non se disciolveranno, havendo S. S^{ta} dichiarato a don Ugo chel s^r Giovanni è homo del re de Franza, per il che verrà a stare in campo con le genti chel si ritrova. Vero è che non so che compagnia di fanti li restarà, che io non lho dimandato, ne S. S^{ta} me lo ha ditto, ma seranno solo revocate le genti del S^r et quelle del conte Guido con la persona sua, per modo che per questa diminutione di genti non si pensa che lo exercito non sia per poter fare quanto occorra così comodamente come prima, maxime che si intende che de li homeni d' arme vi ne sono di

soverchio una parte, così referisse Giuliano Leno, quale è venuto novamente di campo, benchè sono qualche dì che partite di là. Il papa me ha ditto che questa tregua non li seria spiaciuta quando fusse stata fatta di sua volontà come havea in animo per le cose del Turco, per remedio de le quali afferma che personalmente volea andare in Franza et in Spagna, si come me havea ditto il datario,¹ et per ogni modo operare che la pace seguesse, ma essendo mo seguito questo disordine et venuto alla tregua per necessità et non per volontà, lo animo se li è raffreddito, per forma che più non pensará di exeguire questo proposito suo tanto santo, ma voltará il pensiero ad altre cose. . . . Roma XXIII sep^{is} 1526.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

38. NICOLAS RAINCE TO ANNE DE MONTMORENCY.²

1526, November 26, Rom.

. . . Monseigneur [le grant maistre], vous verrez au demourant par les dites lettres de monseigneur le conte [de Carpy] au Roy des autres nouvelles de par deça et l'estat ouquel se retrouve nostre dict Saint Père, qui est bien le plus ennuyé et en la plus grosse peur qu'il fut oncques, et tant estonné, et pareillement ses bons ministres, ne voyant mesmement venir du costé de delà ce que tousjours sa Sainteté et eulx ont esperé, et veoir de tous costez tant de perilz et dangers. A quoy sa dicte Sainteté n'a moyen d'obvyer, qu'il ne sçait ne eulx aussi que dire ne penser, sinon de tout habandonner et s'enfuyr, et encores hyer et aujourd'hui le m'a dict sa Sainteté deux ou troys foyes, et le pys est qu'il dict ne sçavoir bonnement ymaginer là où il se puisse sauver. Sans point de faulte, monseigneur, si bientost, bientost il ne luy vient quelque ayde du Roy, et mesmement de quelque bonne somme d'argent, je ne voy aucun ordre qu'il puisse resister ne s'afermer icy en Rome, et est bien à doubter que à bien grant peine la provision puisse venir à temps. Il ne laisse de faire plus que le possible en tous cas, et a envoyé ce soir le seigneur Laurens Cibo à Boulongne en dilligence pour faire gens, et desjà s'en faict à Florence et autres lieux, et tousjours continue en son bon et ferme propoz envers le Roy, qui est sa seule esperance. Encores

¹ Giberti.

² See *supra*, p. 345

m'a dict ce jourdhuy le magnifique Salviati que sa dicte Saincteté est pour plus tost habandonner tout et fuyr, que de faire chose qui soit contre le voulloir et intention du Roy ny à son prejudice. . . .

De Rome, ce lundi XXVI jour de novembre MV^cXXVI.

[National Library, Paris, Ms. Franç. 2984, f. 109.]

39. LANDRIANO TO M. SFORZA, DUKE OF MILAN.¹

1526, November 28, Rom.

. . . Hogi d. Diego ha donato aviso che a Gaeta sono smontate salve le 5 nave Cesaree, che si diviserò da le altre nel giongere in Corsica et che sono smontati el fratello del marchese con 1500 lanzchinechi e 300 Spagnoli. El Guizardino poi avisa che nel andare a Ferrara el duca li havea mandato incontro chel non andasse perchè l' havea firmato con lo Imperatore et così se ne ritornava a Modena. [The remainder in cipher:] Questa cosa ha talmente smarito Sua S^{ta} che è restato morto benchè li oratori de Franza, Anglia, Venetiani et altri facciano quanto pono per sublevarlo, nondimanco a mè pare non potersi più levare, sta perduto in tutto et, se non vien qualche gran caso de li lanzchinechi, io tengo certissimo o papa fara uno accordo como potrà o una nocte se ne partirà su le galere, parmi vederlo como uno malato disperato da li medici che non vol più consiglio ne adiuto. Non poteva venire cosa che più lo alterasse. Ha fatto scrivere a Venetiani che faccino passare le sue gente dreto a costoro. Credo non lo farano et così tutta la strada Romea sarà de Todeschi. Il papa non vol rompere la tregua et loro la romperano a luy. De Franza non cè nulla et questo dispera ognuno; concludo che siamo qui in un grandissimo bisbiglio et quasi disperati se Dio non ce adiuta.

[Orig. State Archives, Milan.]

40. GALEOTTO DE' MEDICI TO FLORENCE.²

1526, November 30, Rom.

. . . Li cardinali che hieri et hoggi hanno fatto congregatione quel fussi da fare in questi travagli proponivano tre modi: difendersi, partirsi o accordare. Hanno havuto infra di loro

¹ See *supra*, p. 345.

² See *supra*, p. 346.

varie opinioni, al difendersi non havere la possibilità, al partirsi vergogna et pericolo; finalmente risolverono che l'accordo sia il meglor partito si possa pigliare. . . .

[Orig. State Archives, Florence.]

41. LANDRIANO TO M. SFORZA, DUKE OF MILAN.¹

1526, December 2, Rom.

. . . Di Franza non sono advisi, dinari, gente ni soccorso se non chel re balla ogni di et ad altro non attende et nui siamo più morti che vivi. Quà si fano gente a furia a Bologna et Modena anche, ma dubito faremo romore assai et pochi fatti perchè sento che si ha animo d' accordarsi non per voluntà ma per extrema necessità. Scio chel papa trema di tal accordo, perchè mai si fidarà et non starà mai col animo riposato.

[Orig. State Archives, Milan.]

42. LANDRIANO TO M. SFORZA, DUKE OF MILAN.²

1526, December 12, Rom.

This morning a letter from the Emperor, in reply to the Brief, was read in Consistory: Che S. S^{ta} scripse ad S. M^{ta} nanti la guerra, nel qual aduceva le cause perchè S. S^{ta} si movea ad dicta guerra che erano la liberatione de Italia et deli figlioli del re. S. M^{ta} si sforza confutar tutte dicte cause et carichar S. S^{ta}.

Ad parte poy cè una lettera del Imperatore al papa et collegio qual non è lecta. Dice che S. S^{ta} voglia indicare un concilio et non lo facendo luy lo indicano li cardinali, altramente como Imperatore lo congregarà luy. Se extima che ciò facia per tirar uno accordo vergognosa. Credo sia tutto mal animo. Questa è una mala materia.

[Orig. State Archives, Milan.]

43. CONSISTORY OF THE 19th OF DECEMBER, 1526.³

Romae die mercurii 19 [Decembris] 1526. Rev^{mus} d. card^{us} de Cesis legit litteras serenissimi Caroli in imperatorem electi ad S.

¹ See *supra*, p. 345. This report is in cipher.

² See *supra*, p. 357. This report also in cipher.

³ See *supra*, pp. 357, 358.

D. N. scriptas sub dat. Granatae die . . .¹ Septembris 1526 et alias sacro collegio reverend^{morum} domin. cardinalium sub. dat. Granatae die 6 Octobris 1526, quibus continebantur . . .¹ in quarum lectione quattuor horae et plus consumptae sunt, excedebant enim folia 25 super diversis materiis.

[*Acta consist. vicecanc. in Consistorial Archives of the Vatican.]

44. FRANCESCO GONZAGA TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.²

1527, Januar. 10, Rom.

. . . Il papa non staria in tanto timore, se non fosseron questi Fiorentini, quali per dubio de Fiorenza et di Toschana stimolano tuttavia S. S^{ta} che si veda de ritrovare verso de acordo se è possibile, depingendo lo inferno se questi Spagnoli de Milano con Lanzchenechi vengono inanti verso Toschana, et son certo che essi pagariano tutta questa summa de cento 50^m du^{ti} per essere liberati da questo suspecto. Vi è appresso la moglie di Philipppo Strozza che con lacrime, sospiri et lamenti sta alle horecchie di S. S^{ta} procurando et instando la liberatione del marito, de modo che il povero pontifice è combattuto da ogni canto non altramente che una nave in mezzo il mare agitata da contrarii venti. . . .

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

45. BULL OF POPE CLEMENT VII. AGAINST THE COLONNA.³

1527, Februar. 20, Rom.

Sacrosanctae Romanae ecclesiae. Enumeration of all the transgressions of the Colonna, especially the raid of September, 1526. Statement of the judicial proceedings against these evil-doers (*supra*, p. 340 nn. 1, 2, 3) and of the sentence passed. It then goes on further, f. 61^b f: Nos igitur . . . motu proprio, non ad alicujus nobis super hoc oblatae petitionis instantiam . . . universis et singulis . . . injungimus atque mandamus, ut eosdem Ascanium, Vespasianum, Petrum Franciscum, Marcellum, Joannem Jeronimum, Julium Scipionem, Fabium et alios sic

¹ Hiatus in the original.

² See *supra*, p. 363; also Gregorovius, 3rd ed., VIII., 488.

³ See *supra*, pp. 335, 337, 340, 368.

declaratos, sententiatos, privatos et censuris illaqueatos ac inhabiles declaratos personaliter capiant et captos ad nos transmittant vel saltem de civitatibus . . . ejicient . . . nec cum eis commercium . . . habeant etc. Interdict on all places where the above named find refuge; further, sentence of the greater excommunication specially reserved to the Pope against all who act contrary to these commands, and in any way whatever give help to the above, together with deprivation of all benefices. Non obstantibus etc.

Dat. Romae 1526 [st. fl.] X cal. martii a° 4°.

Sec. Arch. of the Vatican, Regest. Vat. 1441 (Clem. VII.

Secret. A. I.-IV. lib. 5), f. 47-64.]

46. FRANCESCO GONZAGA TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.¹

1527, Mai 5, Rom.

. . . Il duca di Burbon mandò heri sera un trombetta al s^r Renzo come capo de Romani a dimandargli la terra, et, principiato che hebbe a parlare, non lo volse audire et lo licentiò, ma doppoi esso trombetta disse che dimandava passo et vittuaglia per andare nel regno. Erano passati alcuni fanti et in buon numero li Tevero apreso ponte molle in due nave, ma il s^r Horatio Baglioni che ha quella guardia se gli è affrontato et ni sono stati morti una gran frotta. Il papa sta di bonissimo animo et si spera bene. Vederàssi fra hoggi et dimane quello che n' haverà ad essere quanto sia per questo primo affronto. . . .

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

47. FRANCESCO GONZAGA TO FEDERIGO GONZAGA, MARQUIS OF MANTUA.²

1527, Mai 7, Rom.

. . . In questo exterminio et total ruina de Roma, essendo heri intrato per forza dentro lo exercito Ces^{co}, scrivo a V. Ex. facendole intendere che è una compassione extrema ad vedere questa calamità, essendo andato a sacho et tutta via continuando tutta questa terra, di modo che chi po essere in suo sentimento è più che homo, essendo una compassione la maggiore del mondo a vedere questo cossi crudel spectaculo, il qual commoveria pietà a

¹ See *supra*, p. 386. This report is in cipher.

² See *supra*, pp. 399, 412.

sassi. Il papa si ridusse heri mattina in castello, dove andò in grandissima frezza. . . .

Roma alli VII de mazo 1527.

[Orig. Gonzaga Archives, Mantua.]

48. MATTEO CASELLA TO THE DUKE ALFONSO OF FERRARA.¹

1527, Mai 7, Rom.

[Sig^{or}] mio etc. In questa horribile calamità scrivo a V. Ex^{tia}; quella saperà adoncha, si como [a Dio] è piaciuto, heri di poi mezo giorno entrorno in Roma per forza tuto lo exercito cesareo. In el primo congresso fu morto il signore duca de Borbone de una archebusata et il prefato exercito ha sachezato tuta heri sera et tuta nocte questa misera cità di Roma e tutavia dura il sacho. O miseranda et offana² cità, o che pietà, o che compassione. Io con la persona . . .³ salvate insino qui in santo Apostolo⁴ appresso la illustrissima Madama,⁵ alla quale è salvata la casa sua cum tuti quelli li sono drento insieme qui; penso che si salvara anchora per lo avenire per essere qui il D. Ferante suo fiolo et il conte Alexandro de Novalora et un capitano spagnolo chiamato il S^{re} Alfonso de Cordua et anchora li sono li lancechenecchi della guardia del quondam duca di Borbone. Io ho perso tuto quello aveva e cavalcature et robe et ogni altra cosa. Il papa è assediato in castello con la mazore parte di li cardinali. Mon-signore de santi quattro⁶ urtato da la furia è stato calpestrato da cavali et non sta ben . . .³ è in castello. Si dice se è mandati per il s^{re} Vicere. Li Colonesi anchora non [sono] comparsi. Il rev^{mo} s^{re} Hercule, nipote di V. Ex^{tia}, è facto cardinale et ha habiuto [in tem]po la b[e]reta. Tuto il mondo va a romore. Se salvo la vita mi contento, ma questa . . .³ ben pegio cha la staffeta. Madama Ill^{ma} non obstante le sopradicte provisione è tanta [in] paura che more di paura; et a V. Ex^{tia} mi aracomando e li racomando la mia povera famiglia e fioli.

In Roma a dì 7 de mazo 1527 a hore 15.

Avixo quella che me ne viro a casa cum la s^{ra} marchesana, quale se mitirà in viaggio como la via sia sicura.

¹ See *supra*, p. 412.

² Perhaps affannata.

³ Obliterated.

⁴ Palazzo Colonna.

⁵ Isabella Gonzaga.

⁶ Lor. Pucci.

Di V. Ill. S^{ria} humilissimo servitore Matheo Casella.

[A tergo:] Allo ill^{mo} s^{or} duca don Alfonso duca di Ferrara s^{re} mio singularissimo in Ferrara. Cito, cito, cito.

[Orig. State Archives, Modena. (This letter is half obliterated from damp).]

49. CARDINAL SALVIATI TO BALDASSARE CASTIGLIONE.¹

1527, Juni 8 [Paris].

. . . Mons^r di Borbona con lo exercito a gran giornate arrivò a Viterbo a III dove fece pocho danno et non vi soprastette se non una notte et si spinse alla volta di Roma, dove arrivò alli V, et la mattina delli VI comincio a dar la battaglia al Borgo di verso la casa del cardinale Alexandrino et di Araceli. Nel primo assalto furno ributtati gagliardamente et mortone molti. Stetterno adunque circa due hore et ritornorno con certi strumenti da buttare in terra el muro et, anchora che quelli di dentro facessino el debito gagliardamente, per forza entrarono. Nel entrare fù amazato mon^r di Borbona d' uno archibuso che li dette nella fronte. Volleno quelli di dentro far testa in su la piazza de san Pietro et ne borghi et feceno difesa assai, pure alla fine convenne si ritraheessino in disordine et fù preso el Borgo. El papa era stato fino a quell' hora in palazzo et si ritirò in castello con 9, o 10 cardinali et molti altri prelati, et il r^{mo} di santi IIII che per borgo a cavallo se ne andava in castello fù buttato da cavallo et calpestò et con fatica et mal trattato fù portato in castello, dove si è detto dipoi esser morto, ma non si sa. Li inimici subito andorno alla volta di Transtevere et al portone dal figlio del s^{or} Renzo furno ributtati, ma essendo dalla parte di sopra entrati alcuni di loro bisognò che anchora lui si ritraheessi et hebbe fatica a salvarsi et il Trastevere fù preso. A ponti erano li Romani, e quali havevono fatto X mila huomini et promesso gran cose, ma feceno pochissima resistentia, così vel circa la sera fù presa tutta Roma et messo tutto a fil di spada et a brodetto; el conte Guido, quando Roma fù presa, si trovava a ponte Salara con VIII cento archibusieri et V cento cavalli et inteso il caso si ritirò a Utricoli. La mortalità dicono essere stata grande et esservi morto più di III mila delli Caesarei, delli altri numero infinito. Le rapine

¹ See *supra*, pp. 391, 393, 396, 404, 411, 437.

infinitissime. Non vi si è salvata casa nessuna se non è quella di s^{to} Apostolo, dove stava la marchesana di Mantua, la quale pagava di taglia XL mila ducati, et la casa delli r^{mi} Valle, Siena et Caeserino, e quali si sono composti a più di XXX mila ducati per uno et pur si restano prigionieri. El r^{mo} di Araceli essendo prigioniero et non havendo modo a pagare la taglia dicono esser stato menato in sur uno asino per Roma et scopato. Così dicono esser morto qualche altro cardinale, ma di niente si sa el certo. In castello è N. S^{ce}, Farnese, Monte, Zanthoria, Campegio, Ragona, Trivultio, Orsino, Pisano et lo Ermellino. Como si partì di Roma la sera dinanzi et è a Civitavecchia. A Firenze era Cibo, Ridolphi et Cortona. Le impietà et ribalderie che hanno fatto non si potrebbero scrivere. Morto tutti li putti innocenti di s^{to} Spirito, buttato tutti li infermi in Tevere, profanato et violato tutte le monache, amazati tutti e frati. Bruciato la capella grande di san Pietro et di Sixto; bruciato il Volto santo. Rubato le teste delli apostoli et le altre reliquie et levatone l'argento buttatole nella strada et conculcate. Conculcato il Sacramento et buttato nel fango, et in somma fatto tutte le rubalderie che si può, tanto che mi raccapriccio a considerarle, vedendo che costoro benchè heretici pur christiani hanno fatto quello che mai si senti che in alcuno luogo facessino li Turchi. Vede adunque V. S. il povero papa per desiderare el bene et la pace et creder troppo dove ha condotto quella povera città, capo del mondo, la Chiesa et se; pur ci è qualche speranza che Sua S^{ta} con chi è in castello si salvi perchè lo exercito Franzese et de Venitiani andava tutto a quella volta e dovevano essere alli XXI al Isola. Ecci anchora lettere da Lione, che allegono lettere da Firenze de 29, che dicono essersi accostati al castello, che entravano et uscivano a lor posta, ma anchora non ce nè certeza. El s^{or} Renzo è col papa in castello et il s^r Horatio Baglioni. Doppo questi accidenti di Roma, Perugia per opera del duca d' Urbino è tornata alla devotione del s^{or} Malatesta et Horatio Baglioni. In Firenze anchora si è mutato lo stato et tornato come era inanzi che Medici vi entrassino, ma senza violentia o scandalo nessuno, et li Medici non son rebelli anzi possano starvi come cittadini et godere il loro pacificamento.

Io so che essendo lo Imperatore tanto catholico quanto dimostra harà grande dispiacere di questa nuova, perchè non ha

dimostro mai volere deprimere o suppeditare la Chiesa, anzi li sono sempre dispiaciuti molto questi Lutherani, et tanto più li dovera dispiacere intendendo Sua Santità essere stata ingannata per confidar troppo in sua M^{ta}, se ben chi lo ha causato ne ha portato le debite pene, ma il dolersene de sua M^{ta} non satisfarà alli danni et ruine nostre, le quali Dio voglia che finischino qui, perchè a me pare che adesso apunto ricomincia la guerra mandando questo re christ^{mo} mons^r di Lutrech con XXX mila fanti et V cento lance fra IIII giorni in Lombardia dove ne troverà altri X et buon numero di gente d' arme de s^{ti} Venitiani oltra li exerciti del duca d' Urbino e del marchese di Saluzo che sono verso Roma. Et a questa opera nuova che fa questa M^{ta} promette concorrer el ser^{mo} re d' Inghilterra alla paga di X mila fanti ogni mese. Vede adunque V. S. che questa non voglio dir vitorria di Roma, ma più presto uno assassinamento non ha giovato molto alli Caesarei, anzi commosso questi altri principi a far più che non volevano et d' ogni cosa la povera Italia ne porta le pene. . . .

[Secret Arch. of the Vatican, Nunziatura di Francia I, 2-5.]

50. GIOVANNI BATTISTA SANGA TO UBERTO DA GAMBARA.¹

1527, Juni 27.

Del Sanga di galera sopra Porto de 27 di giugno 1527.

Rev. et ill. s. mio oss^{mo}. Questa è la prima comodità che dopo le ruine nostre mi occorre di poter dar a V. S. aviso che io son vivo, perchè da quel dì in quà son stato sempre in lochi donde non ho havuta comodità alcuna dimandarle lettere, et perchè delle cose publiche V. S. n' harà inteso tanto che ne saprà quanto io, non rinoverò con la commemoration il dolor mio quale è in quel summo grado che esser puo et mi trovo l' animo assai più debile che non harrei creduto per poterlo sostenere, pure *levius fit patientia quidquid corrigere est nefas*. Mons. mio, che Gothi, che Vandali, che Turchi furono mai simili alle colluvie di questo esercito col quale si fa la grandezza del Imperatore. *Horresco referens* il stratio et la delusion che si è fatta di tutte le cose sacre ne mi basteria una risma di carta a raccorne pur qualche esempio l' haver buttato il sacramento per terra per rubbar li calici o le reliquie de santi per spogliarli di quello argento che haveano atorno. *Ludus est a*

¹ See *supra*, pp. 400, 404, 405, 408, 412.

rispetto delle cose più gravi. Non è stata chiesa, non monestero alcuno sicuro, le monache delle più religiose et di buona vita che fussero in Roma si son vendute per Roma ad un giulio l' una a chi se ne ha voluto satiar le voglie sue, li stridi et li ululati delle povere madri, alli quali son stati morti in seno li figlioli che lattavano o rapiti per farli recattare, et il lamenti delle povere persone tormentate crudeliss^{te} son stati tanti ut isthinc exauditos putem. Arseno infinite case, tutte le chiese diventate stalle, l' imagine del crucifisso del Populo et molte altre delle più devote di Roma son state bersaglii di archibusi; vestirono anche quel crucifisso che è ad uno delli 7 altari di S. Pietro alla lanzch. per delusion, ma io entro pur dove non vorrei et con effetto perdonimi Dio et di santi che di quello si è fatto in loro disprezzo. Ho ben horror grande, ma non compassion equale a quella che ho de' poveri homeni tormentati, perchè se Dio non vendica l' offese sue, anchor io non me ne dolero et se le testa di S. Pietro, S. Paolo, S. Andrea, S. Giov. Battista et di tanti altri santi buttate per terra, se li corpi di S. Piero et S. Paolo, che erano sotto l' altar grande di S. Pietro, li quali erano senza esser visti in tanta veneration, sparsi per terra con distratio, quale non haveriano havuto ardire di farne quelli stessi che li martirizorono, non moveno quei santi di chi son quelle reliquie a pregar Dio per la vendetta, ne anche io voglio chiamarla quanto alli destratii della Chiesa, ma si bene quanto al male fatto alla povera patria mia, a tanti amici et a me stesso, et se l' Imperatore comporta valersi di tali instrumenti alla grandezza sua et Dio seguiti d' aiutarla, non voglio dire di renegar le fede nec inquirere in iudicia Dei quae sunt abyssus multa, ma si bene creder che S. M^{ta} divina voglia ben noi christiani, ma creda farci tanto migliori quanto manco principi religiosi ci da, ma hor che ho dato questo poco sfogamento al dolor dal quale comincia ogni parlare et ogni lettera mia per haverne l' animo tanto pieno che tutti li sensi ne sono occupati, diro a V. S. di me, della salute. . . . He took refuge in the palace of the Marchioness Isabella; remained there eight days, and with her he left Rome and wandered round about.

Giberti comporta questa fortuna con quella grandezza d' animo che V. S. ha conosciuto nelle altre cose. He [Sanga] wants to find another home: poiche a Roma dispero di poter star mai; che quando ben mi fusse permesso non mi sufferiria mai il cor di

veder cadaver miserabile eius urbis, la quale ho visto già in gloria et m'era cara più che me stesso. He asks for help as he has lost everything: ne chiedo beneficii o cosa eccles^a perche son resolutissimo viver più presto povero nel secolo che ricco nella chiesa, nella quale come V. S. disse già m'aveva fatto fuggire la povertà et hora me ne levo più volentieri vendendola manifestamente ruinare.

[Ricci Archives, Rome.]

51. POPE CLEMENT VII. TO THE LEADERS OF THE
IMPERIAL TROOPS.¹

1527, Juli. 23, Rom.


Capitaneis exercitus Caes. M^{ti}s. Molestum nobis fuit accepisse, nostram civitatem Narniae nostris commissariis in vobis intra civitatem recipiendis et charitative tractandis non paruisse; verum cum poenam propterea persolverint, vos tudiose hortamur et rogamus, cum illis miseris, qui superstites sunt, clementius agere eisque civitatem relinquere velitis. Quod vestra erit dignum virtute et ser^{mi} Caesaris bonitati consentaneum, nobis vero, qui illum populum vestrae clementiae commendamus, summe gratum.

Dat Romae etc. 23 julii 1527, a. 4°.

Blosius.

[Secret Arch. of the Vatican, Arm. 39, vol. 47, n. 197.]

¹ See *supra*, p. 432.



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